ELLIS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/26/12. (gpr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHELLE ELLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-163J
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND
NOW,
this
~~~ay
of
September,
2012,
upon
due
consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the
Commissioner
of
Social
Security
( "Commissioner" )
denying
plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental
securi ty
income
under
Ti tIes
II
and
XVI,
respectively, of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED
that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
14) bel and the same hereby iS
I
granted and plaintiffls motion for
summary judgment (Document No. 11) be, and the same hereby is,
denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may reject or discount any evidence if
reasons for doing so.
'A072
(Rev. 8/82)
Cir. 1999) .
the ALJ explains the
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
substantial
findings,
evidence,
even if
differently.
2001).
a
it
reviewing
would have
Fargnoli v.
court
is
bound
decided
the
factual
Massanari,
247 F.3d 34,
by
38
those
inquiry
(3d Cir.
These well-established principles preclude a reversal or
remand of the ALJ I S decision here because the record contains
substantial
evidence
to
support
the
ALJ 's
findings
and
conclusions.
Plaintiff protectively filed her pending applications 1 for
benefits on March 9,
November
9,
2005,
2007, alleging a disability onset date of
due
to
migraines,
depression and
anxiety.
Plaintiff's applications were denied initially.
At plaintiff's
request an ALJ held a video hearing on June 23,
2009, at which
plaintiff,
represented by counsel,
appeared and testified.
On
August 19, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff
is not disabled.
review making
On May 20,
the
ALJ's
2011,
decision
the Appeals Council denied
the
final
decision
of
the
Commissioner.
Plaintiff was 42 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision
and is classified as a younger person under the regulations.
C.F.R.
§404.1563(c)
and
416.963(c).
She
has
a
high
20
school
education and has past relevant work experience as an elementary
school aide and a pharmacy tech, but she has not engaged in any
substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.
1
For purposes of plaintiff's Title II application, the ALJ found
that plaintiff met the disability insured status requirements of the Act
on her alleged onset date and has acquired sufficient quarters of
coverage to remain insured only through December 31, 2010.
~A072
(Rev. 8182)
- 2
After
testimony
reviewing
from
plaintiff's
plaintiff
and
medical
a
records
vocational
and
expert,
hearing
the
ALJ
concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
Act.
The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes
that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of migraines,
an adjustment disorder and bipolar disorder,
those impairments,
alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any
of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404,
Subpart P.
The ALJ
also
found
that
plaintiff
retains
the
residual
functional capacity to engage in work at the medium exertional
level except she is limited to simple,
routine tasks,
avoid
a
exposure
supervisors
and
to
the
peers
public
of
10%,
unscheduled absences per year.
with
and
she
(R.
17).
she must
maximum
exposure
must
permitted
be
to
5
Taking into account
these limiting effects, a vocational expert identified numerous
categories of jobs which plaintiff can perform based upon her agel
education,
work
including racker,
vocational
experience
and
residual
functional
folder and labeler /marker.
expert's
testimony,
the
ALJ
found
capacity,
Relying on the
that,
although
plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, she is capable
of making an adjustment to numerous jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded
that plaintiff is not disabled under the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
'A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 3
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period
of
at
least
twelve
1382c(a) (3) (A).
months.
42
U.S.C.
§§423(d) (1) (A)
and
The impairment or impairments must be so severe
that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national
economy
II
42
§§423 (d) (2) (A)
U.S.C.
and
§1382c (a) (3) (B) .
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a
claimant
416.920.
is under a
disability. 2
20
C.P.R.
§404.1520 and
If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any
step, the claim need not be reviewed further.
Id.; see Barnhart
v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003).
Here,
plaintiff
determination
that
raises
three
plaintiff
is
challenges
not
to
disabled:
the
(1)
ALJ's
the
ALJ
improperly evaluated the medical evidence by erroneously rejecting
the
opinions
of
her
treating
physician and
the
consultative
2 The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a
severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the
criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1i (4) if
not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her
past-relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any
other work which exists in the national economy, in light of her age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C. F. R.
§§404.1520 and 416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social security, 347
F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). In addition, when there is evidence of
a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the
Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments
set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520a and 416.920a.
Oit.A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 4
examiner;
(2)
the ALJ misrepresented plaintiff' s activities of
daily living in evaluating plaintiff's credibility; and,
(3) the
ALJ's residual functional capacity finding and hypothetical to the
vocational expert failed to account for all of plaintiff's workrelated limitations.
Upon review, the court is satisfied that the
ALJ properly evaluated the evidence and that all of the ALJ's
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's
first
argument
evaluated the medical evidence.
is
that
the
ALJ
improperly
Specifically, plaintiff contends
that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of her treating
physician, Dr. Holsinger, who opined in a medical assessment dated
February 7, 2008, that plaintiff is "limited" in her ability to
do almost all work-related mental activities, (R. 205-06), and the
consultative examiner, Dr. Kennedy, who opined in a medical source
statement
dated
June
29,
2007,
that
plaintiff
had
"marked"
limitations in her ability to do a number of work-related mental
activities and "extreme" limitations in several others.
185).
(R. 184
The court finds no error in the ALJ's evaluation of this
evidence.
Under the Social Security Regulations and the law of this
circuit,
opinions
substantial,
of
treating
physicians
are
entitled
20 C.F.R.
and at times even controlling, weight.
§§404.1527(d) (2)
and 416.927(d) (2) i
Fargnoli,
to
247 F.3d at 33.
Where a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity
of
an
impairment
clinical
and
is
well
laboratory
supported
diagnostic
'4llIA072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 5
by
medically
techniques
acceptable
and
is
not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record
will be given controlling weight.
opinion
is
not
entitled
to
Id.
l
it
When a treating source/s
controlling weight
I
it
is
to be
evaluated and weighed under the same standards applied to all
other medical opinions
including
the
specialization.
Here
I
the
taking into account numerous factors
I
opinion/s
consistency
supportabilitYI
I
and
20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) (2).
ALJ
adhered
to
evaluating the medical evidence.
the
foregoing
standards
in
The ALJ expressly addressed the
reports from both Dr. Holsinger and Dr. Kennedy in his decision
and
adequately explained why he
weight.
(R. 17).
II
gave
those
opinions
"little
The ALJ noted that Dr. Kennedy/s opinion is
inconsistent with his own additional findings set forth in his
medical
source
including,
statement
significantly
I
as
detailed
his
finding
in
the
ALJ's
decision,
that plaintiff
problems with her ability to hold employment"
has
(R. 181).
"no
The ALJ
also determined that the opinions of both Dr. Holsinger and Dr.
Kennedy were
inconsistent with other evidence
in the
including plaintiff's activities of daily living.
record,
(R.
17).
FinallYI the ALJ noted that the assessments of Dr. Holsinger and
Dr. Kennedy were at odds with those of the state agency reviewer,
Dr. Glover, who found that plaintiff has no more than moderate
limitations in any area of functioning.
(R. 196i 199-200).
Thus
I
because the limitations advanced by Dr. Holsinger and Dr. Kennedy
were inconsistent with the totality of the evidence, the ALJ gave
them little weight.
(R.
19).
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 6
The record supports the ALJ's evaluation of the foregoing
medical evidence.
The ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's severe
impairments do not result in completely debilitating limitations
also is supported by other evidence in the record as discussed by
the ALJ.
report
(R.
that
15-17).
Significantly,
plaintiff
has
never
Dr.
been
Kennedy noted in his
hospitalized
for
the
treatment of any mental disorder and at the time of his evaluation
she was
not
medication
receiving
summary
" individual
from
Cambria
Retardation dated June 24,
Functioning
("GAF")
3
2001,
score of 60,
treatment."
County
Mental
(R.
180).
A
Health/Mental
noted a Global Assessment of
which is indicative of only
moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational
or school functioning.
(R
212).
That same report shows that
plaintiff was scheduled for 6 appointments between November 1,
2008, and June 8, 2009, but only kept 4 of those.
Dr.
Holsinger's
progress
notes
indicate
that,
although
plaintiff was struggling dealing with her daughter's leukemia, she
was "doing fairly well," and "improving somewhat." (R. 207).
Dr.
Holsinger's notes also demonstrate that plaintiff was reluctant
to go to counseling.
(R. 209).
In light of all of the evidence,
3
The GAF score considers psychological, social and occupational
functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. See American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV) (4 th ed. 1994). Although the use of the GAF scale is
not endorsed by the Social Security Administration because its scores
do not have any direct correlation to the disability requirements and
standards of the Act, See 65 Fed.Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (2000), as with
any other clinical findings contained in narrative reports of medical
sources, the ALJ nevertheless is to consider and weigh those findings
under the standards set forth in the regulations for evaluating medical
opinion evidence.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).
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