SMITH v. ASTRUE

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 11 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 14 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 4/25/12. (kw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL T. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.
Civil Action No. 11-164J
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW, this
of the parties'

~~ of April,

2012, upon due considera ion

cross-motions for summary judgment pursuan

to

plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissi ner
of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his applications for
disability insurance benefits
income

("SS!" )

under Titles

("DIB")

and supplemental secu ity

II and XVI,

respectively,

of I the

Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's
motion for summary judgment
hereby is,

(Document No.

14)

be,

and the same

granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgbent

(Document No. 11) be, and the same hereby is, denied.

I

I

As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") hjs an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may reject

or discount

if

the ALJ explains

the

Plummer v. Apfel,

186 F.3d 422, 429

(3d

Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supporte

by

reasons for doing so.
Cir.
'Il>.A072

(Rev. 8182)

1999) .

substantial

evidence,

any evidence

a

reviewing

court

is

bound

by

ose

findings,

even

differently.
2001).

if

it

would have

Fargnoli v.

Moreover,

decided

Massanari,

disability

is

not

the

factual

247 F.3d 34,

38

in<tiry
(3d Cir.

determined merely

by. the

presence of impairments, but by the effect that those impairments
have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gaibfUI
activity.

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).

These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remaJd of
the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substant
evidence to support his findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed his DIB and SSI applications on May 27, 2009,
alleging

disability

as

of

December

31,

2008,

due

to

spinal

stenosis, neck and shoulder pain, left arm and hand numbness and
difficulty with concentration.
denied.

Plaintiff's

applications

At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a video hearin

I

ere
on

June 8, 2010, at which plaintiff appeared represented by counsel.
On July 27, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plain iff
is not disabled.

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's req est

for review on May 27, 2011, making the ALJ's decision the f'nal
decision of the Commissioner.

The instant action followed.

Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 45 years old
on his alleged onset date of disability and is classified
younger

individual

§§404 .1563 (c),

under

416.963 (c) .

the

regulations.

Plaintiff

experience as an auto body repairman,

has

past

20

relevant

construction worker

laborer, but he has not engaged in substantial gainful
any time since his alleged onset date of disability.
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(Rev. 8/82)

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C . . R.

at

After

reviewing plaintiff's

medical

records

and hearing

testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the

hear~ng,

the ALJ concluded that he is not disabled within the meanin
the Act.

of

Although the medical evidence established that plain iff

suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative disc dis ase
of

the

cervical

spine

and

attention

deficit

hyperacti ity

disorder, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not

eet

or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set f rth
in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appe dix
111) •

nal

The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual
capacity

to perform

limitations.

light

work with a

number

nal

of

Plaintiff is limited to occasional overhead lift'ng,

overhead reaching and postural activities, and he is limited
more than frequent fingering and handling with his left hand.

In

addition,

to

plaintiff is precluded from concentrated exposur

hazards, and he is limited to performing simple, unskilled

~ork

(collectively, the "RFC Finding").
As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined lhat
plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ

However,
concl~ded

that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience: and
residual functional capacity enable him to perform other work lhat
I

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such a!s an
information clerk, hand packer or silver wrapper.

AccordinklY,

the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
'laAO 72

(Rev. 8/82)

- 3 ­

the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to

in

substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical

tal

impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous peri
at least twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A), 1382c (a) (3)

The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the

ant

"is

ot,

not

only

unable

to

do

his

previous

work

but

considering his age, education and work experience, engage
other

kind

of

substantial

national economy .... "

gainful

work

which

exists

any
in. the

1382c (a) (3) I(B) .

42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A),

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorpoJ:'ate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whe her
a claimant is disabled.

The ALJ must determine:

(1) whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activi tYi (2)
if not, whether he has a severe impairmenti (3) if so, whether his
impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix Ii

(4)

if

rom

not,

whether

the

claimant's

impairment

performing his past relevant work;

and

prevents

(5)

if so,

him

whether the

claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,

in light of his age,

residual

functional

416.920(a) (4).

education,

capacity.

20

work experience and
I

C.F.R.

§§404 .1520 (a) !(4) ,

If the claimant is found disabled or not

at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary.
In this case,

disa~led

Id.

plaintiff challenges the ALJ's

finding

at

steps 3 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process.

At ste

3,

that

his

plaintiff

argues

that

the

ALJ

erred

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(Rev, 8182)

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4

­

by

concluding

impairments do not meet or equal any listing in Appendix 1.
a
Further, plaintiff claims the ALJ' s step 5 finding that he re i ins
the residual functional capacity to perform work that exist

in

the national economy is not supported by substantial eviden e.
For reasons explained below, these arguments are without me~it.
Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ's findings at step
the

sequential

evaluation process.

At

step

3,

the ALJ

determine whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal
the

listed

impairments.

Security Administration,

Burnett

v.

Commissioner

220 F.3d 112, 119

B of

0

of

ial

(3d Cir. 2000).

The

listings describe impairments that prevent an adult, regardless of
!

age,

education or work experience,

activity.

from performing any gaipful

20 C.F.R. §§404.1525(a), 416.925(a)

204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000).

i

~Kn~e~~~~~e~l,

"If the impairment is

ent

to a listed impairment, then [the claimant] is per se disable
no further analysis is necessary."
It

is

the ALJ's

burden

to

and

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119:
identify

the

relevant

I

listed

impairment in the regulations that compares with the claima tis
impairment.

Id. at 120 n.2.

However, it is the claimant's bu den

to present medical findings that show his impairment matches
equivalent to a listed impairment.
1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992).

0

is

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d

In determining whether the claimaft's

impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the ALJ mustiset
forth the reasons for his decision.

Burnett, 220 F.2d at 11

Here, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to find

hat

he meets or equals listings under sections 1.00 (musculoskeltal
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5 ­

system

disorders)

and

12.00

(mental

disorders).

Although

plaintiff broadly claims that he meets one or more listings upder
these sections,
allegedly

meets,

I

he does not identify any specific
nor

does

he

cite

any

medical

listing he
evidence

demonstrate that he satisfies all the requirements of a

to

partic~lar

listing.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, a review

ord

establishes that the ALJ employed the appropriate analysi
arriving at his step 3 finding.
evidence

of

record

and

found

in

The ALJ analyzed
that

plaintiff

suffers

rom

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and atten ion
deficit hyperactivity disorder,
However,

which are severe

impairmen~s.

the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments,

even

when considered in combination,l do not meet or equal any listed
impairment.

The ALJ stated that he considered listings

1.041 and

12.03, but he found that plaintiff's conditions do not satisfy all
the criteria of either of those listings.

(R. 115).

The ALJ then

explained why plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal t ose
listings.

(R. 115-116).

The ALJ satisfied his burdenj however, plaintiff faile

to

sustain his burden of showing that his impairments meet or e ual
a listing.

Other than making a broad, unsubstantiated asser ion

lplaintiff is incorrect that the ALJ failed to consider his impai ents
in combination in determining that he is not disabled. As part of the . J's
step 3 finding, he explained that even when considered in combinatiion,
plaintiff's severe impairments do not meet or equal any listing.
(R. 115).
Further, the ALJ considered plaintiff's severe impairments in combination in
assessing his residual functional capacity, and subsequently finding him not
disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
(R. 117-120) . .
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that he meets or equals listings under sections 1.00 and 12!. 00,
!

plaintiff

failed

to

demonstrate

supports his argument.

that

Furthermore,

the
the

evidence

of

rebord

court notes that no

medical source of record found that plaintiff's impairments keet
or equal a listing. 2

For these reasons, the court finds that the

ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence.
The court likewise finds that the ALJ's step 5 findin
supported by substantial evidence.

is

At step 5, the Commissio er

must show there are other jobs that exist in significant nu

ers

in the national economy which the claimant can perform consis ent
with

his

age,

education,

past

work

experience

and

resiJual

functional capacity.3 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(g) (1), 416.920(g)
Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5

(~)

becaus~

he

I
2 Plaintiff also asserts in connection with his step 3 argument tha~ the
ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh the opinions of his treating
physicians. To the contrary, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Adnan
la,
plaintiff's neurosurgeon, and stated that he gave Dr. Abla's op
significant weight. (R. 118). Although Dr. Abla advised that plaintiff s
not return to his past work (which involved working as a laborer, constru
worker and auto body repairman), (R. 493), Dr. Abla did not find that plai
was precluded from performing less strenuous work, and even advised th
should "remain active and keep going with his life./I
(R. 494).
The ALJ likewise properly considered and evaluated the opinion 0
Keith Eicher, who stated on an employability assessment form for
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare that plaintiff was tempor rily
disabled for less than twelve months.
(R. 595).
Whether plaintiff was
considered to be disabled for purposes of receiving state welfare benefi s is
irrelevant because another agency's determination regarding disability i not
binding on the Commissioner of Social Security.
20 C.F.R. §§404. 504,
416.904.
In addition, as the ALJ correctly observed, Dr. Eicher did not
provide any explanation on the state welfare form to support his opini p of
temporary disability, and his opinion was inconsistent with other rE\cord
evidence concerning plaintiff's functional capabilities.
For these reasons,
the ALJ properly gave Dr. Eicher's opinion little weight. (R. 119).

3 Res idual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual Jtill
is able to do despite the limitations caused by his impairments.
20 C.IF.R.
§§404.1545(a) (1), 416.945(a) (1); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40.
In assessing a
claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider! his
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of wdrk.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (4), 416.945(a) (4).
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{Rev. 8/82)

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improperly

evaluated

and

rejected

plaintiff's

SUbjeC~iVe
resi~ual

and thus incorrectly assessed his

complaints of pain,
functional capacity.

The court finds that these arguments aack

merit.

I

First, a claimant's complaints and other subjective symPfoms
must

be

supported by objective medical

evidence.

20

C.f.R.

§§404.1529(c), 416.929(c)i Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,1362
(3d Cir.

1999).

An ALJ may reject the claimant's subjective
expl~ins

testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he
why he is rejecting the testimony.

Schaudeck v. Commissione

Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).

of

Here, the ALJ

properly analyzed plaintiff's sUbjective complaints of pain, and
he explained why he

found plaintiff's

testimony not enti' ely

credible.
In evaluating plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ complied

ith

the appropriate regulations and considered all of the rele1ant
evidence

in

plaintiff's

the

record,

activities

of

including
daily

the

living,

medical
the

eVide1ce,

extent

of

his

treatment, plaintiff's own statements about his symptoms and 'the
opinions of physicians who treated and examined him.
C.F.R.

§§404.1529(c) (1) - (c) (3),

Security Ruling 96-7p.

§§416.929(c) (1) - (c) (3)

See 20
j

S09ial

The ALJ then considered the extentl to

which plaintiff's alleged functional limitations reasonably c4Uld
be accepted as consistent with the evidence of record and how
i

those

limitations

§§404.1529(c) (4),

affect

his

ability

416.929(c) (4).

ctl:oAOn
(Rev. 8/82)

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to

work.

20

C.F1.R.

The ALJ determined that the

objective evidence is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegatio
total

Accordingly,

disability.

the

ALJ

of
hat

determined

plaintiff's testimony regarding his limitations was not enti ely
credible.

(R.

explained the basis
decision,

This court finds that the ALJ adequa ely

118).

for his

credibility determination in his

(R. 117-19), and is satisfied that such determina ion

is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ's residual functional
capacity assessment failed to account for his alleged back, beck
and arm pain and problems with concentration.
the

ALJ's

comprehensive

RFC

Finding

To the

incorporated

I

contr~ry,

all! of

plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record
supported,

including accommodations

concentration problems.

for

any alleged pain! and

The ALJ accounted for plaintiff's b

neck and arm pain by limiting him to only occasional over
lifting,

overhead reaching and postural activities and no

than frequent fingering and handling with his left hand.

Furt

the ALJ limited plaintiff to performing simple, unskilled w
which would account for any concentration problems he experienc s.
For these reasons,

the court finds that the ALJ's RFC Fin

fully accommodated plaintiff's functional limitations that
supported by the evidence of record.
In conclusion, after carefully and methodically
all of the medical evidence of record,

conside~ing

the ALJ determined that

plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial
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The

evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.

Therefore, the deci ion

of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq.

630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard

Suite B

Altoona, PA 16602

Stephanie L. Haines
Assistant U.S. Attorney
319 Washington Street
Room 224, Penn Traffic Building
Johnstown, PA 15901

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