CLOSSIN v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION et al
Filing
35
ORDER granting 29 Motion to Set Expert Witness Fee. It is further Ordered that Dr. Christopher Lincoski shall be compensated by the Defendant at the rate of $1,500 for the first three hours of his deposition, or any part thereof, and at the rate of $400 per hour thereafter, and as more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 7/8/2014. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS J. CLOSSIN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-01
)
)
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY,
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
ORDER
I.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Order Fixing Expert
Witness Fee (ECF No. 29). Specifically, Defendant asks the Court to set a reasonable fee
for Defendant's deposition of Plaintiff's treating physician and expert, Dr. Christopher
Lincoski. Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E) provides, "Unless manifest injustice
would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery: (i) pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D)."
In determining whether a fee request is reasonable, courts consider a number of factors:
(1) the witness's area of expertise; (2) the education and training required
to provide the expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of
other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, and
complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually
charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) fees traditionally
charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to
assist the court in balancing the interest implicated by Rule 26.
Delgado v. Sweeney, No. 01-cv-3092, 2004 WL 228962, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2004) (quoting
Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 329, 333 (D. Del. 2003)). "[T]he burden of
proving
the
reasonableness
of an
expert's fees
lies
with the party seeking
reimbursement." Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New England Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586, 589
(D. Colo. 2009). Ultimately, the district court has discretion to set an expert fee that it
deems is reasonable. 1 Delgado, 2004 WL 228962, at *3; see also Edin v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 188 F.R.D. 543, 545 (D. Ariz. 1999).
III.
Plaintiff initiated this action pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. ยง51, et seq., alleging that he developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome during his
employment with Defendant. (See ECF No. 1). The parties are currently engaged in
discovery. According to Plaintiff's Rule 26(a) disclosures, Plaintiff intends to present the
expert testimony of Dr. Lincoski at trial regarding Plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome. Consequently, Defendant has attempted to schedule the deposition of Dr.
Lincoski. The deadline for depositions of Plaintiff's experts is August 30, 2014. (See ECF
No. 34
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