DOTY v. COLVIN

Filing 18

ORDER denying 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 1/2/2014. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD DOTY,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 13-80-J

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o

R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of January, 2014, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under Subchapter
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §401, et seq., finds that the
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and,
accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405 (g)

U.S. Department of Health

&

i

Jesurum v. Secretary of

Human Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.

1995) i Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.

denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993)
1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
944

(W.D.

Pa.

1990)

i

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,

See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942,
(if

supported by

substantial

evidence,

the

Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither
1

reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided
the claim differently)

(citing Cotter v. Harris

I

642 F. 2d 700

I

705

(3d Cir. 1981)).1

The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's argument that the Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") erred in determining his residual functional capacity ("RFC") and in
finding him to be not disabled. Specifically, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's
contention that the ALJ was required to accept the functional limitations set forth
in the non-examining state agency physician's opinion merely because there were no
other opinions as to his functional limitations in the record.
Plaintiff's argument that an ALJ can only rej ect a non-examining state agency
physician's opinion based on another opinion seems to be based on his incorrect
reading of Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986). That decision does not,
as Plaintiff suggests, hold that an ALJ' s RFC findings must be based on a particular
medical opinion or that an ALJ may only reject a medical opinion as to functional
limitations based on another opinion. Rather, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Doak, held simply that nothing in the record in that case, which consisted of
testimony and three medical reports, supported the ALJ's finding that the claimant
could perform light work. While the Circuit pointed out that none of the three reports
contained a suggestion from a physician that the claimant could perform light work,
in no way did it suggest that a finding of light work could only be supported if
one of the three had expressly opined that the claimant could perform such work,
nor did it find that their contrary opinions precluded such a finding per se. Indeed,
interpreting Doak in this manner would ignore the fact that II [t] he ALJ - - not treating
or examining physicians or State agency consultants - must make the ultimate
disability and RFC determinations. If Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F. 3d 356,
361 (3d Cir. 2011).
See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d} (2), 404.1546(c}; S.S.R.
96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 {S.S.A. 1996}. Such an interpretation would also ignore the
fact that \\ [t] here is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular
findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC." Titterington v.
Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006).
also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362
{holding that each fact incorporated into the RFC need not have been found by a
medical expert}. As the Circuit Court explained in Titterington, \\ [s] urveying the
medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of an ALJ's duties." 174 Fed. Appx. at
11. Consistent with this later case law, Doak does not prohibit the ALJ from making
an RFC assessment even if no doctor has specifically made the same findings and even
if the only medical opinion in the record is to the contrary.
See Hayes v. Astrue,
2007 WL 4456119, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2007). The Third Circuit did nothing more
than make a substantial evidence finding in light of a limited record and did not
purport to create a rule that an RFC determination must be based on a specific medical
opinion, and subsequent Third Circuit case law confirms this understanding. To the
extent other courts in the Circuit have interpreted Doak so as to conflict with
decisions such as Chandler and Titterington, i.e., Gunder v. Astrue, 2012 WL 511936
{M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2012}, this Court disagrees.
Plaintiff's emphasis on the opinion evidence is particularly misplaced given
that forms such as those submitted by the state adjudicator here, requiring him merely

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to "check a box or fill in a blank," rather than provide a substantive basis for
the conclusions stated, are considered "weak evidence at best" in determining whether
the claimant is disabled. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993).
The ALJ' s decision focused far more on the objective medical evidence, and substantial
evidence supports her well-reasoned rationale as to why these records demonstrate
that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of medium work. In finding that
Plaintiff could perform such work, the ALJ discussed at length Plaintiff's treatment
records and history, the internal inconsistencies of the state agency physician's
opinion, and the fact that later medical evidence unavailable to the state agency
physician contradicted his opinion.
The Court further notes that Doak, and the other cases on which Plaintiff
relies, such as Bi
2013 WL 3830503 (W.D. Pa. July 24,2013), Akers
v.
, 997 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa. 1998), and Serafini v. Astrue, Case No.
ected opinions from
CA07-253 (W.D. Pa. 2007), involved situations where the ALJ
treating physicians. It is, of course, axiomatic that a treating physician is
entitled to more deference under the law than is a state adjudicator. When assessing
a claimant's application for benefits, the opinion of the claimant's treating
physician generally is to be afforded significant weight.
Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001) i
186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999).
In fact, the regulations provide that a treating physician's opinion is to be given
"controlling weight" so long as the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c) (2) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d
at 43; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. As a result, the Commissioner may reject a treating
physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence,
and not on the basis of the Commissioner's own judgment or speculation, although
he may afford a treat
physician's opinion more or less weight depending upon the
extent to which supporting explanations are provided. See
, 186 F.3d at 429.
There is no such rule providing for controlling weight to be given by an ALJ to a
state agency adjudicator's opinion. To the contrary, "the opinions of a doctor who
has never examined a patient have less probative force as a general matter, than
they would have had if the doctor had treated or examined him," Morales v. Apfel,
225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the opinion
as to functional capacity was provided by a physician who did not treat or examine
Plaintiff, but who rendered an opinion in the role of state adjudicator after
reviewing the record.
Accordingly, cases involving the deference to be shown to a treating
physician's opinion as to functional limitations offer little insight in a case such
as this one. Since the opinion here was offered by a non-treating, non-examining
source, the state agency physician did the same thing in formulating his opinion
that the ALJ did - review the record. Indeed, while an RFC assessment offered by
a claimant's treating physician is based on his or her own medical findings, a state
adjudicator's RFC assessment is based on an analysis of the evidence in the record
as a whole. See S.S.R. 96-5p at *4. This case therefore does not present the issue
of an ALJ
ecting a physician's diagnosis or medical conclusion based on testing,
examination, or clinical observations. Instead, the ALJ's review of the record
evidence simply produced a different result than that of a state agency physician
acting, not as a medical provider, but as an adjudicator. In fact, as noted above,
unlike the state agency physician, the ALJ had access to the entire record when making
her determination. Even assuming Doak is to be interpreted as Plaintiff suggests,
it would not apply to a situation such as this, where the opinion at issue was issued

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 11) is DENIED and defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (document No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

by a non-exam~n~ng adjudicator based on an incomplete medical record rather than
by a treating physician. Such an interpretation would essentially give controlling
weight to a non-examining adjudicator's opinion any time there is no other opinion
as to functional limitations in the record, regardless of the nature of the other
medical evidence.
Regardless, as stated above, rej ection of even a treating physician s opinion
does not require reliance on another opinion. such an opinion can be rejected on
the basis of contradictory medical evidence, not just contrary opinions. If a
treating physician's opinion can be rejected based on contrary non-opinion medical
evidence, a non-examining state agency physician's opinion is certainly not
controlling merely because there is no other medical opinion in the record. The
evidence on which an ALJ can rely can and does take a variety of forms. Plaintiff
attempts to muddy this standard throughout his briefs by trying to equate the terms
medical evidence and medical opinion, implying that a lack of a contrary opinion
is the same as a lack of cont rary evidence. However, as the court explained above,
the ALJ clearly discussed the medical evidence contradicting the state adjudicator's
opinion that Plaintiff could perform only light work, including evidence unavailable
to the adjudicator, and substantial evidence supports her decision.
I

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