SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
22
ORDER denying 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 7/15/14. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES B. SMITH,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 13-209
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 16 and
19). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 17 and 20). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) and granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 19).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (ACommissioner@) denying his application for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed his application in October of
2010, alleging he had been disabled since January 2, 2009.
(ECF No. 14-6, p. 7).
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Lawrence J. Neary, held a hearing on December 15, 2011.
(ECF No. 14-2, pp. 32-59). On February 10, 2012, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Act. (ECF No. 14-2, pp. 14-26).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this court.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 16 and 19). The
1
issues are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally,
the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would
have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court
must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.
20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a).
The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
2
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. '404.1520.
The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical
evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606
F.2d at 406.
Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity
(step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Plaintiff’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)1
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding2 is not supported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 17, pp. 6-21). To support this assertion, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give
appropriate weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Cassone, M.D.
Id. After a review of the evidence, I disagree.
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
1
RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence,
including the medical records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations
and description of his/her own limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3).
Additionally, a person’s RFC is an administrative finding reserved for the ALJ, not a medical
opinion to be rendered by a doctor. 20 C.F.R. §' 404.1527, 416.927; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1546(c),
416.946(c).
2
Plaintiff’s RFC arguments are limited to his mental impairments. (ECF No. 10). As a result,
my analysis will be limited accordingly.
3
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a
non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more
weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds
that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give
that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Third Circuit has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where . .
. the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a treating
physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medical
evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 14,
2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577 F.3d 500,
505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in giving Dr. Cassone’s opinion little
weight because he was the treating doctor for almost two years and because there were
4
confirming opinions by consulting examiners, Drs. Clark and Mills. (ECF No. 17, pp. 6-18).
Thus, Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion evidence. Id. After
a review of the evidence, however, I disagree.
To begin with, the standard of review is not whether there is evidence to establish that
Plaintiff is disabled but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, simply because Dr. Cassone
was Plaintiff’s treating doctor and there may be opinions supporting Dr. Cassone’s opinions does
not mean that Plaintiff’s treating physician was entitled to great weight. As I stated previously,
“where . . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining
physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the treating physician’s
assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical evidence. Morales v. Apfel, 225
F.3d at 317.
Here, the ALJ thoroughly went through the opinions of Drs. Cassone, Clark, and Mills and
gave appropriate reasons for discounting their opinions.
(ECF No. 14-2, pp. 20-24).
For
example, with regard to Dr. Cassone’s opinion, the ALJ noted internal inconsistencies between
Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores3 and his actual treatment notes and
between his opinion that Plaintiff could not work and the lack of reasoning or evidence to support
said opinion. (ECF No. 14-2, pp. 22-23). He also noted inconsistencies with other evidence of
record. Id. Based on the same, I find there is substantial evidence of record to support the
ALJ’s weighing of the opinion of Dr. Cassone. Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
Similarly, with regard to Dr. Mills, the ALJ noted internal inconsistencies between
Plaintiff’s GAF scores and his assessment of moderate limitations. (ECF No. 14-2, p. 22).
3
A GAF score is used to report an individual's overall level of functioning with respect to
psychological, social, and occupational functioning. The GAF scale ranges from the lowest score
of 1 to 100, the highest score possible. The GAF score considers “psychological, social, and
occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (“DSM–IV TR”) 34 (4th ed. 2000).
5
Nonetheless, the ALJ gave Dr. Mills’ opinion partial weight to the extent it was consistent with
other medical evidence. Id. Based on a review of the record, I find there is substantial weight to
support the ALJ’s opinion. Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
With regard to Dr. Clark, the ALJ gave his opinions little weight because they were
internally inconsistent and inconsistent with other medical evidence.4 (ECF No. 14-2, pp. 21-24).
Based on a review of the record, I find there is substantial weight to support the ALJ’s opinion.
Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give any reason for rejecting the
aforementioned doctors’ opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to contcentrate, persist at tasks, and
maintain pace. (ECF No. 17, pp. 18-21). A review of the record reveals, however, that the ALJ
in this case thoroughly discussed the concentration, persistence and/or pace opinions and
properly weighed them. See, ECF No. 14-2, p. 21-24 (where ALJ goes through and discusses
concentration, persistence and/or pace opinions of various doctors). Consequently, I find no
merit to this argument.
C. Non-examining State Agency opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave greater weight to the opinions of the
non-examining state agency doctors than Plaintiff’s treating doctor. (ECF No. 17, pp. 21-25).
State agency opinions merit significant consideration. See SSR 96–6p (“Because State agency
medical and psychological consultants ... are experts in the Social Security disability programs, ...
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f) require [ALJs] ... to consider their findings of fact about
the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s)....”). Moreover, an ALJ is entitled to rely
upon the findings of an agency evaluator even if there is a lapse of time between the report and
4
Plaintiff also seems to suggest that the ALJ erred in failing to assign weight to the 2007
assessment by Dr. Clark. (ECF No. 17, p. 15). A review of the ALJ’s opinion reveals, however,
that he assigned Dr. Clark’s 2007 opinion “little weight.” (ECF No. 14-2, p. 21). Thus, Plaintiff’s
argument in this regard is misplaced.
6
the hearing. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012). After a review
of the record, I find there is substantial evidence of record to support the weight given to the
non-examining state agency opinions by the ALJ. See, ECF No. 14-2, pp. 21-24. Therefore, I
find the ALJ properly discharged his duties in evaluating and weighing all medical opinions.
Consequently, I find no error in this regard and remand is not warranted on this basis.
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred when he gave great weight to the
non-examining state agency opinions that Plaintiff has “moderate” limitations of concentration,
persistence and/or pace but failed to discuss said limitations in his opinion or include them in the
RFC. (ECF No. 17, pp. 25-30). I disagree. As I stated previously, a review of the record
reveals that the ALJ in this case thoroughly discussed the concentration, persistence and/or pace
opinions and properly weighed them. See, ECF No. 14-2, p. 21-24 (where ALJ goes through and
discusses concentration, persistence and/or pace opinions of various doctors). Consequently, I
find no merit to the argument that the ALJ failed to discuss said limiations.
With regard to the ALJ’s failure to include said limitation in the RFC, Plaintiff submits that
restricting Plaintiff to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks; only occasional interaction with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers, and only occasional changes in the work setting” do not encompass
Plaintiff’s moderate limitation of concentration, persistence and/or pace.
(ECF No. 17, pp.
25-31). In the same vein, then, Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical presented by the ALJ to the
vocational expert failed to reflect all of Plaintiff's limitations in concentration, persistence, and
pace.
(ECF No. 17, p. 29). I disagree.
The ALJ in this case found Plaintiff’s RFC to be limited to light work with multiple
exceptions, including “limited to only simple, routine, repetitive tasks; can only have occasional
interaction with the public, supervisors and co-workers; and can only have occasional changes in
the work setting.”
(ECF No. 14-2, p. 20).
Such restrictions have repeatedly been found
sufficient to accommodate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. See, e.g.,
7
McDonald v. Astrue, 293 F. App’x 941, 947-48 (3d Cir. 2008); Menkes v. Astrue, 262 F. App'x
410, 412 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The term ‘simple routine tasks,’ in the context of the disability
proceedings, generally refers to the non-exertional or mental aspects of work. For example,
performing a ‘simple routine task’ typically involves low stress level work that does not require
maintaining sustained concentration.... Having previously acknowledged that Menkes suffered
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace, the ALJ also accounted for these
mental limitations in the hypothetical question by restricting the type of work to ‘simple routine
tasks.’ ”); Watson v. Colvin, No. 12-552, 2013 WL 5295708, *5 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 18, 2013);
Polardino v. Colvin, No. 12–806, 2013 WL 4498981, *3 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 19, 2013) (“The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that a limitation to simple, routine tasks sufficiently
accounts for a claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace.”); Hart v.
Colvin, No. 13–5, 2013 WL 4786061, *9 (W.D.Pa. Sept.6, 2013) (“Hart's concentration-related
difficulties were accommodated by the limitations permitting the performance of only simple,
routine, repetitive tasks.”).
Based on the above, I find ALJ's hypothetical (ECF No. 14-2, pp. 55-57) was not in error
and no additional RFC restriction was necessary to accommodate Plaintiff's concentration,
persistence and/or pace impairments. Therefore, remand on this basis is not warranted.
An appropriate order shall follow.
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES B. SMITH,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 13-209
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 15th day of July, 2014, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 16) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.
19) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?