CONTE v. RIOS et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying as moot 7 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint; denying 30 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; denying 32 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; granting in part and de nying in part 34 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. It is further Ordered that Plaintiff is granted 21 days from 11/25/2015, the date upon which discovery is to be completed, to file a second amended complaint, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion & Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 8/27/2015. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW CONTE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSE R. RIOS, RANDY RUEDIGER,
MIDDLESEX TOWNSHIP, DAVID
WELLINGTON, MARS BOROUGH,
OFFICER ANDRA SCHMID, ADAMS
TOWNSHIP,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-225
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Introduction
This civil rights action arises from the injuries Plaintiff sustained after Defendant
Jose Rios’ vehicle collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle during a high-speed police pursuit.
Plaintiff has asserted various civil rights claims against Defendants, alleging violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as state law claims. Presently
before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and motions to dismiss
the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos.
7, 30, 32, 34) 1 Having reviewed the motions and briefs, along with the applicable law, and
for the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 7, 30, and 32
ECF No. 7 is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint filed by Defendants Randy Ruediger and
Middlesex Township. ECF No. 30 is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed by
Defendants Ruediger and Middlesex Township. ECF No. 32 is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
amended complaint filed by Defendants David Wellington and Mars Borough. ECF No. 34 is a
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed by Defendants Andra Schmid and Adams
Township.
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are DENIED, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss at ECF No. 34 is GRANTED. However,
Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint as set forth in the Order.
II.
Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over the federal constitutional claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims
occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
III.
Background
This case involves injuries Plaintiff sustained after Defendant Rios’ vehicle
collided with his vehicle. The following facts are alleged in the amended complaint,
which the Court will accept as true for the sole purpose of deciding the pending motions.
On June 17, 2013, Defendant Ruediger of the Middlesex Township Police
Department encountered Defendant Rios sitting inside his vehicle, which was stationary
along a public street. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 15-16.) For reasons unknown to Plaintiff, Defendant
Ruediger initiated contact with Defendant Rios and falsely suggested he was a criminal
suspect. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Defendant Rios fled in his vehicle, and Defendant Ruediger
initiated a pursuit.
(Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)
Defendant Wellington of Mars Borough Police
Department and Defendant Schmid of Adams Township Police Department joined the
pursuit, with Defendant Ruediger primarily in the lead position and Defendant
Wellington occasionally assuming the lead position. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) Upon Plaintiff’s
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information and belief, none of the officers had reason to believe Defendant Rios had
committed a crime or was a danger to others. (Id. ¶ 23.)
The pursuit, which began in Middlesex Township, continued through Adams
Township and Richland Township before ending in a collision in Gibsonia. (Id. ¶ 25.)
The pursuit was conducted at high rates of speed in residential and commercial areas. (Id.
¶ 26.) According to police records, the pursuit reached speeds of 110-120 miles per hour,
and Defendant Ruediger considered terminating it. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Defendants continued
the pursuit through a heavily trafficked shopping area, and Defendant Rios’ vehicle
struck Plaintiff’s vehicle while he was stopped at a red light in a commercial area with a
speed limit of 45 miles per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.) Plaintiff’s left leg was nearly severed, and
he sustained multiple broken bones, deep tissue wounds, and bone loss. (Id. ¶ 61.)
Plaintiff underwent extensive surgeries, bone grafts, and rehabilitative therapy. (Id. ¶ 62.)
Defendant Middlesex Township’s policies provide that a high-speed pursuit
should be terminated if it exposes any officer, member of the public, or suspect to
unnecessary risks, especially if heavy traffic, highly congested areas, or erratic driving is
involved. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) Defendant Mars Borough’s policies provide that each officer has
the authority to terminate a pursuit based on danger and that an officer should terminate
a chase when “the hazards of exposing the officer and the public to unnecessary dangers
are higher than the degree of crime committed by the pursued.”
(Id. ¶¶ 42-44.)
Defendant Adams Township’s policies provide that pursuits are disfavored for minor
incidents and limits the use of pursuits to the most serious of circumstances. (Id. ¶¶ 4647.)
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Defendant Rios was charged with and convicted of aggravated assault by a motor
vehicle, and he was sentenced to three to six years of incarceration in state prison. (Id. ¶
34.) All charges relating to Defendant Rios’ alleged acts of fleeing or eluding the police
were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 35.)
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a six-count complaint on October 20,
2014, which he amended on December 15, 2014. (ECF Nos. 1, 26.) Count I asserts a claim
against Defendants Ruediger, Wellington, and Schmid for violating Plaintiff’s rights to
bodily integrity and to be free from injury by law enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 64-74.) Count II asserts a claim against
Defendant Middlesex Township for failure to train Defendant Ruediger. (Id. ¶¶ 75-79.)
Count III asserts a claim against Defendant Mars Borough for failure to train Defendant
Wellington. (Id. ¶¶ 80-85.) Count IV asserts a claim against Defendant Adams Township
for failure to train Defendant Schmid. (Id. ¶¶ 86-90.) Count V asserts a state law claim for
negligence against Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Wellington, Mars
Borough, Schmid, and Adams Township. (Id. ¶¶ 91-97.) Count VI asserts a state law
claim for negligence against Defendant Rios. (Id. ¶¶ 98-102.)
Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Wellington, Mars Borough, Schmid,
and Adams Township now move to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint. (ECF
Nos. 7, 30, 32, 34.) The parties have fully briefed the Court on the pending motions (see
ECF Nos. 8, 31, 33, 35, 38, 43, and 44), and this matter is now ripe for adjudication.
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IV.
Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint or any portion of a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although the
federal pleading standard has been “in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years,” the
standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge is now well established. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F. 3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2009).
In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must conduct a twopart analysis. First, the court must separate the factual matters averred from the legal
conclusions asserted. See Fowler, 578 F. 3d at 210. Second, the court must determine
whether the factual matters averred are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a “‘plausible
claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The
complaint need not include “‘detailed factual allegations.’” Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F. 3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
Moreover, the court must construe the alleged facts, and draw all inferences
gleaned therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 228
(citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F. 3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). However, “legal
conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, the complaint must present sufficient “‘factual
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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.’” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F. 3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Ultimately, whether a plaintiff has shown a “plausible claim for relief” is a
“context-specific” inquiry that requires the district court to “draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The relevant record under
consideration includes the complaint and any “document integral to or explicitly relied
upon in the complaint.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F. 3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F. 3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). If a
complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court must
permit a curative amendment, irrespective of whether a plaintiff seeks leave to amend,
unless such amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 236; see also
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F. 3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
V.
Discussion
As discussed above, Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 20, 2014, which he
amended on December 15, 2014. (ECF Nos. 1, 26.) Defendants Ruediger and Middlesex
Township filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s initial complaint on November 12, 2014.
(ECF No. 7.) Because Plaintiff has since amended his complaint, the Court will deny
Defendants Ruediger and Middlesex Township’s first motion to dismiss as moot.
Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Wellington, Mars Borough, Schmid,
and Adams Township have filed three motions to dismiss the amended complaint, each
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arguing that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts supporting a plausible claim that
Defendants intended to injure Plaintiff; that Defendants Ruediger, Wellington, and
Schmid are entitled to qualified immunity; that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to
support his failure-to-train claims against Defendants Middlesex Township, Mars
Borough, and Adams Township; and that any claims for punitive damages against
Defendants Middlesex Township, Mars Borough, and Adams Township must be
dismissed. Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Schmid, and Adams Township
further request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims contained in Counts V and VI of the amended complaint.
In response, Plaintiff requests that the Court dismiss, without prejudice, Count I as
to Defendant Schmid and Count IV as to Adams Township. (ECF No. 43 at 1.) Plaintiff
also concedes that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, punitive damages may not be awarded
against municipal bodies and therefore consents to the dismissal of any claims for
punitive damages against Defendants Middlesex Township and Mars Borough. (ECF
Nos. 38 at 11, 44 at 6.) However, Plaintiff argues that the amended complaint adequately
alleges facts supporting his remaining claims and asserts that Defendants Ruediger and
Wellington are not entitled to qualified immunity.
As a result of Plaintiff’s response, the Court will dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s
amended complaint as to Defendant Schmid with leave granted to Plaintiff to file a
second amended complaint after fact discovery is completed. The Court will also dismiss
Count IV of Plaintiff’s amended complaint with leave granted to Plaintiff to file a second
amended complaint after fact discovery is completed.
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The Court will dismiss, with
prejudice, all claims for punitive damages against Defendants Middlesex Township, Mars
Borough, and Adams Township. 2
A. Counts I through III – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
In Counts I through III of the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
Plaintiff has asserted two distinct, though related, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
First, Plaintiff asserts a claim alleging Defendants Ruediger and Wellington violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to bodily integrity and to be free from injury by law
enforcement. Second, Plaintiff asserts claims that Defendants Middlesex Township and
Mars Borough failed to train their officers. Both claims are premised on allegations that
Defendants Ruediger and Wellington did not terminate the high-speed pursuit that
resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. The Court will separately evaluate Plaintiff’s claim under
the legal principles that apply to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as stated above.
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Because Plaintiff requested that the Court dismiss only Count IV as to Adams Township, he does
not expressly concede that punitive damages may not be awarded against Adams Township. (See
ECF No. 43.)
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Adams Township in Count V of his
amended complaint. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 91-97.) Because Plaintiff has conceded that punitive damages
may not be awarded against a municipal body, all claims for punitive damages against Adams
Township will be dismissed.
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1. Count I – Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violations
In Count I of the amended complaint (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 64-74), Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Ruediger and Wellington violated his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
right to bodily integrity and to be free from injury by law enforcement. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that their conduct “‘shocks the
conscience.’” (ECF No. 31 at 4 (quoting Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 374-75
(3d Cir. 1999)); ECF No. 33 at 5 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47
(1998)).) Relying upon Lewis, Defendants assert that this standard requires Plaintiff to
allege facts demonstrating that they intended to injure him.
In response, Plaintiff argues that “the determination of whether police conduct
‘shocks the conscience’ depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case” and
notes that Lewis was decided in the context of a motion for summary judgment, after
discovery had been completed. (ECF No. 38 at 5.) Plaintiff distinguishes the cases upon
which Defendants rely, asserting that they involved dangerous circumstances
necessitating high-speed pursuits.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XIV. Although the text of the Due Process Clause refers only to the
“process” through which a person is deprived of a constitutionally-protected liberty or
property interest, the Supreme Court has declared that the constitutional provision
“guarantees more than fair process.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
The Due Process Clause has been construed to prohibit “certain government actions
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regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
“In this respect, the Fourteenth Amendment substantively
prohibits a State from ‘abusing governmental power’ or ‘employing it as an instrument of
oppression.’” Douglas v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 329, 350 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)). “When
government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive
due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.” United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). The essential requirements of procedural “due process”
are “notice and an opportunity to respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 546 (1985). The “due process” required under the Fourteenth Amendment “is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff’s amended complaint sufficiently
states a plausible claim for relief. As Plaintiff argues, the cases upon which Defendants
rely in support of their arguments were in the context of motions for summary judgment.
Defendant Ruediger cites to only one non-binding case — Levy v. City of Hollywood, 90 F.
Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2000) — that was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss.
Similarly, Defendant Wellington cites to only one non-binding case — LaBar v. Alercia, No.
09-CV-4182, 2010 WL 3855268 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010) — that was decided in the context
of a motion to dismiss. The courts in both Levy and LaBar based their decisions upon
Lewis, before discovery began. See Levy, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1346; LaBar, 2010 WL 3855268, at
*5-6.
Additionally, both cases involved a different set of circumstances, and, as the
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Supreme Court stated in Lewis, “[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in one environment
may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of
circumstances.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. It is therefore appropriate to address Defendants’
arguments after discovery has been completed.
Moreover, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ conduct “shocks the
conscience and amounts to a reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff]’s
federally protected rights.”
(ECF No. 26 ¶ 69.)
Specifically, Plaintiff avers that
“Defendants, after sufficient time for deliberation and in violation of established policy,
knowingly operated their vehicles at excessively high rates of speed, in essence
compelling [Defendant Rios] to travel erratically and at dangerously high speeds, causing
him to lose control of his vehicle and violently collide with Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 72.) Plaintiff
further alleges that “Defendants’ conduct constitutes a malicious abuse of authority
unmotivated by a legitimate governmental interest, in that their actions did nothing to
thwart or stop a vehicle pursuit,” and “because of their aggressive unreasonable conduct,
they created the only scenario by which the chase could conclude: a vehicle collision on a
high trafficked road.” (Id.) Thus, because Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded his claim, the
Court will address Defendants’ arguments, should they again raise them on summary
judgment, at the close of discovery. See, e.g., Boyle v. City of Liberty, 833 F. Supp. 1436, 1449
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (denying motion to dismiss because the facts necessary to determine
whether the officers’ action was reasonable were “not yet before the court, and await[ed]
development during discovery”).
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Arguing in the alternative, Defendants Ruediger and Wellington contend that they
are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 31 at 6-8; ECF No. 33 at 9-11.) Qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense available to government officials sued in their
personal capacities, and for which the defendants have the burden of proof. See Brown v.
Cwynar, 484 F. App’x 676, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). It is intended to “shield government officials
performing discretionary functions, including police officers, ‘from liability from civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Kopec v. Tate, 361
F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “An
officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he meets at least one of a two prong inquiry.”
Patrick v. Moorman, 536 F. App’x 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2013). The first prong asks whether
there is a constitutional violation, and the second prong asks whether the constitutional
right was clearly established. Id. at 260; Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223-24 (3d Cir.
2010).
While the Supreme Court has directed courts to address the issue of qualified
immunity at the “earliest possible stage in the litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991), a full analysis of whether qualified immunity applies in the instant case is
difficult based on the undeveloped record presently before the Court. See Newland v.
Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (cautioning that it is “generally unwise to
venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to
develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases”). Here, the Court has already
concluded that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in his amended complaint to state a
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plausible claim for relief and has established a constitutional violation on the facts alleged.
Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that to determine whether
immunity is lost, a court must decide “whether a constitutional right would have been
violated on the facts alleged”) (internal quotations omitted). Also, the facts alleged in the
amended complaint, taken as true, show that Plaintiff’s constitutional “interest in bodily
security was clearly significant.” Boyle, 833 F. Supp. at 1449; see also Spencer v. City of W.
Palm Beach, No. 15-CV-80019, 2015 WL 4651089, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2015) (denying
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity because “it is now clearly established that
an officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment during a high-speed pursuit when he
operates his vehicle with the sole purpose of causing injury”).
Determining whether Defendants’ actions shock the conscience is a fact-specific
inquiry; thus, “[t]he determination of the issue at this point would be premature.” Boyle,
833 F. Supp. at 1449-50; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 242 n.7 (“A decision as to qualified immunity
is ‘premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical facts relevant to the
immunity analysis.’”) (quoting Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Accordingly, the Court will defer its consideration of whether Defendants Ruediger and
Wellington are entitled to qualified immunity, without prejudice to Defendants raising
the defense at a later stage in this litigation. See Zion v. Nassan, 727 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404
(W.D. Pa. 2010).
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2. Counts II and III – Failure to Train
In Counts II and III of the amended complaint (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 75-85), Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Middlesex Township and Mars Borough violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by failing to train Defendants Ruediger and Wellington. Defendants argue that Plaintiff
asserts a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and fails to
allege facts sufficient to establish that Defendants Ruediger and Wellington committed
substantive due process violations in furtherance of the policies of Defendants Middlesex
Township and Mars Borough. Defendants also claim that Plaintiff’s amended complaint
fails to identify any policies or customs of Defendants Middlesex Township and Mars
Borough that encourage officers to engage in high-speed pursuits.
In response, Plaintiff argues Defendants incorrectly characterize his failure-to-train
claims as Monell claims, explaining that his claims are based upon Defendants’ failure to
properly train Defendants Ruediger and Wellington to conform to each department’s
policy requiring the termination of unreasonably dangerous pursuits.
Relying upon
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994), Plaintiff contends that a
municipality may be liable if it implemented a policy of inadequate training, causing an
officer to unsafely conduct a pursuit.
“[A] municipality’s failure to train police officers only gives rise to a constitutional
violation when that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.” Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126-27 (3d
Cir. 1998). A failure to train can form the basis for § 1983 municipal liability only if “the
plaintiff can show both contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or
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knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the
supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of
approval to the offending subordinate.”
Id. at 127 (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth
Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff’s amended complaint sufficiently
states a plausible claim for relief. Here, Plaintiff identifies a policy or custom, namely that
the Defendants Middlesex Township and Mars Borough encouraged their respective
officers to terminate high-speed pursuits exposing any officer, member of the public, or
suspect to unnecessary risks. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 36-44.) Moreover, the amended complaint
explicitly states that Defendants Ruediger’s and Wellington’s failure to adhere to
Defendants Middlesex Township’s and Mars Borough’s policies “resulted from
inadequate training” and “evidences that the need for more or different training was so
obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights such that
the policymaker’s failure to do so amounts to deliberate indifference.” (Id. ¶¶ 78-79, 8485.)
Plaintiff links Middlesex Township’s and Mars Borough’s policies to the following
facts.
Plaintiff avers, upon his information and belief, that Defendant Rios was not
engaged in any suspicious or illegal activity when Defendant Ruediger approached him.
(Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Ruediger initiated a pursuit
“[d]espite the fact that there was no basis to believe or suggest that [Defendant] Rios had
committed a crime or . . . was a danger” and that “none of the officers involved in the
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pursuit had any reason to believe that [Defendant] Rios had committed a crime or was a
danger to others.” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.)
In describing the pursuit, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Wellington “called out
high speed over the radio,” and Defendant Ruediger considered terminating the pursuit.
(Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant Ruediger stated that he “would check with Northern Regional
Police to see if [the department] wanted to proceed with the pursuit,” but he “instead
decided to proceed.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that although the pursuit continued through a
commercial shopping area, “with at least one officer being ‘trapped in traffic,’” the officers
“acted intentionally and willfully by choosing to maintain an illegal and dangerous
pursuit.” (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)
Defendant Middlesex Township asserts that Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed
because Plaintiff “alleges only one incident allegedly caused by an officer subject to the
Middlesex police pursuit police,” (ECF No. 31 at 12), and Defendant Mars Borough argues
that “Plaintiff has only alleged that one Mars Borough police officer on one occasion . . .
failed to follow the departmental pursuit policy,” (ECF No. 33 at 14). While Plaintiff may
be unable to ultimately prevail on his claims, that determination is not presently before
the Court. Instead, the Court need only test the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the
amended complaint. Here, “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Jankowski v. Lellock, No. 2:13-CV-194, 2013
WL 5945782, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013) (quoting Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211; Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678); see also McNeill v. Borough of Folcroft, No. 13-CV-3592, 2013 WL 6158725, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 22, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs adequately pleaded
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the defendant “maintained a policy of not instructing [the] officers on the proper conduct
of high-speed chases”) (citing Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1292). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants Ruediger and Middlesex Township’s motion to dismiss Count II and
Defendants Wellington and Mars Borough’s motion to dismiss Count III.
B. Counts V and VI – State Law Claims for Negligence
In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff has brought a state law negligence claim
against Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Wellington, Mars Borough, Schmid,
and Adams Township.
Defendant Rios.
He has also brought a state law negligence claim against
Defendants Ruediger, Middlesex Township, Schmid, and Adams
Township have requested that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if
the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Because the Court has not dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, Defendants’ request will be denied.
D. Punitive Damages
In Counts II, III, and V, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Defendants
Middlesex Township, Mars Borough, and Adams Township. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 75-85, 91-
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97.) 3 As discussed above, Plaintiff concedes that punitive damages may not be awarded
against municipal bodies. (ECF Nos. 38 at 11, 44 at 6.)
The law is well-settled that punitive damages may not be awarded against a
municipality under § 1983. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981); Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Although Plaintiff has
not conceded that punitive damages may not be awarded against Defendant Adams
Township (see ECF No. 43), the Court will strike Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages
against the township sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(1). See
Rosky v. Plum Borough, No. 09-CV-1051, 2010 WL 1904339, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2010).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss all claims for punitive damages against Defendants
Middlesex Township, Mars Borough, and Adams Township.
D. Leave to Amend
The law is well settled that, “if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be
inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 245. Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15 embodies a liberal approach to amendment and directs that “leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires” unless other factors weigh against such relief. Dole v. Arco Chem.
Co., 921 F. 2d 484, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1990). Factors that weigh against amendment include
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
3
Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages against Adams Township in Count IV of his amended
complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 86-90.) However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has requested that the Court
dismiss, without prejudice, Count IV. (ECF No. 43 at 1.)
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cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Amendment is futile “if the amended complaint would
not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F. 3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court may therefore
“properly deny leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to
dismiss.” Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F. 2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Holder, 994 F. Supp.
2d 719, 727 (W.D. Pa. 2014). In light of these legal principles favoring the opportunity to
amend a deficiently pleaded complaint, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend
Count I as to Defendant Schmid and Count IV as to Adams Township except with respect
to the punitive damages claim, should Plaintiff develop sufficient facts through discovery
to support these claims.
VI.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny as moot Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motions
to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint at the close of discovery as set forth in the Order.
An appropriate order follows.
19
Case 3:14-cv-00225-KRG Document 59 Filed 08/28/15 Page 1 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW CONTE,
)
)
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-225
)
)
v.
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
)
JOSE R. RIOS, RANDY RUEDIGER,
MIDDLESEX TOWNSHIP, DAVID
WELLINGTON, MARS BOROUGH,
OFFICER ANDRA SCHMID, ADAMS
TOWNSHIP,
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants.
)
ORDER
th
AND NOW, this
~7day of August 2015, upon consideration of the Defendants'
motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 7, 30, 32, 34), and for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motions are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(1) Defendants Randy Ruediger and Middlesex Township's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No.7) is DENIED as moot.
(2) Defendants Randy Ruediger and Middlesex Township's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 30) is DENIED.
(3) Defendants David Wellington and Mars Borough's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 32) is DENIED.
(4) Defendants Andra Schmid and Adams Township's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
Count I of the amended complaint is dismissed as to
Case 3:14-cv-00225-KRG Document 59 Filed 08/28/15 Page 2 of 2
Defendant Andra Schmid, with leave to amend at the close of discovery.
Count IV of the amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend at the
close of discovery except with respect to the punitive damages claim. In all
other respects, Defendants Andra Schmid and Adams Township's motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.
(5) All claims for punitive damages in Counts II, III, and V against Defendants
Middlesex Township, Mars Borough, and Adams Township are dismissed,
with prejudice, without leave to amend.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted 21 days from November 25,
2015, the date upon which discovery is to be completed, to file a second amended
complaint.
BY THE COURT:
KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
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