CLOUSER v. GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 56 Motion to Stay the Trial of Plaintiff's Wrongful Death Claim. It is further Ordered that the parties shall continue to comply with the deadlines set forth in the Scheduling Order entered on 6/9/2016 (ECF No. 60 ), and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 8/9/2016. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SYLVIA A. CLOUSER,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR
CARE, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-33
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Introduction
Before the Court in this matter is a motion to stay the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful

death claim filed by Defendants Golden Gate National Senior Care, LLC t/d/b/a Golden
Living, GGNSC Altoona Hillview GP LLC a/k/a and/or t/d/b/a Golden LivingCenterHillview, and GGNSC Altoona Hillview LP a/k/a and t/d/b/a Golden LivingCenterHillview. (ECF No. 56.) This matter has been fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 57, 61, 65) and is
ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to stay will be
DENIED.
II.

Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and

28 U.S.C. § 1441. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

III.

Background
Plaintiff initiated the instant action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common

Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania, on January 12, 2015. (See ECF No. 1-2.) Defendants
removed the action to this Court on February 5, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) The Court notes that
this case appears to be one of a number of similarly situated actions arising in federal
courts in Pennsylvania. The following facts are alleged in the complaint, which the Court
will accept as true for the sole purpose of deciding the pending motion.
On or about April 8, 2011, Plaintiff’s decedent, John J. Clouser, was admitted as a
resident at the Golden Living Center-Hillview skilled nursing facility in Altoona,
Pennsylvania, for his mobility issues and advancing Alzheimer’s disease and dementia.
(ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 7-8.) Although Mr. Clouser did not have skin breakdown at the time of
his admission, he developed redness and irritation of the skin around his coccyx, groin,
scrotum, and buttocks from August 2011 through the time of his discharge on February
17, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Documentation throughout 2012 indicated that Mr. Clouser had no
abnormal skin conditions, and no documentation was made concerning Mr. Clouser’s
incontinence. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 16-17.) Records from 2013 included false documentation as to
Mr. Clouser’s weekly skin checks, his activities of daily living, and his intake and outtake
logs. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.)
On February 17, 2013, Mr. Clouser had red blood draining from his rectum, which
increased throughout the day, but his medical records did not include notations of skin
breakdown.

(Id. ¶¶ 18-20.)

Plaintiff, who was not informed of the gravity of Mr.

Clouser’s condition, requested that Mr. Clouser not be transferred to Altoona Hospital
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until the following morning. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Defendants’ February 18, 2013, discharge
records stated that Mr. Clouser weighed 256 pounds, had no pressure ulcers, and was
suffering from internal bleeding. (Id. ¶ 23.) Altoona Hospital’s admission notes from
February 18, 2013, indicated that Mr. Clouser weighed 225 pounds, was septic, and was in
renal failure. (Id. ¶ 24.)
When Mr. Clouser was examined on February 19, 2013, he was diagnosed with a
perianal fistula and a decubitus ulcer extending from the buttocks toward the anus. (Id. ¶
25.) Because Mr. Clouser’s white blood count was 22.6, he was diagnosed with sepsis and
underwent a debridement of the decubitus ulcer and drainage of the perirectal abscess.
(Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Although blood and urine cultures tested negative for infection, cultures
taken from the wound revealed the growth of Proteus Mirabilis, Escherichia Coli, and
Enterococcus Faecalis. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) On February 21, 2013, Mr. Clouser underwent a
laparoscopic sigmoid colostomy and debridement of the perianal wound, but he
remained septic. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Mr. Clouser passed away that day. (Id. ¶ 32.)
In Count I of her complaint, Plaintiff asserted a wrongful death action against
Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 35-39.) In Count II of her complaint, Plaintiff included a survival
action against Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 40-42.) Alleging that Defendants’ conduct was willful,
wanton, negligent, and careless, Plaintiff requested punitive damages as to both of her
claims. (See id. at 12-14.)
In response to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants filed an amended motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion to compel arbitration. On March 23, 2016,
the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions as follows:
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(1)

Defendants’ motion to compel the arbitration of Count I, Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim,
was denied; (2) Defendants’ motion to compel the arbitration of Count II, Plaintiff’s
survival action claim, was granted; (3) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages as to Count I, the wrongful death claim, was granted; and (4)
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as to Count II, the
survival action claim, was denied. Clouser v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC, No. 3:15CV-33, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37880, at *27 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2016). As a result, the only
claim pending before this Court is Count I, Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
IV.

Applicable Law
A stay is an extraordinary measure that requires a court to exercise judgment and

to weigh competing interests. See United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 893 (3d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also
Commw. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Landis, 299
U.S. at 254). As such, “the power to stay an action, in non-mandatory stay cases, is firmly
within the discretion of the court.” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Maclaren, L.L.C., No. 10-CV363, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31508, at *13 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2012) (citing Cost Bros., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 760 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1985)).
In determining whether a stay of the litigation is appropriate, a court must balance
the interests favoring a stay against the interests frustrated by a denial of a stay. Id. (citing

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Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In doing
so, a court should consider the following factors: (1) whether a stay would unduly
prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether
denial of the stay would create a clear case of hardship or inequity for the moving party;
(3) whether a stay would simplify the issues and the trial of the case; and (4) whether
discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set. Akishev v. Kapustin, 23 F.
Supp. 3d 440, 446 (D.N.J. 2014). A court may also consider the length of the requested
stay. Structural Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:07-CV-1793, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82266, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2008). The “party requesting a stay bears the burden of
showing that the circumstances justify an exercise” of the Court’s discretion to issue a
stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009).
IV.

Discussion
Initially, the Court notes that Defendants do not oppose conducting discovery in

connection with the survival and wrongful death claims simultaneously. (ECF No. 57 at
7.) After the parties were unable to prepare a joint scheduling order because they could
not reach an agreement regarding whether the trial of the wrongful death claim must be
stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration of the survival claim, Defendants filed the
instant motion. (See ECF Nos. 55; 56 ¶ 9-10; 57-1.) At a status conference held on June 6,
2016, the parties agreed to file a joint scheduling order with the notation that trial dates
are “To Be Determined.” (ECF No. 58 at 2.) The parties further agreed to complete
discovery while the Court considered Defendants’ motion to stay the trial of the wrongful

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death claim. (Id.) The parties filed their joint scheduling order on June 8, 2016, and
agreed that discovery will be completed by October 14, 2016. (ECF No. 59 at 2.)
A.

The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that a stay of the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim is
necessary to give complete effect to the alternative dispute resolution agreement (“ADR
Agreement”) that the parties signed. (ECF No. 57 at 1.)

Relying upon the Federal

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (“the FAA”), Wick v. Atl. Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1979), and Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), Defendants assert that wellsettled law provides that non-arbitrable claims must be stayed pending the outcome of
arbitration. (Id. at 4-5, 7.) Defendants also argue that because there are issues common to
both the survival and wrongful death claims, permitting a jury to make findings would
violate the ADR Agreement’s provision requiring an arbitrator to “solely adjudicat[e]”
Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at 6-7.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that Wick and Sibley are inapplicable because all
parties in both cases were bound by an agreement to arbitrate, and the non-arbitrable
claims were raised by the plaintiff who had also asserted the arbitrable claims. (ECF No.
61 at 2-5.) Relying upon Mendez v. Puerto Rican Int’l Cos., Inc., 553 F.3d 709 (3d Cir. 2009),
and Berrios v. Hovic, No. 05-CV-192, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56772 (D.V.I. June 8, 2010),
Plaintiff contends that the wrongful death beneficiaries cannot be subjected to a stay
pending arbitration because they are not bound by the ADR Agreement and because they
did not raise any non-arbitrable claims. (Id. at 5-8.)

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Based upon preclusion by collateral estoppel, Plaintiff also argues that a stay
would prejudice the wrongful death beneficiaries. (Id. at 8-11.) Specifically, Plaintiff
states that if the arbitrator determines that Defendants were not negligent or that
Defendants’ negligence was not a factual cause of Plaintiff’s survival damages, then
Defendants will assert issue preclusion against the wrongful death beneficiaries. (Id. at 9.)
If Defendants succeed, then the wrongful death beneficiaries would be deprived of their
right to be heard by a jury. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that, on the contrary, if a jury finds that
Defendants were negligent and if Plaintiff successfully asserts issue preclusion in
arbitration, the arbitrator may still resolve the survival claim. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff
reiterates that the wrongful death beneficiaries were not parties to the ADR Agreement.
(Id. at 9-11.) She therefore asserts that the ADR Agreement’s provision requiring an
arbitrator to solely adjudicate claims is inapplicable. (Id. at 9-10.)
In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has improperly suggested that there are
two plaintiffs in this matter — Sylvia A. Clouser and the Estate of Mr. Clouser. (ECF No.
65 at 1-3.) Because Plaintiff is the only party to this action, Defendants contend that Wick
and Sibley are applicable, while Plaintiff’s reliance upon Mendez is inapposite. (Id. at 2-3.)
Defendants assert that a stay of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim will not deprive her of the
right to a jury trial because arbitrators’ findings are considered final judgments for the
purposes of collateral estoppel. (Id. at 4-5.) Finally, Defendants contend that they will be
prejudiced if Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim proceeds to trial because, pursuant to the
ADR Agreement and the FAA, an arbitrator must be permitted to make his or her own
findings regarding all issues related to the arbitration. (Id. at 6.)
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B.

The Factors Applicable to a Motion to Stay

In weighing the competing interests presented here, the Court finds that a stay of
trial in the instant matter is not warranted. The Court will separately address each factor
applicable to a motion to stay.
1.

Undue Prejudice to the Non-Moving Party

As discussed above, Plaintiff argues that the wrongful death beneficiaries may be
deprived of their right to a jury trial if this matter is stayed. (ECF No. 61 at 8-11.) In
response, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has inappropriately suggested that the
wrongful death beneficiaries are also parties to this action. (ECF No. 65 at 1-3.)
Initially, the Court notes that the cases upon which the parties rely in support of
their arguments are unpersuasive. First, Defendants’ reliance upon Wick and Sibley is
misplaced because neither case included a claim for wrongful death. See Wick, 605 F.2d at
167 (explaining that the plaintiffs had filed claims for breach of contract, fraud and deceit,
negligent design and construction, breach of warranty, and replevin); Sibley, 543 F.2d at
541 (stating that the complaint included breach of contract claims, federal and state
securities law claims, and common law fraud claims). Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance upon
Mendez and Berrios is inapposite because neither case included a claim for wrongful death.
See Mendez, 553 F.3d at 710 (explaining that the plaintiffs had filed claims for employment
discrimination and retaliation); Berrios, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56772, at *2 (noting that the
plaintiffs had filed claims against the defendants for race-based discrimination, wrongful
discharge, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). Because
the only claim pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death, the Court
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concludes that the cases upon which the parties have relied are factually distinguishable
and are not binding upon the Court.
Defendants are correct that Sylvia A. Clouser is the single plaintiff in this matter.
(ECF No. 65 at 1.) However, as Defendants concede, Plaintiff “wears two hats: wrongful
death beneficiary and Executrix of the Estate of John J. Clouser.” (Id.) The caption of
Plaintiff’s complaint identifies the plaintiff as “SYLVIA A. CLOUSER, individually and as
Executrix of the Estate of John J. Clouser.” (ECF No. 1-2.) Within her complaint, Plaintiff
asserts her wrongful death and survival claims against Defendants as “Executrix of the
Estate of John J. Clouser.” (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 35-42.)
As the Court explained in its decision to retain Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim
while dismissing Plaintiff’s survival claim in favor of arbitration, “[u]nder Pennsylvania
law, ‘wrongful death actions are derivative of decedents’ injuries but are not derivative of
decedents’ rights.’”

Clouser, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37880, at *22 (quoting Pisano v.

Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)). As a result, “‘state and
federal courts have consistently declined to compel arbitration of wrongful death claims
in these types of cases, because the beneficiaries’ rights cannot be surrendered by an
agreement signed only by the decedent.’” Id. (quoting GGNSC Uniontown, LP v. Bauer,
No. 15-CV-231, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170727, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2015)).
It is well settled that “‘[a]llowing the decedent to contract away the rights of third
parties who are not the beneficiaries of an arbitration agreement would indeed undo
traditional contract principles and make arbitration agreements much more powerful than
other agreements, solely by virtue of the fact that they concern arbitration.’” Golden Gate
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Nat’l Senior Care, LLC v. Beavens, 123 F. Supp. 3d 619, 634 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting N. Health
Facilities v. Batz, 993 F. Supp. 2d 485, 493 (M.D. Pa. 2014)).

Accordingly, “[s]ince a

wrongful death action does not belong to the decedent and is not derived from the
decedent’s rights, a decedent may not waive a wrongful death beneficiary’s right to a jury
trial.” Id. While the wrongful death beneficiaries are not separately identified in the
complaint, the well-settled principles governing wrongful death beneficiaries establish
that they are entitled to a jury trial. See id. The wrongful death beneficiaries would
therefore suffer undue prejudice if the Court stayed the trial of this matter until the
arbitration of Plaintiff’s survival claim has been completed.
Moreover, because Plaintiff has asserted her wrongful death and survival claims
against Defendants as “Executrix of the Estate of John J. Clouser” (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 35-42),
issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, may apply. In Pennsylvania, issue preclusion
applies where: (1) the issue presented is identical; (2) there was a final judgment on the
merits; (3) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party or was in privity
with a party to the earlier proceeding; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Whiteford v. Penn Hills
Municipality, 323 Fed. Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174
F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff and Defendants both state that an
arbitration award may result in issue preclusion. Plaintiff states that “if the wrongful
death claim is stayed . . . and the arbitrator finds negligence against [D]efendants but
finds the negligence was not a factual cause of [P]laintiff’s survival damages, or the
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arbitrator finds no negligence, [D]efendants will undoubtedly attempt to assert issue
preclusion against the wrongful death beneficiaries.” (ECF No. 61 at 9.) Defendants state
that “[i]t is settled law that arbitration decisions can have collateral estoppel effect.” (ECF
No. 65 at 4.)
In applying the factors applicable to issue preclusion, the Court first finds that the
issue presented is identical. Specifically, the issue presented in Plaintiff’s wrongful death
and survival claims is the alleged negligence of Defendants. (See ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 33-34;
see also ECF No. 57 at 6 (Defendants noting “the commonality of issues in the wrongful
death and survival claims”).) Second, if the Court grants Defendants’ request to stay the
trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim pending the outcome of the arbitration of
Plaintiff’s survival claim, then a final judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s survival claim
will have been entered. See, e.g., Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Under Pennsylvania law, arbitration proceedings and their findings are considered final
judgments for the purposes of collateral estoppel.”).
Regarding the third factor, and as discussed above, Plaintiff has asserted her
wrongful death and survival claims against Defendants as “Executrix of the Estate of John
J. Clouser.” (Id. ¶¶ 35-42.) Defendants would assert issue preclusion against Plaintiff as a
party to the earlier arbitration. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Riley, No. 15-CV-7374, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77790, at *16-17 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016) (noting that the plaintiff was in privity
with the decedent because “wrongful death beneficiaries can be said to be in privity with
the decedent or successors in interest to the extent that their interests overlap with those
of the decedent”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Fourth, Plaintiff would
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have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her survival claim at the arbitration.
Accordingly, issue preclusion may apply to the outcome reached during the arbitration of
Plaintiff’s survival claim.
While the Court appreciates Defendants’ argument that “the use of collateral
estoppel in non-jury trial settings is not at odds with a party’s constitutional right to a jury
trial,” (ECF No. 65 at 5), the Court, in applying the first factor applicable to a motion to
stay, cannot conclude that Plaintiff would not suffer any prejudice if her wrongful death
claim is stayed. Even if issue preclusion did not potentially apply, Plaintiff, who is over
eighty years old, (see ECF No. 61 at 7), will be prejudiced by a stay “because any
significant delay in the case could hinder her ability to prove her claims.” Costantino v.
City of Atl. City, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18666, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2015) (citing Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707-08 (1997) (“[D]elaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice
resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific
facts, or the possible death of a party”), and New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000)
(“Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses became unavailable and
memories fade.”)). Accordingly, the Court finds that the first factor weighs in favor of
denying Defendants’ motion for a stay of the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
2.

Hardship or Inequity to the Moving Party

As discussed above, Defendants argue that a denial of their motion to stay would
fail to give effect to the ADR Agreement and to the FAA.

(ECF No. 57 at 6-7.)

Specifically, Defendants note that “the ADR Agreement requires all of Plaintiff’s claims to
be address in a single ADR process, ‘which shall adjudicate solely the claims of the Parties
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named in this Agreement.’” (Id. at 6 (quoting ECF No. 40-4 at 2).) Defendants contend
that “[i]f a jury makes a finding regarding [their] alleged negligence, and that finding is
applied in the arbitration, the arbitrator no longer would be ‘solely adjudicating’
Plaintiff’s survival claim” because “[t]he arbitrator’s hands would be tied by a judicial
finding.” (Id. at 6-7.) In response, Plaintiff contends that “if [she] were permitted to
proceed to trial in [the] wrongful death action, and a jury finds [D]efendants were
negligent and that the negligence caused the damages [she] alleged, even if [she is]
successful in asserting issue preclusion in arbitration, the arbitrator can still hear the
matter.” (ECF No. 61 at 9.)
Because the ADR Agreement provides that the ADR process “shall adjudicate
solely the claims of the Parties named in this Agreement,” (ECF No. 40-4 at 2), the Court
cannot determine whether “[t]he arbitrator’s hands would be tied,” (ECF No. 57 at 7), by a
jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., 466 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the court properly left the preclusion issue to the arbitrator); Collins v. D.R.
Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an arbitrator decides
whether issue or claim preclusion applies). However, just as issue preclusion may apply
to the outcome of arbitration, which the Court has discussed in detail above, an arbitrator
could conclude that issue preclusion applies to a jury’s verdict. (See ECF No. 40-4 at 2.)
Thus, while the Court understands Plaintiff’s argument that “an arbitration agreement
cannot dictate what a federal court does with a case that includes parties who have not
agreed to arbitrate” and that “Defendants are making an end-run at attempting to bind
non-parties to an agreement which this [C]ourt has already ruled is not binding on the
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wrongful death beneficiaries,” (ECF No. 61 at 10), the Court, in applying the second factor
applicable to a motion to stay, cannot conclude that Defendants would not suffer any
hardship or inequity if their motion to stay is denied. Because the ADR Agreement
provides that the ADR process “shall adjudicate solely” Plaintiff’s survival claim,
Defendants may suffer hardship or inequity if the trial regarding Plaintiff’s wrongful
death claim proceeds first. Accordingly, the Court finds that the second factor weighs in
favor of granting Defendants’ motion for a stay of the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death
claim.
3.

Simplification of Issues

With respect to the third factor, the Court must consider “‘whether a stay would
simplify the issues and the trial of the case.’” Akishev, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 448 (quoting
Actelion Pharms., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 12-CV-5743, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135524, at *15
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2013)). In that regard, Defendants “bear the burden of establishing that
issuance of a stay would simplify the issues for trial by ‘narrowing’ or ‘outright
eliminati[ng]’ the need for discovery.” Actelion Pharms., Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135524,
at *15 (quoting Weisman v. Mediq, Inc., No. 95-CV-1831, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5900, at *5
(E.D. Pa. May 3, 1995) (noting that “a stay is proper where the likelihood that such motion
may result in a narrowing or outright elimination of discovery outweighs the likely harm
to be produced by the delay”)).
As discussed above, the parties have agreed to conduct discovery in connection
with the survival and wrongful death claims simultaneously. (ECF No. 57 at 7.) Thus, the
issuance of a stay will not simplify the issues for trial by narrowing or eliminating the
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need for discovery.

See Actelion Pharms., Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135524, at *15.

Accordingly, because Defendants have failed to establish that a stay will narrow or
eliminate the need for discovery, the Court finds that the third factor weighs in favor of
denying Defendants’ motion for a stay of the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
4.

Status of the Litigation

With respect to the fourth factor, “the Court evaluates Defendants’ motion for a
stay in accordance with the scope of presently completed discovery and the scheduling of
a trial date.” Akishev, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
While this factor is a “close call” because expert discovery is not complete and no
trial date has been set, see Imagevision.net, Inc. v. Internet Payment Exch., Inc., No. 12-CV-54,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56943, at *15 (D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013), the Court finds that this factor
weighs slightly against a stay for two reasons. First, “[a]lthough no trial date has been set,
discovery is ongoing, [and] a scheduling order has been issued, with cut off dates for
discovery, including expert discovery.” Id. at *14-15. As discussed above, the parties
have agreed to complete discovery by October 14, 2016. (ECF No. 59 at 2.) Additionally,
all expert reports must be completed by January 16, 2017, and a post-discovery status
conference has been scheduled for January 31, 2017. (Id.)
Second, “the Court and the parties have already expended significant resources on
the litigation, and the principle of maximizing the use of judicial and litigant resources is
best served by seeing the case through to its conclusion.” Imagevision.net, Inc., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56943, at *14 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, the Court and the
parties have already expended significant resources on Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
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failure to state a claim and motion to compel arbitration; Defendants’ amended motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and motion to compel arbitration; Defendants’ motion
to stay the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim; and Plaintiff’s motion to compel full
and complete responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (See ECF Nos. 5, 6, 22, 23, 31, 32,
34, 35, 37, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 56, 57, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the
fourth factor weighs in favor of denying Defendants’ motion for a stay of the trial of
Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim. See, e.g., Sightsound Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 11-CV1292, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79319, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) (declining to find that the
status of the litigation favored a stay because, although expert discovery was not
complete and no trial date had been set, the court had devoted “significant resources” to
the matter); SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-389, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104677, at *1112 (D. Del. July 26, 2012) (finding that the status of the litigation did not favor a stay
because although the litigation remained at an “early stage,” the court had expended
substantial time and resources to scheduling and to resolving discovery disputes, as well
as motions to sever, stay, and dismiss).
5.

Length of the Requested Stay

Finally, the Court finds that the length of the requested stay weighs in favor of
denying Defendants’ motion for a stay.

It is well settled that “[s]tays of indefinite

duration are especially discouraged and, because they put the parties effectively out of
court, any order granting such a stay is appealable.” Structural Group, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82266, at *13 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Dover v. Diguglielmo,
181 F. App’x 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a stay of indefinite duration “can
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itself constitute an abuse of discretion”); CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381
F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “an indefinite stay order that unreasonably delays
a plaintiff’s right to have its case heard is appealable”); Cheyney State Coll. Faculty v.
Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 738 (3d Cir. 1983) (“We emphasize that Landis approved stays of
moderate length, and not those of indefinite duration.”); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
723 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying the petitioners’ request for a stay of
indefinite duration).

Because Defendants have not indicated the duration of their

requested stay, the Court concludes that the length of the requested stay weighs in favor
of denying Defendants’ motion for a stay of the trial of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
In sum, because only one factor weighs in favor of a stay, the totality of the
circumstances weighs in favor of denying Defendants’ motion for a stay. Thus, having
examined “the circumstances of the particular case,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433, the Court finds
in its discretion that a stay of this action pending resolution of the arbitration of Plaintiff’s
survival claim would be, on balance, inappropriate.

The Court will therefore deny

Defendants’ request for a stay.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to stay the trial of Plaintiff’s

wrongful death claim will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SYLVIA A. CLOUSER,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-33

)

v.

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)
)

GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR
CARE, LLC, et al.,

)
)
)

Defendants.

)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of August, 2016, upon consideration of Defendants'
motion to stay the trial of Plaintiff's wrongful death claim (ECF No. 56), and in accordance
with the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendants' motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall continue to comply with the
deadlines set forth in the Scheduling Order entered on June 9, 2016. (ECF No. 60.)

BY THE COURT:

~~~

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE