GARDNER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/7/16. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AMY L. GARDNER O/B/O,
C.L.B. (MINOR),
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-49
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 14 and
18). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 15 and 19). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) and denying
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 18).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a minor child, through her mother, brought this action for review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (ACommissioner@) denying her application for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). The alleged
onset date of disability is August 1, 2009. (ECF No. 11-5, p. 12). Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”), Barbara Artuso, held a video hearing on April 16, 2013. (ECF No. 11-2, pp. 35-59). On
August 22, 2013, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 11-2,
pp. 16-29).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 14 and 18).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir.
1986); Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court
would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the
district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
The Social Security Act provides that a child under 18 is “disabled” for purposes of SSI
eligibility if he or she “has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results
in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The Commissioner follows a three-step sequential process in
determining childhood disability: (1) whether the child is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) if
not, whether he or she has a medically determinable severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the
child's severe impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of a set of
criteria for an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. An impairment functionally equals a
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listed impairment if the child has “marked” limitations1 in two domains of functioning or an
“extreme” limitation2 in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a). The six domains are: acquiring and
using information; attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with others; moving
about and manipulating objects; caring for yourself; and health and physical well-being. 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(iv). When evaluating the ability to function in each domain, the ALJ
considers information that will help answer the following questions “about whether your
impairment(s) affect your functioning and whether your activities are typical of other children
your age who do not have impairments”: What activities are you able to perform; What activities
are you not able to perform; Which of your activities are limited or restricted compared to other
children your age who do not have impairments; Where do you have difficulty with your activities
– at home, in childcare, at school, or in the community; Do you have difficulty independently
initiating, sustaining, or completing activities; and What kind of help do you need to do your
activities, how much help do you need, and how often do you need it.
20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(b)(2)(i)-(vi).
In this case, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff has severe impairments,3 Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or
functionally equals the severity of a set of criteria for an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
§416.924. (ECF No. 11-2, pp. 19-33). As a result, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Act.
1
A “marked” limitation “seriously” interferes with a claimant's ability independently to initiate, sustain, or
complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2).
2
An “extreme” limitation “very seriously” interferes with a claimant's ability independently to initiate,
sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3).
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The ALJ found the claimant’s severe impairments to be: migraine headaches and an adjustment disorder
with mixed anxiety and depressed moods. (ECF No. 11-2, p. 19).
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B.
Whether the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff did not meet or
medically equal a Listing
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that Claimant did not meet an
impairment in the Listings, specifically Listing 111.03 (non-convulsive epilepsy). (ECF No. 15, p.
3-7).
To that end, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide any substantive analysis
regarding Listing 111.03 to determine whether Plaintiff actually met or equaled the Listing. Id.
As a result, the Plaintiff essentially argues that there is insufficient discussion for this court to
make a meaningful review and the case should be remanded for full finding by the
Administrative Law Judge with regard to this issue. Id. After careful consideration, I agree.
An applicant is per se disabled if the impairment is equivalent to a listed impairment and,
thus, no further analysis is necessary. Burnett v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000). The Third Circuit has held that:
Putting the responsibility on the ALJ to identify the relevant listed impairment(s) is
consistent with the nature of Social Security disability proceedings which are
“inquisitorial rather than adversarial” and in which “[i]t is the ALJ’s duty to
investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting
benefits.”
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n. 2 (quoting Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000)).
The listing at issue in this case is Listing 111.03 (non-convulsive epilepsy).
Listing
111.03 is met when a child has an established seizure disorder, the occurrence of more than
one minor motor seizure per week, with alteration of awareness or loss of consciousness,
despite at least 3 months of prescribed treatment. In this case, the ALJ fails to engage in any
analysis as to whether Claimant meets this Listing. In two sentences, the ALJ summarily
concludes that “the medical evidence does not contain the objective signs, symptoms or
findings, or the degree of functional limitations, necessary for the claimant’s impairments,
considered singly or in combination, to meet or equal the severity of any sub-section or section
contained in Appendix 1.” (ECF No. 11-2, p. 19). Without more, I find that I cannot engage in
any meaningful review. While I acknowledge that the ALJ discusses the evidence in the next
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section to determine whether Claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that
functionally equals the listing, she fails to make any reference to said evidence in determining if
Claimant actually met or equaled Listing 111.03. It is not for me to speculate that this is the
exact evidence that the ALJ used in making her decision. It is well-established that “[i]f an ALJ
fails to mention probative evidence, then a reviewing court will not be able to determine whether
the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence under §405(g).” McDonnell v. Astrue,
Civ. A. No. 10-222, 2010 WL 3938259 at *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010).
Consequently, I find that the ALJ’s failure to discuss any of the evidence in support of
her conclusion that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments necessitates a remand
to the Commission for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ should set forth and analyze
the evidence of record used in making her determination that Claimant did not meet Listing
§111.03.4
An appropriate order shall follow.
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Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred when he found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equal the listing. (ECF No. 15, pp. 8-11). Because I am
remanding this matter as to whether Plaintiff meets a listing, I refrain from making a decision at this time
on the issue of whether the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equal the listing.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AMY L. GARDNER O/B/O,
C.L.B. (MINOR),
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-49
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 7th day of March, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 14) is granted and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 18) is denied.
It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby
vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the
foregoing opinion.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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