CURRY v. CO. LANGLEY et al
Filing
51
ORDER granting 36 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to the extent that the individual DOC Defendants are barred from suit pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata and the PA DOC is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; granting 40 Motion to Dismiss only to the extent that Wexford Health Services is entitled to dismissal; dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Kaufman and Dr. Mahmud pursuant to the Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for fai lure to state a claim as they are barred from suit pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata; this case is dismissed with prejudice; the Clerk shall mark this case closed; plaintiff has 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on December 18, 2015. (kcc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KENDALL CURRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CO LANGLEY, PA MILLER, PA
KAUFMAN, UNIT MANAGER
FRAZIER, PA WIEMER, PHD MS.
MAHMUD, FORMER
SUPERINTENDENT ROZUM,
CHCA MR. HYDE, PA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WEXLER HEALTH SERVICES,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 15 – 54J
Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
ECF Nos. 36, 40
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kendall Curry (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset (“SCI-Somerset”). He
initiated this prisoner civil rights action on March 3, 2015, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
claims asserted in his Complaint arise out of a slip and fall that occurred at SCI-Somerset on
May 6, 2013. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff attached several exhibits to his Complaint, including a
series of grievances (ECF No. 3-1), declarations by other inmates (ECF No. 3-2), and documents
pertaining to a previous action he filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (ECF
No. 3-3.) Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), (ECF Nos. 36, 40), and Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to both Motions, (ECF
Nos. 44, 46). The Motions are now ripe for review.
1
I.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
The following allegations are contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Around 11:30 a.m. on May 6, 2013, Plaintiff responded to the call for mainline cafeteria.
(ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 16, 18.) Plaintiff states that he walked down the steps and slipped “on the
undry wax and water on the floor.” Id. at ¶ 16. According to Plaintiff, almost everyone on the
unit witnessed the fall, including the block officer, CO Langley. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff blames CO
Langley for waxing the day room floor at 10:30 a.m. that day and describes this as a “poor
decision” and that it was more than negligence because he knew or should have known that
10:30 a.m. is designated for inmate movement to the cafeteria. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff states that in
contrast to what “the officer claims” there were no warning signs posted. Id. at ¶ 15.
Plaintiff alleges that the officers did not allow him to go to medical until after count had
cleared, which was at approximately 1:00 p.m., and at which time Plaintiff’s ankle was so
swollen that it would no longer fit into his shoe. Id. at ¶ 18. Once count cleared, Plaintiff was
allowed to “limp up to the medical department with no assistance besides the help of inmate
Wyatt.” Id. at ¶ 19. At medical, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Miller1 and PA Kaufman. Id. at ¶
20. He claims that Nurse Miller filled out an incident report but did not conduct any type of
examination and denied his request for pain medication. Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff then saw PA
Kaufman at approximately 1:30 p.m. Id. at ¶ 22. He claims that PA Kaufman also failed to
conduct an examination but issued him crutches, an ice bag and an ankle sleeve. Id. at ¶ 22.
Plaintiff claims that the ankle sleeve did not fit because of the swelling but PA Kaufman told him
there was nothing else they could do for him. Id.
1
Plaintiff identifies Ms. Miller as a PA (physician assistant) but Defendants advise that she is a
LPN.
2
The following day, Plaintiff was called to medical for an X-ray. Id. at ¶ 23. Once again
he requested and was denied pain medication. Id. The X-ray revealed a fracture and Plaintiff
was brought back to medical where he was seen by Dr. Mahmud who recommended that he be
placed in the infirmary to await a walking boot. Id. Plaintiff again requested pain medication
but was told by Dr. Mahmud that the medication would be handed out in the infirmary at 4:00
p.m., approximately one-and-a-half hours later. Id. at ¶ 24.
In the infirmary, Nurse Wiemer2 informed Plaintiff that she would be the nurse providing
him medical assistance. Id. at ¶ 25. Days later, on May 13, 2013, Plaintiff informed Nurse
Wiemer that his foot was bumping into stationary objects, which was causing him pain, so he
requested to have his ankle wrapped. Id. at ¶ 26. Two days later, on May 15, 2013, Plaintiff was
seen by Dr. Mahmud and told that Nurse Wiemer would wrap his ankle until his boot arrived.
Id. at ¶ 27. The next day, on May 16, 2013, Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Wiemer who said she was
aware of Dr. Mahmud’s decision to wrap his ankle but had not yet had time to get around to
doing it. Id. at ¶ 28. That same day, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining of inadequate
medical care for his fractured ankle. Id. at ¶ 30. He complained that he had yet to receive any
medical treatment for his ankle, except for Motrin three times a day, and complained that his
ankle was never realigned, wrapped, or casted. Id. Plaintiff was released from the infirmary on
May 18, 2013, with crutches but without the walking boot. Id. at ¶ 31. However, the walking
boot arrived the following day. Id. at ¶ 32.
Plaintiff had another X-ray on July 2, 2013, and, on July 16, 2013, Dr. Mahmud informed
Plaintiff that the bone had not yet healed and also that she detected a separate lesion on the bone
that could possibly be cancer, a tumor or a cyst. Id. She told Plaintiff that this required further
2
Plaintiff also identifies Ms. Wiemer as a PA but Defendants advise that she is a retired RN.
3
tests. Id. Additional X-rays were taken on August 7, 2013, August 21, 2013 and September 24,
2013. Id. at ¶ 33.
Plaintiff saw cancer specialist, Dr. Malholtra, on October 3, 2013, who recommended
that Plaintiff see an Orthopedic and have a MRI. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35. Plaintiff had a MRI and bone
imagery test performed on October 14, 2013, and October 29, 2013, respectively. Id. at ¶ 36.
Petitioner was admitted to the infirmary on December 15, 2013. Id. at ¶ 38. The
following day, he requested pain medication from PA Lottig who told Plaintiff that there was no
pain medication ordered for him. Id. Later that day, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining
about the denial of pain medication. Id.
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiff was taken to Johnstown Medical Center for a biopsy on
the bone cyst. Id. at ¶ 39.
In response to a sick call slip, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Wilson on February 27, 2014. Id.
at ¶ 40. Plaintiff complained about the pain in his ankle and Dr. Wilson advised that Plaintiff
report his pain to Dr. Mahmud because he was only filling in, but Dr. Wilson did order additional
X-rays and recommended that Plaintiff be scheduled to see an Orthopedic. Id. Those additional
X-rays were taken the following day, on February 28, 2014. Id. at ¶ 41. In response to another
sick call slip, Plaintiff was given an X-ray on March 28, 2014. Id. at ¶ 42.
On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Robinson who prescribed him Ibuprofen. Id.
Plaintiff had another X-ray on April 21, 2014. Id. On May 13, 2014, Plaintiff was
informed by PA Playcia that all his X-rays were sent to the Orthopedic. Id. at ¶ 44.
On May 22, 2014, Dr. Mahmud advised, per the Orthopedic, that the fracture had healed
and therefore Plaintiff no longer needed the crutches and walking boot. Id. Plaintiff continued
4
to complain of pain over the next couple of months, and, on July 16, 2014, Dr. Wilson prescribed
him Ibuprofen and physical therapy. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 46.
II.
Standard of Review
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aptly summarized the
standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward
with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for
relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations
that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l
Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117–18 (3d
Cir.2013).
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than
when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and
draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v.
Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a §1983 action, the court must “apply the
applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d
244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this
is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently
5
alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at
688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc.,
296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).
The court must allow amendment by the plaintiff in civil rights cases brought under §
1983 before dismissing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), irrespective of whether it is requested, unless
doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.
2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), the
district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile).
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff’s claims are as follows: (a) Against CO Langley: (1) deliberate indifference to
inmate safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and (2) negligence
under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(4). (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 50, 51.); (b) Against Nurse Miller and PA
Kaufman: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and (2) medical malpractice. (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 52, 53.); (c)
Against Dr. Mahmud and Nurse Weimer: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and (2) medical malpractice. (ECF
No. 3 at ¶¶ 54, 55.); (d) Against Dr. Frazier: (1) violation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 3 at ¶ 56.); (e) Against Rozum: (1) violation of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 56,
57.); (f) Against CHCA Hyde: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 58, 60.); and (g) Against the
6
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections: (1) deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 59, 60.)
1.
Res judicata
The claims against Miller, Kaufman, Mahmud, Weimer, Hyde, Langley, Frazier and
Rozum are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which consists of two preclusion concepts:
issue preclusion and claim preclusion. With respect to these Defendants, Plaintiff filed a
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County that involved the same issues in
this case and that was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Klementik on April 21, 2014, in
connection with the denial of his motion for in forma pauperis status. See (Memorandum and
Order dated 4/21/14, ECF No. 3-3 at pp.1-6.)3 Plaintiff’s appeal of that decision was dismissed
by the Commonwealth Court in a per curiam decision dated September 22, 2014. See
(Commonwealth Docket Sheet for 1394 CD 2014, Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 37-1 at pp.8-12.)
Judge Klemenitk’s Pa. R.A.P. 1925 Opinion outlines the allegations that were contained
in Plaintiff’s state court complaint, and it leaves no doubt that the claims, issues and parties were
virtually identical to the instant action. See (Pa. R.A.P. 1925 Opinion dated 7/26/14, Defs.’ Ex.
1, ECF No. 37-1 at pp.1-7.)
3
Not only did Plaintiff attach to his Complaint documents relating to his prior state court action
(ECF No. 3-3), but this Court may also take judicial notice of these documents because they are
matter of public record, see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the
allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public
record.”).
7
a. The applicable law
The Full Faith and Credit Clause4 of the United States Constitution requires the courts of
one State to give preclusive effect to the judgments rendered by the courts of another State.
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942). “A final judgment in one State, if
rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by
the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land” and “gains nationwide force.”
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). Federal courts are not
constitutionally required to give preclusive effect to the judgments issued by state tribunals.
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 n.24 (1982) (remarking that federal
courts are “not included within the constitutional provision”). However, when a judgment is
rendered by a state court, federal courts are statutorily required to accord that judgment
preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The applicable statutory language provides that “[t]he
Acts of legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States . . . shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. “This statute has long been understood to
encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or ‘claim preclusion,’ and collateral estoppel, or ‘issue
preclusion.’” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336
(2005). A federal court must give a judgment issued by a state court the same preclusive effect
that it would be accorded in the courts of the relevant state. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama
Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986).
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S.
CONST., Art. IV, § 1.
4
8
When federal courts are called upon to give preclusive effect to prior state court
judgments, the governing law in such cases is the state law of preclusion from the state of the
prior state court judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (full faith and credit statute); Marrese v.
America Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) (“The statute [i.e.,
Section 1738] directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment
was rendered. ‘It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ
their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes
beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State
from which the judgment is taken.’”); Hillary v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 123 F.3d 1041, 1043
(8th Cir. 1997) (“. . . ‘it is fundamental that the res judicata effect of the first forum’s judgment
is governed by the first forum’s law, not by the law of the second forum.’”). As such, federal
law directs this Court to look to Pennsylvania state law in determining the requirements and
effects of the doctrine of res judicata.
b. Final judgment
Courts, including Pennsylvania state courts, have included in the description of res
judicata a requirement that the earlier case have resulted in a “final judgment on the merits.”
See, e.g., Knouse v. W.C.A.B. (G.O.D. Inc.), 886 A.2d 329, 335 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“res
judicata provides that, when a final judgment on the merits exists, a future suit between the
parties on the same cause of action is precluded.”). However, a “final judgment on the merits” is
not an inflexible requirement. Bearoff v. Bearoff Brothers, Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 75 (Pa. 1974)
(“While the general rule for either collateral estoppel or res judicata to apply is that a final and
valid judgment must have been entered, . . . this rule is not without exception.”) (citing Kannel v.
Kennedy, 94 F.2d 487, 488 (3d Cir. 1937), which held that “[i]t is the general rule that the
9
doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the absence of a final judgment. There are exceptions,
however, to this rule.”). Moreover, even where the requirement for “a valid final judgment on
the merits” is applicable, what a “final judgment on the merits” means is very broad in
Pennsylvania for purposes of applying res judicata. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Flamini, 445 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“Pennsylvania law takes a broad view on
what constitutes a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of res judicata.”).
In Pennsylvania, the dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim has been held to be
a final judgment on the merits. See Brown v. Conney, 442 A.2d 324, 326 (1982); Coggins v.
Carpenter, 468 F. Supp. 270, 280 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In this case, the Court of Common Pleas of
Somerset County found that Plaintiff “failed to set forth any arguable basis for a cause of action”
and dismissed his case with prejudice. (ECF No. 3-3 at pp. 5-6.) This qualifies as an
adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
c. The applicability of res judicata
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, on the merits, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies,
and as to them constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same cause of
action. In re Weisbrod & Hess Corp., 129 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1942).
As explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded
litigation from subsequently asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or
could have been raised, in the previous adjudication. R/S Financial Corporation
v. Kovalchick, 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. 1998). The doctrine of res judicata
developed to shield parties from the burden of re-litigating a claim with the same
parties, or a party in privity with an original litigant, and to protect the judiciary
from the corresponding inefficiency and confusion that re-litigation of a claim
would breed. Id.
10
Wilkes v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 376 (Pa. 2006) (emphasis added). In
order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply under Pennsylvania law, the two actions must
share the following four conditions: “(1) the thing sued upon or for; (2) the cause of action; (3)
the persons and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued.”
Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Bearoff, 327
A.2d 72 (1974)). While these four prongs are to be analyzed, the courts of Pennsylvania have
cautioned against giving them a too literal interpretation. See, e.g., Radakovich v. Radakovich,
846 A.2d 709, 715 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“The purpose behind the doctrine, which bars the relitigation of issues that either were raised or could have been raised in the prior proceedings, are
to conserve limited judicial resources, establish certainty and respect for court judgments . . . . In
keeping with these purposes, the doctrine must be liberally construed and applied without
technical restriction.”). In accordance with the purpose of the doctrine, the Court considers the
four prongs.
As to the first prong, described as the “identity of the thing sued upon” or “identity of
subject matter,”5 the Court finds that the “thing sued for” in both the Somerset County lawsuit
and the present lawsuit are the same; the fall Plaintiff sustained on May 6, 2013, and subsequent
medical care thereafter. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“Isolating the alleged wrongful act is critical to the first requirement [of res judicata] – identity
of subject matter. In this case, a single event, the November 1, 1985 discharge, gave rise to both
state and federal actions. Because that same occurrence underlies both suits, the first prerequisite
of claim preclusion is met.”); O’Brien v. Valley Forge Specialized Educational, No. 03-3984,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20655, 2004 WL 2316425, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004) (“When the
In re Estate of Tower, 343 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. 1975) (describing the first prong as “identity of
the thing or subject matter sued for”).
5
11
‘same occurrence underlies both suits,’ this requirement [of identity of the thing sued upon] is
met.”); Jett v. Beech Interplex, Inc., No. 02-9131, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352, 2004 WL
1588230, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2004) (“The first factor for this Court to consider is the
similarity of the thing sued upon in both Jett I and Jett II. In this case, the operative facts and the
subject matter of this action are identical to the prior State Court proceedings . . . . Thus, this
Court concludes that the first element of the res judicata doctrine is satisfied.”) (citations
omitted); RegScan, Inc. v. Brewer, No. 04-6043, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6412, 2006 WL
401852, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (“in comparing the ‘thing sued upon’ in the state and
federal actions, the Court concludes that based on all of the above, the operative facts and the
subject matter are closely aligned, and the first element of the res judicata doctrine is
satisfied.”).6 The facts and subject matter of this action are the same as Plaintiff’s prior state
court lawsuit. Therefore, this prong is satisfied.
As to the second prong, the “identity of the cause of action”, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that, applying res judicata to a prior Pennsylvania state court decision, as this
Court is now, “res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Davis v. United States Steel Supply,
688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Greenberg v. Potomac Health Sys., 869 F. Supp. 328,
331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“Whether a cause of action is the same depends on the ‘essential similarity
of the underlying events,’ rather than on the specific legal theories invoked.’”); McArdle v.
Tonetti, 627 A.2d 1219, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“As to the identity of cause[s] of action,
rather than resting upon the specific legal theory invoked, res judicata generally is thought to
turn on the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”).
All of the preceding federal cases cited in this section, addressing the “identity of issues,” were
construing Pennsylvania law of res judicata.
6
12
Here, the underlying events giving rise to Plaintiff’s various legal claims in this case are identical
to those in his prior state court lawsuit. Therefore, this prong is satisfied.
As to the third and fourth prongs, “identity of parties and capacities”, the Court finds that
these prongs are satisfied as to all Defendants named in this lawsuit except for the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Services, who were not parties to Plaintiff’s state
court lawsuit.
To summarize, the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County issued a final judgment
on the merits in Plaintiff’s case when they dismissed it for failure to state a cause of action.
Additionally, the four conditions that must be satisfied in order for the doctrine of res judicata to
apply have easily been met in this case. Thus, Defendants Langley, Miller, Kaufman, Frazier,
Wiemer, Dr. Mahmud, Rozum and Hyde are all entitled to dismissal from this action with
prejudice.7
2.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Plaintiff’s claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In 1890, the Supreme Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits by citizens against their own state. See Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890). As a result, private parties may not sue a state or state agency by name in
federal court unless Congress validly abrogates state sovereign immunity or the state waives its
immunity. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
In response to the Defendants’ res judicata argument, Plaintiff maintains that he was not given
a “full and fair hearing in state court” because he was not afforded the opportunity to amend his
complaint to state a cognizable claim. See ECF No. 44 at p.4. However, there is nothing in the
elements of res judicata that mandates a state court give the right to amend a defective complaint
or prohibits its application in the event that the state court does not allow for amendment.
7
13
State sovereign immunity also extends to state agencies. Id. It is well settled that the
Department of Corrections is an agency or arm of the state, and therefore, entitled to the same
Eleventh Amendment immunity which the Commonwealth enjoys.8 See Lavia v. Pennsylvania,
Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department of the
Commonwealth, see Pa. Stat.Ann., tit. 71 § 61, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity.”) Here, the Commonwealth did not consent to suit and Congress has not
abrogated its sovereign immunity. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Moreover, as a state agency, the Department of
Corrections is not a “person” and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). For these reasons, they will be dismissed from
this action with prejudice.
3.
Wexford Health Services9
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegations directly related to Wexford Health Services
apart from identifying it as the medical provider at SCI-Somerset. See ECF No. 3 at ¶ 12. In
fact, Wexford is not mentioned anywhere in the Complaint except for this one instance. As a
consequence, Wexford seeks dismissal because Plaintiff is attempting to establish their liability
on the grounds of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, which is impermissible. See Natale
v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (because respondeat superior
and vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a corporation under
8
Plaintiff has sued each named Defendant in their official capacity in addition to their individual
capacity, but the agency’s immunity also extends to individual defendants sued in their “official”
capacities. See O’Donnell v. Department of Corrections, 790 F.Supp.2d 289, 305 (M.D. Pa.
2011).
9
Plaintiff incorrectly identifies this Defendant as “Wexler Health Services”.
14
contract with the state cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those
theories).
A private corporation acting on behalf of the state, such as Wexford Health Services, may
be held liable under section 1983 only where it has instituted a policy or custom that caused the
Plaintiff’s constitutional injury. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84.
Here, there are no allegations that Wexford had an affirmative policy or custom that
caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury. Therefore, they are entitled to dismissal.
4.
Defendants PA Kaufman and Dr. Mahmud
Counsel for Defendants Dr. Mahmud, PA Kaufman and Wexford Health Services filed
only a Partial Motion to Dismiss, failing to argue that two of his clients, Dr. Mahud and PA
Kaufman, are barred from suit pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. However, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), federal courts are granted the authority to sua sponte
dismiss claims in in forma pauperis proceedings if the court determines that a claim is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)(iii). Plaintiff requested and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus, this
Court has the authority to sua sponte dismiss his claims against Defendants PA Kaufman and Dr.
Mahmud for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim because, like the individual Department of
Corrections Defendants, they too are barred from suit pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
See, supra, § III.1.
5.
Amendment of Complaint
The court must allow amendment by the plaintiff in civil rights cases brought under §
1983 before dismissing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), irrespective of whether it is requested, unless
15
doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.
2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), the
district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile). We
are cognizant of these holdings, but find that allowing for amendment by Plaintiff would be
futile. A careful review of the record commands that Plaintiff, even garnering all the liberalities
that accompany his pro se status, fails to state any claims under § 1983 for which relief may be
granted.
The following Order is now entered.
AND NOW this 18th day of December, 2015;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed Defendants Langley,
Miller, Frazier, Wiemer, Rozum, Hyde and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (ECF
No. 36) is GRANTED to the extent that the individual Defendants are barred from suit pursuant
to the doctrine of res judicata and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Kaufman, Dr. Mahmud, and Wexford Health Services (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED only to the
extent that Wexford Health Services is entitled to dismissal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court’s authority under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Defendants Kaufman and Dr. Mahmud are dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim against them as they are barred from suit pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice and the
Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED.
16
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to file a notice of appeal as provided by
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge
Cc:
Kendall Curry
HG-8533
SCI Somerset
1600 Walters Mill Road
Somerset, PA 15510
(Via First Class U.S. Mail)
All counsel of record
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?