TINGSTROM v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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ORDER granting 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the case is remanded for further evaluation in light of this Order. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 9/29/2016. (lwp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DECTER RYAN TINGSTROM,
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) Civil Action No. 15-130-J
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Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12), filed in the above-captioned matter on December
11, 2015,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.
AND, further, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 10), filed in the above-captioned matter on November 13, 2015,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, this matter is
hereby remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for further
evaluation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in light of this Order.
I.
Background
On August 22, 2013, Decter Ryan Tingstrom protectively filed a claim for Supplemental
Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.
Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that he became disabled on March 24, 2000, due to a mood
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disorder, psychosis, a learning disorder, cluster “B” personality traits, and a history of brain
injury (at age 6). (R. 162).
After being denied initially on January 7, 2014, Plaintiff sought, and obtained, a hearing
on June 30, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 32-60). In a decision dated
September 11, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits. (R. 16-31). The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision on March 4, 2015. (R. 1-6). Plaintiff filed a
timely appeal with this Court, and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings and the transcript of
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “‘[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g))); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that the court has plenary review of all legal issues, and reviews the administrative law judge's
findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate’” to support a conclusion. Plummer v.
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir.
1995)). However, a “‘single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.’”
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110,
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114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “’Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—
particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really
constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.’” Id.
A disability is established when the claimant can demonstrate “some ‘medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any substantial
gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period.’” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (internal citation omitted)). “A claimant is
considered unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity ‘only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .’” Id. at 39 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
The Social Security Administration has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability as defined
by the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In Step One, the Commissioner must determine whether
the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If
so, the disability claim will be denied. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If not,
the second step of the process is to determine whether the claimant is suffering from a severe
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). “An impairment or combination of impairments is not
severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). If the claimant fails to show that his or her
impairments are “severe," he or she is ineligible for disability benefits. If the claimant does have
a severe impairment, however, the Commissioner must proceed to Step Three and determine
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whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the criteria for a listed impairment. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If a claimant meets a listing, a finding of disability is automatically
directed. If the claimant does not meet a listing, the analysis proceeds to Steps Four and Five.
Step Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(e), and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to this
past relevant work, see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). If the claimant is
unable to resume his or her former occupation, the evaluation then moves to the fifth and final
step.
At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate
that the claimant is capable of performing other available work in the national economy in order
to deny a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). In making this determination, the ALJ
should consider the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience. See id. The ALJ
must further analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining
whether he or she is capable of performing work and is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923.
III.
The ALJ's Decision
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial
gainful activity since August 22, 2013. (R. 21). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff met the
second requirement of the process insofar as he had certain severe impairments, particularly,
specific learning disability, cognitive disorder, mood disorder, psychosis, attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder, history of marijuana abuse in partial remission, cluster B personality
traits, schizoaffective disorder, insomnia, and migraine headaches. (R. 21). The ALJ concluded
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that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet any of the listings that would satisfy Step Three.
(R. 21-24).
The ALJ next found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with certain non-exertional limitations, including that he is limited to no
exposure to pulmonary irritants, and no exposure to hazardous conditions including unprotected
heights and dangerous machinery; is limited to unskilled work consisting of simple, routine tasks
involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple, work-related decisions with few
workplace changes; is limited to no work at production rate, fast pace, or quota standards; and is
limited to occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. (R. 24-27). At
Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, so he moved
on to Step Five. (R. 27). The ALJ then used a vocational expert (“VE”) to determine whether or
not a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
The VE testified that, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff
could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as box bender,
hand packer, night stock clerk, and equipment cleaner. (R. 27-28, 55-56). Accordingly, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 28).
IV. Legal Analysis
Plaintiff argues, in essence, that her RFC is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of consultative examining psychologist
Charles Kennedy, Ph.D. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not provide an
adequate explanation for his decision to give “no weight” to Dr. Kennedy’s opinion that Plaintiff
has “marked” limitations social functioning, particularly in his ability to interact appropriately
with supervisors, co-workers and the public. (R. 26). The Court finds that, because the ALJ
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failed to address properly these particular social limitations, the Court cannot find that the ALJ’s
formulation of Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will
remand the case for further consideration.
RFC is defined as “‘that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations
caused by his or her impairment(s).’” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40 (quoting Burnett v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). Not only
must an ALJ consider all relevant evidence in determining an individual’s RFC, the RFC finding
“must ‘be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.’”
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)). “‘[A]n
examiner’s findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where
appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate
factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision.’”
Id. (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996)
(“The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports
each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical
evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).”).
In his discussion of the opinion expressed by Dr. Kennedy in December, 2013, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Kennedy had indicated, among other things, that Plaintiff had “‘marked’
limitations in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, make
judgments in complex work-related decisions, interact appropriately with the public, supervisors,
and co-workers, and respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine
work setting.” (R. 26, 358-59). Although the ALJ admittedly gave “partial” weight to the
limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform complex tasks, he gave “no weight” to Dr. Kennedy’s
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finding of “marked” limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public, supervisors, and
co-workers because, as he explained, “they are entirely inconsistent with the claimant’s ability to
perform personal care, go outside daily, walk by himself, go out alone, and go shopping in
stores, and [certain] high GAF scores.” (R. 26).
The Court notes that, in explaining why he gave no weight to Dr. Kennedy’s findings of
marked limitations, most of the factors listed by the ALJ are not actually related to the social
functioning limitations he is rejecting. In fact, as Plaintiff points out in his brief, three of the
factors that the ALJ listed—performing personal care, going out alone, and walking by
himself—are solitary activities by definition, and two of the factors—going outside daily and
Plaintiff’s GAF scores—are not necessarily inconsistent with a marked limitation in social
functioning. (R. 26). In fact, the only factor the ALJ listed that is obviously related to social
functioning is going shopping in stores. (R. 26). Nevertheless, while Plaintiff did state in his
function report that he shops for food weekly for three hours, it is not clear to the Court that the
existence of this factor alone sufficiently justifies the ALJ’s complete rejection of Dr. Kennedy’s
finding of marked limitations. (R. 177). Since the ALJ did not provide further explanation as to
the evidence he relied upon in the record in reaching his conclusions, nor is it clear how the
factors he listed are relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to perform the social functions at issue, the
Court finds that the ALJ’s decision lacked adequate discussion and clarity to explain his
findings. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis is simply insufficient to permit
meaningful review.
Accordingly, in this case, without providing an explanation of the basis upon which he
rejected the social limitations at issue in Dr. Kennedy’s opinion, it is not clear to the Court
whether the ALJ’s decision in this regard was based on substantial evidence. While the ALJ was
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certainly not required to simply adopt all of the findings of Dr. Kennedy, he was required to
explain adequately his basis for rejecting them if he chose to do so. Thus, the ALJ’s comments
concerning the marked social limitations contained in Dr. Kennedy’s opinion do not allow the
Court to determine the basis for his decision to give “no weight” to that portion of the opinion.
Remand is therefore required to allow for further discussion regarding the rationale for rejecting
the marked limitations as to Plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers found by Dr. Kennedy.
Additionally, the ALJ should, of course, ensure that proper weight be accorded to the
various opinions and medical evidence presented in the record, and he should verify that his
conclusions concerning Plaintiff’s RFC are adequately explained, in order to eliminate the need
for any future remand. Indeed, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s RFC
determination regarding Plaintiff’s impairments could, in fact, be supported by the record. It is,
instead, the need for further explanation that mandates the remand on this issue.
V.
Conclusion
In short, the record simply does not permit the Court to determine whether the ALJ’s
determination of Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence, and, accordingly, the
Court finds that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision in this case. The Court
hereby remands this case to the ALJ for reconsideration consistent with this Order.
s/ Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:
Counsel of record
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