WILLIAMS et al v. CITY OF JOHNSTOWN

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 3/17/2016. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD S. WILLIAMS and DONNA
WILLIAMS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF JOHNSTOWN,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-144
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

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Memorandum Opinion and Order
I.

Introduction
This case arises from the condemnation of two rental homes owned by Plaintiffs.

Presently before this Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendant City of Johnstown. (ECF No. 2.)
For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
Complaint.
II.

Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1331 and 1343. The Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
III.

Background
Plaintiffs initiated the instant action by filing an eight-count complaint in the Court of

Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania, on April 17, 2015. (ECF No. 1-1.) Defendant
timely removed the action to this Court on May 19, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege the
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following facts in the complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the sole purpose of
deciding the pending motion.
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, own two rental homes located at 709 Sherman Street and at
709 ½ Sherman Street, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 1-3.) The two rental homes
are not attached to one another. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs received rental income for these two homes,
and kept the homes in good condition. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.)
On or about March 4, 2014, the City of Johnstown’s Bureau of Code Enforcement
Inspector, Mr. Leroy Palov, Code Enforcement Officer, went to the rental units at 709 Sherman
Street and 709 ½ Sherman Street. (Id. ¶ 8.) The stated reason for his visit was that the porch roof
on one of the units had fallen. (Id.) During this visit, the Code Enforcement Officer placed
condemnation signs on both the 709 Sherman Street and the 709 ½ Sherman Street rental units.
(Id. ¶ 4.) After having been told that the Code Enforcement Officer smelled gas, the renters at
709 Sherman Street and at 709 ½ Sherman Street were ordered to leave the homes. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.)
The Code Enforcement Officer also contacted the water, gas, electric, and other utility
companies and demanded that those utilities be shut off. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiffs did not receive a notice of violations of either rental home prior to the
condemnation. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs received notice of the reasons for the condemnation on
August 6, 2014, from the City of Johnstown Code Enforcement Officer. (Id.) Plaintiffs have not
been compensated for the condemnation of the homes. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Since the date on which the rental homes were vacated and condemned, the pipes have
burst due to lack of heat, and trespassers have caused damage to the homes. (Id. ¶ 14.) Damage
to the 709 ½ Street unit is so severe that Plaintiffs may be required to build a new home in its
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place. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendant has prevented Plaintiffs from fixing the damage at the homes. (Id. ¶
15.)
In Counts I and II of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims for unlawful takings in
violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. (Id. ¶¶ 17-27.) In support thereof,
Plaintiffs allege that they own the rental homes at 709 Sherman Street and at 709 ½ Sherman
Street. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 24.) Plaintiffs aver that they received rental income for these homes and kept
them in good condition. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant condemned the homes,
ordered all residents to leave, ordered all utilities to be shut down, and did so without giving
Plaintiffs proper notice, compensation, or opportunity to be heard. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 26.) Plaintiffs
therefore assert that Defendant’s actions constitute an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiffs’
property without just compensation, in violation of the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 27.)
In Counts III and VIII of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims for invasion of privacy.
(Id. ¶¶ 28-33, 61-65.) In support thereof, Plaintiffs aver that the Code Inspector for the City of
Johnstown, with the aid of the Johnstown City Police, entered the homes at 709 and 709 ½
Sherman Street without a warrant, without notice to Plaintiffs, without permission or license,
and with force, on or about March 4, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 62-65.) Plaintiffs assert that because the
Inspector entered the homes without following the ordinances and regulations that govern such
inspections, Defendant has violated the Constitutional rights of privacy in the home. (Id. ¶¶ 3133, 65.)
In Count IV of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant violated their due process
rights under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 34-38.) In support
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thereof, Plaintiffs aver that they have a right to a hearing when a life, liberty, or property
interest is at stake. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiffs assert that in this case, they were never given a hearing or
the ability to be heard after the condemnation of their homes on or about March 14, 2014, which
implicates a property interest. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Plaintiffs state that they have therefore been
deprived of their constitutional due process right under the 14th Amendment. (Id. ¶ 38.)
In Count V of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for negligent inspection. (Id. ¶¶ 3950.) In support thereof, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants Code Enforcement Officers inspected the
properties at 709 and 709 ½ Sherman Street on or about March 4, 2014, for the purpose of
inspecting a reportedly collapsed roof, but Plaintiffs state that the porch roof had not collapsed.
(Id. ¶¶ 40-42.) Plaintiffs allege that the Inspector stated that there was a gas leak, and shut off
the utilities at the properties and placed condemnation signs on the homes. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs
allege that on or about August 26, 2014, they received a letter from Defendant stating that the
reason for the condemnation was the need for flooring repairs, ceiling repairs, electrical issues,
and smoke detector and fire extinguisher issues, along with mentions about the cabinets and
sinks. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiffs state that this letter did not mention gas leaks. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs
assert that Defendant had a duty to inform Plaintiffs of the violations and to provide Plaintiffs
with time to remedy any such violations, but that Defendant failed to provide notice or an
opportunity for Plaintiffs to remedy any issues. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Plaintiffs aver that they suffered
damages, loss of income, and property damage to the homes as a result of the utilities having
been shut off. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)
In Count VI of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for conversion. (Id. ¶¶ 51-55.)
Plaintiffs allege that the condemnation of the homes at 709 and 709 ½ Sherman Street, without
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notification or an opportunity for Plaintiffs to remedy any violations, resulted in damages to
both properties. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) Plaintiffs aver that the damages resulting from Defendant’s
actions have rendered the properties unusable to Plaintiffs and unable to be repaired. (Id. ¶ 51.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs of the use of their properties
and has committed conversion. (Id. ¶ 52.)
In Count VII of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for trespass. (Id. ¶¶ 56-60.) In
support thereof, Plaintiffs aver that the Inspector entered the property located at 709 and 709 ½
Sherman Street without a license, warning to Plaintiffs, or permission. (Id. ¶¶ 58-59.) Plaintiffs
allege that such actions constitute a trespass. (Id. ¶ 60.)
On May 27, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a brief in support of the
motion. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on August 10, 2015.
(ECF No. 9.) The parties have fully briefed the Court on the pending motion, and the matter is
now ripe for adjudication.
IV.

Applicable law
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint or any portion of a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although the federal
pleading standard has been “in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years,” the standard of
review for a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge is now well established. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 209 (3d Cir. 2009).
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In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must conduct a two-part
analysis. First, the court must separate the factual matters averred from the legal conclusions
asserted. See id. at 210. Second, the court must determine whether the factual matters averred
are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint need not include “‘detailed factual
allegations.’” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, the court must construe the alleged facts, and draw all inferences gleaned
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 228 (citing Worldcom,
Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). However, “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action…do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Rather, the complaint must present sufficient “‘factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Sheridan v. NGK
Metals Corp. 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Ultimately, whether a plaintiff has pleaded a “plausible claim for relief is a “contextspecific” inquiry that requires the district court to “draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The relevant record under consideration includes the complaint
and any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” U.S. Express Lines,
Ltd. V. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the district court must permit a curative amendment, irrespective of whether a plaintiff

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seeks leave to amend, unless such amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d
at 236; see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
V.

Discussion
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient because it fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for
Fifth Amendment unlawful takings and for violation of procedural due process fail because
Plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of the procedure provided under state law for seeking
compensation in the event of a legal or de facto condemnation. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 4, 7.) Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution similarly fail
because Plaintiffs did not avail themselves of the remedies afforded under Pennsylvania’s
Eminent Domain Code, and because there is no private cause of action for monetary damages
for violations of Pennsylvania constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’
state-law claims for negligent inspection, trespass, conversion, and invasion of privacy also fail
because the City is immune from such claims. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Accordingly, Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims for Unlawful Takings in Violation of the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
Defendant states that Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ complaint must fail. Defendant argues
that Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful takings under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated to the
states by the 14th Amendment, are insufficient because the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Code provides procedures through which a land-owner may seek just compensation for the
taking of property. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 3-4; ECF No. 3 at 5-6.) Defendant argues that because
Plaintiffs failed to allege that they availed themselves of this procedure or that they were denied
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just compensation through this procedure, their Fifth Amendment claims must be dismissed.
(ECF No. 2 ¶ 4; ECF No. 3 at 5-6.)

Similarly, Defendant states that Plaintiffs’ claims for

violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution must fail because Plaintiffs did not avail themselves
of the remedies afforded under Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 5; ECF No.
3 at 6-7.) Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Pennsylvania
Constitution must fail because there is no private cause of action for monetary damages for
violations of Pennsylvania constitutional rights. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 5; ECF No. 3 at 7.) The Court
agrees with Defendant, and will dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
proscribes the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const.
amends. V, XIV. Compensation need not be paid in advance of the taking; rather, “all that is
required is that a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation exist
at the time of the taking.” Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
recognized that “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has used the procedure
and been denied just compensation.” Id. at 195.
Pennsylvania provides inverse condemnation procedures in its Eminent Domain Code.
See 26 Pa. C.S.A. § 101 et seq. The provisions of Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code provide
that a condemnee is entitled to just compensation when his property has been taken, injured, or
destroyed. See 26 Pa. C.S.A. § 701. The Code also provides a procedure by which a property
owner may pursue relief for the taking of his property. See Pa. C.S.A. § 502. Through this
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procedure, a landowner may request the appointment of viewers to declare that a taking has
occurred and to ascertain just compensation. See 26 Pa. C.S.A. § 502(c).
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they pursued their takings claims using the procedure
provided under Pennsylvania law. Nor do they allege that they were denied just compensation
through that procedure. Plaintiffs’ complaint therefore fails to state a claim for an unlawful
taking under the United States Constitution. Because the claims for violations of the United
States Constitution set forth in Counts I and II of the complaint are not ripe for review by this
Court, they will be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to refile the claims if and
when they can allege that they have availed themselves of the procedures provided under
Pennsylvania law and have been denied just compensation thereunder. See Chainey v. St., 523
F.3d 200, 222 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding District Court reversal of jury verdict and holding that
takings claim was not yet ripe to be heard in federal court because “Pennsylvania provides
adequate process for plaintiffs to obtain just compensation” under its Eminent Domain Code.);
Gelnett v. Township of Chapman, 2015 WL 7454757, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015) (dismissing
takings claim as not ripe for review when Plaintiffs failed to plead any facts indicating that they
had exhausted the procedure under the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania); Baranowski
v. Borough of Palmyra, 868 F.Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing Plaintiffs’ takings claims
and refusing to allow Plaintiffs to amend complaint to include a state law takings claim because
Plaintiffs had not used the state procedure under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code, and
had therefore not been denied just compensation by the state, which precluded the federal court
from deciding any illegal takings claims).

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Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that private property shall
not “be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation
being first made or secured.” PA. CONST. art. I § 10. The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code
expressly states that it provides “a complete and exclusive procedure and law to govern all
condemnations of property for public purposes and the assessment of damages.”26 Pa. C.S.A. §
102(a); see also Ash v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 143 Fed.Appx. 439, 441 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Fulmer v. White Oak Borough, 146 Pa. Cmwlth. 473, 606 A.2d 589, 593-94 (1992)).
Moreover, federal courts regularly hold that there is no private cause of action for monetary
damages for violations of Pennsylvania Constitutional rights. See, e.g., Spell v. Allegheny Cnty.
Admin., 2015 WL 1321695, at *4 (W.D. Pa. March 24, 2015) (“[N]o private cause of action for
damages exists for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”) (citing Pocono Mountain
Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011)); Yunik v. Wetzel,
2014 WL 5426198, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2014) (“no Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no
Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”) (internal quotations omitted); Tirado v. Montgomery Cnty., Pa., 2013
WL 1285487, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss complaint alleging a
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution because there is no private cause of action for money
damages permitted under Pennsylvania law for such a violation); Anderson v. Dauphin Cnty.
Adult Probation Office, 2016 WL 769278, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2016) (collecting cases holding
that there is no private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they exhausted their remedies for
the alleged takings under the procedures provided by Pennsylvania law. Moreover, even if they
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had exhausted these remedies, Plaintiffs seek “compensatory, punitive and any other damages”
as relief for the claims asserted at Counts I and II of the complaint. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3, 4.) Because
the exclusive remedy for an alleged taking in violation of Pennsylvania law is the Eminent
Domain Code, and because there is no private cause of action for money damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violations of the Pennsylvania
takings clause. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Pennsylvania state
Constitution at Counts I and II will be dismissed with prejudice. See Gerner v. Borough of Bruin,
37 Pa.Cmwlth. 271, 273 (1978) (dismissing claim and holding that appellants could not seek
alternative relief and holding that the Eminent Domain Code provides the exclusive remedy for
a taking); Gold v. Summit Tp., 660 A.2d 215, 217-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (recognizing that the
Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code directs that eminent domain proceedings be governed
exclusively by the Code); Tirado, 2013 WL 1285487, at *1-2 (granting motion to dismiss
complaint alleging a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution because there is no private
cause of action for money damages permitted under Pennsylvania law for such a violation).
B. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claim for Violation of Procedural Due Process Under the
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
Defendant argues that Count IV of Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed. Defendant
asserts that to state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process in violation of the 14th
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he or she has taken advantage of the available
processes under state law. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 7.) Here, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs failed to allege
that they used the administrative appeal process available to them. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 7.) Defendant

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argues that this failure to take advantage of the process available to them under the Johnstown
City Code is fatal to Plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment claim. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 7.)
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Fundamental to the due process right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
are notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542
F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The
opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Id. Generally this opportunity to be heard must take place before the deprivation occurs; the
Supreme Court has held, however, that under certain circumstances, a state may satisfy its due
process requirements “by making available some meaningful means by which to assess the
propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking.” Elsmere Park, 542 F.3d at 417
(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ ownership of the 709 and 709 ½ Sherman Street
properties is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The central question
is, therefore, whether Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights in that property interest were
violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the due process
rights of a property owner in the context of the condemnation of an apartment complex in
Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2008). In that case, the court
recognized, as noted above, that generally, a hearing should be held before the government
deprives a person of property. Id. at 417. The court noted, however, that “[w]hen there is the
necessity of quick action by the State, or where providing any meaningful predeprivation
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process would be impractical, the Government is relieved of the usual obligation to provide a
predeprivation hearing.” Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)) (internal
quotations omitted). In Elsmere Park, the Third Circuit determined, at the summary judgment
stage, that under the circumstances in that case, a predeprivation hearing was not required and
that the plaintiff had been provided with an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Id. at 420-23.
Defendant urges this Court to adopt the same reasoning here, and to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim
for a due process violation given their failure to allege that they took advantage of the
postdeprivation remedies available to them.
Although the Court does not agree that it is bound to follow Elsmere Park’s holding and
reasoning, given the distinct procedural posture of that case, the Court does agree that
Plaintiffs’ failure to avail themselves of the administrative remedies available to them is fatal to
their procedural due process claim and will therefore dismiss Count IV of the complaint. The
Third Circuit has applied the Williamson finality rule to procedural due process claims, meaning
that a federal claim for procedural due process is not ripe for review unless and until a
deprivation occurs pursuant to the procedures provided under the local or state code. See Taylor
Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291-93 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting cases from
other federal courts of appeals that also apply the Williamson finality rule to procedural due
process claims, including the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal). Plaintiffs’ procedural
due process claim is ancillary to their unlawful takings claims. Because the procedural due
process claim arises from the same allegedly illegal taking as Counts I and II of the complaint,
the Williamson ripeness rule applies to the procedural due process claim as well. See id. The
Court therefore holds that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim must be dismissed because it
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is not ripe at this time. See Bolick v. Northeast Indus. Services Corp., 2015 WL 540066, at *5-6 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 10, 2015) (dismissing Plaintiffs’ takings, procedural due process, and substantive due
process claims without prejudice as premature where the complaint failed to allege any facts to
suggest that Plaintiffs had availed themselves of the remedies afforded under the Pennsylvania
Eminent Domain Code, or any facts to demonstrate that they had been denied just
compensation); Baranowski, 868 F.Supp. at 89-90 (dismissing substantive due process claim
where the “crux” of Plaintiffs’ complaint was their illegal taking claim and where the
substantive due process claim was ancillary and depended entirely upon whether there was an
illegal taking); Schertel v. Rex, 764 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that Plaintiffs had
a “complete and adequate remedy” under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code, and
dismissing Plaintiffs’ unlawful takings claims and due process claims where Plaintiffs had
failed to avail themselves of the remedies available under that Code).
C. Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims for Invasion of Privacy, Negligent Inspection,
Conversion, and Trespass
Defendant argues that Counts III, V, VI, VII, and VIII must be dismissed because the city
is generally immune from tort claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 8541, et seq., and because the claims for negligent inspection, trespass, conversion, and
invasion of privacy do not come within any exception to liability under the PSTCA. (ECF No. 2
¶¶ 8-9.)
The Court will dismiss Counts III, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the complaint. The Court need
not address the substantive arguments raised by the parties, however, because the Court only

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has jurisdiction over these state-law claims pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction. 1 Jurisdiction
over supplemental state-law claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides that “the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However,
the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). As to § 1367(c)(3), “where the claim over
which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must
decline to decide the pendent state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45
F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to plead any claims over which this
Court has original jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court does not find that an affirmative
justification for exercising jurisdiction over the state-law claims is present in this case. The Court

With respect to Counts III and VIII, both labeled as claims for “Invasion of Privacy,” the Court notes that
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ “Constitutional Rights of privacy in the home” and
“illegally search[ed] a residence without a proper search warrant and/or any search warrant.” (ECF No.
1-1 ¶¶ 31, 65.) In briefing, Defendants construe these claims as state-law claims. (ECF No. 3 at 14.) The
Court also construes these claims as state-law claims. Even if construed as federal claims, however,
Counts III and VIII must be dismissed as they fail to state a claim for a violation of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights for the same reasons that Counts I, II, and IV fail to state a claim, discussed at
Sections V.A. and B., infra. Specifically, Plaintiffs did not challenge the inspections and subsequent
condemnation of the rental homes, the crux of which are the claims that these constituted unlawful
takings, pursuant to the procedures provided under Pennsylvania state law. See Baranowski, 868 F.Supp.
at 89-90. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to allege a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights
in Counts III and VII, they fail to allege any essential element of those claims. These legal conclusions as
to constitutional violations of their right to privacy in the home do not suffice to state a claim. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681.
1

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must therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, without
prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to refile those claims in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
(providing for at least a thirty-day tolling of any applicable statute of limitation to allow a
plaintiff to re-file state law claims in state court).
D. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court “should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” “[A] district court has discretion to deny
a request to amend if it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the
amendment would prejudice the other party.” Frasier v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20, 2004) (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002)).
The Court finds that any attempt to amend the complaint as to the claims arising under
the Pennsylvania Constitution would be futile, because, as discussed above, there exists no
claim for money damages arising thereunder. See Spell, 2015 WL 1321695, at *4. Therefore, to the
extent they allege claims for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Counts I and II are
dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend.
The Court finds that amendment of the claims for unlawful takings and for violation of
Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process arising under the United States Constitution would
also be futile unless Plaintiffs can allege that they have availed themselves of the procedures
provided under Pennsylvania law as discussed in sections V.A. and B. above. Counts I, II, and
IV are therefore dismissed with leave to amend granted for Plaintiffs to amend the complaint
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only to allege these facts, if present. To the extent Plaintiffs cannot allege that they have used
these procedures, Counts I, II, and IV are dismissed without leave to amend.
The Court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
They are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to refile those claims in state court.
VI.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. An

appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD S. WILLIAMS and DONNA
WILLIAMS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

)
)

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-144
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)
)

CITY OF JOHNSTOWN,

)
)

Defendant.

+'n

AND NOW,

)

ORDER

this~ day of March, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant's motion

to dismiss (ECF No. 2), and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

BY THE COURT:

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE