AIELLO v. AIELLO
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - upon consideration of Appellant's appeal (ECF No. 1 ), the supplemental record from the Bankruptcy Court (ECF No. 2 ), Appellant's brief in support of his appeal (ECF No. 3 ), and Appellee's brief in o pposition to Appellant's appeal (ECF No. 4 ), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's appeal is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, as memorialized in Aiello v. Aiello, No. 12-70806-JAD (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015) (ECF No. 1 -2), is AFFIRMED, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 2/17/2016. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID J. AIELLO,
Appellant,
v.
MARIRA A. AIELLO,
Appellee.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-193
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Appellant’s Notice of Appeal of the
Bankruptcy Court’s July 13, 2015, memorandum opinion (ECF No. 1-2) and order (ECF No.
1-3) granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision on July 23, 2015, (ECF No. 1), and filed a brief in support of his appeal on
September 9, 2015, (ECF No. 3). Appellee filed her brief in opposition to Appellant’s appeal
on October 9, 2015, (ECF No. 4), and this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons
set forth below, this Court will deny Appellant’s appeal and will affirm the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
1
II.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 158(a), which provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered
in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157
of this title. An appeal under this subsection shall be taken only to the district
court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The appeal in this case is taken from the decision rendered by the
Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania.
This Court therefore has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. See In re Michael, 699
F.3d 305, 308 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court sits as an appellate court to review a
bankruptcy court.”); see also In re Professional Management, 285 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (a
district court’s jurisdiction is proper as to an appeal of the final order of the bankruptcy court
under 28 U.S.C. §158(a)).
III.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court adopts the facts as set forth in the Bankruptcy Court’s July 23, 2015,
memorandum opinion. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4.) Appellee was married to Donald Aiello,
Appellant’s twin brother. (Id. at 2.) When Donald Aiello passed away in 1977, Appellant
became the executor of his estate after Appellee renounced her appointment. (Id.) After
Appellee filed a petition seeking an accounting of Appellant’s administration of the estate,
2
she filed exceptions to the accounting in the Court of Common Pleas of Elks County,
Orphans’ Court Division, alleging self-dealing and a breach of fiduciary duty.
(Id.)
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Orphans’ Court concluded that Appellant failed to act
in the best interest of the estate as a result of his self-dealing to promote his own interest to
the detriment to the estate, failed to fulfill his obligations as executor, and breached his
fiduciary duties. (Id.) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of the
Orphans’ Court. (Id.)
In 2010, based upon the surcharges with interest imposed by the Orphans’ Court,
Appellee entered judgment against Appellant in the amount of $1,021,723.34. (Id. at 3.)
Appellant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on September 6, 2012. (Id.) On January 2,
2014, Appellee filed a complaint to determine dischargeability. (Id.) Appellee then filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the judgment against Appellant arising from
the decision of the Orphans’ Court constituted a nondischargeable debt and that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel precluded Appellant from relitigating issues that had been decided by
the Orphans’ Court and the Superior Court. (Id. at 3, 5.) The Bankruptcy Court held a
hearing and ordered briefing on Appellee’s motion. (Id. at 3-4.)
B.
The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision
Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Bankruptcy Court first determined
that a final judgment on the merits of the case had been reached by the Orphans’ Court when
it concluded that Appellant violated his fiduciary duty and imposed surcharges. (Id. at 8.)
3
The Bankruptcy Court found that the identity of the parties was the same because Appellee
was the plaintiff and Appellant was the defendant in both actions.
(Id. at 8-9.)
The
Bankruptcy Court also found that the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
because the Orphans’ Court held an evidentiary hearing before rendering a decision, and the
appeal was fully litigated before the Superior Court. (Id. at 9.) Regarding the identity of the
issues, the Bankruptcy Court explained that the issue of whether Appellant committed
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary duty was before it and that the issues of Appellant’s
breach of fiduciary duty and resulting damages were before the Orphans’ Court. (Id. at 10.)
The Bankruptcy Court therefore determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied
to the findings and conclusions of the Orphans’ Court and the Superior Court. (Id.)
In reviewing the decision of the Orphans’ Court, the Bankruptcy Court explained that
Appellee, who had relied upon Appellant because she was not knowledgeable about
business, raised seven claims against him in the state-court action. (Id. at 10-11.) First, the
Orphans’ Court found that Appellant redeemed 100 shares of the estate’s interest in a cable
television company for a $200,000 note. (Id. at 11-12.) The shares were valued at $400,000,
and Appellant redeemed the shares before the company was sold for $1.5 million. (Id. at 12.)
Appellant and his other brother, Victor, were the only two remaining shareholders who
benefited from the sale. (Id.) Because the shares would have been valued at $500,000 if they
had been retained until after the sale, the Orphans’ Court imposed a $300,000 surcharge
against Appellant for self-dealing. (Id.)
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Second, the Orphans’ Court found that Appellant purchased 125.5 shares of the
estate’s shares of stock in St. Mary’s Pressed Metals, Inc. without making an effort to market
the estate’s shares publicly or privately. (Id. at 12-13.) An entity known as the Ohio Carbon
Group also purchased the stock. (Id. at 13.) The stock price was determined by Appellant,
an attorney who was the primary advisor to the estate, and a law firm that represented the
Ohio Carbon Group. (Id.) Appellant failed to seek court approval for the sale of stock to
himself and his business associates, and he failed to obtain a stock certificate for the
remaining eighteen shares held by the estate. (Id.) The Orphans’ Court determined that
Appellant’s acts of self-dealing were “blatant” and voided the transfer of the estate’s shares
of stock. (Id. at 13-14.) Third, Appellant loaned $250,000 of the estate’s funds to St. Mary’s
Pressed Metals, Inc. but did not disclose the loan to Appellee. (Id. at 14.) The Orphans’
Court concluded that Appellant engaged in self-dealing and offered no reasonable
explanation for forgiving the balance of the loan. (Id.) A surcharge of $49,268.12, the balance
of the loan, was imposed against Appellant.
(Id. at 15.)
Fourth, the Orphans’ Court
determined that Appellant failed to act with diligence because the eighteen shares of St.
Mary’s Pressed Metals, Inc. stock owned by the estate were not transferred to Appellee. (Id.)
Fifth, Appellant owned 50% of a business called Salberg Auto Wreckers. (Id.) After
distributing $50,000 from the estate to Appellee, Appellant advised Appellee to invest the
funds in the business. (Id.) Appellant then used the funds to buy out the interest of the other
50% partner. (Id.) When the business was sold nine years later for $65,000, only $31,571.75
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was returned to Appellee. (Id. at 15-16.) The Orphans’ Court found that Appellant engaged
in self-dealing and imposed a surcharge of $18,428.25. (Id. at 16.) Sixth, the estate held
interest in three pieces of real property. (Id.) Appellant owned the Van Aken property with
the estate as tenants in common. (Id.) Appellant conveyed the estate’s interest in the
property to himself without seeking court approval. (Id.) The estate’s interest in the Jones
Township property was transferred to Victor’s family trust, and the estate’s interest in the
Johnsonburg property was transferred to Victor. (Id.)
The Orphans’ Court found that
Appellant transferred the estate’s interest in each piece of property without consideration for
the conveyance and without properly accounting for the interest of the estate. (Id. at 17.)
The Orphans’ Court therefore concluded that Appellant violated his fiduciary duty and
voided Appellant’s interest in the Van Aken property. (Id.) Seventh, the Orphans’ Court
determined that Appellant failed to maintain proper care and custody of the estate’s records
and imposed an additional surcharge of $25,000 on Appellant for his failure to act in the best
interest of the estate. (Id. at 18.)
In considering Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the Bankruptcy Court
explained that to prevail under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4), a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
was acting in a fiduciary capacity and that the defendant committed fraud or defalcation
while acting in that capacity. (Id. at 19.) Defalcation is the failure to fully account for funds
handled in a fiduciary capacity. (Id.) The Bankruptcy Court first determined that Appellant
6
stood in a fiduciary relationship to Appellee as executor of the estate to which Appellee was
a beneficiary. (Id.)
Regarding whether Appellant committed defalcation, the Bankruptcy Court
reviewed the standards applied in determining whether conduct is deemed a defalcation.
(Id. at 19-21.) In applying these standards to the facts of the case, the Bankruptcy Court
explained that the Orphans’ Court found “numerous” breaches of fiduciary duty by
Appellant and imposed surcharges for Appellant’s failure to meet the duty of care. (Id. at
22.) The Bankruptcy Court also explained that Appellant, who was not sophisticated in
business and who did not speak English as her native language, placed an “inordinate”
amount of trust in Appellant. (Id. at 23.)
After reviewing the law applicable to such self-dealing, the Bankruptcy Court
concluded that Appellant knew that his actions were breaches of his fiduciary duty or, at a
minimum, consciously disregarded the substantial risk that his actions would result in a
breach of fiduciary duty. (Id. at 24-26.) Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court determined that
Appellant’s series of actions and inaction exhibited a pattern of “managing the estate of his
brother for his own convenience and purposes.” (Id. at 26-27.) Explaining that the decision
of the Orphans’ Court was replete with such findings, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that
“[t]he gap between [Appellant’s] duty and his conduct was sufficiently obvious and
occurred with such frequency that . . . [he] was at least willfully blind to the risk that his
conduct would violate his fiduciary duty.” (Id. at 28-29.) Because the Bankruptcy Court
7
found that “the record is sufficient to establish the requisite state of mind of [Appellant],” it
granted summary judgment to Appellee, holding that Appellant committed defalcation and
that the debt owed to Appellee is nondischargeable. (Id. at 30-31.)
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, and
decrees entered by bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). In reviewing a bankruptcy
court’s decision, a district court must apply several standards of review. First, a bankruptcy
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its exercise of discretion for abuse
thereof. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 145 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 1998). A factual finding is
“clearly erroneous” if the reviewing court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 319 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal quotations omitted). Under the clearly erroneous standard, “it is the responsibility
of an appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact-finder unless
that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support
displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive
evidentiary data.” Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir.
1996) (internal quotations omitted).
Second, a bankruptcy court’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See In re
Ruitenberg, 745 F.3d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor
Resolution Corp., 197 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1999). Third, mixed questions of fact and law must
8
be differentiated and reviewed under the appropriate standard for each component. See In re
Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 326 F.3d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 2003). Fourth, a bankruptcy
court’s exercise of discretion must be reviewed for abuse. In re Friedman's Inc., 738 F.3d 547,
552 (3d Cir. 2013). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its ruling rests upon an
error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts. In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d
116, 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
V.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Bankruptcy Court’s Factual Findings
As noted above, the Court cannot disturb the factual findings of the Bankruptcy
Court unless they are “clearly erroneous.” In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d at 319 n.14. The
only factual findings that were made by the Bankruptcy Court concerned the procedural
history of Appellee’s petition seeking an accounting of Appellant’s administration of the
estate, Appellee’s exceptions to the accounting, the decision of the Orphans’ Court, and the
Superior Court’s affirmance of the Orphans’ Court. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4.) The parties’
briefs reiterate the facts as set forth by the Bankruptcy Court, (see ECF No. 3 at 6-7; ECF No. 4
at 8-10), and the documents attached to Appellant’s appeal confirm these facts, (see ECF No.
2). The Court therefore cannot conclude that the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings are
“completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility” or
“bear[] no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” DiFederico v. Rolm Co.,
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201 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the Court may not disturb the Bankruptcy
Court’s factual findings.
B.
The Bankruptcy Court’s Legal Conclusions
As discussed above, this Court exercises plenary, or de novo, review over any legal
conclusions reached by the Bankruptcy Court. In re Ruitenberg, 745 F.3d at 650 (3d Cir. 2014);
Am. Flint Glass Workers Union, 197 F.3d at 80. The Court must “exercise plenary review of the
court’s interpretation and application of [the] facts to legal precepts.” In re Nortel Networks,
Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2011).
In his brief in support of his appeal, Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court
improperly
applied
the
doctrine
of
collateral
estoppel
to
the
case
because
nondischargeability is independent of the issue of the validity of the underlying claim. (ECF
No. 3 at 8.)
Appellant also asserts that the Bankruptcy Court improperly held that a
defalcation occurred, arguing that the Bankruptcy Court relied upon case law that is
distinguishable from this case. (Id. at 10, 12.) Appellant states that the Orphans’ Court did
not make any findings as to his mental state and found only that he was strictly liable to
Appellee after determining that he had engaged in self-dealing.
(Id. at 11.)
Because
Appellant’s intent was not litigated before the Orphans’ Court, Appellant contends that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply and that his state of mind is an issue of fact that
must be determined by the trial court. (Id. at 12-14.)
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In response, Appellee argues that well-settled law supports the proposition that
intent may be determined from the record. (ECF No. 4 at 15.) Appellee emphasizes that
“Appellant has been found to have committed blatant acts of self-dealing after a trial on the
merits, which he orchestrated for his own benefit and to the detriment of Appellee, as found
by the Orphans’ Court based upon the evidence presented at trial, as well as by the Superior
Court based upon the record on appeal.” (Id. at 16.) Appellee asserts that the Bankruptcy
Court relied upon well-settled law in rendering its decision and provides additional case law
for the Court’s consideration. (Id. at 17-20.) Because Appellant’s conduct was obvious and
occurred with frequency, Appellee requests that the Court deny his appeal. (Id. at 20.)
Having conducted a de novo review of the law, the Court concludes that the
Bankruptcy Court did not err in granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. In
conducting its de novo review, the Court first finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applies. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the issue decided in the prior
case is identical to one presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the
merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or is in privity with a
party in the prior case; and (4) the party seeking to relitigate had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. See LaMacchia v. Tarbell, 440 B.R. 668, 672 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2010); see also Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 203 n.15 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, the second, third, and fourth requirements are satisfied. The parties involved
in the Orphans’ Court action are the same as in the instant case. The Orphans’ Court reached
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a final judgment finding Appellant in violation of his fiduciary duty and imposing
surcharges. In reaching its decision, the Orphans’ Court provided the parties with a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue by holding an evidentiary hearing and rendering a
decision. The Court also finds that the Bankruptcy Court properly relied upon Li v. Peng, 516
B.R. 26 (D.N.J. 2014), and Tomasi v. Savannah N. Denoce Trust, No. 12-1401, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
4596 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2013), in concluding that there is an identity of the issues. In Li,
the appellant argued that collateral estoppel did not apply to his disbarment proceeding
because the disciplinary proceeding did not address defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity. 516 B.R. at 42. In rejecting the appellant’s argument, the court explained:
While Appellant is correct that the State Court did not rule on any issues
relating to the dischargeabilty in bankruptcy of Appellant’s liabilities, this
was of no consequence for the Bankruptcy Court’s decision; the
underlying factual issues surrounding Appellant’s fraud and
misappropriation of client funds, which were directly raised in the New
Jersey Supreme Court, were identical to those before the Bankruptcy
Court when it made its independent decision concerning dischargeability
under § 523(a)(4).
Id. at 43. The court further explained that “[f]raudulent [i]ntent may be determined from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the act.”
Id. at 44 (internal quotations omitted).
Because “the facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court support[ed] a finding against
Appellant either as a disloyal fiduciary or an embezzler,” the court concluded that the state
court had resolved identical issues to those posed before the Bankruptcy Court.
Id.
Similarly, in Tomasi, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the state court’s finding that the
appellant’s self-dealing conduct had constituted “bad faith” satisfied 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
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Tomasi, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4596 at *34. The Bankruptcy Court therefore properly concluded
that identifity of the identity of issues requirement of the collateral-estoppel doctrine was
satisfied.
In applying Li and Tomasi to the instant case, the facts and circumstances surrounding
Appellant’s conduct support a finding against Appellant as a disloyal fiduciary. See Li, 516
B.R. at 44; Tomasi, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4596 at *34. Although Appellant was found to have
breached his fiduciary duty, such a finding “does not, however, necessarily mean that a
breach rises to a level of defalcation.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 23 (citing Fogg v. Pearl, 502 B.R. 429,
442 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[N]ot all breaches of fiduciary duties rise to the level of a
defalcation under § 523(a)(4).”).) In this case, however, Appellant’s conduct supports a
finding of several “intentional wrong[s].” Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754,
1756 (2013) (“‘[D]efalcation’ requires an intentional wrong. An intentional wrong includes
not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper but also reckless conduct of the kind
that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent.”). Appellant sold the estate’s stock in a
cable television company to himself and a third party; purchased 125.5 shares of the estate’s
shares of stock in St. Mary’s Pressed Metals, Inc. without making an effort to market the
estate’s shares publicly or privately; loaned $250,000 of the estate’s funds to St. Mary’s
Pressed Metals, Inc.; advised Appellee to invest $50,000 of the estate’s funds in a business in
which he was an owner; and conveyed the estate’s interest in three different pieces of real
property for no value. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 11-18.) Moreover, Appellant failed to advise
13
Appellee, who speaks English as a second language and is not sophisticated in business, of
the estate’s transactions. (See id.) He also failed to obtain court approval for transactions that
required it. (See id.)
Not only do the factual circumstances of Appellant’s conduct support a finding that
the breach of his fiduciary duty constituted defalcation, but well-settled case law also
supports such a finding. See, e.g., Heers v. Parsons, 529 B.R. 734, 743 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015)
(upholding grant of summary judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) after finding that
the defendant’s pervasive and unjustified breaches of fiduciary duties reflected a conscious
and reckless disregard); Smiedt v. Williams, No. 13-40856, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 2585, at *28
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. June 12, 2014) (granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) after concluding that the defendant’s self-dealing and
intentional retention of funds was not as a result of mere inadvertence or negligence); De
Leon v. Cordova, No. 12-10756, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3060, at *14-15 (Bankr. D.N.M. July 30, 2013)
(granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) after
concluding that the defendant, who “breached her fiduciary duties for the purpose of selfdealing and for self-benefit,” “knew the improper nature of her actions, or at least was
grossly negligent with respect to those actions and her fiduciary duties); Pearl, 502 B.R. at 443
(finding that the defendant’s conduct of spending more than $160,000 of the estate’s reserve
“warrant[s] the conclusion that either she was aware of, or she willfully blinded herself to,
the impropriety of her conduct”).
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Additionally, the Court notes that in a case involving facts similar to the instant case,
the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment, finding that the defendant’s debt was
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). Chaney v. Grigg, No. 12-7008, 2013 Bankr.
LEXIS 4411 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2013). Specifically, the defendant, who had represented
the plaintiff in connection with marital dissolution proceedings, paid himself over two
million dollars in attorneys’ fees. Id. at *3-4. The Bankruptcy Court, noting that the issue of
the defendant’s breach of his fiduciary duty was not litigated, determined that the defendant
“at a minimum consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct
would turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.” Id. at *30. The Bankruptcy Court therefore
concluded that the state of mind required by Bullock had been established and that the
defendant’s debt was nondischargeable. Id. at *30-31. On appeal, this Court affirmed,
finding that “the Bankruptcy Court was entitled to rely on the ancillary proceedings to find
evidence of Appellant's state of mind for purposes of establishing defalcation.” Grigg v.
Chaney, No. 3:13-CV-292, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158769, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2014). The
Third Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision. Chaney v. Grigg, 619 Fed. Appx. 195 (3d Cir.
2015) (“The Bankruptcy Court provided a detailed analysis, which we need not further
expound here, and concluded (correctly) that Grigg acted in violation of his fiduciary
capacity with the state of mind required by Bullock.”).
Accordingly, in applying well-established law and in examining the many instances
in which Appellant conduct constituted “an intentional wrong,” the Court will affirm the
15
Bankruptcy Court’s holding that Appellant’s debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4).
C. The Bankruptcy Court's Exercise of Discretion
Finally, the Court reviews a bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion for abuse. In re
Friedman's Inc., 738 F.3d at 552. A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its ruling
rests upon an error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts. In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy,
Inc., 188 F.3d at 122. Because the Court concurs with the Bankruptcy Court’s application of
the relevant law to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, no error of law or
misapplication of the law to the facts is present in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Appellant’s appeal and will affirm the
decision of the Bankruptcy Court, as memorialized in Aiello v. Aiello, No. 12-70806-JAD
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015). (ECF No. 1-2.)
An appropriate order follows.
16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID J. AIELLO,
)
)
Appellant,
)
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-193
)
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
)
MARIRA A. AIELLO,
)
)
Appellee.
)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of February, 2016, upon consideration of Appellant's
appeal (ECF No. 1), the supplemental record from the Bankruptcy Court (ECF No. 2),
Appellant's brief in support of his appeal (ECF No.3), and Appellee's brief in opposition to
Appellant's appeal (ECF No. 4), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's appeal is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, as
memorialized in Aiello v. Aiello, No. 12-70806-JAD (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015) (ECF No.12), is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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