RHONE v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby Ordered that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. It is further Ordered that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. It is further Ordered that th e Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 36 ) is ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court as supplemented herein. It is further Ordered that the Clerk of Court mark this case CLOSED. And it is further Ordered that pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rul es of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner has thirty (30) days to file a notice of appeal as provided by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 8/30/2019. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS R. RHONE,
Petitioner,
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA,ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE ST ATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF
BLAIR, and THOMAS McGINLEY,
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI COAL
TOWNSHIP,
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Civil Action No. 3: 15-cv-0229
United States District Judge
Kim R. Gibson
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court are the counseled Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 2254 ("Petition") filed on behalf of Petitioner Thomas R. Rhone
("Petitioner" or "Rhone") (ECF No. 20), the Report and Recommendation of United States Chief
Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy recommending that the Petition be denied ("R&R," ECF
No. 36), and Petitioner's counseled Objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 39). For the following
reasons, the Report and Recommendation will be adopted, as supplemented, the Petition will be
denied, and a certificate of appealability will be denied.
I. ST AND ARD FOR REVIEWING A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The filing of timely objections requires the court to "make a de nova determination of
those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is
made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); see also Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining
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that de nova review is not required if objections are not specific). In doing so, the Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations contained in the
report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). The district court may, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, rely on the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7. "District Courts, however, are not
required to make any separate findings or conclusions when reviewing a Magistrate Judge's
recommendation de nova under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)." Hill v. Barnacle, 655 F. App'x 142, 148
(3d Cir. 2016). With regard to the portions of the R&R to which no objections are made, the
district court should, as a matter of good practice, "satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the
face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory
committee notes.
II. DISCUSSION
The Petition was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Eddy, who issued a R&R
recommending that the Petition be dismissed. While Rhone generally "opposes all the findings
of the Report and Recommendation," he specifically objects to the recommendation that Claim
Three of the Petition be dismissed. Respondents did not file a response to Petitioner's
objections. His objections necessitate a de nova review of the R&R by this Court.
Insofar as Rhone has a general objection to all the findings of the R&R, the Court finds
that such an objection is without merit and will be denied. An objection to a R&R must explain
how the magistrate judge's analysis is alleged to have been wrong, why it was wrong, and how
de nova review will achieve a different result on that issue. An objection that does nothing more
than state a disagreement with the magistrate judge's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes
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what has been presented before, is not an objection as that term is used in this context. See
Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (noting that "[t]he filing of objections to a magistrate's
report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues - factual and legal - that are at
the heart of the parties' disputes").
Turning to Rhone's objection regarding Claim III of the Petition, the Court finds that the
magistrate judge correctly recommended that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Petitioner
does not dispute that the claim is procedurally defaulted, but rather, for the first time, now argues
that the procedural default should be excused under Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)). Thus, the Court will tum to Petitioner's
argument that he can overcome the procedural default of his trial counsel ineffective assistance
claim under Martinez.
For claims of ineffectiveness of counsel not preserved and thus defaulted on collateral
review, Martinez provides a possible means for establishing cause to excuse the default.
Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
repeated the requirements of the narrow exception to the doctrine of procedural default
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Martinez: "This exception is available to a
petitioner who can show that: 1) his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel
has 'some merit;' and that 2) his state-post conviction counsel was 'ineffective under the
standards of Strickland v. Washington." Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928,
93 7 (3d Cir. 2019).
Here, the Court does not find that Petitioner's state post-conviction counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise a claim of trial counsel ineffective assistance based on divided
loyalties under the standards of Strickland. Strickland contains two prongs, a performance prong
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and a prejudice prong, both of which must be met to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Bey, 856 F.3d at 238. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a
petitioner must prove" '(l) that his counsel's performance was deficient, that is, it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his
client,' i.e., that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.' "Id., citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Our
appellate court has reasoned that to prove that post-conviction counsel's performance caused
petitioner prejudice, petitioner "must show that state post-conviction counsel could have
obtained a different result had he presented the now-defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim." Workman, 915 F.3d at 939 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2019). Meaning, petitioner "must
prove the merits of his underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in order to excuse
the procedural default of that claim and obtain consideration on the merits." Id. The Third Circuit
further clarified in Workman that for the purposes of a Martinez analysis, "what is important is
that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is "substantial," not that a
petitioner has, in fact, been "prejudiced" by trial counsel's deficient performance under
Strickland." Id.
As to the first Strickland prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was
reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As to the second prong, the United States Supreme
Court held that "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at
694.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant counsel's "undivided loyalty."
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 1983). In Mickens v. Taylor,
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the United States Supreme Court defined an "actual conflict" as "precisely a conflict that
affected counsel's performance - as opposed to a mere theoretical division ofloyalties." 535
U.S. 162,171 (2002).
Here, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel had divided loyalties because counsel "knew
that Mr. Lyles was willing to take responsibility and plead guilty." Obj. at 2. Petitioner argues
that his trial counsel "was handicapped by the knowledge that Mr. Lyles had informed him that
he was responsible for the crimes ... [and, therefore] was not free to argue that Mr. Lyles
committed the crimes because Attorney Passarello knew that Mr. Lyles had agreed to take
responsibility for the crimes." Obj. at 3.
The Court finds that the record belies Petitioner's arguments that Attorney Passarella had
divided loyalties which hampered his representation of Petitioner. Rather, the record evidence
reflects that Attorney Passarello vigorously advocated on behalf of his client. Further, at the
PCRA hearing, Attorney Passarella testified that he had numerous discussions with Petitioner
and Eli Lyles about the potential for conflict of interest if they had inconsistent defenses. A
motion to suppress was filed on behalf of both defendants and after the motion was denied, Eli
Lyles sought separate counsel. Attorney Passarello acknowledged that at some point was
informed that Mr. Lyles was willing to take a plea in return for the no! pros of charges against
Petitioner and Mr. Robinson, the other co-defendant. PCRA Hearing Transcript, ECF No. 10,
Exhibit F, at 42. However, Attorney Passarella further testified that he did not take that
statement as a factual admission by Mr. Lyles, but rather he took the statement "as Mr. Lyles was
willing to fall on the sword for Mr. Rhone and Mr. Robinson," as "Mr. Lyles never indicated to
me that he was fully and solely responsible for the drugs or the gun that was in the motor
vehicle." Id. (emphasis added).
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Rhone has made no showing or provided any record support for his assertion that his trial
counsel's performance was affected by "divided loyalties." Nor has he shown that his trial
counsel's performance was unreasonable or that his counsel acted under a conflict of interest.
Accordingly, Rhone has failed to establish the "cause" in "cause and prejudice." For these
reasons, the Court finds that Rhone has not shown that his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
has substantial merit under either Martinez or Strickland and Claim III will be denied.
Upon review of the R&R, as well of Rhone's objections thereto, the Court finds that
Rhone's objections are unpersuasive. The Magistrate Judge's report offers a thorough, accurate,
and well-reasoned analysis of the facts and legal issues pertinent to the claims raised in Rhone's
habeas Petition.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that a certificate of
appealability should be denied. Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether each of
Rhone's claims should be denied. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000). Accordingly, a
certificate of appealability will be denied as to each of Rhone' s claims. The denial of a
certificate of appealability does not prevent Rhone from appealing the order denying his petition
so long as he seeks, and obtains, a certificate of appealability from the court of appeals. See
Fed.R.App.P. 22(b)(l),(2).
IV. CONCLUSION
After de novo review of the pleadings and documents in this case, together with the R&R
and objections thereto, and in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, Rhone's objections will
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be overruled, the R&R will be approved and adopted as supplemented herein, and a certificate of
appealability will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.
August
,_Jik;
:?!l_, 2019
Kim R. Gibson
United States District Judge
cc:
All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)
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IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS R. RHONE,
Petitioner,
V.
COMMONWEAL TH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF
BLAIR, and THOMAS McGINLEY,
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI COAL
TOWNSHIP,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 3: 15-cv-0229
United States District Judge
Kim R. Gibson
Respondents.
ORDER
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AND NOW, this30 day of August, 2019, in accordance with the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 36) is
ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court as supplemented herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mark this case CLOSED.
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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 4(a)(l) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner has thirty (30) days to file a notice of appeal as provided by
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
\£t:~
Kim R. Gibson
United States District Judge
cc:
All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)
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