FRANKLIN v. LYNCH et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 Partial Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's claims under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (Count I) are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (C ount II) is dismissed with prejudice. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he shall do so within 21 days of issuance of this Order. Plaintiff's ame ndments, if any, are to be limited to claims under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note), and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 11/18/2016. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALTON C. FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LORETTA LYNCH et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:16-cv-36
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5). For the
reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I.

Background 1
Alton Franklin wants to buy a handgun and long gun for home self-defense. (ECF No. 3

¶ 10.) But because Franklin was involuntarily committed in 2002, federal law prohibits him
from possessing any firearm. He filed this case against the federal government, challenging that
prohibition.
In September 2002, Franklin was involuntarily committed under Section 302 of
Pennsylvania’s Mental Health and Procedures Act (“MHPA”) (50 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7302). (Id.
¶¶ 3, 10.)

Franklin’s commitment was an isolated incident and was based on a doctor’s

signature. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 21.) The procedures to commit someone involuntarily under Section 302
are straightforward: if a doctor certifies that there is a need for a person’s involuntary
commitment, then a county administrator may issue a warrant for that person’s involuntary
The background facts are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which the court accepts as
true for purposes of deciding the pending Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5). See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters
& the Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
1

commitment. See 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7302(a)(1). Or, if a doctor observes conduct by a person
which reasonably supports the conclusion that the person’s involuntary commitment is needed,
that doctor can arrange for commitment without obtaining a warrant. See § 7302(a)(2). Either
way, involuntary commitment under Section 302 does not include such things as advising the
patient they have the right to an attorney, an opportunity to challenge the evidence, a hearing,
or a neutral factfinder. Thus, Franklin’s involuntary commitment did not include any of these
things. (ECF No. 3 ¶ 22.)
Under both federal and Pennsylvania law, Franklin’s involuntary commitment
disqualified him from owning a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (barring anyone “who has
been committed to a mental institution” from “possessing . . . any firearm”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 6105(c)(4) (barring anyone “who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution for
inpatient care and treatment under section 302 [of the MHPA]” from possessing any firearm).
Pennsylvania law provides a procedure whereby people who are prohibited from owning a
firearm under Pennsylvania law can challenge that prohibition. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(e)(f); § 6105.1. On July 1, 2014, Franklin filed a petition for relief from firearms disability with the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 6105(f)(1). (See ECF No. 3 ¶ 25.) A hearing was held on Franklin’s petition, and on October
14, 2014, the Court of Common Pleas issued an order relieving Franklin of “any and all firearms
disabilities imposed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania deriving from his civil commitment
under 50 P.S. § 7302 in September 2002.” (ECF No. 3-1 at 4.)
The Court of Common Pleas found that Franklin (1) may possess a firearm without
presenting a danger to himself or others; (2) no longer suffered from the mental-health

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condition that was the basis of his involuntary commitment; (3) had been fully released and
discharged from all treatment, supervision, and monitoring related to his involuntary
commitment (and had been since September 2002); and (4) had not been adjudicated as a
“mental defective.” (See id. at 3.) The Court of Common Pleas also instructed the Pennsylvania
State Police to notify the FBI that Franklin was no longer prohibited from possessing firearms
under Pennsylvania law on the basis of his involuntary commitment. (Id. at 4.)
Although the order by the Court of Common Pleas relieved Franklin of the prohibition
on owning firearms under Pennsylvania law, it did not affect his federal-law prohibition. And a
Philadelphia Division Counsel of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives
(“ATF”) has informed Franklin’s attorney that there is currently no procedure available under
Pennsylvania or federal law to challenge the federal prohibition. 2 (ECF No. 3 ¶ 30.) Thus,
Franklin brought this case against the Attorney General of the United States, the Acting Director
of the ATF, the Director of the FBI, and the United States of America.
Franklin alleges four counts as grounds for relief. Specifically, he alleges violations of
the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 3 the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Federal law does contain a provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), equivalent to Pennsylvania’s relief
statute. Under § 925(c), a person prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law may apply to the
Attorney General for relief. The ATF has promulgated a rule, 27 C.F.R. § 478.114, setting forth the
procedures for such an application for relief. In practice, however, both 18 U.S.C. §925(c) and 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.114 are meaningless; Congress has denied any funding “to investigate or act upon applications for
relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).” Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2187 (2015). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) does
not provide an actual avenue of relief.
2

3

Pub L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note).

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Constitution, and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Franklin seeks a
variety of declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 22-24.)
II.

Jurisdiction & Venue
All of Franklin’s claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The

Court therefore has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And because a
substantial part of the events giving rise to Franklin’s claims—namely, his involuntary
commitment—occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania, venue is proper in this district
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
III.

Standard of Review
Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss Franklin’s claims pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint or any
portion of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The legal standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge is well established. In determining the
sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must conduct a two-part analysis. First, the court
should separate the factual and legal elements of the claims. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Second, the court must determine whether the factual matters alleged
are sufficient to establish that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 211 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint, however, need not include “detailed
factual allegations.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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The court must also accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe
all inferences gleaned therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at
228 (citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)).

But “legal

conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, the complaint must present
sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239,
263 n.27 (3d Cir .2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Ultimately, whether a plaintiff has stated a “plausible claim for relief” is a contextspecific inquiry that requires the district court to “draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

The record to consider in making this

determination includes the complaint and any “document integral or explicitly relied on in the
complaint.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis
omitted) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). If a
claim is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court must permit a
curative amendment regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks leave to amend, unless amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted); see also Shane v. Fauver,
213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
IV.

Discussion
Defendants have moved to dismiss Franklin’s claims under the NICS Improvement

Amendments Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Although Franklin’s claim under the
NICS Improvement Amendments Act is styled as a single count in his First Amended

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Complaint, this claim actually consists of two subclaims; Franklin alleges violations of Section
101(c) and Section 105 of that Act. (ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 49-67.) Defendants argue that both subclaims
should be dismissed because Sections 101(c) and 105 do not apply here. And Defendants argue
that Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause should be dismissed because there
is no private right of action under that Clause. Further, Defendants argue that even if Franklin’s
Full Faith and Credit Clause claim was a valid cause of action, it should be dismissed because it
fails on its merits.
A.

Claims under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007

In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,4 which required
the Attorney General to establish by November 30, 1998, the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (“NICS”) for the purchase of firearms. The Brady Act also requires
that firearms dealers contact NICS to run a background check on prospective buyers before
transferring firearms to those buyers. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(A). NICS became operational in
November 1998 and is administered by the FBI under the supervision of the Attorney General
of the United States. 28 C.F.R. § 25.1; see also National Instant Criminal Background, 63 Fed.
Reg. 58303, 58303 (Oct. 30, 1998) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 25).
In the wake of the 2007 mass shooting at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Congress enacted the NICS Improvement Amendments Act (“NIAA”). 5 NIAA
sought to improve the background-check system by facilitating access by the FBI of records
relating to criminal history and mental health. See NIAA § 2. Employing established principles

4

Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.).

5

Pub L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note).

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of federalism, NIAA adopted a two-pronged approach. First, NIAA imposed a requirement on
federal departments and agencies to share relevant records with the Attorney General. See
NIAA § 101(a)-(b). Second, NIAA authorized the issuance of federal grants to incentivize states
to improve the quality of information they provide to NICS. See NIAA § 103. To be eligible for
such a federal grant, a state must “certify, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, that the
State has implemented a relief from disabilities program in accordance with section 105 [of
NIAA].” NIAA § 103(c).
Franklin asserts that Defendants have violated Sections 101(c) and 105 of NIAA.
Specifically, Franklin alleges that Defendants’ inclusion in the NICS database of a record related
to his involuntary commitment violates Section 101(c)(1).

And Franklin asserts that

Pennsylvania’s relief-from-disabilities program meets the criteria in Section 105. He argues that
Defendants’ refusal to remove his federal-law prohibition on owning firearms therefore violates
Section 105.
1.

Section 101(c) 6 Claim

Defendants argue that Franklin’s claim under Section 101(c) should be dismissed
because that section is inapplicable.

They assert that Section 101(c) is directed to federal

agencies that conduct mental-health adjudications or impose commitments.

Defendants

contend that Section 101(c) therefore applies only when a federal agency possesses a mentalhealth record because that agency conducted the underlying adjudication or imposed the

In his First Amended Complaint, Franklin asserts a claim under Section 101(c) but does not specify
under which subsection the claim arises. (See ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 51-57.) Because the First Amended
Complaint quotes Section 101(c)(1) and based on the Court’s reading of the entirety of Section 101(c), the
Court construes Franklin’s claim as arising under Section 101(c)(1).
6

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commitment. According to Defendants, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposed
Franklin’s commitment—and not the federal government—Section 101(c) does not apply here.
Franklin counters that the plain language of Section 101(c) contradicts Defendants’
interpretation. He asserts that Section 101(c) applies regardless of the origins of the underlying
record and regardless of what entity—federal or state—conducted the adjudication or imposed
the commitment.

And Franklin argues that Section 101(c) applies here because the FBI

provided the Attorney General with a record of Franklin’s involuntary commitment.
Franklin is correct that the plain language of Section 101(c) contradicts Defendants’
interpretation. But this does not avail him. Franklin has failed to state a claim under Section
101(c)(1) because no federal department or agency provided a record of his commitment to the
Attorney General.
We start and end with the text of Section 101(c)(1), which states in relevant part:
(1) IN GENERAL.—No department or agency of the
Federal Government may provide to the Attorney General any
record of an adjudication related to the mental health of a person
or any commitment of a person to a mental institution if—
(A) the adjudication or commitment, respectively, has
been set aside or expunged, or the person has otherwise been
fully released or discharged from all mandatory treatment,
supervision, or monitoring;
(B) the person has been found by a court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority to no longer suffer from
the mental health condition that was the basis of the
adjudication or commitment, respectively, or has otherwise
been found to be rehabilitated through any procedure
available under law; or
(C) the adjudication or commitment, respectively, is
based solely on a medical finding of disability, without an

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opportunity for a hearing by a court, board, commission, or
other lawful authority, and the person has not been
adjudicated as a mental defective consistent with section
922(g)(4) of title 18, United States Code, except that nothing in
this section or any other provision of law shall prevent a
Federal department or agency from providing to the Attorney
General any record demonstrating that a person was
adjudicated to be not guilty by reason of insanity, or based on
lack of mental responsibility, or found incompetent to stand
trial, in any criminal case or under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
Thus, Section 101(c)(1) prohibits federal departments and agencies from providing to the
Attorney General records related to a mental-health adjudication or commitment if any of the
criteria in subsections (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), or (c)(1)(C) are satisfied. But contrary to Defendants’
assertion, the applicability of Section 101(c)(1) is not limited to situations where “the federal
agency [was] the entity that conducted the adjudication or ordered the commitment to occur.”
(ECF No. 12 at 2.) Section 101(c)(1) contains no qualifier as to the type of federal departments or
agencies it applies to—it simply states that “[n]o department or agency of the Federal
Government” may provide qualifying mental-health records to the Attorney General. Without
any limiting language, “no department or agency” means no department or agency.
Defendants rely on different subsections of Section 101(c) to read limiting language into
Section 101(c)(1). This argument is unpersuasive. Yes, Section 101(c)(2)(A)(i) is directed to
“[e]ach department or agency of the United States that makes any adjudication related to the
mental health of a person or imposes any commitment to a mental institution.”

And

Section 101(c)(3) applies to “any Federal department or agency that conducts proceedings to
adjudicate a person as a mental defective.” But the conclusion to draw from those sections is
not that similar limiting language should be read into Section 101(c)(1). Rather, it is that the

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omission of such limiting language in Section 101(c)(1) was intended. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (If statutory language is clear, “it
would be improper to conclude that what Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless
within its scope.” (citation omitted)); Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (“[W]e
ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”);
Animal Legal Def Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1217 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Where
Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.” (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants’ reliance on subsequent legislative history for their interpretation of Section
101(c)(1) is also misplaced. Defendants quote S. Rep. No. 110-473, at 83 (2008), but the quoted
language discusses an agreement between the FBI and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
which resulted from a request by the Attorney General for NICS information. As the two
sentences immediately preceding the quote make clear, that request was made pursuant to
sections of NIAA and the Brady Act which authorize the Attorney General to request NICS
information from federal agencies. The quoted language and the underlying request have no
relation to Section 101(c). And Defendants’ citation of S. Rep. No. 111-282, at 8 (2010), also
provides no support for their interpretation; the quoted language from that source speaks only
to Section 101(c)(2)—and not to Section 101(c)(1).
It is also worth noting that Defendants’ conception of Section 101(c)(1) creates a bizarre
workaround to Section 101(c)(1)’s prohibition. NIAA amended the Brady Act to require all
federal departments and agencies to provide the Attorney General with relevant records
(including

mental-health

records)

for

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inclusion

in

the

background-check

system. See NIAA § 101(a). Under Defendants’ interpretation of Section 101(c)(1), agencies that
conduct mental-health adjudications or impose commitments are barred from providing
qualifying mental-health records to the Attorney General. But those agencies would not be
barred under Section 101(c)(1) from providing the same records to, for instance, the Department
of Agriculture—which presumably does not conduct mental-health adjudications or impose
commitments. And under Defendants’ interpretation, the Department of Agriculture would
also not be prohibited under Section 101(c)(1) from providing the Attorney General with those
records.

In fact, once the Department of Agriculture received those records, it would be

required by law to provide them to the Attorney General. See id. Defendants’ conception of
Section 101(c)(1) thus turns that section’s prohibition into a procedural detour instead of a
roadblock. It seems implausible that Section 101(c)(1) was intended to function in such a
manner.
In sum, Section 101(c)(1) applies to all federal departments and agencies. And Section
101(c)(1)’s language is expansive; it prohibits federal departments and agencies from providing
the Attorney General with “any [qualifying] record.” (emphasis added). Section 101(c)(1)
therefore applies regardless of whether the underlying record was the result of the agency’s
own adjudication or commitment. Put simply, when any federal department or agency is in
possession of any record related to a mental-health adjudication or commitment, and any of the
criteria in subsections (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), or (c)(1)(C) are satisfied, then the federal department
or agency is prohibited from providing the Attorney General with that record.
Notwithstanding Section 101(c)(1)’s breadth, Franklin has failed to state a claim under
Section 101(c)(1) because he has not alleged that a federal department or agency provided a

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record of his commitment to the Attorney General. Franklin contends that the “FBI is providing
[his mental-health record] to the Attorney General by adding the record to NICS.” (ECF No. 10
at 8 n.3.) But the FBI does not “provide” the Attorney General with records within the meaning
of Section 101(c)(1) because the FBI and the Attorney General are synonymous for purposes of
the administration of NICS. Thus, Franklin’s claim under Section 101(c)(1) fails.
The statutory and regulatory scheme of NICS illustrates that the FBI and the Attorney
General are synonymous for purposes of the administration of NICS. Under the Brady Act, the
Attorney General is charged with establishing NICS. See Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993).

The Attorney General fulfills this statutory obligation by delegating the

implementation and administration of NICS to the FBI. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.3; see also National
Instant Criminal Background, 63 Fed. Reg. 58303, 58303 (Oct. 30, 1998) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
25). By law, the Attorney General is the “head of the Department of Justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 503,
and the FBI is part of the Department of Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 531. Furthermore, the Attorney
General is authorized to delegate performance of official functions to other agencies of the
Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 510. As Defendants point out in their Reply, NICS is
“established at the FBI,” is “based at the [FBI],” and its systems manager is the director of the
FBI. 28 C.F.R. § 25.3(a)-(c). And the FBI is “responsible for maintaining data integrity during all
NICS operations that are managed and carried out by the FBI.” 28 C.F.R. § 25.5. After the FBI
receives a record, there is thus no separate step where the FBI “provides” that record to the
Attorney General. As the agency responsible for NICS and tasked with its administration, it is
the FBI which is provided information by other entities for inclusion into NICS.

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Franklin has failed to state a claim under Section 101(c)(1) because that section has no
application here.

Section 101(c)(1) prohibits federal agencies from providing the Attorney

General—or, in practical terms, the FBI—with qualifying records. Franklin has demonstrated
that it would likely be impermissible for a federal agency to provide the FBI (or the Attorney
General) with a record of his involuntary commitment. But Section 101(c)(1) says nothing about
states. Here, it was the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which provided the FBI with the
record of Franklin’s commitment. Thus, Franklin has failed to state a claim under Section
101(c)(1).
2.

Section 105 Claim

Under NIAA, “the Attorney General shall make grants to States” to incentivize states to
improve the quality of information they provide to NICS. See NIAA § 103. To be eligible for
such a federal grant, a state must “certify, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, that the
State has implemented a relief from disabilities program in accordance with section 105 [of
NIAA].” NIAA § 103(c). Section 105(a) of NIAA provides that a state’s disabilities-relief
program is considered “implemented” if the program (1) allows a person who has been
prohibited from owning firearms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) or § 922(g)(4) to apply to the
state for relief from the prohibition; (2) provides that a state court or other lawful authority
“shall grant the relief . . . if the circumstances regarding the disabilities . . . and the person’s
record and reputation, are such that the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest”;
and (3) permits a person whose relief application is denied to “file a petition with the State court
of appropriate jurisdiction for a de novo judicial review of the denial.” Further, Section 105(b)

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states that if relief is granted to a person under a qualifying disabilities-relief program, the
underlying adjudication or commitment is “deemed not to have occurred” for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and § 922(g)(4).
Franklin asserts that Pennsylvania’s disabilities-relief program, codified at 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 6105(f)(1), meets the criteria of Section 105. According to Franklin, Defendants’ refusal to
approve Pennsylvania’s disabilities-relief program or accept the order by the Court of Common
Pleas relieving his state-law disability therefore violates Section 105. And Franklin alleges that
Defendants have approved substantially similar disabilities-relief programs by other states.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Franklin’s claim under Section 105. In support, they
argue that Pennsylvania’s disabilities-relief program does not satisfy Section 105 because
Pennsylvania’s program does not specify the factors that the state court must consider in
making its determination and does not require the state court to make the necessary specific
findings.
Defendants are correct; Pennsylvania’s disabilities-relief program does not satisfy
Section 105. Section 105(a) provides specific criteria that a state’s disabilities-relief program
must satisfy in order to qualify under that section. Relevant here is Section 105(a)(2), which
provides that a disabilities-relief program qualifies if it:
provides that a State court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority shall grant the relief, pursuant to State law and in
accordance with the principles of due process, if the circumstances
regarding the disabilities referred to in paragraph (1), and the
person’s record and reputation, are such that the person will not
be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that
the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest;

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Thus, in order to qualify, a state’s program must instruct the reviewing court to consider the
circumstances regarding the disabilities as well as the person’s record and reputation. These
factors must be considered in making two determinations: (1) that the person will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and (2) that the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to the public interest.
Pennsylvania’s disabilities-relief program falls short on some of these requirements. 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(f)(1) provides as follows:
Upon application to the court of common pleas under this
subsection by an applicant subject to the prohibitions under
subsection (c)(4), the court may grant such relief as it deems
appropriate if the court determines that the applicant may possess
a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.
Pennsylvania’s program does not require a court to consider the circumstances regarding the
disabilities or the person’s record and reputation. And the court does not need to determine
that the granting of relief would not be contrary to the public interest. Instead, Pennsylvania’s
disabilities-relief program requires only that the court “determine that the applicant may
possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.” § 6105(f)(1).
Further, it is irrelevant that Defendants have approved substantially similar disabilitiesrelief programs by other states. Nothing in Section 105 makes the effectiveness of a state’s
disabilities-relief program contingent on Defendants’ approval. Thus, the fact that Defendants
have “approved” similar disabilities-relief programs by other states is of no consequence; the
only question is whether Pennsylvania’s program satisfies Section 105. It does not.
Because Pennsylvania’s program does not conform to Section 105, Franklin has failed to
state a claim under that section. Section 105(a) is explicit in its criteria. Pennsylvania’s program

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does not comply with those criteria, and therefore does not qualify as a disabilities-relief
program for purposes of Section 105. As a result, Defendants are under no obligation to accept
pursuant to Section 105(b) the Court of Common Pleas’ order relieving Franklin of his
disability. Franklin has therefore failed to state a claim under Section 105.
B.

Full Faith and Credit Clause Claim

The last claim to discuss is Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution. Although styled as a constitutional claim, Franklin relies also on the
federal statute which implements the Full Faith and Credit Clause, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Franklin asserts that Defendants’ refusal to accept the order by the Court of Common Pleas as a
basis to relieve him of his federal firearms disability violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Defendants argue that Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause must be
dismissed because there is no private right of action under that clause or under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Further, Defendants assert that even if Franklin’s Full Faith and Credit Clause claim arose
under another federal statute, it should be dismissed because it fails on its merits.
Defendants are correct; there is no private right of action under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause or under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72
(1904); Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1555 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The Supreme Court held long
ago that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not a source of federal jurisdiction.” (citing
Northern Securities, 194 U.S. at 72)). In the absence of a private right of action, Franklin has
failed to state a valid claim. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).

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Furthermore, even if Franklin had a private right of action, neither the Full Faith and
Credit Clause nor 28 U.S.C. § 1738 entitle him to the relief he seeks. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the United States Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Pursuant to that Clause, Congress has prescribed the following:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by
affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or
admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a
judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738. Thus, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each state to recognize and
enforce valid judgments rendered by the courts of other states. As the Supreme Court has
explained,
[t]he very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter
the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective
of the state of its origin.

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Milwaukee County. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
But the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not implicated in this case. The order by the
Court of Common Pleas states that Franklin is relieved of his state-law disability, and instructs
the Pennsylvania State Police to “notify the FBI that [Franklin] is no longer prohibited from
possessing firearms under Pennsylvania law as it relates to his civil commitment under 50 P.S.
§ 7302 in September 2002.” (ECF No. 3-1 at 4.) The order does not instruct the Defendants to
relieve Franklin of his federal-law prohibition. 7 And the order does not expunge Franklin’s
involuntary commitment—it merely states that his commitment will not be the basis for
denying him a firearm under state law. Thus, Defendants are not refusing to recognize or
enforce the order by the Court of Common Pleas; the order simply does not apply to them.
Accordingly, Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause must be dismissed.
C.

Leave to Amend

Although the Court will grant Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5), the
Court will allow Franklin to amend his complaint to state alternative counts under NIAA.
When a district court dismisses one or more claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must
allow the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted); see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115.
Here, for the reasons discussed above, Franklin has failed to state a viable claim under Sections
101(c)(1) and 105 of NIAA.

But Franklin may be able to state a claim under Section

Nor could it. See, e.g., TransAmerica Assurance Corp. v. Settlement Capital Corp., 489 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing cases) (sovereign immunity barred state-court decision ordering federal government to take
governmental action).
7

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101(b)(2)(B). 8 And Section 101(a) of NIAA, which amended Section 103(e)(1) of the Brady Act,
includes language which may also lend itself to a viable claim. Thus, the Court will grant
Franklin leave to file an amended complaint.
As for Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court finds that
amendment on that claim would be futile. Amendment is futile “if the amended complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F. 3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court may therefore
“properly deny leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to
dismiss.” Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F. 2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989). Because the Court finds that
amendment of Franklin’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause would be futile, leave to
amend is denied on that claim. Franklin’s amendments, if any, are therefore to be limited to
claims under NIAA.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) is

GRANTED. A corresponding Order follows.

Section 101(b)(2)(B) instructs the Attorney General to “provide for the timely removal and destruction of
obsolete and erroneous names and information from the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System.”

8

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALTON C. FRANKLIN,

)

Case No. 3:16-cv-36

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

LORETTA LYNCH, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER
NOW, this 18th day of November 2016, upon consideration of Defendants' Partial
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) and for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion
accompanying this Order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 5) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of
2007 (Count I) are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's claim under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause (Count II) is dismissed with prejudice.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint.

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he shall do so within 21 days of issuance of

this Order.

Plaintiff's amendments, if any, are to be limited to claims under the NICS

Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922 note).

BY THE COURT:

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE