SHATZER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 16

OPINION and ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/22/17. (sps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD JOSEPH SHATZER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:16-95

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AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 12 and
14]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 13 and 15]. After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion [ECF No. 14] is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 12] is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). On or about February 18, 2013, Plaintiff applied
for DIB. [ECF No. 6-7, at 194]. In his application, he alleged that since August 24, 2010, he had
been disabled due to chronic back pain and depression. Id. at 194, 197. His date last insured is

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Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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December 31, 2015. Id. at 194. The state agency denied his claims initially, and he requested
an administrative hearing. [ECF No. 6-4, at 69-72]. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Donald
M. Graffius held a hearing on December 5, 2014, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel.
[ECF No. 6-2, at 29-58]. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and testified on his own behalf. Id. A
vocational expert also was present at the hearing and testified. Id. at 51-57. In a decision dated
February 5, 2015, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. [ECF No.
6-2, at 12-24]. Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s determination by the Appeals Council, and,
on March 3, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. [ECF No. 6-2, at
1-3]. Having exhausted all of his administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 12 and 14].
The issues are now ripe for my review.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Additionally,
the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court
would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
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1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district
court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

The ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical
evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606
F.2d at 406.

Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity
(step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
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B.

WHETHER THE ALJ’s RFC FINDING FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL OF
PLAINTIFF’S DOCUMENTED MENTAL LIMITATIONS
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments, including scoliosis of the right hip;

mild degenerative disc disease at the T11-12 level; bilateral piriformis syndrome; mood disorder,
secondary to medical condition; depressive disorder due to another medical condition;
unspecified depressive disorder; major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate;
unspecified anxiety disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; bipolar disorder with psychotic
features; marijuana abuse; and alcohol dependence in remission. [ECF No. 6-2, at 14]. He
then found that Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically
equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Id. at 14-15. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that he was limited to occasional
postural maneuvers such as balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and climbing ramps and
stairs; was limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production
environment, involving only simple work-related decisions, and in general, relatively few work
place changes; and was limited to working primarily with objects rather than people and to no jobs
requiring teamwork or interaction with the public. Id. at 17-22. The ALJ ultimately concluded
that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore,
that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 23-24.
In his opinion, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist,
Waleed Mushref, M.D. [ECF No. 6-2, at 20, 22 (citing Ex. 10F)]. On November 6, 2014, Dr.
Mushref opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff would occasionally have difficulty interacting with
supervisors and coworkers, managing even a low stress environment, and maintaining

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concentration, pace, and task persistence during an eight-hour work day. [ECF No. 6-19, at 879
(Ex. 10F)]. Although Plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Mushref’s characterization of his limitations,
he argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to include those limitations in his RFC finding,
particularly the limitations on maintaining concentration, task persistence, and pace. [ECF No.
13, at 6-9]. This argument is without merit.
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a
non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give
more weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ
finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give
that opinion controlling weight. Id. Unless a treating physician’s opinion is given controlling
weight, the ALJ must consider all relevant factors that tend to support or contradict any medical
opinions of record, including the patient/physician relationship; the supportability of the opinion;
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and the specialization of the provider at
issue. Id. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). “[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole,
the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained:
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“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where
. . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § [404.1527]([c])(2), the
opinion of a treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is
well-supported by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the
record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 403 F. App’x 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010). The ultimate
issue of whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act is for the Commissioner to
decide. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3). Likewise, the final responsibility for determining a
claimant's RFC is reserved to the Commissioner, who will not give any special significance to the
source of another opinion on this issue. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2), (d)(3).
Here, the ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Mushref’s opinion, stating that the opinion was
supported by the evidence and that it showed moderate limitations in social functioning,
concentration, persistence, and pace.2 [ECF No. 6-2, at 22]. Consistent with Dr. Mushref’s
opinion, the ALJ incorporated numerous mental limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC, including: a
limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production
environment, involving only simple work-related decisions, and, in general, relatively few
workplace changes; and a limitation to working primarily with objects rather than people and to no
jobs requiring teamwork or interaction with the public.

Id. at 17.

Although Plaintiff

acknowledges these restrictions, he nevertheless argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding and
hypothetical question to the VE inadequately address his moderate limitations of concentration,
persistence, and pace. [ECF No. 13, at 6-9]. In particular, Plaintiff cites Ramirez v. Barnhart,
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Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s characterization of his limitations in the areas of social functioning,
concentration, persistence, and pace as “moderate.”

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372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004) and related cases, for the proposition that a limitation to simple,
routine tasks does not adequately account for a claimant’s moderate deficiencies in pace. [ECF
No. 13, at 8]. Plaintiff’s reliance on Ramirez is misplaced.
As an initial matter, several courts within this Circuit have distinguished Ramirez and held
that a limitation to simple, routine tasks adequately conveys “moderate” limitations in
concentration, persistence and pace. See Padilla v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 10-cv-4968, 2011 WL
6303248, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2011) (citing cases). Furthermore, and in any event, the ALJ in
this case did not merely limit Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks. Rather, as set forth above, his
hypothetical question to the VE and his RFC finding limited Plaintiff to “simple, routine, repetitive
tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production environment, involving only simple work-related
decisions, and, in general, relatively few workplace changes.” [ECF No. 6-2, at 17, 52 (emphasis
added)]. These additional limitations go beyond simple, routine tasks and more than adequately
address Plaintiff’s moderate limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace.

See, e.g.,

Haines v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-309, 2012 WL 1069987, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012).
To the extent Plaintiff further contends that the RFC finding fails to account for his social
limitations or time off-task, such argument is likewise without merit. As an initial matter, the RFC
finding and hypothetical questions to the ALJ adequately account for Plaintiff’s moderate social
limitations, by restricting Plaintiff, inter alia, to working primarily with objects rather than people
and to no jobs requiring teamwork or interaction with the public. [ECF No. 6-2, at 17, 52-53].
Thus, Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ ignored his social deficits in the RFC finding is
groundless.
With respect to time off-task, Plaintiff cites the VE’s testimony that a person who missed
work one day per month on a regular basis or who was off task more than 15% of the day would
be competitively unemployable. [ECF No. 13, at 5]. This testimony, however, is immaterial to
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Plaintiff’s claims because the evidence does not support a finding that Plaintiff’s mental
impairments resulted in such limitations. The only medical evidence Plaintiff cites in support of
his alleged inability to work on a regular and continuous full-time basis is a mental status
evaluation form completed by treating psychologist, Jason Cook, on November 4, 2014. [ECF
No. 13, at 4 (citing Ex. 9F)]. This form is identical to the one that Dr. Mushref completed on the
same date, except that Dr. Cook opined that Plaintiff would often (as opposed to occasionally)
have difficulty maintaining concentration, pace, and task persistence during an 8 hour work day,
and that Plaintiff experiences approximately 30 bad days per month during which his symptoms
are increased and he would not be able to complete an 8 hour work shift. [ECF No. 6-19 (Ex.
9F)]. Again, the ALJ did not ignore this evidence. Rather, he acknowledged Dr. Cook’s opinion,
but found that the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff was unable to complete an 8
hour workday or would often have difficulty with concentration, persistence, and pace. [ECF No.
6-2, at 22]. In support of his decision not to accord weight to this portion of Dr. Cook’s opinion,
the ALJ properly cited to underlying medical records and treatment notes showing that Plaintiff
consistently had intact cognitive functioning, attention, and concentration, as well as to the
contrary opinion of treating psychiatrist Dr. Mushref. Id. (citing Exs. 3F, 5F, 8F, and 10F). As
set forth above, when physician opinions conflict, the ALJ may choose whom to credit and may
reject a treating physician’s assessment when, as here, such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence.
Because the ALJ appropriately weighed the mental health evidence and accounted for
Plaintiff’s moderate mental limitations in formulating his RFC, substantial evidence supports this
portion of his RFC finding, and remand on this point is unwarranted.

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C.

WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE ANY LIMITATIONS ON
PLAINTIFF’S ABILITY TO REACH
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC finding is deficient because it failed to incorporate any

limitations on reaching. [ECF No. 13, at 9-11]. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the record
shows that the VAMC prescribed Plaintiff a TENS unit, as well as grab bars for the shower/tub,
orthotics for his shoes, a “reacher” to aid in reaching objects on the floor or above his shoulders, a
long handled shoe horn, elastic shoe laces, a long handled sponge, and a sock aid. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff states that his need for these assistive devices “plainly evidence[s] a limitation on
reaching,” and, therefore, that the ALJ erred in failing to include a reaching limitation in his RFC.
Id. at 9-11. Plaintiff asserts that this alleged omission is material because, according to the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and related supplement, Selected Characteristics of
Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT Selected
Characteristics”), all of the positions identified by the VE as jobs Plaintiff could perform (garment
sorter, fruit cutter, and fabric folder) require frequent handling3 and reaching. Id. at 10-11. After
careful consideration, I disagree.
The DOT Selected Characteristics defines “reaching” as used in that publication as
“[e]xtending hand(s) and arm(s) in any direction.” DOT Selected Characteristics, at C-3. Even if
the three jobs identified by the VE require frequent reaching, however, there is no medical or other
objective evidence to support Plaintiff’s assertion that he had any such reaching limitations. In
particular, the treatment notes pertaining to the various assistive devices listed above do not
indicate that Plaintiff had any issues using his upper extremities or any general inability to reach
with his arms and hands. To the contrary, the medical records plainly show that the devices
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Although Plaintiff references “reaching” and “handling” in his argument heading, the body of his argument
discusses only “reaching.” Thus, I focus primarily on reaching here. My conclusions in this regard,
however, would apply equally to Plaintiff’s ability to handle objects. The DOT Selected Characteristics
defines “handling” as “[s]eizing, holding, grasping, turning, or otherwise working with hand or hands.” DOT
Selected Characteristics at C-3.

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were intended to alleviate Plaintiff’s complaints of chronic low back pain and related pain in his
leg(s) and feet. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 6-12, 6-18, 6-19 (Exs. 5F, 8F) at 440, 803-04 (describing
TENS unit as alleviating factor for lower left back pain); 808, 820 (noting use of orthotics for foot
pain); 756-57 (providing grab bars to help Plaintiff get in/out of soaking tub); 817 (instructing
Plaintiff on use of grab bars, long handled sponge, hand-held shower, reacher,4 sock aid, long
handled shoe horn, and elastic shoe laces to address his difficulty dressing his lower body and
reaching his lower body to complete bathing “secondary to low back pain”). The RFC’s limitation
to light work involving only occasional postural maneuvers, including inter alia, occasional
stooping and crouching, 5 more than adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s alleged difficulties
reaching his lower body due to back pain. Because none of the assistive devices to which
Plaintiff points or the associated medical records reflect an inability to extend his hands or arms or
any other upper extremity limitations not already encompassed by the RFC, the ALJ did not err by
failing to include additional reaching limitations in his RFC finding.
Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ erroneously failed to consider his ability to reach is
without merit. As an initial matter, the ALJ obviously is not required to address evidence that
does not exist. As set forth above, the medical evidence to which Plaintiff cites does not reflect
any reaching limitations. Nevertheless, and in any event, the ALJ thoroughly discussed all of the
pertinent medical evidence of record, including the records to which Plaintiff cites regarding
assistive devices. See ECF 6-2, at 17-22 (making RFC finding “[a]fter careful consideration of
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Plaintiff misleadingly states in his brief that the VAMC prescribed a “reacher” to aid him “in reaching
objects on the floor or above his shoulders.” ECF No. 13, at 10 (emphasis added). The pertinent medical
records, however, say no such thing. Rather, as set forth above, the reacher was one of seven items
provided to address Plaintiff’s alleged difficulty reaching his lower body to complete bathing and lower body
dressing secondary to low back pain. ECF No. 6-19, at 817. The records do not mention any difficulties
reaching above his shoulders. Id.
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The DOT Selected Characteristics defines “stooping” as “[b]ending body downward and forward by
bending spine at the waist, requiring full use of the lower extremities and back muscles,” and “crouching” as
“[b]ending body downward and forward by bending legs and spine.” DOT Selected Characteristics, at C-3.

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the entire record,” including, inter alia, the medical records contained in Exhibits 5F and 8F). As
Defendant correctly notes, the regulations do not require the ALJ to discuss every detail of the
record evidence cited in his opinion. See Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-04
(3d Cir. 2008).
Moreover, the ALJ’s opinion expressly acknowledged Plaintiff’s subjective assertion that
“his pain was getting worse and that he experienced problems with squatting, bending, standing,
reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, and climbing stairs.” See ECF No. 6-2, at 19 (emphasis
added) (citing Ex. 4E). After careful consideration of the record, however, the ALJ concluded
that “the objective medical findings and the claimant’s significant activities of daily living do not
support the degree of symptoms and limitations alleged.” Id. In support of this conclusion, the
ALJ cited, inter alia, pertinent treatment and progress notes, diagnostic studies, objective medical
findings, and Plaintiff’s self-described activities of daily living. Id. at 17-22 (citing Exs. 4E, 1F, 2F,
3F, 4F, 5F, 8F, and Hearing Testimony). Plaintiff’s significant activities of daily living included
going fishing as much as he can (including the day before the hearing where he caught a small
fish); playing softball; taking care of his son when he is with him; driving daily to his mother’s
house a few blocks away; sometimes washing dishes and taking care of laundry; cooking and
cleaning everything but the bathroom; sometimes going outside to throw a football with his son;
trying to keep up with his woodworking, including making walking sticks by carving wood he
obtains from the woods; regularly walking in the woods and going to the river; and taking care of
his dogs. Id. at 21 (citing Exs. 4E and 8F and Hearing Testimony); see also ECF No. 6-2, at
33-45.

All of these factors are proper considerations in determining a claimant’s credibility and

in formulating a claimant’s RFC.
As the above demonstrates, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations
resulting from his back impairment, including reaching, in making his RFC determination, and
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substantial record evidence, including medical evidence and Plaintiff’s significant activities of
daily living, supports his findings in this regard. Because the RFC adequately accounts for
Plaintiff’s physical limitations supported by the record, Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are
unpersuasive.
D.

WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME OFF TASK OR
MISSED DAYS STEMMING FROM FLARES OF PLAINTIFF’S BACK PAIN
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ’s RFC finding erroneously failed to account for

off-task time or missed days resulting from flares of Plaintiff’s sciatic pain. ECF No. 13, at 11-14.
This argument is without merit.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, the Commissioner must consider all "symptoms,
including pain," in the disability determination.

Statements of pain alone, however, are not

enough to establish a disability; the claimant must also present objective medical evidence to
show that the medical impairment "could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged."

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); SSR 96-7p.

Once the Commissioner has

determined from the "medical signs or laboratory findings" that the claimant has an impairment
which could reasonably produce the pain, then the Commissioner must evaluate the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the Plaintiff’s symptoms to determine how the pain limits the
claimant's capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1); SSR 96-7p. In determining the limits
on the claimant's capacity for work, the Commissioner will consider the entire case record,
including evidence from the treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from
agency employees, and other factors such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the
pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The Commissioner also will look at inconsistencies between

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the claimant's statements and the evidence presented. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).
Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony or daily activities permit an ALJ to conclude that some or
all of the claimant's testimony about his limitations or symptoms is less than fully credible. See
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2002). Although the ALJ may weigh the
credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence he rejects and the
reasons for discrediting such evidence. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d
Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, an ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to great deference. See
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir.2003).
Plaintiff=s assertion that the ALJ here “over-relied” on the minimal findings on Plaintiff’s
radiological testing and not the “full picture” in failing to account for off-task time or missed days
stemming from flares of Plaintiff’s back pain is incorrect. In addition to the relatively mild or
unremarkable diagnostic findings, which Plaintiff does not dispute, the ALJ thoroughly analyzed
the “other evidence” of record, including, as Plaintiff acknowledges, pertinent treatment records
and clinical findings. See ECF No. 6-2, at 16-22 (citing treatment notes at Exs. 1F, 2F, 3F, 4F, 5F
& 8F). The ALJ also considered plaintiff=s subjective complaints of pain, including his testimony
that he had problems completing tasks and was unable to work because he has a lot of bad
days, and properly concluded that those complaints were not fully credible and did not limit
plaintiff=s ability to perform light work as limited by the RFC.

Id. In addition to the objective

medical findings cited above, the ALJ pointed to the fact that Plaintiff’s self-reported activities of
daily living did not support the degree of symptoms and limitations alleged. Id. As previously
discussed, Plaintiff reported significant activities of daily living, including: going fishing as much
as he can; playing softball; taking care of his son when he is with him; driving daily to his mother’s
house a few blocks away; sometimes washing dishes and taking care of laundry; cooking and
cleaning everything but the bathroom; trying to keep up with his woodworking, including making
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walking sticks by carving wood he obtains from the woods; regularly walking in the woods and
going to the river; and taking care of his dogs. Id. at 21 (citing Exs. 4E and 8F and Hearing
Testimony); see also ECF No. 6-2, at 33-45. The ALJ also noted that the evidence did not show
that Plaintiff’s medication regimen or the side effects from his medications caused him significant
functional limitations. Id. (citing Exs. 2E, 4E, 5F, 8F, and Hearing Testimony).
All of these factors are proper considerations in determining a claimant’s credibility and in
formulating a claimant’s RFC.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 96-7p.

The ALJ directly

addressed Plaintiff’s allegations that his impairments caused severe pain and did not reject his
allegations entirely. Rather, the ALJ incorporated numerous limitations related to Plaintiff’s pain
complaints in his RFC finding. See id. at 17 (RFC finding containing limitations on, inter alia,
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and climbing ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds).

Although the VE testified that no unskilled jobs exist for someone who is

unproductive for two days or more out of a 30-day period, the evidence did not support the need
for such limitations in this case. It is well-established that an ALJ is only required to accept the
responses to hypothetical questions that accurately reflect a claimant’s impairments.

See

Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269,
1276 (3d Cir. 1987). As set forth herein, the record evidence does not support the additional
limitations Plaintiff claims here. See, e.g., Hazlett v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv-00538, 2014 WL
3845730, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2014); Brown v. Colvin, No. 15-3135, 2015 WL 7573205, at *11
(D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2015) (record did not support a finding that Plaintiff would necessarily be off task
more than ten percent out of an eight-hour work day or absent two or more days per month due to
symptoms of low back pain).

Because the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s limitations

supported by the record, I find no error on this issue.

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III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. An appropriate Order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD JOSEPH SHATZER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:16-95

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AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2017, after careful consideration of the submissions of
the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order, it is ordered the
decision of the ALJ is affirmed and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 12] is
DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. Senior District Judge

1

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).