WYLIE v. TRANSUNION, LLC
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 25 Motion for Summary Judgment and all of Plaintiff David C. Wylie's claims in the above-captioned case are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 9/29/2017. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID C. WYLIE,
Case No. 3:16-cv-102
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
Pending before the Court is Defendant Trans Union LLC’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 25). This is an action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq. (“FCRA” or “Act”), in which Plaintiff David C. Wylie (“Wylie”) alleges that Defendant
Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”) 1 continues to report falsely and inaccurately the status of his
alleged debt owed to credit-furnisher First National Bank of Pennsylvania (“FNB”).
As is evident from both parties’ briefing (see ECF Nos. 27, 32, 33, 37), the only real
dispute regarding Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is whether Wylie’s failure to
respond to Trans Union’s requests for admissions and failure to timely file a responsive
statement of material facts resulted in deemed admissions. The Court has separately ruled on
this dispute in its recent Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 43) by denying Wylie’s
The Court notes that, while the caption refers to “TransUnion, LLC” as a single word with no space and
a comma, Trans Union itself consistently breaks its name into two words in all of its filings and does not
include a comma between “Trans Union” and “LLC.” Based on Trans Union’s Disclosure Statement (ECF
No. 7), it appears that Trans Union LLC features a space between “Trans” and “Union,” but other
parents, subsidiaries and/or affiliates are a single word without a space. See, e.g., “TransUnion
Intermediate Holdings, Inc.” In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will follow Trans Union’s choice
of spacing and naming conventions.
Rule 36(b) Motion to Withdraw or Amend Responses to Defendant’s Request for Admissions
(“Rule 36(b) Motion) (ECF No. 29) and Wylie’s Motion for Leave to File Out of Time Statement
of Material Facts in Support of his Response to Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion to File Late Statement”) (ECF No. 41). Thus, for the purposes of Trans Union’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, Wylie has admitted to all of the admissions requested by Trans Union
in discovery and agreed with Trans Union’s Statement of Material Facts. (See ECF Nos. 26-6,
Therefore, because Wylie has twice-admitted that Trans Union did not violate the FCRA
or report any inaccurate information to a third party and for the reasons that follow, Trans
Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Jurisdiction and Venue
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Wylie’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1337(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 1681(p). Because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Wylie’s
claims occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania, venue is proper in this district
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Relevant Procedural History
On May 4, 2016, Wylie filed his original Complaint, alleging that Trans Union was
inaccurately reporting a delinquency on his account with FNB. (ECF No. 1.) Trans Union filed
its first Motion to Dismiss on July 5, 2016. (ECF No. 7.) Mooting this first Motion to Dismiss,
Wylie filed his Amended Complaint on July 26, 2016. (ECF No. 11.) Trans Union then filed its
second Motion to Dismiss on August 12, 2016. (ECF No. 18.) During the pendency of this
second Motion to Dismiss, the case was to proceed according to the Court’s Initial Scheduling
Order of August 19, 2016. (ECF No. 21.)
As part of its effort to pursue discovery, Trans Union served Wylie with Trans Union’s
Requests for Admissions on July 21, 2016. (See ECF No. 36; ECF No. 26-6.) As conceded by his
Rule 36(b) Motion, Wylie never responded to Trans Union’s Requests for Admissions. (See ECF
After the close of fact discovery, Trans Union filed the present Motion for Summary
Judgment, its Statement of Material Facts, and its Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment on February 15, 2017. (ECF Nos. 25-27.) Likely realizing the consequences of his
refusal to participate in discovery because of the content of the Motion for Summary Judgment,
Wylie filed his Rule 36(b) Motion (ECF No. 29) and Brief in Support of Rule 36(b) Motion (ECF
No. 30) on March 3, 2017, asking the Court to set aside Wylie’s default admissions over six
months after the deadline.
Wylie then filed his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and his Reply Brief
to the Motion for Summary Judgment on March 8, 2017. (ECF Nos. 32-33.) However, despite
the mandate of Local Rule 56(C), Wylie did not timely file a responsive statement of material
Noticing this violation of Local Rules, Trans Union filed its Reply in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 22, 2017 (ECF No. 37), in which Trans Union correctly
noted that Local Rule 56(E) provides that alleged material facts set forth in either party’s
statement of material facts are “deemed admitted unless denied or otherwise controverted by a
separate concise statement of the opposing party.” LCVR 56(E). Trans Union also filed its
Response in Opposition to Wylie’s 36(b) Motion on March 22, 2017 (ECF No. 36.)
Likely motivated by Trans Union’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment, Wylie then filed his Statement of Material Facts on April 5, 2017 (ECF No. 33) and
filed his Motion to File Late Statement (ECF No. 41) on April 12, 2017—26 days after the
deadline established by Local Rule 56(C). Trans Union filed its Response in Opposition to this
Motion on April 21, 2017. (ECF No. 42.)
The Court denied both Wylie’s 36(b) Motion and his Motion to File Late Statement on
September 29, 2017 (ECF No. 43)—the effect of which is that Wylie has admitted to all of Trans
Union’s Requests for Admissions and Trans Union’s Statement of Material Facts by operation of
As discussed supra and infra, Wylie has admitted to all of the content of Trans Union’s
Requests for Admissions and Statement of Material Facts. Therefore, rather than repeating
those admissions here, the Court incorporates the facts admitted therein by reference. (See ECF
No. 26; ECF No. 26-6.)
Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is appropriate only where . . . there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact . . . and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Melrose, Inc.
v. Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6
(3d Cir. 2007)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Issues of fact are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Material facts are those that will affect the
outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court’s role is “not to
weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the
evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). “In making this
determination, ‘a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and draw all inferences in that party's favor.’” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If the moving party meets this burden, the party
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials” of the
pleading, but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 n.11 (1986)). “For an issue to be genuine, the nonmovant
needs to supply more than a scintilla of evidence in support of its position—there must be
sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.”
Coolspring Stone Supply v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Podobnik
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that a party opposing summary
judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to
show the existence of a genuine issue”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given the Court’s decision on Wylie’s Rule 36(b) Motion and Motion to File Late
Statement (see ECF No. 43), the outcome of Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment
requires little discussion. Because Wylie has admitted to Trans Union’s version of the facts
through his default admissions, there is no dispute of material fact.
And, under these
undisputed facts, Trans Union is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court must grant
Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 2
As discussed in the Court’s earlier decision (ECF No. 43), Wylie’s failure to respond to
Trans Union’s Requests for Admissions resulted in the default admission of the matters
requested, see Fed R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3), and Wylie’s failure to timely file a responsive statement of
material facts resulted in a default admission of Trans Union’s Statement of Material facts, see
LCvR 56(E). The Court did not grant Wylie leave to withdraw his default admissions or to file a
late responsive statement of material facts. (See ECF No. 43.) Thus, both of these sources of
default admissions apply to Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Wylie’s default admissions regarding his failure to respond to Trans Union’s Requests
for Admissions are conclusive and sufficient to support summary judgment. See Langer v.
Monarch Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 786, 803 (3d Cir. 1992); Kida v. EcoWater Systems LLC, Civil Action
No. 10-4319, 2011 WL 4547006, at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011); 3 McNeil v. AT & T Universal
The Court notes that Wylie essentially conceded that summary judgment must be granted in favor of
Trans Union unless the Court granted its Rule 36(b) Motion by stating that “upholding the Defendant’s
deemed admissions would practically eliminate a presentation of the merits of the case.” (ECF No. 30 at
3 The Court refers the parties to Judge Baylson’s opinion in Kida v. EcoWater Systems LLC, et al for a
thorough coverage of the law regarding Rule 36 admissions and summary judgment. See Kida v. EcoWater
Systems LLC, Civil Action No. 10-4319, 2011 WL 4547006, at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing cases).
Card, 192 F.R.D. 492, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Moreover, because admissions are conclusive, they are
not weighed against competing evidence on a summary judgment motion. Kida, 2011 WL
4547006, at *3; In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
Local Rule 56(E) provides for the same effect, i.e., the uncontroverted content of the
movant’s statement of material fact is deemed admitted and carries conclusive weight for the
purposes of summary judgment motions. See LCvR 56(E).
Pursuant to Rule 36 and Local Rule 56(E), Wylie has conclusively admitted the following
for the purposes of summary judgment: 4
Trans Union has not violated any provision of the FCRA with respect to Wylie.
(ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.a; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 23.)
Trans Union followed reasonable procedures to assume maximum possible
accuracy of the information Trans Union reported with respect to Wylie. (ECF
No. 26 ¶ 33.b; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 22.)
Trans Union’s reinvestigation of Wylie’s disputes regarding the information
Trans Union reported with respect to Wylie were reasonable. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.c;
ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 33.)
Trans Union never furnished inaccurate information about Wylie in a credit
report to any third party. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.d; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 31.)
Trans Union never furnished Wylie’s credit report to a third party. (ECF No. 26
¶ 33.e; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 32.)
The Court does not represent this list as an exhaustive list of Wylie’s default admissions; the list includes
only the more pertinent admissions.
Trans Union did not knowingly, intentionally or recklessly commit any act or
omission in conscious disregard for Wylie’s rights. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.f; ECF No.
26-6 ¶¶ 35-37.)
The actions of Trans Union in handling Wylie’s credit file and in dealing with
Wylie were not done with the intent to harm Wylie. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.g; ECF No.
26-6 ¶ 6.)
Wylie was not damaged as a result of any act or omission on the part of Trans
Union. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.h; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 24.)
Wylie was not denied credit or had terms changed as a result of the information
Trans Union reported with respect to Wylie. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.i; ECF No. 26-6 ¶
Wylie did not suffer any emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment or
mental anguish as a result of Trans Union’s conduct. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.j; ECF No.
26-6 ¶ 27.)
Wylie did not incur any expenses in connection with medical, spiritual or
counseling treatment resulting from the events which form the basis of this
litigation. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.k; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 21.)
The Court agrees with Trans Union that these admissions are dispositive of all issues in
the case. (See ECF No. 27 at 11.) The Court need not go much further than Wylie’s admission
that Trans Union did not violate any provision of the FCRA with respect to Wylie. (ECF No. 26
¶ 33ba; ECF No. 26-6 ¶ 23.) All of Wylie’s claims are under the FCRA, so this admission alone is
fatal to Wylie’s case.
Even beyond this overarching admission, the remainder of the admissions discussed
supra clearly demonstrate that Wylie has failed to establish the requirements of any of his causes
of action. Trans Union’s Brief accurately details these failures, and the Court will not repeat this
analysis here. (See ECF No. 27 at 11-15.) However, these deficiencies are obvious and glaring.
Trans Union, as the moving party, easily met its initial responsibility of stating the basis
for its Motion for Summary Judgment and identifying the default admissions that demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. On the other hand,
Wylie, bound by the conclusive weight of his default admissions, failed to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine for trial. See Saldanav, 260 F.3d at 232. The Court has no doubt
that, given Wylie’s admissions, a reasonable jury could not find in favor of Wylie.
Coolspring, 10 F.3d at 148; Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 594. Consequently, the Court grants Trans
Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID C. WYLIE,
Case No. 3:16-cv-102
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
NOW, this 29th day of September 2017, upon consideration of Defendant Trans Union
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) and for the reasons set forth in. the
Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED and all of Plaintiff David C. Wylie's
claims in the above-captioned case are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BY THE COURT:
KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?