WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. CARNELL et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - upon consideration of Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (ECF No. 48 ), and for the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay's Motion (ECF No. 48 ) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Jeffrey A. Camell's crossclaim against Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay c ontained in the Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Crossclaim by Defendant Jeffrey A. Camell (ECF No. 39 Paragraphs 79-92) is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is to terminate Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay as parties to this case on the docket, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 4/19/2018. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Case No. 3:16-cv-130

)
)

Plaintiff,

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

)

v.

)

JEFFREY A. CARNELL, ANNA M.
CARNELL, RYAN P. JAY, and LARRY E.
JAY,

)

)
)
)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction

Pending before this Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the
Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
("the Motion") filed by Defendants Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay ("the Jays") as to the crossclairn
of Defendant Jeffrey A. Camell ("Mr. Carnell). 1 (ECF No. 48.) Although Mr. Carnell has not
responded to the Jays' Motion (ECF No. 48) and brief in support thereof (ECF No. 49), the
deadline for Mr. Camell's response-Le., April 3, 2018-passed over two weeks ago and, thus,
the Jays' Motion is ripe for disposition.
The Jays argue that Mr. Carnell's crossclaim against them should be dismissed for
failure to request a legally cognizable remedy. (See ECF No. 49 at 3-4.) This Court agrees with
the Jays' argument.

Given the late timing of this Motion, the Court construes this Motion solely as a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. See infra Part III (discussing the permissible time frame for the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings).

1

Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, the Jays' Motion is GRANTED. Thus, Mr.
Camell's crossclaim against the Jays is DISMISSED.
II.

Relevant Background

This Court detailed the procedural and factual background of the instant case in
multiple prior memorandum opinions and orders. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell, Case
No. 3:16-cv-130, 2017 WL 1498087, at *1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2017); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Carnell, Case No. 3:16-cv-130, 2018 WL 840141, at *1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 3:16-cv-130, 2018 WL 988352, at *1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2018). The

Court will not further expand upon this previously-provided background in the current
Memorandum Opinion. However, the Court will provide a brief background as to those issues
particularly pertinent to the instant Motion.
As this Court previously summarized, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") brought
this case against two mortgagors-Mr. Camell and Anna M. Carnell2-and the two notary
publics who notarized the underlying mortgage documents-the Jays-after the Carnells
allegedly defaulted on their mortgage payments. See Wells Fargo, 2018 WL 840141, at *1. Wells
Fargo primarily seeks an order quieting title to the property underlying the mortgage. Id.
Most relevant for the purposes of the present Motion, Mr. Carnell filed his Answer and
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, 3 and Crossclaim on May 8, 2017. (ECF No. 39.) In this
Answer, Mr. Carnell denies that he signed the two mortgages with Wells Fargo in 2008 and
2009. (Id. 'Il'Il 14, 25.) Mr. Camell's Answer also stated that he served a prior answer upon Wells

The Carnells were married at the time the property was acquired.
This Court dismissed Mr. Carnell's counterclaims against Wells Fargo. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Carnell, Case No. 3:16-cv-130, 2018 WL 840141 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018).

2

3

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Fargo on May 29, 2012 in a related state foreclosure action, in which he previously averred that
he did not sign these two mortgage instruments. (Id. <JI 35.)
Additionally, Mr. Carnell's Answer included a crossclaim against Anna M. Carnell and
the Jays. (See ECF No. 39 at <JI<JI 79-92.) Mr. Camell's crossclaim alleges that Anna M. Carnell
and the Jays "caus[ed] or otherwise allow[ed] his signature to be forged upon two Wells Fargo
Mortgages." (Id. <JI 80.) The remainder of the allegations under the crossclaim heading of Mr.
Carnell's Answer relate to Wells Fargo's alleged wrongdoing in promoting hasty, unsupervised
"take home" mortgages that enabled Anna M. Camell to forge Mr. Carnell's signature. (Id. <JI<JI
79-92.) Mr. Carnell's Answer asserts that Anna M. Camell "forged her husband's name on the
paperwork and found a willing and able notary to notarize the signatures." (Id. <JI 88.) The
Answer further alleges that Mr. Carnell "never signed anything with. regard to the two Wells
Fargo Mortgages and as such, could not have signed in front of the two notaries." (Id. <JI 89.)
In response to this crossclaim, the Jays filed the instant Motion (ECF No. 48) and their
brief in support thereof (ECF No. 49) on March 13, 2018.

Mr. Carnell has not filed any

documents in opposition to the instant Motion. Any responses were due on or before April 3,
2018.

See Practices and Procedures of Judge Kim R. Gibson, Rule II.D.4 (Aug. 23, 2017),

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/sites/pawd/files/JG-Practices-Procedures.pdf

(providing

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days to respond to motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings).
III.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12( c) provides that "[a ]fter the pleadings are closedbut early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c); see also Hadeed v. Advanced Vascular Res. of Johnstown, LLC, 3:15-cv-22, 2017 WL

-3-

4998663, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017). "The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on
the pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is not materially different
from the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)." Zion v. Nassan, 283 F.R.D. 247, 254 (W.D. Pa. 2012); see Harleysville Ins. Co.

of New York v. Cerciello, No. 3:08-CV-2060, 2010 WL 11534317, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2010) ("The
standard of review used for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is substantively identical
to that of a motion to dismiss."); Minnesota Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ahrens, 432 F. App'x 143, 147
(3d Cir. 2011).
Either motion may be used to seek the dismissal of a complaint based on a plaintiff's
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); id. at
12(h)(2)(B). The only difference between the two motions is that a Rule 12(b) motion must be
made before a "responsive pleading" is filed, whereas a Rule 12(c) motion can be made "[a]fter
the pleadings are closed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); id. at 12(c); Cerciello, 2010 WL 11534317, at *2.
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786
(3d Cir. 2016). But, detailed pleading is not generally required. Id. The Rules demand only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

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Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. 4 First, the court must "tak[e] note of the
elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009).
Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662
F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.") (citation omitted).

Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Id.; see also Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786.

Ultimately, the plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV.

Discussion
The Jays argue that this Court should dismiss Mr. Camell's crossclairn because Mr.

Camell failed to make any demand for relief against the Jays and, in the alternative, because the
Jays do not hold any legal or equitable interest in the real estate underlying this lawsuit. (See
ECF No. 49 at 3-4.) This Court is persuaded by both of the Jays' arguments and, thus, will
dismiss Mr. Camell' s crossclaim against them.

Although Iqbal described the process as a "two-pronged approach," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, the Supreme
Court noted the elements of the pertinent claim before proceeding with that approach, id. at 675-79.
Thus, the Third Circuit has described the process as a three-step approach. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787;
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Santiago v. Warminster Township,
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)).

4

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First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading must contain "a
demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
relief."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).

Mr. Carnell's Answer has failed to satisfy this basic and

fundamental requirement. (See ECF No. 39 <JI<JI 79-92.)
Even after assuming the veracity of all of the allegations contained in Mr. Carnell's
Answer and the reasonable inferences therefrom, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Connelly, 809 F.3d at
786, this Court is unable to identify any demand for relief or request for any remedy in relation
to Mr. Carnell's crossclairn against the Jays. In short, Mr. Carnell has failed to ask this court for

any relief, therein failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), and this Court
must dismiss Mr. Carnell's crossclaim against the Jays.
Second, even were this Court to infer a request for relief by Mr. Carnell for his
crossclairn against the Jays that is identical to the relief Wells Fargo sought against all
Defendants-an inference this Court is unwilling to make, Mr. Carnell's crossclaim against the
Jays would still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

As stated supra Part II,

Wells Fargo's claims request relief in the form of an order quieting title to the property
underlying the mortgage, an equitable lien, or an equitable mortgage. See Wells Fargo, 2018 WL
840141, at *l. In essence, Wells Fargo is seeking to determine the validity of its 2008 and 2009
mortgages on the real property at 4139 Elk Lick Road, Everett, Pennsylvania.
However, no allegations in any pleadings assert that any person or entity-including the
Jays-has any legal or equitable interest in the Elk Lick Road property other than the Carnells
and Wells Fargo. Therefore, the relief requested by Wells Fargo against all Defendants, if
somehow imputed to Mr. Carnell's crossclaim against the Jays, likewise provides no cognizable

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request for relief because no allegations suggest that the Jays possess any interest in the Elk Lick
Road property from which Wells Fargo's property-based request for relief could flow.

V.

Conclusion
In sum, the Jays' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (ECF No. 48) is
GRANTED because Mr. Carnell has failed to request cognizable relief.

Carnell's crossclaim against the Jays is DISMISSED.
A corresponding order follows.

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Accordingly, Mr.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

)

Case No. 3:16-cv-130

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

JEFFREY A. CARNELL, ANNA M.
CARNELL, RYAN P. JAY, and LARRY E.
JAY,

)
)

)
)

)

Defendants.

NOW, this

19

+h

ORDER

day of April 2018, upon consideration of Ryan P. Jay and Larry E.

Jay's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (ECF No. 48), and for the reasons in the
Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Ryan P. Jay
and Larry E. Jay's Motion (ECF No. 48) is GRANTED.

Accordingly, Jeffrey A. Camell's

crossclaim against Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay contained in the Answer and Affirmative
Defenses, Counterclaim, and Crossclaim by Defendant Jeffrey A. Camell (ECF No. 39 <JI<JI 79-92)
is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is to terminate Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay
as parties to this case on the docket.
BY THE COURT:

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE