WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. CARNELL et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1) FINAL JUDGMENT is HEREBY ENTERED against Defendant Jeffrey A. Carnell and Defendant Anna M. Carnell on Count I and Count II of Wells Fa rgo Bank N.A.'s Complaint. 2) It is HEREBY DETERMINED AND DECLARED that Defendant Jeffrey A. Carnell and Defendant Anna M. Carnell are bound to the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage, recorded on April 7, 2009 in record book 1273, page 389 with the Bedf ord County Recorder of Deeds. 3) It is HEREBY DETERMINED AND DECLARED that the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage validly encumbers Defendant Jeffrey A. Carnell and Defendant Anna M. Carnell's full interest in the Property described therein (4139 Elk Li ck Road, Everett, PA 15537, parcel number F11-19) as a mortgage lien. 4) The Bedford County Recorder of Deeds is HEREBY DIRECTED to record a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to reflect the Court's determination in this matter. 5) The Bedford County Recorder of Deeds is HEREBY DIRECTED to make an appropriate notation in the relevant mortgage index to further reflect the Court's determination in this matter, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 6/14/2018. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

)

Case No. 3:16-cv-130

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

JEFFREY A. CARNELL and ANNA M.
CARNELL,

)

)
)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I.

Introduction

Presently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50)
filed by Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") against Defendants Jeffrey A. Carnell
and Anna M. Carnell (collectively "the Carnells"). This Motion has been fully briefed (see ECF
Nos. 51, 52, 54, 55, 56) and is ripe for disposition.
This case arises from Wells Fargo's claims against two mortgagors, Jeffrey Carnell and
Anna Carnell. Wells Fargo seeks, inter alia, quiet title and a declaratory judgment regarding the
property underlying the mortgage on the basis that the Carnells defaulted on their mortgage
payments. However, Wells Fargo's claims are complicated by Jeffrey Carnell's assertion that
Anna Carnell impermissibly signed his name on the mortgage documents. In the instant Motion,
Wells Fargo asks this Court to grant summary judgment in its favor because, regardless of

The Court has removed Ryan P. Jay and Larry E. Jay from the caption in this case because these former
Defendants were fully terminated from this case in prior Memorandum Opinions and Orders. See Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 1882854 (W.D. Pa. April 19, 2018); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 988352 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2018).
1

whether Jeffrey Camell' s version of the facts are true, Anna Camell had the authority to enter the
mortgage on Jeffrey Camell's behalf under a power of attorney-despite not remembering that
she had such authority until years later, shortly before the instant case was scheduled for
mediation.
For the reasons that follow, Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) is
GRANTED.
II.

Jurisdiction and Venue

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l), district courts have original jurisdiction over cases between
citizens of different states if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. For diversity purposes,
a national banking association-like Wells Fargo-is considered a citizen of "the State designated
in its articles of association as its main office." Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 1348.
Wells Fargo's main office is located in South Carolina and Defendants are domiciled in
Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1 <J[<J[ 1-5; ECF No. 39 <J[<J[ 1-5.) Further, the value of the mortgage
underlying this dispute exceeds $75,000. (ECF No. 1 <J[ 24; ECF No. 39 <J[ 24.) This Court, therefore,
has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l).
Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the property in question is
in the Western District of Pennsylvania and at least one defendant resides in the Western District
of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 25 <J[ 3; ECF No. 29 <J[ 3.)
III.

Relevant Procedural History

Wells Fargo filed its Complaint with this Court on June 10, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Wells
Fargo's Complaint features ten counts: (1) a claim for quiet title against the Camells in Count I,

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(2) a claim for declaratory judgment against the Camells in Count II, (3) claims for an equitable
lien or equitable mortgage against the Camells in Count III, (4) additional claims for an equitable
lien or equitable mortgage against the Camells in Count IV, (5) a claim for breach of contract
against Anna Camell in Count V, (6) a second claim for breach of contract against Anna Camell
in Count VI, (7) a claim for fraud against Anna M. Camell and Ryan P. Jay in Count VII, (8) a
claim for fraud against Anna M. Camell and Larry E. Jay in Count VIII, (9) a claim for negligent
misrepresentation against Anna M. Camell and Ryan P. Jay in Count IX, and (10) a claim for
negligent misrepresentation against Anna M. Camell and Larry P. Jay in Count X. (Id. at 16-20.)
However, in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) filed by Ryan P.
Jay and Larry E. Jay (collectively "the Jays"), this Court dismissed all claims against the Jays with
prejudice because Wells Fargo failed to bring its claims against the Jays within the applicable
statute of limitations. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 988352,
at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2018). This Court also dismissed all crossclaims brought by Jeffrey Camell
against the Jays, fully terminating the Jays from the instant case. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell,
Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 1882854 (W.D. Pa. April 19, 2018).
On April 12, 2018, Wells Fargo filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment, Concise
Statement of Material Facts, and Brief in Support thereof. (ECF Nos. 50, 51, 52.) Jeffrey Camell
opposed this Motion by filing his Response to Movant's Concise Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts and Brief in Opposition on May 4, 2018. (ECF Nos. 54, 55.) Anna Camell, prose,
has not filed any response. Lastly, Wells Fargo filed its Reply Brief on May 18, 2018. (ECF No.
56.)

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IV.

Relevant Factual History
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 2
Jeffrey Camell and Anna Camell were married on two separate occasions-the latter of

which occurred on August 21, 1999. (ECF No. 511{1{ 9-10; ECF No. 541{1{ 9-10.) The Carnell's
second marriage ended in divorce in 2013. (ECF No. 511{ 52.) 3
On May 9, 2003, Jeffrey Camell executed a durable power of attorney appointing Anna
Carnell as his agent/attorney-in-fact. 4 (ECF No. 51 <JI 11; ECF No. 51-3; ECF No. 54 <JI 11.)
However, Anna Carnell only remembered that she had this power of attorney "right before the
mediation" in the present litigation. (ECF No. 541{ 11; ECF No. 54-1 at 132: 14-17.) This power
of attorney generally authorizes Anna Camell to act on Jeffrey Carnell's behalf, including an
express authorization for Anna Camell to mortgage property on Jeffrey Camell's behalf. (ECF
No. 51 <JI<JI 14-16; ECF No. 51-3; ECF No. 54 <JI<JI 14-16.) Anna Camell managed the Camells'
finances from August 21, 1999 until 2010. (ECF No. 511{ 19; ECF No. 541{ 19.)

The Court derives these facts from a combination of Wells Fargo's Concise Statement of Material Facts
and exhibits thereto (ECF No. 51) and Jeffrey A. Carnell's Response to Movant's Concise Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts and exhibits thereto (ECF No. 54).
3 The Carnells did not respond to paragraph 52 of Wells Fargo's Concise Statement and, thus, the content
of paragraph 52 is deemed admitted. See LCvR 56(E) (stating that the uncontroverted content of the
movant's statement of material facts is deemed admitted and carries conclusive weight for the purposes of
summary judgment motions); see also Wylie v. TransUnion, LLC, Case No. 3:16-cv-102, 2017 WL 4386404, at
*3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing cases and stating the same principle).
4 The Court notes that, despite Wells Fargo referring to the person designated by a principal in a power of
attorney to act on behalf of that principal with the older term "attorney-in-fact," this Memorandum Opinion
will hereinafter use the term "agent" to align with the terminology used in the current Pennsylvania statute
and in Jeffrey Carnell's power of attorney. See 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 5601(f); 20 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 5601, Jt. St. Govt. Comm. Comment-1999, subsection (f); ECF No. 51-3.
2

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Jeffrey Camell concedes that he never formally revoked his power of attorney, but believed
that the power of attorney was only to be used if he and Anna Carnell were "on good terms" and
he was incapacitated. (ECF No. 51 <[ 13; ECF No. 54 <[ 13.)
After the Camells' second marriage, the Camells acquired title to real property located at
4139 Elk Lick Road, Everett, Pennsylvania 15537 ("the Property") as "husband and wife" by deed

dated October 14, 2005. (ECF No. 51 <[ 21; ECF No. 54 <[ 21.)
Pursuant to a promissory note dated September 5, 2005, M&T Mortgage Corporation
("M&T") loaned the Camells the principal sum of $82,400.00. (ECF No. 51 <[ 22; ECF No. 54 <[ 22.)
Pursuant to a mortgage dated September 5, 2006 ("the M&T Mortgage"), the Camells gave a
mortgage against the Property in order to secure repayment of the debt to M&T. (ECF No. 51 <[
25; ECF No. 54 <[ 25.) Jeffrey Camell's signature appears on both the M&T promissory note and

the M&T Mortgage; he signed his own name on both of these M&T documents. (ECF No. 51 <[<[
23-24, 26-27; ECF No. 54 <[<[ 23-24, 26-27.)

Pursuant to a promissory note dated June 30, 2008, Wells Fargo loaned the Camells the
principal sum of $101,952.00 to, at least in part, pay off the debt secured by the M&T Mortgage.
(ECF No. 51 <[<[ 28, 36; ECF No. 54 <[<[ 28, 36.) Pursuant to a mortgage dated June 19, 2008 ("the
2008 Wells Fargo Mortgage"), the Camells gave a mortgage against the Property to Wells Fargo

in order to secure repayment of the 2008 debt to Wells Fargo. (ECF No. 51 <[ 32; ECF No. 54 <[ 32.)
Jeffrey Carnell's name appears on both the 2008 Wells Fargo loan and the 2008 Wells Fargo
Mortgage, but he did not sign them-Anna Camell signed his name. (ECF No. 51 <[<[ 29-31, 3335; ECF No. 54 <[<[ 29-31, 33-35.)

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Pursuant to a promissory note dated March 31, 2009, Wells Fargo loaned the Camells the
principal sum of $156,548.00 to, at least in part, pay off the debt secured by the 2008 Wells Fargo
Mortgage. (ECF No. 51 <]I<JI 39, 47; ECF No. 54 <JI<JI 39, 47.) Pursuant to a mortgage dated March
20, 2009 ("the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage"), the Camells gave a mortgage against the Property to
Wells Fargo in order to secure the repayment of the 2009 debt to Wells Fargo. (ECF No. 51 <JI 43;
ECF No. 54 <JI 43.) Jeffrey Camell's name appears on both the 2009 Wells Fargo loan and the 2009
Wells Fargo Mortgage, but he did not sign them-Anna Camell signed his name. (ECF No. 51
<JI<JI

40-42, 44-46; ECF No. 54 <JI<JI 40-42, 44-46.)
On March 14, 2012, Wells Fargo filed an action in the Bedford County Court of Common

Pleas to foreclose on the lien of the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage against the Property ("Foreclosure
Action"). (ECF No. 51 <JI 50; ECF No. 54 <JI 50.) In this Foreclosure Action, Jeffrey Camell filed an
answer and new matter on May 29, 2012, stating that the M&T Mortgage was "legitimate," but
asserting that he did not execute the 2008 Wells Fargo Mortgage or the 2009 Wells Fargo
Mortgage. (ECF No. 51 <JI 51; ECF No. 54 <JI 51.) However, the Foreclosure Action has purportedly
been discontinued effective March 16, 2018 due to the substitution of Specialized Loan Servicing,
LLC as a party plaintiff for Wells Fargo. (ECF No. 54 <JI 51 n.16.)

V.

Legal Standard
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where ... there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact ... and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Melrose, Inc. v.
Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380,387 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375,380 n.6 (3d

Cir. 2007)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Issues of
fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

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nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also McGreevy v.

Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Material facts are those that will affect the outcome of the
trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court's role is "not to weigh the
evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of
record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Am. Eagle

Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). "In making this determination, 'a
court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonrnoving party and draw all
inferences in that party's favor."' Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271,278 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets this burden, the party opposing
summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials" of the pleading, but
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Saldana v. Kmart

Corp., 260 F.3d 228,232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574,587 n.11 (1986)). "For an issue to be genuine, the nonmovant needs to supply more than
a scintilla of evidence in support of its position-there must be sufficient evidence (not mere
allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant." Coolspring Stone Supply v. Am. States

Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584,594
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting that a party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just
bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue")
(internal quotation marks omitted).

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VI.

Discussion
Wells Fargo argues that it is entitled to summary judgment based on two theories: (1)

Anna Carnell had the express actual authority to enter into the Wells Fargo mortgages on Jeffrey
Carnell' s behalf under his durable power of attorney and, in the alternative, (2) Jeffrey Carnell is
bound to the 2008 Wells Fargo Mortgage and the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage pursuant to the socalled "entireties presumption" under Pennsylvania law. (See ECF No. 52 at 9-14.) Jeffrey
Carnell, in response, argues that a genuine dispute of material fact exists because of four
alternative scenarios supportable by the facts, that Pennsylvania's Statute of Frauds bars Wells
Fargo's requested relief, and that an equitable lien cannot be imposed. (See ECF No. 55.)
The Court will address each of Wells Fargo's arguments and Jeffrey Carnell's
counterarguments in turn.

A. Anna Camell Acted on Jeffrey Camell's Behalf with Express Actual Authority
Under a Valid Durable Power of Attorney in Signing His Name to the Wells
Fargo Mortgages
Despite the unusual factual circumstances of this case, the resolution of Wells Fargo's
instant Motion for Summary Judgment is remarkably simple. Jeffrey Carnell executed a valid
durable power of attorney on May 9, 2003 that selected Anna Carnell as his agent. See supra Part
IV. Pursuant to her express actual authority as Jeffrey Carnell's agent, Anna Carnell signed
Jeffrey Carnell's name on two Wells Fargo mortgages in 2008 and 2009. See id. Jeffrey Carnell
never revoked this power of attorney, nor has the validity of this power of attorney been
questioned by any party. See id. Anna Camell also signed her own name to both of these Wells
Fargo mortgages. See id. Therefore, both Anna Camell and Jeffrey Camell are bound by the 2008

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Wells Fargo Mortgage and the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage, and Wells Fargo is entitled to
appropriate relief.
However, this brief recitation of the facts and law fails to capture the oddities of this caseoddities which merit further discussion and, hopefully, prompt all of the parties to exercise
greater caution and care in their real estate, loan, and mortgage practices.
As a preliminary issue, for the purposes of the instant Motion, the Court accepts as fact
that Anna Camell signed Jeffrey Camell's name on both Wells Fargo mortgages,5 and, thus, this
Court will first engage in an analysis as to whether Pennsylvania law permits Anna Camell to act
on Jeffrey Camell's behalf. Under the Pennsylvania common law of agency, an agent has the
authority to act on behalf of and bind the principal if certain requirements are satisfied. See Walton

v. Johnson, 66 A.3d 782, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); James v. Duquesne University, 936 F. Supp. 2d 618,
641 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Stout Street Funding LLC v. Johnson, 873 F. Supp. 2d 632, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
Relevant here, "express actual authority" arises "where the principal deliberately and specifically
grants authority to the agent as to certain matters." Walton, 66 A.3d at 786.
One way in which express actual authority can arise is through a power of attorney. See
20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5601-14; In re Weidner, 938 A.2d 354, 359 (Pa. 2007).
Pennsylvania statutory law specifically recognizes that a principal may, through a written
instrument, delegate to an agent the authority to borrow money and mortgage real property on
the principal's behalf. See 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.§§ 5601-14.

5

See infra Part VI.C for a discussion of why the Court views the facts in this manner.

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In the instant case, the summary judgment record indisputably establishes that Jeffrey
Camell validly executed a notarized durable power of attorney that named Anna Camell as his
agent with the express actual authority to borrow money and mortgage property on his behalf.

See supra Part IV. A power of attorney lasts until revocation through notice to the agent, death of
the principal, or the filing of a divorce action by a principal married to his or her agent. See 20 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5604, 5605. No evidence presented to this Court suggests that any
of these revocatory events transpired. 6 Thus, the undisputed material facts before this Court
show that Anna Camell had the express actual authority to enter into both Wells Fargo mortgages
on Jeffrey Camell's behalf.
Yet, two additional wrinkles merit discussion due to their rarity and oddity. First, Anna
Camell forgot that she was Jeffrey Camell's agent under his power of attorney until years after
she signed his name on the Wells Fargo mortgages. See supra Part IV. Second, Anna Carnell did
not present the power of attorney instrument when she signed Jeffrey Camell's name on the two
mortgage documents, nor did she sign her own name as agent for Jeffrey Camell or otherwise
indicate that she was signing on Jeffrey Camell's behalf as his agent. Jeffrey Camell argues that,
because of these purported deficiencies, Anna Camell acted improperly and could not bind
Jeffrey Camell to the mortgages. (See ECF No. 55.)
The Court acknowledges the rhetorical appeal of Jeffrey Camell's arguments and the
oddity of this situation -particularly the peculiarity of accidentally or unknowingly acting under
a power of attorney.

Moreover, the Court certainly would not advise agents, notaries, or

The Carnells' divorced a second time in 2013, years after the second Wells Fargo Mortgage in 2009. See
supra Part IV.
6

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mortgagees to follow the example of the parties in this case. Nevertheless, neither the parties'
nor this Court's own research has uncovered any statute, case, or principle of Pennsylvania law
requiring an agent to act with any particular level of mens rea or consciousness when acting on
behalf of a principal.
Furthermore, although a third-party-such as Wells Fargo-would be wise to require
proof that an agent has the requisite authority to act on behalf of a principal, Pennsylvania law
does not by default require that an agent provide such proof in order to exercise his or her actual
express authority; nor does Pennsylvania law require that an agent use specific words, particular
phrases, or formal notations to validly act on the behalf of a principal. See 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons.
Stat Ann. § 5602(c) (explaining that powers of attorney can, but need not, be filed with the clerk
of the orphan's court); id. § 5603 (providing rules for the implementation of powers of attorney);
id. § 5608 (detailing rules regarding acceptance and reliance on powers of attorney without

requiring a power of attorney to be presented or displayed for the agent's authority to be valid);
id. § 5610 (providing that a court may order an agent to file accountings, but that they are not

automatically required).
While conventional wisdom would admonish the parties' handling of the execution of the
Wells Fargo mortgages, Pennsylvania law requires that powers of attorney be strictly construed.

See In Re Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.3d 372, 385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The power of attorney in the
present case explicitly states that Anna Carnell can act on Jeffrey Carnell's behalf "in my name
and or in her name." (ECF No. 51-3 at 3.) That is precisely what Anna Carnell did. She signed
the 2008 Wells Fargo Mortgage and the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage in Jeffrey Carnell's name.

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In addition, the parties and this Court have not identified any authority to suggest that an
agent must sign his or her own name or disclose any other details in order to bind a principal to
a written agreement. To the contrary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-albeit over 175 years
ago-permitted an agent who signed a principal's name on a deed to bind that principal. See

Devinney v. Reynolds, 1 Watts & Serg. 328, 1841 WL 4095 (Pa. 1841). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reasoned:
It would be useless to add the name and seal of the attorney, for it is what
it purports to be, the deed of the principal and not the attorney, and
therefore does not require his name or seal, but the name and seal of the
principal only.

Id. at 332, 1841 WL 4095, at *5.
Despite its age, Devinney constitutes binding precedent from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and, especially given the lack of any authority to the contrary, persuades this Court that
Anna Camell could validly bind Jeffrey Camell to both Wells Fargo mortgages by signing his
name as his agent without any additional notations or explanations. See Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v.

Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that, when
interpreting state law, federal courts must follow the state's highest court); Hadeed v. Advanced

Vascular Resources of Johnstown, LLC, Case No. 3:15-cv-22, 2017 WL 4998663, at *17 n.26 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 30, 2017) (same).
The main thrust of Jeffrey Carnell' s argument is that he "disputes that he ever gave her
authority to sign his name to the mortgage loan documents." (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Unfortunately
for Jeffrey Camell, he did-when he named Anna Camell as his agent in his power of attorney
on May 9, 2003. Jeffrey Camell may not have expected the authority delegated by his power of

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attorney in 2003 to be used to sign his name on mortgage instruments in 2008 and 2009, and Anna
Camell herself may have even forgotten that she held such authority to act on Jeffrey Camell's
behalf. Nonetheless, under Pennsylvania law, Anna Carnell held express actual authority to bind
Jeffrey Carnell to the 2008 Wells Fargo Mortgage and the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage and, based
on the undisputed material facts presented to this Court, that is exactly what she did.
Accordingly, as provided by Pennsylvania's Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, the
"act performed by an agent [i.e., Anna Camell] pursuant to a power of attorney has the same
effect and inures to the benefit of and binds the principal [i.e., Jeffrey Camell] and the principal' s
successors in interest as if the principal had performed the act." 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5601.4(g).

B. Alternatively, Pennsylvania's "Entireties Presumption" Binds Jeffrey Carnell to
the Wells Fargo Mortgages
Independent from Anna Camell' s authority under the power of attorney, Pennsylvania
law has recognized a doctrine known as the "entireties presumption" for at least 80 years that
provides Wells Fargo with a separate basis for summary judgment. See Madden v. Gosztonyi

Savings & Trust Co., 200 A. 624, 630-31 (Pa. 1938); see also In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir.
2007); Deutsche Bank Nat'[ Trust Co. v. Evans, 421 B.R. 193, 197 (W.D. Pa. 2009); Clingerman v.

Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378,381 (Pa. 1986).
Under Pennsylvania law, "[a] conveyance of either real or personal property to a husband
and wife, without more, vests in them an estate by the entireties." Plastipack Packaging, Inc. v.

DePasquale, 937 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In regard to such a property by the
entireties, Pennsylvania law recognizes '"a well-established presumption that during the term of

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a marriage either spouse has the power to act for both, without specific authorization, so long as
the benefits of such action inure to both."' Scott v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., Civil Action
No. 13-5540, 2016 WL 320219, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2016) (quotingJ.R. Christ Const. Co. v. Olevsky,
232 A.2d 196, 199 (Pa. 1967)). The entireties presumption "can render a mortgage enforceable
even though only one spouse actually executed the mortgage." Id.; see, e.g., Deutsche Bank, 421

B.R. at 197.
In the present case, the undisputed facts before this Court reveals that the Camells were
married on August 21, 1999 and took title to the Property as "husband and wife" on October 14,
2005. See supra Part IV. Additionally, the evidence before this Court shows that the proceeds of
the Wells Fargo mortgages were used to discharge the underlying debt from prior mortgages and
loans on the Property and/or deposited in the Camells' joint bank account. See id. Thus, under
the entireties presumption, Jeffrey Camell benefited from these transactions by Anna Camell and
is bound to them. 7
C. The Alternative Factual Scenarios Proposed by Jeffrey Camell Do Not Create A

Genuine Dispute of Material Fact
The Court recognizes the unusual circumstances surrounding the execution of the 2008
Wells Fargo Mortgage and the 2009 Wells Fargo Mortgage. As detailed above, see supra Part IV,
and in prior Memorandum Opinions in this case,8 the evidence the parties have presented in this
case could lead a reasonable jury to believe in multiple factual scenarios.

The Court notes that Herb v. Citimortgage, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 441 (M.D. Pa. 2013), to any extent it would
be persuasive to this Court, is easily distinguishable from the present case because, unlike in Herb, Jeffrey
Carnell authorized Anna Carnell to borrow money and mortgage property on his behalf in the power of
attorney. See supra Part IV.
8 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 1882854 (W.D. Pa. April 19, 2018); Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 WL 988352 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2018); Wells Fargo Bank,
7

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Jeffrey Carnell attempts to categorize these multiple scenarios into four alternatives that
he argues feature genuine disputes of material fact: (1) Jeffrey Carnell personally signed his name
on the Wells Fargo mortgages in front of the notaries; (2) Anna Carnell signed Jeffrey Carnell's
name on the Wells Fargo mortgages with his "consent and understanding"; (3) Anna Carnell
signed Jeffrey Carnell's name on the Wells Fargo mortgages "using the power of attorney"; or (4)
Anna Carnell signed Jeffrey Carnell's name on the Wells Fargo mortgages "without his authority
or consent." (See ECF No. 55 at 1-2.) However, this Court concludes that these four alternative
scenarios are immaterial for the purposes of deciding Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Jeffrey Carnell's "first alternative" would unmistakably result in the grant of summary
judgment against him because, under this "first alternative," Jeffrey Carnell appeared before the
notaries and signed both Wells Fargo mortgages himself. The Court acknowledges that a factual
dispute exists as to whether Jeffrey Carnell personally signed the Wells Fargo mortgages, but, as
Wells Fargo concedes (ECF No. 56 at 1-2), the Court must resolve this factual dispute in favor of
Jeffrey Carnell in deciding the instant Motion. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278 (quoting Armbruster, 32
F.3d at 777) (stating that, for the purposes of deciding a motion for summary judgment, "'a court
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences
in that party's favor."'). Wells Fargo's Concise Statement of Material Facts and Reply Brief both
admit that, for the purposes of the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must view

N.A. v. Carnell, Case No. 16-cv-130, 2018 840141 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Carnell,
Case No. 16-cv-130, 2017 WL 1498087 (W.D. Pa. April 25, 2017).

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Anna Camell as having signed Jeffrey Camell's name on the Wells Fargo mortgages. (See ECF
No. 51; ECF No. 56 at 1-2.) Thus, the Court discounts this "first alternative."
The remaining "alternative" scenarios proposed by Jeffrey Camell all feature Anna
Camell signing Jeffrey Camell's name on the Wells Fargo mortgages, but allegedly differ as to
whether Anna Camell possessed the requisite authority to sign the mortgages on Jeffrey Camell's
behalf. (See ECF No. 55.) However, this Court holds that this putative dispute of fact is not
"genuine." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (stating that, if "the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,"
there are no "genuine" disputes of fact); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
("Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.").
As discussed in greater detail supra Part VI.A, the summary judgment record establishes,
without dispute, that Jeffrey Camell executed a power of attorney granting Anna Camell
authority to enter mortgages on his behalf and in his name. Therefore, the second, third, and
fourth "alternatives" posed by Jeffrey Camell are, in fact, one and the same. The only material
fact in these three latter scenarios is that Anna Carnell possessed a valid power of attorney and,
under the authority granted thereunder, signed the Wells Fargo mortgages on behalf of Jeffrey
Camell. Unfortunately for Jeffrey Carnell, Pennsylvania law does not require Jeffrey Camell to
have provided any additional consent beyond the execution of the power of attorney itself to
allow Anna Carnell, as his agent, to enter the Wells Fargo mortgages on his behalf. See supra Part
VI.A. Nor does Pennsylvania law require that Anna Carnell physically presented the power of
attorney document or signed the mortgages by signing Jeffrey Camell's name on the mortgages

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in a particular manner or with a specific mark or notation to indicate that she was signing his
name as his agent. See id.
In essence, under the first "alternative," summary judgment must be granted in favor of
Wells Fargo because, in this first scenario, Jeffrey Camell personally signed the Wells Fargo
mortgages. And, under the second, third, and fourth putative "alternatives," summary judgment
must be granted in favor of Wells Fargo because, regardless of the factual distinctions that Jeffrey
Camell attempts to create between these latter three "alternatives," Anna Camell signed the
Wells Fargo mortgages with the express actual authority to bind Jeffrey Camell to those
mortgages. Thus, Jeffrey Camell's "four alternatives" do not provide any genuine dispute of
material fact and, consequently, do not persuade this Court that granting summary judgment in
favor of Wells Fargo is improper.

D. Pennsylvania's Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Relief Sought by Wells Fargo
and, Regardless, Jeffrey Camell Has Waived This Defense
Jeffrey Camell next argues that Anna Camell' s execution of the Wells Fargo mortgages on
his behalf violates Pennsylvania's Statute of Frauds and that these mortgage instruments are
unenforceable against him because he did not sign the documents. (ECF No. 55 at 6.) However,
Jeffrey Camell's argument ignores the plain wording of Pennsylvania's Statute of Frauds. See 33
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1 (providing that the enumerated contracts must be "put in
writing, and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents, thereunto
lawfully authorized by writing .... ") (emphasis added).
Here, as discussed throughout this Memorandum Opinion, no parties dispute that Jeffrey
Camell signed and validly executed the durable power of attorney. Therefore, the power of

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attorney satisfies the requirements of Pennsylvania's Statute of Frauds because it is a written
authorization for Anna Camell to act as Jeffrey Camell's agent.
Furthermore, failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds is an enumerated affirmative
defense under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c)(l) that is waived unless pleaded under Rule
8(c) or made in an appropriate motion under Rule 12(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(l); Fed. R. Civ. P
12(b); see also Moody v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Sys. Inc.

v. Bridge Elecss Co., 335 F.2d 465, 466 (3d Cir. 1964)) (" An affirmative defense which is neither
pleaded as required by [R]ule 8(c) nor made the subject of an appropriate motion under [R]ule
12(b) is waived.").
In the instant case, Jeffrey Camell did not plead or otherwise raise the Statute of Frauds
affirmative defense in his Motion to Dismiss Wells Fargo's Complaint or in his Answer to Wells
Fargo's Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 26-28, 39.) Therefore, Jeffrey Camell has waived this defense.

See Moody, 870 F.3d at 218.
E. Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment Does Not Seek the Imposition of
an Equitable Lien
Lastly, Jeffrey Camell concludes his Brief in Opposition by arguing that the Court cannot
impose an equitable lien on the Property because, under Pennsylvania law, the mortgagee-Le.,
Wells Fargo-is a "volunteer" that is not entitled to an equitable remedy. (ECF No. 55 at 7-11.)
However, Jeffrey Camell's argument is misplaced. Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment
does not ask this Court to impose an equitable lien. (See ECF No. 50.) Instead, Wells Fargo asks
this Court to determine that the liens of the Wells Fargo mortgages are themselves valid-not to

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conclude that equity deems a lien or mortgage to exist in lieu of an actual lien or mortgage.

(See id.)
Consequently, because this Court has held that the Wells Fargo mortgages are valid based
upon the authority conferred by the power of attorney and under Pennsylvania's "entireties
presumption," the Court grants relief separate and distinct from the imposition of an equitable lien
based upon unjust enrichment, and Jeffrey Carnell's arguments to the contrary are inapposite and
unavailing. See Herb, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 447-51 (discussing equitable liens based on unjust
enrichment).
VII.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) is
GRANTED.

In sum, Anna Carnell had the express actual authority to bind Jeffrey Carnell to the Wells
Fargo mortgages pursuant to his valid durable power of attorney. While the circumstances
surrounding this case are unusual and certainly do not reflect best transactional practices by Anna
Carnell, Wells Fargo, or the notaries, Pennsylvania law permits agents to bind their principal to
loans and mortgages as long as they possess the requisite authority-regardless of whether they
sign documents in a particular manner, present proof of their authority, or consciously consider
the source of their authority when signing on behalf of their principal.
This Court does not condone or advise that transactions should occur as they did for the
two Wells Fargo mortgages in this case, but this Court, nevertheless, holds that Pennsylvania law
views Jeffrey Carnell as bound by the Wells Fargo mortgages.
A corresponding order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

)

Case No. 3:16-cv-130

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

JEFFREY A. CARNELL and ANNA M.
CARNELL,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

ORDER
NOW, this

/J/fAday of June 2018, upon consideration of the Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 50) filed by Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and for the reasons set forth in
the Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) is GRANTED.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1) FINAL JUDGMENT is HEREBY ENTERED against Defendant Jeffrey A.
Camell and Defendant Anna M. Carnell on Count I and Count II of Wells Fargo
Bank N.A.'s Complaint.
2) It is HEREBY DETERMINED AND DECLARED that Defendant Jeffrey A.
Camell and Defendant Anna M. Carnell are bound to the 2009 Wells Fargo
Mortgage, recorded on April 7, 2009 in record book 1273, page 389 with the
Bedford County Recorder of Deeds.

3) It is HEREBY DETERMINED AND DECLARED that the 2009 Wells Fargo
Mortgage validly encumbers Defendant Jeffrey A. Camell and Defendant
Anna M. Camell's full interest in the Property described therein (4139 Elk Lick
Road, Everett, PA 15537, parcel number Fll-19) as a mortgage lien.
4) The Bedford County Recorder of Deeds is HEREBY DIRECTED to record a
copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to reflect the Court's
determination in this matter.
5) The Bedford County Recorder of Deeds is HEREBY DIRECTED to make an
appropriate notation in the relevant mortgage index to further reflect the
Court's determination in this matter.

BY THE COURT:

l

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.

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KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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