HAY v. SOMERSET AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 36 Motion to Compel; denying 45 Motion to Strike, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 6/29/2017. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HEATHER HAY,
)
Case No. 3:16-cv-229
)
Plaintiff,
)
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
v.
)
)
SOMERSET AREA SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
)
)
)
Defendant,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEPHEN SHAFFER
)
)
Third-Party Defendant
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Introduction
This action arises from allegations that Defendant Somerset Area School District
was deliberately indifferent to the inappropriate sexual conduct of a former teacher,
Stephen Shaffer, which resulted in the teacher repeatedly sexually abusing the Plaintiff
while she was a student. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel More
Specific Responses to Interrogatories and Document Requests. (ECF No. 36). Plaintiff asks
that this Court compel production of School District records relating to instances of
inappropriate sexual misconduct by teachers, going back as far as 1988, the year Shaffer
began working at the school. (ECF No. 42 at 1.) The School District objects on relevance
grounds, and argues that it need only produce documents relating to incidents which
occurred while the student attended the school.
The Motion has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 37, 39, 42) and the parties had the
opportunity to present their arguments during a telephonic status conference (ECF No.
41). Accordingly, the Motion is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below,
the Court will GRANT Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The Court will also DENY the
School District's Motion to Strike.
II.
Motion to Compel Standard
Generally, materials that are relevant to an issue in a case are discoverable unless
they are privileged. Rule 26 explains the scope of discovery:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in
the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to
relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). While the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is broad,
"this right is not unlimited and may be circumscribed." Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173
F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1999). Indeed, Rule 26(b)(l) imposes "two content-based limitations
upon the scope of discovery: privilege and relevance." Trask v. Olin Corp., 298 F.R.D. 244,
257 (W.D. Pa. 2014). Even relevant discovery may also be limited by a court if the burden
of producing it outweighs the benefit based on the specifics of the case. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(l).
2
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff requests records relating to instances of inappropriate sexual misconduct
by teachers from 1988-2005; the years Shaffer taught at the school. The School District
limited its responses to 1999-2005, which represents the years Plaintiff attended the school
plus two additional years prior. Plaintiff avers that instances of inappropriate sexual
misconduct by teachers from 1988-1998 are relevant to establish a custom, policy, and
practice of deliberate indifference by the School District. (ECF No. 42 at 5.) Plaintiff
points to police records relating to Shaffer's arrest which mention three incidents of
misconduct by Shaffer prior to 1998.
(Id. at 3.)
This, Plaintiff argues, supports her
ultimate claim that the School District knew of Shaffer's penchant for inappropriate
behavior and chose to do nothing about it. And as such, more detailed information on
these three incidents as well as information on any other incidents that may have
occurred during that time period is relevant and discoverable.
In response, the School District argues that anything before 1999 is irrelevant
because under the case law, "sporadic incidents" are insufficient to establish a sexual
harassment claim and three incidents over ten years is surely sporadic. (ECF No. 39 at 4.)
The School District further argues that Plaintiff has already received a significant number
of records including the police report which references these three incidents, and that
asking for records from 1988-1998 amounts to a fishing expedition. (Id. at 4-7.)
After review, the Court finds the School District's irrelevancy argument
unavailing. The premise of Plaintiff's Complaint is that the School District was aware of
inappropriate behavior by Shaffer for years but took no action, eventually resulting in
3
Shaffer sexually abusing her.
Discovery into complaints against teachers, including
Shaffer, while he taught at the school is plainly relevant to Plaintiff's claims.
The School District's argument that "sporadic incidents" are insufficient to
establish a sexual harassment claim is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the case
law cited by the School District involves the sufficiency of sexual harassment claims on
summary judgment motions. At the discovery stage, a party may obtain information as
long as it is relevant to a claim or defense. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l). Discovery is not
limited to admissible evidence let alone evidence that is singlehandedly sufficient to
prove a claim at the summary judgment or trial stage. Second, the School District's
argument assumes that the three incidents mentioned in the police report are the only
incidents that occurred between 1988 and 1998. Without discovery, neither Plaintiff nor
the Court can conclude that that is true. Plaintiff is entitled to explore whether there were
more incidents besides the three mentioned, as well as for more details on the three
incidents mentioned in the police report.
Third, while Plaintiff's Title IX claim will ultimately require her to prove that the
harassment was severe and pervasive; to rule now that the three incidents prior to 1998
were insufficient to constitute sexual harassment oversimplifies the issue. (ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she was repeatedly raped by Shaffer; allegations
which would easily rise to the level of harassment. Whether or not and at what point the
School District was on notice is an issue better resolved at summary judgment.
Additionally, at Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983. Such a claim
carries a different standard than a sexual harassment claim:
4
[i]n order to establish liability a plaintiff must demonstrate both that the
defendant's policy, practice, or custom played an affirmative role in
bringing about the sexual abuse and that the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to that abuse. In order to establish deliberate
indifference on the part of the defendant, "something more culpable [must
be shown] than a negligent failure to recognize [a] high risk of harm" to
plaintiffs.
Kline ex rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 255 F. App'x 624, 628 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Black by Black
v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist.,985 F.2d 707, 712013 (3d Cir. 1993)). Thus for Count I, the issue is
whether the School District had a "policy, practice, or custom" that "played an affirmative
role in bringing about the sexual abuse."
The issue is not whether or not the three
incidents prior to 1998 were too sporadic to constitute severe and pervasive harassment.
Again, Plaintiff has clearly pied that she suffered sexual abuse at the hands of Shaffer.
The School District's handling of complaints of misconduct while Shaffer taught in the
district is clearly relevant to whether a "policy, practice, or custom" of the School District
"played an affirmative role in bringing about" that sexual abuse. 1
While the School District states that the request is "unduly burdensome" in its
brief, it does not explain why the request would be especially burdensome, and argues
primarily relevance. While it may take some effort to collect records dating back this
long, the School District has not provided any reason why it would be "unduly
burdensome," particularly in light of the obvious relevance of the requested evidence to
The School District also argues that information which Plaintiff requests on the male/female ratio
in Shaffer's classes over the years is particularly irrelevant. In response, Plaintiff argues that the
School District received numerous calls from parents demanding that their daughters not be placed
in Shaffer's classes and thus that changes in the makeup of his classes is probative of the School
District's knowledge of issues relating to Shaffer's conduct with female students and the School
District's handling of such issues. For the same reasons as discussed with respect to the rest of
Plaintiff's discovery request, the Court agrees that this information is relevant and discoverable.
1
5
Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to compel and
order the School District to tum over the requested records dating back to 1988.
Motion to Strike
The School District has also filed a Motion to Strike Scandalous Matter from
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 45.) In particular, the School District objects to a
statement in Plaintiff's Motion that it "has yet to address a single deficiency identified" by
counsel for Plaintiff. (Id. at 1.) The School District argues that such statements are untrue
and cast it in a false light because counsel for the School District did in fact respond to
counsel for Plaintiff by stating the reasons the School District feels the requested
discovery is irrelevant. The purpose of a motion to strike under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) "is to
clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into
immaterial matters." Tennis v. Ford Motor Co., 730 F.Supp.2d 437, 443 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
'"[S]uch motions are not favored and usually will be denied unless the allegations have
no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if
the allegations confuse the issues in the case."' Id. (quoting Thornton v. UL Enterprises, No.
09-287E, 2010 WL 1005021, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010)).
None of the above situations are applicable to this case. Striking the statement
from Plaintiff's Motion would do nothing to streamline the litigation, nor is there any risk
of confusion of the issues of the case, and the only possible "unnecessary foray into
immaterial matters" is the Motion to Strike itself. While the School District characterizes
Plaintiff's statement as blatantly false, in the Court's view it is at worst an exaggeration
that comes nowhere close to meeting the definition of "scandalous" for the purpose of a
6
12(f) motion.
'"Scandalous pleading must 'reflect cruelly' upon the defendant's moral
character, use 'repulsive language' or 'detract from the dignity of the court."' Vay v.
Huston, No. CIV.A. 14-769, 2015 WL 4461000, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2015) (citations and
quotations omitted). Therefore, the School District's Motion to Strike will be denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and
deny the School District's Motion to Strike.
An appropriate order follows.
7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HEATHER HAY,
)
Case No. 3:16-cv-229
)
Plaintiff,
)
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
)
v.
)
SOMERSET AREA SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
)
)
)
Defendant,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEPHEN SHAFFER
)
)
Third-Party Defendant
)
ORDER
AND NOW, thisz:lth day of June, 2017, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel (ECF No. 36), and in accordance with the attached memorandum opinion, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Somerset Area School District's
Motion to Strike (ECF 45) is DENIED.
B~~
KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?