HYMAN v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE et al

Filing 123

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 104 Motion in Limine to Preclude Hearsay, Speculation, and Irrelevant Evidence. It is further Ordered that: (1) Evidence of other lawsuits against Trooper Devlin is inadmissible; (2 ) Evidence of other repossession-related lawsuits involving the Pennsylvania State Police is inadmissible; (3) The Court will defer ruling on the admissibility of evidence of what Ms. Hyman overheard or was told by other people until trial; and (4) Evidence of Pennsylvania State Police Collective Bargaining Agreements is admissible, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/17/2019. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA HYMAN,

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-89

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

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v.

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)

CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE,
COMMONWEALTH RECOVERY
GROUP, INC., PENNSYLVANIA
STATE POLICE, COL. TYREE C.
BLOCKER, MICHAEL MORRIS,
BRYAN DEVLIN, JOHN DOE
TROOPERS 1-10.,

)
)
)

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)
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)
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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Hearsay, Speculation,
and Irrelevant Evidence. (ECF No. 104.) This Motion is fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 105, 115)
and is ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
In his Motion, Defendant argues that the Court should exclude five separate pieces
of evidence. Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from introducing: (1) evidence of other
lawsuits naming Defendant Bryan Devlin; (2) evidence of other lawsuits against the
Pennsylvania State Police arising out of repossessions; (3) information that Ms. Hyman was
told by other individuals; (4) information that Ms. Hyman overheard; and (5) evidence or
information related to the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Pennsylvania State
Police. The Court will address each unrelated piece of evidence separately.

I.

The Court Will Preclude Plaintiff from Introducing Evidence of Other Lawsuits
Against Defendant Bryan Devlin
Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be precluded from introducing evidence that

Trooper Devlin was involved in other lawsuits in his professional capacity under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(6). 1
In response, Plaintiff argues that "[t]he lawsuit against Defendant Devlin is relevant
because it shows that Defendant knew he would have no financial obligations stemming
from his wrongdoing, and therefore had good reason to be indifferent to Plaintiff's rights."
(ECF No. 115 at 3.) Plaintiff bases this argument on Trooper Devlin's testifying that the
Commonwealth paid for his legal representation when he was sued in the past. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that "Defendant's knowledge that he would receive legal representation if
he were to be sued serves as a disincentive to comply with the law." (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that this evidence is relevant to her punitive-damages claim. (Id.)
To prove her claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff must show that "defendant's conduct ..
. involves reckless or callous indifferent to the federally protected rights of others." Allah

v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497
(3d Cir. 1996)).
The Court finds that Trooper Devlin's knowledge that the Commonwealth would
provide him with legal representation to defend against allegations of professional

Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides that "(e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character." FED. R. Evro. 404(6)(1). It also provides that "this evidence
may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." FED. R. Evro. 404(6)(2).
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misconduct is generally relevant. It shows that Devlin knew that there would be no
financial consequences for misconduct-related lawsuits. Plaintiff may use this evidence to
insinuate "a disincentive to comply with the law" or that Trooper Devlin was motivated to
ignore Ms. Hyman's federally protected rights.
Evidence that Trooper Devlin knew that the Commonwealth would provide him
with a legal defense is also relevant to explain Trooper Devlin's statements during the
repossession. While Trooper Devlin was on the scene, an individual told him that he could
not assist in a civil repossession. 2 (See ECF No. 99 at 6.) Trooper Devlin responded by
stating that they could file a complaint against him afterwards. (Id.)
However, evidence of other lawsuits against Trooper Devlin is inappropriate other
acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). If the jury learns that Trooper Devlin
had been sued in the past, jurors may infer that Trooper Devlin has a propensity to commit
wrongful acts in his professional capacity. Accordingly, this evidence is inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
And because any negative inference by the jury may prejudice Trooper Devlin,
evidence of past lawsuits is also inadmissible because this prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d
507,516 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence related to prior lawsuits involving the parties
should be excluded under rule 403); Leahy v. Salem, No. 10-cv-3933, 2011 WL 13263541, at

During the repossession, Trooper Devlin spoke on a cell phone with Ms. Hyman's law-student
daughter. (See ECF No. 94-16.) Ms. Hyman's daughter informed Trooper Devlin that police may
not enforce a civil contract or take sides in a civil dispute. (Id.) Trooper Devlin told her that "you
can file a complaint on me later." (Id.)

2

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*4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2011) (holding that the introduction of prior lawsuits as character
evidence is unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403).
Although Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other acts to show knowledge, the Court
will not admit evidence of past lawsuits because there is a less prejudicial way to show
Trooper Devlin's knowledge. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (holding
that the "Rule 403 'probative value' of an item of evidence ... may be calculated by
comparing evidentiary alternatives").

If Trooper Devlin denies knowledge that the

Commonwealth would provide him with a legal defense, Plaintiff can impeach Trooper
Devlin using his prior deposition testimony. And as discussed below, the Court will allow
Plaintiff to use Pennsylvania State Police Collective Bargaining Agreements ("CBAs") to
show that Trooper Devlin knew that the Commonwealth would provide legal
representation in misconduct-related lawsuits.3
In sum, knowledge that the Commonwealth would pay for Trooper Devlin's legal
defense is relevant. But evidence of other lawsuits against Trooper Devlin is inadmissible
because it is improper propensity evidence and prejudicial.

II.

The Court Will Preclude Plaintiff from Introducing Evidence of Other
Repossession-Related Lawsuits Against the Pennsylvania State Police
Defendant argues that evidence of prior repossession-related lawsuits against the

Pennsylvania State Police is inadmissible. Defendant argues that this evidence is not
relevant to whether Trooper Devlin "acted unreasonably and in derogation of the law in

Plaintiff notes that Pennsylvania State Police CBAs can be used to show that Trooper Devlin knew
the Commonwealth would defend him against misconduct allegations. (See ECF No. 115 at 3) ("This
[collective bargaining] agreement can be offered to show that Defendant Devlin knew that his police
misconduct would be defended by the Commonwealth.").)

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the present instance." (ECF No. 105 at 2.) Defendant also argues that this evidence is
improper other-acts evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
In response, Plaintiff argues that evidence of other repossession-related lawsuits
involving the Pennsylvania State Police is relevant because Defendant Devlin testified that
he received annual training on court decisions involving due process of law. 4 (ECF No. 115
at 2.)
The Court finds that evidence of other repossession-related lawsuits involving the
Pennsylvania State Police is inadmissible because its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403; Blancha, 972 F.2d at 516
(holding that evidence related to prior lawsuits involving the parties should be excluded
under Rule 403). Moreover, the Court finds that this evidence may improperly lead the
jury to infer that state troopers have a propensity to unlawfully assist in civil repossessions
because the State Police were sued for similar conduct in the past. See FED. R. Evm. 404(b).

III.

The Court Will Defer Deciding Whether to Preclude Plaintiff from Introducing
Evidence of What Ms. Hyman was Told by Other Individuals or Overheard
Defendant argues that any evidence of statements made to or overheard by Ms.

Hyman is inadmissible hearsay. (ECF No. 105 at 2-3.) However, Defendant's Motion does
not identify specific hearsay statements that he seeks to exclude. Nor does it acknowledge
or discuss hearsay exceptions or exclusions. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d); 803.
In response, Plaintiff points out that some hearsay statements in this case will fall

While Trooper Devlin testified that he periodically receives updates on case law as part of his
training, he did not recall receiving any case law about police involvement in civil repossessions.
(ECF No. 115-1 at 8.)

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within an exception or exclusion to the rule against hearsay. 5 (ECF No. 115 at 1-2.) The
Court agrees. Because Defendant has not argued that any specific statements should be
excluded, the Court defer ruling on this aspect of Defendant's Motion. Instead, the Court
will rule on hearsay objections at trial.

IV.

The Court Will Not Preclude Plaintiff from Introducing Evidence of or
Information Related to Pennsylvania State Police Collective Bargaining
Agreements
In his Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not be permitted to introduce

evidence of Pennsylvania State Police CBAs because the CBAs are irrelevant to the issues
in this case and likely to confuse the jury. (ECF No. 105 at 3.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that the State Police CBAs are relevant to her punitivedamages claim. The CBAs provide that the Commonwealth will provide legal counsel to
defend any alleged misconduct by police-union members. (ECF No. 115 at 3.) Plaintiff
argues that this provision in the CBAs shows that Defendant Devlin was indifferent to Ms.
Hyman's rights because he knew that his misconduct would be defended by the
Commonwealth. (Id.)
To prove her claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff must show that "defendant's
conduct ... involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others." Allah 226 F.3d at 251-52 (quoting Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1497).

The Court finds that it is overwhelmingly likely that some hearsay statements introduced in this
case will be admissible because they are the statement of a party opponent. See Fed. R. Evid.
802(d)(2). Moreover, it seems likely that other hearsay statements will be admissible to show that
Trooper Devlin was on notice that he arrived at a civil repossession. See In re Tylenol (Acetoaminophen)
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 286, 293 (E.D. Pa. 2016). This evidence
would also be admissible to show Trooper Devlin's state of mind.
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The Court finds that evidence of the CB As is relevant to Plaintiff's punitive-damages
claim. 6 The provision in the CBAs on legal defense indicates that Trooper Devlin knew that
the Commonwealth would provide a defense to a misconduct-related lawsuit. This is
relevant to Plaintiff's punitive-damages claim because it may show "a disincentive to
comply with the law" or that Trooper Devlin was motivated to ignore Ms. Hyman's
federally protected rights. Accordingly, the Court will admit evidence of the Pennsylvania
State Police CBAs.

V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Hearsay,

Speculation, and Irrelevant Evidence (ECF No. 104) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.

A corresponding order follows.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, "[e)vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and (b) the fact is of consequence
in determining the action." FED. R. Evro. 401.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA HYMAN,

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-89

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE,
COMMONWEALTH RECOVERY
GROUP, INC., PENNSYLVANIA STATE
POLICE, COL. TYREE C. BLOCKER,
MICHAEL MORRIS, BRYAN DEVLIN,
JOHN DOE TROOPERS 1-10.,

)
)
)
)
)
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Defendants.

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+A

AND NOW, this /

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ORDER

day of January, 2019, upon consideration of Defendant's

Motion in Limine to Preclude Hearsay, Speculation, and Irrelevant Evidence (ECF No. 104),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1)

Evidence of other lawsuits against Trooper Devlin is inadmissible;

(2)

Evidence of other repossession-related lawsuits involving the Pennsylvania
State Police is inadmissible;

(3)

The Court will defer ruling on the admissibility of evidence of what Ms.
Hyman overheard or was told by other people until trial; and

(4)

Evidence of Pennsylvania State Police Collective Bargaining Agreements is
admissible.
BY THE COURT:

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE