SMITH v. NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - upon consideration of Smith's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 24 ), and in accordance with the attached memorandum opinion, it is hereby Ordered that the motion is DENIED, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 7/31/2018. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY J. SMITH,

)

Case No. 3:17-cv-191

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)

v.

)
)

NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,

)
)

Defendant.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

Introduction
Gregory Smith initiated this action on October 17, 2017, by filing a two-count Complaint

before this Court (ECF No. 1). Smith alleged that Navient Solutions, LLC ("Navient"), a loan
servicing agency, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA") and intruded
on Smith's privacy by using automated systems to call his cell phone approximately 134 times
during a seven week period, despite the fact that Smith repeatedly requested that Navient cease
calling him. (See ECF No. 1 at'['[ 13-19.)
On March 6, 2018, the Court entered an Initial Scheduling Order ("Order"). (ECF No. 21.)
The Order gave the parties until April 20, 2018 to amend the pleadings. (Id.) Neither of the parties
filed an amended pleading by the deadline.
On July 6, 2018-approximately ten weeks after the deadline to amend the pleadings
passed-Smith filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint ("Motion") (ECF No. 24). Smith wishes

to add a third count against Navient for violating the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension
Uniformity Act ("FCEUA"). 1 Navient opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 27.)
The Motion is fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 24, 27) and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons
explained below, the Court will DENY the Motion.
II.

Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over Smith's federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Smith's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial portion of the events giving rise
to the claims occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

III.

Background

Smith argues that the Court should grant him leave to amend his Complaint under Rule
15. Smith asserts that his Amended Complaint "will not allege additional factual allegations and
merely seeks to add an additional cause of action that relies on the same set of facts alleged in his
complaint." (ECF No. 24 at 1-2.) Smith contends that there will be no undue delay because
discovery remains ongoing. (Id. at 2.) He also states that there is no evidence of bad faith and that
Navient will not suffer prejudice, because discovery is still ongoing and the Amended Complaint
relies on the same facts alleged in the original Complaint. (Id. at 4.)
In response, Navient contends that the Court should deny Smith's Motion because Smith
failed to satisfy Rule 16's "good cause" requirement for modifying a scheduling order. (ECF No.

Smith incorrectly refers to the FCEUA as "the Pennsylvania Fair Debt Collection Practices Act"
throughout his brief. The "short title" of the statute that Smith invokes provides that "[t]his act shall be
known and may be cited as the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act." 73 Pa.CS.§ 2270.1.
1

2

27 at 2.) Navient asserts that Smith failed to cite Rule 16 or give any explanation for why he failed
to bring his FCEUA claim in his original Complaint. (Id.) Navient further contends that Smith
cannot demonstrate "good cause" because Smith admits that his Amended Complaint "relies on
the same set of facts" as his original Complaint, which indicates that Smith had sufficient facts to
allege the FCEUA claim before the deadline to amend the pleadings passed. (Id.) Navient also
speculates that Smith tactically elected to wait to bring his FCEUA claim until this point because,
while the TCPA does not provide for attorney's fees,2 the FCEUA does. Navient states that it
would be prejudiced if the Court granted Smith's Motion because Navient has devised a litigation
strategy and decided to expend resources based on the fact that Smith's original claims did not
include attorney's fees. (Id. at 5.)
IV.

Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15. But, as this Court recently stated, "when a party seeks leave to amend the pleadings after the
deadline set by a court's scheduling order, that party must first satisfy Rule 16(b)(4)'s
requirements for modifying a scheduling order." Abed-Rabuh v. Hoobrajh, No. 3:17-CV-15, 2018
WL 300453, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2018) (Gibson, J.) (quoting Hadeed v. Advanced Vascular Res. of

Johnstown, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-22, 2017 WL 4286343, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017) (Gibson, J.).
Accordingly, the Court will begin by analyzing Smith's Motion under Rule 16.
A.

Rule 16 Analysis

Under Rule 16(b)(4), a scheduling order "may be modified only for good cause and with

See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663,668 (2016) (observing that "the TCPA does not provide for
an attorney's-fee award.")
2

3

the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. As this Court recently noted, "[i]n the Rule 16(b)(4)
context, 'good cause' looks to the diligence of the party seeking modification of the scheduling
order." Abed-Rabuh, 2018 WL 300453, at *2 (quoting Hadeed, 2017 WL 4286343, at *2). "The moving
party has the burden to demonstrate' good cause' under Rule 16(b)( 4) before a court will consider
amending under Rule 15." Abed-Rabuh, 2018 WL 300453, at *2 (quoting Hadeed, 2017 WL 4286343,
at *2).
The Court finds that Smith failed to demonstrate good cause. Smith did not articulate a

single reason for why he failed to assert his FCEUA claim within the deadline to amend the
pleadings. For instance, Smith does not allege that, after the deadline to amend the pleadings
expired, he discovered additional facts, or obtained new information, relevant to his FCEUA
claim. Instead, Smith acknowledges that his claim rests on the exact same facts as those he already
asserted in his original Complaint, and merely argues that the Court should grant him leave to
amend because Rule 15 applies a liberal standard to amending the pleadings. While Smith
correctly characterizes Rule 15' s standard as liberal, he completely ignores the fact that he bears
the burden to establish "good cause" before the Court may amend its previous Order. Because
Smith has failed to articulate a reason for his failure to assert his claim FCEUA within the
timeframe permitted by the Court's Order, the Court finds that Smith failed to satisfy his burden
to demonstrate "good cause."
V.

Conclusion

Because Smith failed to demonstrate "good cause" for his failure to assert his FCEUA
claim prior to the deadline for amending the pleadings, the Court will DENY Smith's Motion.
An appropriate order follows.
4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
)

GREGORY J. SMITH,

Case No. 3:17-cv-191

)

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

)
)

v.

)
)

NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,

)

Defendant.

)

'>+AND NOW, this

3

J

ORDER

day of July, 2018, upon consideration of Smith's Motion to

Amend (ECF No. 24), and in accordance with the attached memorandum opinion, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

KIM R. GIBSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE