DIAMOND et al v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al
Filing
73
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - upon consideration of Union Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40 ) and Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 38 ), and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Union Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 62 ) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, excluding Plaintiffs' claims for the repayment of previously paid fair-share fees, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 7/8/2019. (dlg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ARTHUR DIAMOND, on behalf of himself )
and others similarly situated, et al.,
)
Case No. 3:18-cv-128
)
Plaintiffs,
)
JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)
v.
)
)
PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Introduction
Plaintiffs Arthur Diamond, Justin Barry, Douglas R. Kase, Jeffrey Schwartz, Matthew
Shively, Matthew Simkins, and Sandra H. Ziegler (collectively, "Plaintiffs") bring this purported
class-action lawsuit against the Pennsylvania State Education Association, the Chestnut Ridge
Education Association, and the National Education Association (collectively, "Union
Defendants"), as well as Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro, Chairman of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board James M. Darby, Members of the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board Albert Mezzaroba and Robert H. Shoop, Jr., and Bedford County, Pennsylvania,
District Attorney Lesley Childers-Potts (collectively, "Commonwealth Defendants"). Plaintiffs,
who are all current or retired Pennsylvania public-school teachers, allege that Union Defendants
violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by forcing Plaintiffs to pay fees to unions as a condition
of their employment ("fair-share fees") under 71 Pa. Stat. § 575 ("Section 575"), even though
Plaintiffs chose not to join the Pennsylvania State Education Association or its affiliate unions.
Plaintiffs also claim that Commonwealth Defendants, who are charged in various ways with
enforcing Pennsylvania's laws, must be enjoined from enforcing Section 575 in an
unconstitutional manner. The outcome of this case turns in significant part on the application of
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018), which was decided by the Supreme Court on June 27, 2018, less than two weeks after
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this matter. (See ECF No. 1.)
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Commonwealth Defendants
and Union Defendants. (ECF Nos. 38, 40.) These Motions have been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 38,
39, 40, 41, 48, 51) and are now ripe for disposition.
For the reasons that follow, this Court will GRANT Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF
Nos. 38, 40).
II.
Venue 1
Because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in the
Western District of Pennsylvania, venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2).
III.
Background
A. Background on the Constitutionality of Fair-Share Fees
Before discussing Plaintiffs' claims, the Court will briefly describe the law on the
constitutionality of fair-share fees.
1
Issues with subject-matter jurisdiction are discussed in Section V.
2
l. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
In 1977, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431
U.S. 209 (1977).
In Abood, the Court confronted a Michigan statute that allowed unions
representing local-government employees to utilize "agency-shop" clauses in collectivebargaining agreements. Id. at 211. These clauses required every employee represented by a
union, even those who declined to become union members for political or religious reasons, to
pay union dues. Id. at 212. Pursuant to this statute, a union that represented teachers employed
by the Detroit Board of Education (the "Board") entered into a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Board that required non-union-member teachers to pay a charge to the union equal to
the regular dues paid by union members. Id. The non-member teachers sued, alleging that the
charges paid under the agency-shop clause were used to support political activities, as opposed
to simply being used to defray the costs of the union's collective-bargaining activities, and that
the clause thus violated the teachers' First Amendment rights. Id. at 213.
The Court held that the charges were constitutional to the extent they were used to finance
the union's collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance activities. Id. at 225.
The Court explained:
A union-shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of
[collective-bargaining] activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the
incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders' to refuse to
contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that
necessarily accrue to all employees.
Id. at 221-22. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that agency-shop arrangements promote what
later case law has dubbed "labor peace." Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. The Court explained that
designating one union as the exclusive representative of a group of employees "frees the
3
employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits
the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack
from rival labor organizations." Abood, 431 U.S. at 221.
However, the Court also concluded that the agency-shop clause and fees were
unconstitutional insofar as the clause compelled non-member teachers to pay fees to the union
that supported the union's political activities. Id. at 234-36. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart explained that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by
his mind and his conscience, rather than coerced by the State." Id. at 234-35. Based on these First
Amendment principles, the Court held that the Constitution prohibited the union from requiring
a non-member "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition
of holding a job as a public school teacher." Id. at 235. The Court elaborated:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression
of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of
other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining
representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be
financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object
to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will
by the threat of loss of governmental employment.
Id. at 235-36.
2. 71 Pa. Stat. § 575
In accordance with Abood, Pennsylvania enacted its own agency-shop statute for public
employees in 1988, 71 Pa. Stat.§ 575. According to Section 575, if mandated by the provisions of
a collective-bargaining agreement, non-members of public-employee unions must pay fair-share
fees to the unions. Id.§ 575(b). These fees consist of the regular union-membership dues less "the
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cost for the previous fiscal year of [the unions'] activities or undertakings which were not
reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the employe organization as
exclusive representative." Id. § 575(a).
Section 575 also contains provisions (1) indicating how the public employer is to deduct
the fair-share fees from non-members' paychecks, (2) describing union notice obligations to nonmembers, and (3) providing procedures for non-members to challenge the propriety of fair-share
fees or the payment of fair-share fees on religious grounds. Id. § 575( c)-(h). In the event of a
challenge on religious grounds, the non-member objector must pay the equivalent of the fairshare fee. Id. § 575(h). However, the union does not receive that payment-the fee goes "to a
nonreligious charity agreed upon by the non[-]member and the [union]." Id.
Finally, Section 575 contains penalty provisions.
Particularly, "[a]ny employe
organization which violates the provisions of this section or fails to file any required report or
affidavit or files a false report or affidavit shall be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand
dollars ($2,000)." Id. § 575(1). In addition, "[a]ny person who willfully violates this section, or
who makes a false statement knowing it to be false, or who knowingly fails to disclose a material
fact shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or undergo imprisonment for not
more than thirty (30) days, or both." Id. § 575(m).
Consistent with Abood, the general propriety of the fair-share fees permitted under Section
575 withstood constitutional scrutiny for many years. See Hohe v. Casey, 740 F. Supp. 1092, 1094
(M.D. Pa. 1989) ("It is beyond doubt that agency shop fair-share fees, accompanied by appropriate
procedural safeguards, are constitutional." (citing Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood, 431 U.S. at 209)), vacated in part on
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other grounds, 956 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1992). However, the Supreme Court slowly began to question
its holding in Abood. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627, 2632-38 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps.
Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (" Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a
justification for compelling non[-]members to pay a portion of union dues represents something
of an anomaly .... "). Then, the Court overruled Abood in June 2018 in Janus. See Janus, 138 S. Ct.
at 2460. Based on Janus, the constitutionality of Section 575 is now challenged.
3. Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31
In Janus, the Court dealt again with a state law requiring non-union-member public
employees to pay fees to the union to compensate the union for costs incurred in the collectivebargaining process. See id. at 2460-61. The Court held that the state law was unconstitutional. Id.
at 2478, 2486.
The Court rejected the rationale in Abood because, among other reasons, Abood' s free-rider
justification did not support upholding the fees. Id. at 2469. Specifically, the Court explained:
In simple terms, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel
a person to pay for another party's speech just because the government thinks that
the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay.
Id. at 2467.
Moreover, the Court rejected Abood' s "labor peace" argument. Id. at 2465-66. The Court
explained that the Abood Court falsely assumed a close relationship between the designation of a
union as the exclusive representative of a group of employees and the fees. Id. The Court noted
that today, there are groups of public employees who are exclusively represented by one union
but who are not compelled to pay such fees. Id. at 2466. "It is [thus] now undeniable that 'labor
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peace' can readily be achieved 'through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms' than the assessment of agency fees." Id.
After concluding that the doctrine of stare decisis did not prohibit overruling Abood, the
Court held that "States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from
nonconsenting employees." Id. at 2486. "Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the
union may be deducted from a non[-]member's wages, nor may any other attempt be made to
collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay." Id.
Plaintiffs bring the present claims within this context.
B. Factual and Procedural Background2
Plaintiffs Arthur Diamond, Justin Barry, Douglas R. Kase, Jeffrey Schwartz, Matthew
Shively, and Matthew Simkins are public-school teachers in various Pennsylvania school
districts. (ECF No. 62 <]I<]I 17-22.) Plaintiff Sandra H. Ziegler is a retired public-school teacher who
taught in a Pennsylvania school district for 24 years. (Id.
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