HARRELL v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 17

ORDER denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 8 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Mark R. Hornak on 3/7/2025. (dpo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODDESHA HARRELL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 23-68-J

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and her claim for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp.
942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely

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because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981)).1

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case, and pro se pleadings are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1999). As such,
the Court has reviewed and considered all of Plaintiff’s filings in this case and the issues she has
raised therein. It has also liberally construed these documents so as to give Plaintiff’s arguments
the broadest reading possible. Nonetheless, while the Court believes that Plaintiff has done a
credible, good-faith job of explaining her position, it is important to understand the limited scope
of the Court’s authority in this matter. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) permits a district court to review a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. However, judicial review is based solely
on the pleadings and the transcript of the record, and the scope of the Court’s review is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the
record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s findings of fact.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001); Schaudeck v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the court has plenary
review of all legal issues and reviews the findings of fact of the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence). If the district court
finds this to be so, it must uphold the Commissioner’s final decision. See Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court may not set aside a decision that is
supported by substantial evidence “even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing § 405(g)); Monsour
Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986)); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).
Therefore, the Court is limited to reviewing the record before it to assure itself that this
record adequately supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant
time period, i.e., the alleged onset date of March 14, 2019 and the date of the ALJ’s decision –
January 4, 2023. Whether Plaintiff was disabled during some time other than the relevant period
is outside the Court’s scope of review. Therefore, the Court cannot consider evidence that was
not before the ALJ in its determination of whether or not the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594; Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d
356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). It also may not consider evidence that does not relate to the relevant
period. See Szubak v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“An implicit materiality requirement is that the new evidence relate to the time period for which
benefits were denied.”). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider evidence of Plaintiff’s
hospitalization in 2014, nor records from after January 4, 2023, that she has submitted to the
Court (e.g. Doc. Nos. 3-5, 14, 15).
In her various filings with this Court, Plaintiff raises several arguments, including that the
ALJ “dismissed letters from [her] psychiatrist as well as [her] therapist.” (Doc. No. 3-2, p. 1).
While it is not completely clear to which letters she is referring, the Court notes that the record
contains a Treatment Plan signed by Randall Orr, M.D., and Todd Slezak, CRNP, in April of
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2022 regarding her mental health conditions (R. 640-47), as well as a letter from NP Slezak
dated October 5, 2022, explaining that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with Bipolar II Disorder and
discussing the impact of her symptoms. (R. 1061). However, Plaintiff’s argument
notwithstanding, the ALJ did expressly address and discuss both of these records in his decision
denying benefits. The ALJ appropriately addressed the Treatment Plan as part of the objective
medical record and discussed the findings contained therein. (R. 18). He treated NP Slezak’s
letter as a medical opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional capacity and found it not persuasive.
(R. 20). The Court holds that these findings had sufficient record support.
For cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the regulations that apply to
an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence are set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and
416.920c. Pursuant to these regulations, ALJs are to consider several factors, including the
medical source’s treating relationship with the claimant, but “the two most important factors for
determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” See 82
Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c), 416.920c(b) and
(c). The ALJ, applying these regulations, found NP Slezak’s opinion to be unsupported by the
relevant contemporaneous treatment records and inconsistent with other parts of the record,
including the opinions of the state agency reviewing consultants. He adequately explained the
basis for so finding, and substantial evidence supports his decision.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ gave insufficient consideration to her own subjective
testimony regarding the impact of her symptoms, including the side effects caused by her
medications, the menstrual bleeding caused by her adenomyosis that would cause her to be
absent more than a day per month, and the aggravation of her symptoms from a 2022 motor
vehicle accident. However, the ALJ expressly discussed each of these issues, finding Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, including
those noted above, to be not entirely consistent with the record. (R. 13, 16, 17). In so doing, the
ALJ discussed the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s treatment history, her activities of daily
living, and the various medical opinions. The Court finds that his analysis complied with the
governing law and is supported by substantial evidence.
An ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s testimony is still often referred to as a
“credibility” determination, although that term has been eliminated from the Commissioner’s
policy concerning “subjective symptom evaluation.” Schneider v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-1299,
2019 WL 698471, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2019) (citing S.S.R. 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029
(S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016)) (explaining S.S.R. 16-3p “clarif[ied] that the subjective symptom
evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character”). The manner of the evaluation,
though, remains unchanged in most ways, and many concepts that applied when the evaluation
was considered to be one of credibility continue to apply now. This includes the significant
deference given to an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective testimony. See Paula R. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 20-18808 (RBK), 2022 WL 950242, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022)
(“Credibility determinations are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’” (quoting Hoyman v. Colvin, 606
Fed. Appx. 678, 681 (3d Cir. 2015))). Such deference is warranted here, given the ALJ’s thorough
explanation for the basis of his findings.
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 8) is GRANTED as set forth herein.
s/Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge

ecf:

Counsel of record

cc:

Toddesha Harrell
109 Kegg Avenue
Apartment 64
Johnstown, PA 15904

The Court further notes that the issue is not the nature of Plaintiff’s diagnoses, but what
functional limitations her conditions caused. See Walker v. Barnhart, 172 Fed. Appx. 423, 426
(3d Cir. 2006). The ALJ clearly acknowledged that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with Bipolar II
Disorder and adenomyosis, as well as her use of medication and the impact of that medication,
and included limitations in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to account for these
conditions. As the Court explained above, if supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
merely because it would have decided the claim differently. See Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360;
Monsour Med. Ctr., 806 F.2d at 1190-91; Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at
705). Moreover, “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion
does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for
that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). As
discussed herein, the Court has found that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, and
the Court therefore is not at liberty to draw its own conclusions from the record.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that she
would miss more than a day of work per month because of her symptoms and treatment, thereby
precluding her from all work, the Court notes that the ALJ specifically rejected this contention,
explaining that the objective medical record did not reflect the frequency or seriousness of
symptoms, particularly from Plaintiff’s adenomyosis, that would necessitate that many absences.
(R. 13). Moreover, Plaintiff provides no evidence that her therapy appointments could not be
scheduled outside of her prospective working hours, and thus, there is no indication that Plaintiff
would necessarily have to miss full or partial days of work in order to attend her appointments.
See Stull v. Saul, No. 19-227-E, 2020 WL 5774895, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2020).
Therefore, Plaintiff has not established that she would have the necessary absences per month
that would preclude her from engaging in work on a regular and ongoing basis.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and that
substantial evidence supports his findings. The Court will therefore affirm.
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