Navarro-Ayala v. Governor of PR,et al

Filing 693

OPINION AND ORDER re 678 Motion for Reconsideration: DENIED. Attorney Berkan's fees will be paid no later than June 15, 2016. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 05/12/2016. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ROBERTO NAVARRO-AYALA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

v.
GOVERNOR OF PUERTO RICO, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
In 1974, Roberto Navarro-Ayala (“Navarro”), represented by his
mother, filed this civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
on

behalf

of

himself

and

other

patients

of

the

Rio

Piedras

Psychiatric Hospital (“RPPH”) claiming that the conditions and care
provided by RPPH were insufficient in violation of the patients’
rights pursuant to the United States Constitution.
at pp. 2-3; 594 at p. 3.)

(Docket Nos. 0

Defendants are the governor of Puerto

Rico, the secretary and assistant secretary of the Puerto Rico
Department of Health, the director of RPPH, and their successors
(collectively “the Commonwealth”).

(Docket

No. 0 at p. 2.)

On June 8, 2015, the Court appointed attorney Judith Berkan to
represent the San Patricio Community Support Group (in Spanish,
Grupo

1

de

Apoyo

Comunitario

San

Patricio)

(“Grupo”),1

(Docket

The Court originally indicated that attorney Berkan was appointed
to represent the San Patricio Community Mental Health Center
(“SPMHC”), but later clarified the party name. (Docket No. 689.)

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
No.

630),

and

2

ordered

the

Commonwealth

to

pay

her

interim

attorney’s fees for work performed on behalf of Grupo, a prevailing
party, (Docket No. 673).

Before the Court is defendants’ motion

for reconsideration of the Court’s order approving attorney’s fees,
(Docket No. 678), which Grupo opposes, (Docket No. 680).
following

reasons,

defendants’

motion

for

For the

reconsideration

is

DENIED.
Procedural History
Navarro filed suit on November 25, 1974.
p. 2.)

(Docket No. 0 at

Between 1974-1977, the Court held several hearings which

resulted in the Court accepting the parties’ joint stipulation on
June 3, 1977.
and

ensured

See Docket No. 0 at pp. 3-5.
the

Commonwealth’s

The Court monitored

compliance

with

the

joint

stipulation through reports from Court-appointed Monitor, Professor
David Helfeld, and additional Court orders, with special attention
paid to the deinstitutionalization of RPPH. See Docket 0 at pp. 935.

In the early 1990s, several appeals were taken to the First

Circuit Court of Appeals.

See, e.g., Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-

Colon, 3 F.3d 464 (1st Cir. 1993); Navarro-Ayala v. Nuñez, 968 F.2d
1421 (1st Cir. 1992); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d
1325 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Navarro I”).

In Navarro I, the First

Circuit Court of Appeals found that this suit was a class action
even though it had not been certified as one because it “was
instituted by a complaint seeking class relief, implicitly granted

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

3

class relief, and was conducted for years as a de facto class
action.”

Navarro I, 951 F.2d at 1334.

The First Circuit Court of

Appeals defined the class as “all persons who were patients when
suit was brought and all persons who may in the future receive
treatment or habilitation at [RPPH].”

Id. at 1337.

In 1996, the Court ordered acceptance of the “Plan for aSystem
[sic] of Mental and Health Treatment/Rehabilitation Services” (“the
1996 Rehabilitation Plan”).

(Docket No. 0 at p. 33.)

In 1997,

following discussions regarding the 1977 consent decree, the Court
noted that the Commonwealth had made significant improvement in
patient care at RPPH in compliance with the 1977 consent decree and
returned $95,000 in fines previously assessed to the Commonwealth.
(Docket Nos. 425; 432; 439; 443; 594 at p. 4; 604 at p. 2.)

Such

progress had been made by 1999 that RPPH achieved accreditation by
Medicare and a nation-wide health care commission. (Docket No. 604
at p. 2.)
In March 2000, the Court approved a joint stipulation and
ordered that all money RPPH received from Medicare was to be used
for operating the facility.

(Docket No. 476.)

In August 2000, the

Court approved a second joint stipulation dismissing the case under
specified

conditions, including

continued

accreditation

and

a

yearly budget of at least $18,929,000 for patient care at RPPH.
(Docket Nos. 494; 604 at p. 2.)

In 2002, the Court approved

another joint stipulation, which dismissed the case but kept in

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

4

place the Court’s March 2000 and August 2000 orders.

(Docket

No. 503.)
In 2003, the Court opened an investigation and reappointed
Professor Helfeld as the Monitor in response to a letter from
employees of San Patricio Mental Health Center (“SPMHC”) alleging
deficiencies

in

patient

care

at

that

facility,

with

special

emphasis on RPPH’s budget and SPMHC’s continued existence as a
public institution.

(Docket No. 508 at pp. 1-2.)

Following five

reports by the monitor, the Court concluded its investigation
finding

the

Commonwealth

in

“substantial

compliance

with

the

consent decree and the January 28, 2002 order.” (Docket No. 604 at
pp. 3-4.)

The Court noted that the budget allowance and usage at

RPPH would exceed the required $18,929,000 and that outpatient
services at SPMHC would not be closed or privatized.2
Court

also

instructed

the

Commonwealth

to

ensure

Id.

The

continued

accreditation, to continue providing outpatient services at SPMHC,
and to increase RPPH’s annual budget to $23,000,000. Id. at pp. 45.
Again in 2013, the Court received a letter from mental health
staff members alleging violations by the Commonwealth, specifically
understaffing, an insufficient budget, and a possible loss of
accreditation.

2

(Docket No. 606 at pp. 1-2.)

On September 26,

San Patricio outpatient services are connected to
deinstitutionalization of RPPH. See Docket No. 604 at p. 3.

the

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

5

2014, Grupo moved to reopen the case, complaining of understaffing
and threats of closing SPMHC.

(Docket No. 608.)

In response, the

Court has reopened the case, (Docket No. 631), appointed Daniel E.
Wathen as the monitor, (Docket No. 657), and held several hearings
regarding the alleged violations, (Docket Nos. 622; 647; 656).
Additionally,

the

Court

appointed

attorney

Judith

Berkan

(“Berkan”), a civil rights attorney with forty years of experience,
(Docket No. 668 at p. 2), to represent plaintiff Grupo, (Docket
No. 630), and ordered the Commonwealth to pay her attorney’s fees,
(Docket No. 673). The Commonwealth did not oppose Grupo’s original
motion for payment of attorney’s fees, (Docket No. 668), but now
seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order for payment, (Docket
No. 678).
Legal Standard for Motions for Reconsideration
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically
provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration.”

Sanchez-

Perez v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 717 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193-94 (D.P.R.
2010) (Besosa, J.) (quoting Sanchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 265
F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.P.R. 2010)).

A district court, through its

inherent power, can reconsider interlocutory orders until the entry
of judgment.
116

F.

Supp.

See Mun. of San Sebastian v. Commonwealth of P.R.,
3d

49,

53

(D.P.R.

2015)

(Besosa,

J.)

(citing

Fernandez-Vargas v. Pfizer, 522 F.3d 55, 61 n.2 (1st Cir. 2008));
see also Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2001).

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

6

Here, defendants move the Court to reconsider an interlocutory3
order awarding attorney’s fees.
A district court will alter its original order only if 10it
“evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered
evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.”

Biltcliffe v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25
(1st Cir.

2007)).

Because

defendants

here

present

no newly

discovered information, the Court reviews its grant of attorney’s
fees to attorney Berkan for a “manifest error of law.”
Discussion
The “American Rule” for attorney’s fees prescribes that each
party will bear its own attorney’s fees “unless there is express
statutory authority to the contrary.”

De Jesus Nazario v. Morris

Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court has discretionary authority
to compel payment of reasonable attorney’s fees to the “prevailing

3

There is some debate over whether fee awards are final or
interlocutory. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649,
654 (7th Cir. 2007) (final); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Flaherty, 983
F.2d 1267, 1277 (3rd Cir. 1993) (interlocutory).

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
party”4

in

§ 1988(b).

an

action

7
enforcing

42

U.S.C.

§

1983.

42

U.S.C.

When evaluating fee requests, “the Court needs to

determine whether:

(1) a party is in fact a ‘prevailing party;’

(2) the compensation sought is reasonable (i.e.[,] calculation of
the lodestar); and (3) there are any additional but exceptional
considerations that may require [the court] to adjust [the fee
amount] upward or downward.”

Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-Hernandez,

451 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307-08 (D.P.R. 2006) (Casellas, J.) (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983)).
I.

Prevailing Party
A plaintiff prevails “when actual relief on the merits of his

claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties
by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly
benefits the plaintiff.”

Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11

(2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)).

A

party need not succeed in every claim to be a prevailing party, but
must “prevail[] on the merits of at least some of his claims.”
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001) (noting that even awards of
nominal damages are sufficient for awarding attorney’s fees); see
also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426-27 (awarding attorney’s fees to

4

Case law developing the term “prevailing party” is applicable
regardless of the underlying statute creating the fee-shifting
provision. Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 8 n.1
(1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Sch., 401 F.3d 16, 22 n.8
(1st Cir. 2005).

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

8

patients of a psychiatric hospital who won on five of their six
claims, including a claim for breach of constitutional rights based
on substandard treatment); De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at 199
(“[P]laintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s
fees

purposes

if

they

succeed

on

any

significant

issue

in

litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing suit.”

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429)).

A prevailing party must show “both a material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties and there must be judicial
imprimatur on the change.” Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Sch., 401 F. 3d
16, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

A judicial imprimatur requires that the change in the

parties’ relationship be caused by the court, as opposed to by
voluntary

action

by

the

parties.

See

id.

at

27

(voluntary

settlement); Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 585-59 (1st Cir.
2002) (voluntary dismissal).
held

that

consent

decrees

The United States Supreme Court has
satisfy

both

the

change

in

legal

relationship and judicial imprimatur requirements for obtaining
prevailing party status.

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598, 604 (citing

Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792 (1989) (internal citations omitted)); see also Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (establishing that “parties may be
considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a
consent judgment”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976)).

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

9

Court orders other than consent decrees can also satisfy the
prevailing party requirements if the court (1) orders a change in
the parties’ legal relationship, (2) approves relief based on the
merits,

and

obligations.

(3)

maintains

oversight

to

enforce

the

parties’

Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 9

(1st Cir. 2011).
A.

Origin of Plaintiffs’ Prevailing Party Status
Plaintiffs qualify for payment of interim attorney’s fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for work completed by attorney Berkan
because

plaintiffs

litigation.

qualify

Plaintiffs’

as

a

prevailing

prevailing

party

party

status

established by the Court’s 1977 consent decree.

in
was

this
first

See Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 598, 604 (stating a consent decree is sufficient to
establish prevailing party status).

Since 1977, the Court has

taken no action to remove the protections or change the legal
relationship created by its consent decree and orders.

But see

Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83 (2007) (revoking the party’s
prevailing party status when the court overturned a previous
decision in the party’s favor).
The order enforcing the 1996 Rehabilitation Plan supports
plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties because it meets the three
Hutchinson requirements – (1) it reiterates the change in the
parties’ legal relationship that was created by the 1977 consent
decree; (2) it approves relief based on the merits by ordering

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

10

defendants to take specific actions to improve treatment and
conditions

at

RPPH;

and

(3)

the

Court

defendants’ actions after the order.
at 9.

continued

to

monitor

See Hutchinson, 636 F.3d

The 2002 Court order dismissing the case also affirms

plaintiffs’ prevailing party status pursuant to the Hutchinson test
because (1) it confirms that defendants still have a legal duty to
plaintiffs to uphold the treatment standards espoused in prior
Court orders; (2) it dictates specific actions defendants must
continue to take in compliance with the March 2000 and August 2000
orders; and (3) the Court expressly indicated it would remain
involved in the case to ensure compliance with the 2000 orders.
See Docket No. 503; Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9. Similarly, the 2005
order ending the Court’s 2003-2005 investigation leaves intact
plaintiffs’ prevailing party status because (1) it echoes the
existing legal duty that defendants have to plaintiffs; (2) it
instructs defendants on specific actions required to maintain
treatment standards (i.e., continued outpatient services at SPMHC,
budgetary

allotment

of

$23

million,

and

accreditation);

and

(3) despite a comment that the Court’s oversight “cannot –and
should not– last forever,” the Court retained jurisdiction to
ensure compliance with its previous orders.
pp. 4-6.

See Docket No. 604 at

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
B.

11

Grupo’s Prevailing Party Status
Plaintiffs’ prevailing party status extends to Grupo

because Grupo is a part of the plaintiff class.

The plaintiff

class consists of “all persons who were patients when suit was
brought and all persons who may in the future receive treatment or
habilitation

at

[RPPH].”

Navarro-Ayala,

951

F.2d

at

1337.

Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals did not extend the
class to patients at a different mental health facility known as
the Guerrero Therapeutic Community, located seventy miles west of
RPPH, id. at 1337, 1343, the Court declines to apply a similar
restriction to patients at SPMHC due to its geographic proximity to
RPPH, its location “within the municipality of San Juan,” see id.
at 1327, and the increased integration of the two facilities caused
by this litigation and Commonwealth-wide mental health reform.
This decision is consistent with the Court’s previous decision to
investigate alleged violations at the SPMHC in 2003.
No. 508.

See Docket

Because Grupo is an organization made up of class-member

patients of SPMHC who were patients when the case was filed or
became patients in the time since, it is part of the plaintiff
class. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ prevailing party status applies to
Grupo because relief granted to the class applies to members who
join the class after the Court’s order.

See Theriault v. Carlson,

353 F. Supp. 1061, 1066-67 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev’d on other grounds,
495

F.2d

390

(5th

Cir.

1974)

(stating

that

plaintiff

class

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

12

membership is “not static but consists of, all members of the
[class] whether or not they were members at the time th[e] lawsuit
was brought . . . [because holding] to the contrary would have the
court affirmatively sanction, against new members of the [class],
the [constitutional violations] which it condemned against the old”
(internal citations and italics omitted)).
C.

Defendants’ Challenge to Plaintiffs’ Prevailing Party
Status
Defendants argue that the Court re-opened this case for

the

limited

violated

purpose

the

of

parties’

investigating

stipulations

or

whether
the

defendants

Court’s

had

subsequent

orders, and that because no ruling has been made by the Court on
this “tangent[ial] issue” of stipulation violation, Grupo does not
qualify as a prevailing party.

(Docket No. 678 at pp. 4-5.)

Essentially, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ prevailing party
status does not carry over to the current dispute because the
current dispute is unrelated to the previous proceedings.
Defendants’ attempt to segregate the Court’s current
investigation
unavailing.

from

the

overall

litigation

of

this

case

is

As one court has stated, the “language [of § 1988 and

related cases] strongly indicates that whether a party ‘prevailed’
as that term is used in § 1988 is determined by examination of the
entire

case

and

not

at

various

stages

of

the

litigation.”

Dougherty v. Barry, 820 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.D.C. 1993) (“[A]
proposed bifurcated definition of the prevailing party is lacking

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
in logical force.

13

Regardless of how many courts consider this

matter, it is only one lawsuit with only one prevailing party.”)
(quoting Clymore v. Far–Mar–Co, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (W.D.
Mo. 1983))).
In a similar institutional reform case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for legal work performed more than
three decades after the original consent decree. Gautreaux v. Chi.
Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2007).

In Gautreaux,

African-American public housing tenants and applicants secured a
remedial decree “designed to ban racially discriminatory site
selection and tenant assignment policies.”
housing reform

took

place

in

the

1990s,

Id. at 652.
the

As public

remedial

decree

precluded certain efforts at progress, so the parties worked
together to petition the district court, on a case-by-case basis,
for waivers to the remedial decree.

Id. at 652-53.

The court

granted five such waivers and awarded plaintiffs attorney’s fees
for their work on each waiver request, noting that:
[T]he post-decree proceedings and related work for which
fees are presently sought are not “clearly separable”
from the original judgment order . . . . [T]his case
involves post-judgment work and proceedings that are all
part of one active equitable case, in which compliance
has always been at issue, and modifications and
clarifications of the original judgment order must
continuously be made to account for changing conditions
and circumstances.

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

14

Id. at 653 (second alteration in original).

The Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order awarding
attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.

Id. at 651, 662.

Here, as in Gautreaux, “this case involves post-judgment
work and proceedings that are all part of one active equitable
case, in which compliance has always been at issue.”
at 653.

See id.

The Court’s 1996 Rehabilitation plan and 2000, 2002, and

2005 orders all sought to elicit compliance with provisions of the
original 1977 consent decree, making some modifications in the
methods of achieving the consent decree’s goals to account for
ongoing advances in mental health treatment.

While the Court in

Gautreaux considered the fee award for the fifth waiver as a
separate proceeding due to numerous modifications of the original
decree

which

each

waived

some

of

the

plaintiffs’

protection

pursuant to the original consent decree, Gautreaux, 491 F.3d
at 656, it is unnecessary to do so here because the Court’s postconsent decree orders have reinforced the original consent decree
as opposed to waiving its protections.

Because the Court’s post-

consent decree orders reinforced the original consent decree, the
Court has taken no action to remove the protections or change the
legal relationship created by its consent decree, and Gautreaux
provides persuasive authority for awarding attorney’s fees for
legal work performed several decades after the original decree, the

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

15

Court finds that plaintiffs’ prevailing party status remains intact
despite defendants’ argument to the contrary.
II.

Reasonable Compensation
Defendants also argue that the Court failed to analyze the

reasonableness of attorney Berkan’s fees.
p. 6.)

(Docket No. 678 at

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has established the

lodestar method of calculating fees as its method of choice.
Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 638 (1st Cir. 2015). The lodestar
method multiplies the number of hours worked by the prevailing
party’s attorneys, excluding “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary” hours, by a reasonable hourly rate, as determined by
comparison

to

rates

in

the

community

for

attorneys

“qualifications, experience, and competence.”

of equal

Id. (quoting Cent.

Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating
Emp’rs v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 745 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Here, attorney Berkan has submitted a detailed time record
which documents the date, task description, and amount of time for
each task she has performed pursuant to her representation of
plaintiffs.

See Docket No. 674-1; see also Lipsett v. Blanco, 975

F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding attorney’s billing records
to be acceptable when they listed “the different tasks performed,
the nature of the work, the time consumed, and the dates when
effort was expended”).

Upon review of her time record, the Court

does not find any excessive or redundant entry.

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

16

Additionally, the Court finds the rate of $250 per hour to be
comparable

to

rates

paid

to

other

experienced

civil

attorneys practicing in the San Juan metropolitan area.

rights
See

Gonzalez-Nieves v. Mun. of Aguadilla, Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132
(JAF), 2016 WL 297432, at *2 (D.P.R. 2016) (Fuste, J.) (finding
$280 for court appearances and $250 for out-of-court work to be a
reasonable rate for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
for

an

experienced

attorney

in

a

successful

disability

discrimination claim); see also Rosario-Urdaz, 451 F. Supp. 2d
at

310

(finding

$250

to

be

a

reasonable

rate

for

in-court

proceedings for an attorney with thirty years of civil rights
experience); Anywhere Inc. v. Romero, 344 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348
(D.P.R. 2004) (Laffitte, J.) (finding $250 to be a reasonable rate
for an experienced attorney).

According to the lodestar method,

the reasonable attorney’s fees for attorney Berkan’s work completed
between June 9, 2015 and February 24, 2016 equate to $19,087.50.5
III. Exceptional Considerations
Finally, defendants argue that the Court failed to consider
any relevant “exceptional consideration” that may increase or
reduce the fee award.

(Docket No. 678 at p. 6.)

After calculating

the lodestar, “[t]he court may . . . adjust the potential award
based

on

factors

Matalon, 806

5

F.3d

not
at

captured
638.

in

“[A]

the

lodestar

prevailing

calculation.”

plaintiff

Lodestar = 76.35 hours x $250 hourly rate = $19,087.50.

should

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

17

ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust.”

De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d

at 199 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429).

“[T]he burden is on the

defendant to show that unusual conditions would make an award
unjust or inappropriate.”
Cofield,

215

F.3d

164,

Id. at 200 (quoting United States v.
171

(1st

Cir.

2000)).

Examples

of

exceptional considerations include a fee enhancement for “stellar
performance,” a fee reduction for overstaffing a case, Lipsett, 975
F.2d at 938, 942, and a reduction for time spent on unrelated,
failed claims, Rosario-Urdaz, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
Here, defendants fail to assert any special consideration that
the Court may have overlooked.

Because attorney Berkan did not

charge for work on unrelated or failed claims and because she is
not overstaffing this case.

Accordingly, the Court finds no

exceptional circumstances at this time and declines to increase or
decrease the amount of her fees as calculated using the lodestar
method.

Whether

she

performs

at

a

“stellar”

level

will

be

determined as the case proceeds.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs became prevailing parties in 1977 when the Court
issued a consent decree approving the parties’ joint stipulation to
improve conditions at the PRRH. Plaintiffs retain their prevailing
party status despite the 2002 dismissal of the case and 2003-2005
investigation. Grupo enjoys prevailing party status as part of the

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
plaintiff class.

18

Furthermore, the amount awarded for attorney

Berkan’s work is reasonable and no special circumstances exist to
alter the amount calculated using the lodestar method.

Therefore,

payment to Grupo for the attorney’s fees of attorney Berkan in the
amount of $19,087.50 is justified and there is no manifest error of
law in the Court’s prior order awarding attorney’s fees, (Docket
No. 673).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for reconsideration,

(Docket No. 678), is DENIED.

Attorney Berkan’s fees will be paid

no later than June 15, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 12, 2016.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE