Peguero-Moronta, et al v. Santiago, et al

Filing 256

OPINION AND ORDER: NOTED and MOOT 253 MOTION Requesting Remedy, 255 Second MOTION requesting Order; GRANTING 254 MOTION for voluntary reduction; GRANTING IN PART 244 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses. We award Plaintiffs $372,490.73 in attorney's fees and $13,346.91 in costs and out-of-pocket expenses, for a total of $385,837.64. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 4/8/2010.(mrj)

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U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO M IG U E L IN A PEGUERO-MORONTA, e t al., P la in tif f s , v. C A R L O S GABRIEL-SANTIAGO, et al., D e f e n d a n ts . C i v il No. 01-1390 (JAF)

O P I N IO N AND ORDER P lain tiff s, as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, move for attorney's fees under § 1988 and for costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). (Docket No. 244.) They a ls o move to reduce that fee request, responding to this court's finding in Diffenderfer v. G ó m e z -C o ló n , 606 F. Supp. 2d 222, 229 (D.P.R. 2009), aff'd, 587 F.3d 445, 455-56 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 9 ), that billing a quarter hour for completing a menial task is an unreasonable billing p ra c tic e . (Docket No. 254.) Defendants oppose neither motion. I. S t a n d a r d of Review In order to award attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or costs under Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 54(d), a court first must determine that the requesting party is "prevailing." A party is found "prevailing" where it "succeeded on an important issue in the case, thereby

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g a in in g at least some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit." See Gay Officers Action L e a g u e v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 4 2 4 , 433 (1983)). Status as a prevailing party may be denied where the party's success was " p u re ly technical or de minimis." Id. at 294 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland In d e p . Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)). N e x t, the court must determine that the requested fees are "reasonable." § 1988. It must d o so even where no one opposes the requested award. Wojkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1 s t Cir. 1984). Fees are presumptively reasonable where the requesting party has multiplied a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably spent on litigation. See Gay O f f ic e rs Action League, 247 F.3d at 295 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). A reasonable hourly ra te is the rate prevailing in the relevant community, "taking into account the qualifications, e x p e rie n c e, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved." Id. at 295. And the logged h o u rs are reasonably spent on litigation unless "duplicative, unproductive, or excessive." Id. F in a l ly, the court must determine that the requested costs fall into the categories e n u m e r a te d at 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In re Two Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza H o te l Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 962-63 (1st Cir. 1993). Some commonly claimed expenses are p rop erly denied as costs, when outside the § 1920 categories, but properly awarded as out-ofp o c k e t expenses subsumed under statutorily allowed "attorney's fees." See, e.g., Attrezzi, LLC v . Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636, 6 3 7 (1st Cir. 1983)).

Civil No. 01-1390 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 A. P r e v a ilin g Parties II. A n a l y s is

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In April 2001, Plaintiffs sued Defendants, Carlos Gabriel-Santiago, in his personal and o ff icial capacities, and Susana Hernández, in her personal capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for v iolatin g their First Amendment rights when Defendants fired them on the basis of their p o litica l affiliation. (Docket No. 244 at 5.) Plaintiffs suffered their only loss when this court d is m is s e d their claim against Gabriel-Santiago in his official capacity, on sovereign immunity g ro u n d s . (See id. at 5-6.) On all other claims, Plaintiffs were ultimately successful; a jury a w a rd e d them compensatory and punitive damages and this court awarded them the equitable r e m e d y of reinstatement. (Id.) We, therefore, find Plaintiffs "prevailing," see Gay Officers A c tio n League, 247 F.3d at 293, and, thus, eligible to collect attorney's fees under § 1988 and c o s ts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). B. A t to r n e y ' s Fees 1. H o u r ly Rates

P lain tiff s submit a time sheet documenting the work of seven attorneys. (Docket N o . 244-2.) Each attorney bills one rate for in-court time and another for out-of-court time.1

Plaintiffs' attorneys request the following rates; the first number for each represents dollars charged per hour for in-court time, and the second represents dollars per hour for out-of-court time: Eliezer Aldarondo-Ortiz 310/285; Pablo Landrau-Pirazzi 310/285; Claudio Aliff-Ortiz 230/210; Iván Castro-Ortiz 210/190; Michael Craig McCall 205/185; Sheila Torres-Delgado 160/140; Eliezer A. Aldarondo-López 150/130.

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(Id . at 26-27.) To justify the rates charged, Plaintiffs submit a listing of cases in which the a tto rn e ys ' firm has participated (Docket No. 244-3); each attorney's resumé (Docket Nos. 244-4 to -10); orders from this court awarding similar rates for these or similar attorneys in similar c a s e s (Docket Nos. 244-11 to -13; -15; -16 at 25-33; -17); and similar fee requests granted by th is court (Docket Nos. 244-14; -16 at 1-24). In c lu d e d among the Plaintiffs' submission of earlier awards of this court is a decision f ro m April 2009 in which we awarded these same attorneys, except Pablo Landrau-Pirazzi, the s a m e rate that they now claim for the case at hand. (See Docket No. 244-17.) We see no reason to distinguish between the rates awarded there and the rates currently requested. Further, P lain tiff s' submissions show that Landrau routinely is awarded rates equaling those of Eliezer A ld a ro n d o -O rtiz . (See Docket Nos. 244-11 to -14.) We, thus, award the rates as requested, th o u g h we include an across-the-board reduction of four percent to account for the inflation of p ro p e rly awarded rates during the 8.5 years spent on litigation in this case.2 2. H o u r s Spent on Litigation

P la in tif f s' time sheet lists each hour, or portion of an hour, logged by their attorneys on th is case. (Docket No. 244-2.) Every attorney, except Landrau, attests that the time

d o cu m en ted in the time sheet was "necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for w h ich fees have been charged were correctly and necessarily performed." (Id. at 27-28.)

To calculate this rate reduction, we found the average rate properly charged over the past 8.5 years, using as a starting point the $280 per hour awarded Aldarondo-Ortiz in 2002 (see Docket No. 244-11) and as an ending point the $310 per hour awarded him herein. That average rate represents approximately a four-percent reduction from the rate currently awarded.

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P la in tif f s also submit a second time sheet; its entries replace those on the first time sheet for ta sk s deemed menial--all those for which a quarter hour originally was logged--and instead lo g a tenth hour for each. (See Docket No. 254.) In addition, Plaintiffs submit orders of this c o u rt analyzing the reasonableness of the hours logged by like attorneys in like cases. (See D o ck et Nos. 244-11 to -13; -15; -16 at 25-33; -17.) W e accept Plaintiffs' submission voluntarily categorizing as menial those tasks for which a quarter hour originally was billed, and we, accordingly, accept their reduction of the time lo g g e d for those tasks. Upon review of the first time sheet, we find that the attorneys in some in s ta n c es logged excessive time in that the listed tasks clearly would not have taken the time lo g g e d to complete. (See, e.g., Docket No. 244-2 at 9 (billing half hour to read a line order and fo rty-fiv e minutes to read a one-page order), 12 (billing half hour each to read a one-page order an d a line order), 13 (billing half hour to read a line order), 15 (billing one hour to read two-anda -h a lf pages of text), 16 (billing one hour to read a two-page judgment).) Because the time s h e e t in this case spans 8.5 years of litigation, we exercise our discretion to reduce fees for this e v id e n t practice of over-billing across the board, instead of by individual time entry. See, e.g., J a c o b s v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 562 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to require court to complete h o u r-b y-h o u r analysis given a voluminous fee request); Diffenderfer, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 230-31 (f in d i n g percentage reduction appropriate given lengthy fee request). We, thus, reduce the re q u e ste d attorney's fees by ten percent. We otherwise find the hours logged reasonable and a c c e p t the attorneys' attestation that they were necessarily spent on this litigation.

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I n accordance with the foregoing, we reduce Plaintiffs' original request for attorney's f e e s , $439,021.50 (Docket No. 244-2 at 27), by the amount of their voluntary reduction, $ 5 ,8 9 2 .7 5 (Docket No. 254-2 at 5). We further reduce by fourteen percent, to account for rate in f la tio n and excessive billing and, therefore, award $372,490.73 in attorney's fees. C. C o s t s and Out-of-Pocket Expenses P la in tif f s submit a listing of expenses they incurred in this case, and Aldarondo-Ortiz a ttes ts that each expense was actually and "necessarily incurred in this action." (Docket N o . 244-19.) Plaintiffs also submit receipts, invoices, and credit-card statements--for the most p a rt marked with this case name or number--which together show that Plaintiffs actually incu rred each listed expense. (Docket No. 244-18.) P la in tif f s claim as costs $405 in filing fees; $100 in service of summons; $840.24 in p h o to c o p ie s ; $4,091.97 in transcriptions of depositions and trial testimony; and $2,815.25 in tra n sla tio n and interpreter services. (Docket No. 244-19.) If they were necessarily incurred in th is matter, we may properly award these as costs. See § 1920; see also Riofrío Anda v. Ralston P u r in a Co., 772 F. Supp. 46, 55 (D.P.R. 1991) (explaining court's extension of § 1920(1) to allo w recovery of cost of private process server). Plaintiffs further claim $164.67 in messenger se rv ice s; $427.13 in postage; and $4,502.65 in attorneys' travel and accommodations. (Docket N o . 244-19.) If they were necessarily incurred in this matter, we may properly award these as o u t-o f -p o c ket expenses. See, e.g., Palmigiano, 707 F.2d at 637 (rejecting argument that attorney

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tr a v e l and accommodation expenses are not recoverable as attorney's fees under § 1988); Zayas v . Puerto Rico, 451 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319 (D.P.R. 2006) (categorizing messenger services and p o s ta g e as out-of-pocket expenses). W e deem the documentation submitted adequate to show that these expenses were n ec essa rily and actually incurred in this matter. We, thus, find Plaintiffs entitled to recover thes e as costs under Rule 54(d) and as out-of-pocket expenses allowed as attorney's fees under § 1988, and we award same as requested, in the amount of $13,346.91 (Docket No. 244-19). IV . C o n c lu s io n W e hereby GRANT IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees (Docket No. 244) a n d GRANT Plaintiffs' motion for voluntary reduction (Docket No. 254). We award Plaintiffs $ 3 7 2 ,4 9 0 .7 3 in attorney's fees and $13,346.91 in costs and out-of-pocket expenses, for a total o f $385,837.64. We note and find MOOT Plaintiffs' motions requesting remedy (Docket N o s . 253; 255). I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8 th day of April, 2010. s /J o s é Antonio Fusté J O S E ANTONIO FUSTE C h ie f U.S. District Judge