Rodriguez-Rivera et al v. Rivera-Rios et al

Filing 180

OPINION AND ORDER. DENIED 144 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jose Luis Calderon, Jose Morales, Ariel Soto-Cruz, and Pedro Toledo-Davila. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 3/24/2009.(LB) Modified to substitute Granted for Denied on 3/24/2009 (su).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO R O D R IG U E Z -R IV E R A et al * * P la in tif f s * * v. * Civil No. 06-1381 (SEC) * R IV E R A -R IO S , et al * * D e f e n d a n ts * ********************************** O P I N I O N and ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Defendants Pedro Toledo Davila ("Toledo"), Ariel Soto C ru z ("Soto"), Jose Morales Vazquez ("Morales"), and Jose Luis Calderon's ("Calderon") M o tio n for Summary Judgment (collectively "Defendants") (Dockets ## 143-144) and P la in tif f s ' opposition thereto (Docket ## 161-163). After reviewing the filings and the a p p lic a b le law, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Factual Background O n April 13, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit against Defendants under Section 1 9 8 3 and 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States Constitution's Fourth and E le v e n th Amendments, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, stemming from e v e n ts occurred on April 15, 2005. In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Carlos MalavéC o ló n ("Malavé") was arrested by Sgt. Hermenegildo Rivera-Ríos (Rivera-Rios) and agents J o s é Meléndez-Meléndez ("Meléndez") and David Rodríguez-Franqui ("Rodriguez") (c o lle c tiv e ly "police defendants") in the Liberio Ortiz Public Housing Project, in Aibonito. M a la v é was a drug addict, and immediately prior to his arrest, he had been in a car with two o th e r addicts. It appears that, while he was in the car or exiting therefrom, he swallowed s o m e th in g that Rivera, Meléndez, and Rodríguez, who were patrolling the housing project, to o k to be drugs. T h e police defendants intercepted Malavé and one of the other addicts outside the car. The third individual left the scene. They detained Malavé, and after having him under their p h ys ic a l control, allegedly beat him and punched him in the face, abdomen, back, and waist,

among other areas. As the beating progressed, the three police officers demanded that M a la v é vomit the small bag of drugs that he had swallowed. The police defendants then took Malavé to the Aibonito Police Department to be p ro c e s s e d for drug possession charges. Malavé spent approximately three to four hours at th e police station. While there, he complained of pain and requested medical attention. From th e police station, Malavé was taken to court for a probable cause hearing. After determining th a t there was probable cause for arrest for drug possession, the judge ordered the police d e f e n d a n ts to take him to the hospital. They complied with the judge's directive, and took M a la v é to Hospital Menonita. After a few hours at Hospital Menonita, Malavé was tra n s f e rre d to the Puerto Rico Medical Center during the early morning hours of April 16, 2 0 0 5 . Some hours later on that same day, he died at the Medical Center. The cause of death, a s later determined by the Medical Examiner, was hipovolemic shock, hemoperitoneo, la c e ra tio n to the arm, and corporal trauma. O n May 21, 2008, Defendants filed the instant motion, alleging that (1) Plaintiffs f a ile d to state a Section 1983 claim for which relief could be granted, (2) the claims against th e m should be dismissed because under Section 1983 there is no supervisory liability, and, a s a result, (3) the supplemental state law claims should be dismissed, or, in the alternative, (4 ) they are entitled to qualified immunity. Docket ## 143-144. S ta n d a r d of Review R . FED. CIV. P. 56 T h e Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, d e p o s itio n s , answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty L o b b y, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 6 7 , 77 (1st Cir. 2005). In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the

e v id e n c e . Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1 st Cir. 1994). A t this stage, the court examines the record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant,"

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a n d indulges all "reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. CastilloR o d ríg u e z , 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1 st Cir. 1994). O n c e the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the n o n m o v in g party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at le a s t one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 4 6 , 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "A factual issue is `genuine' if `it may reasonably b e resolved in favor of either party and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make `a c h o ic e between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" DePoutout v. Raffaelly, 4 2 4 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2005)(quoting Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1 st Cir. 1990)); see also S E C v. Ficken, 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1 st Cir. 2008). In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory a lle g a tio n s , improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. M c D o n o u g h , 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds T o b a c c o Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Nor will "effusive rhetoric" and "optimistic s u rm ise " suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 9 5 7 , 960 (1st Cir. 1997). Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an a b s e n c e of material facts in dispute, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w , the "party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to re b u t the motion." Méndez-Laboy v. Abbot Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1 st Cir. 2005) (quoting f ro m Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1 st Cir. 1994). "The nonm o v a n t must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trialw o rth y issue. . . . Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full th ro ttle ." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1 st Cir. 1991) (warning that " th e decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the re c o rd is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (quoting M a c k v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1 s t Cir. 1989)) (holding that "[t]he

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e v i d e n c e illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must h a v e substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder m u s t resolve."). Applicable Law and Analysis B e c a u s e the instant motion is for summary judgment, Defendants must comply with th e requirements of Local Rule 56, and file a statement of facts, set forth in numbered p a ra g ra p h s , and supported by record citations. See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when c o n f ro n te d with a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must: [ s ]u b m it with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material f a c ts . The opposition shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each n u m b e re d paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and u n le s s a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record c ita tio n as required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separa te section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and s u p p o rte d by a record citation...Local Rule 56(c) L o c a l Rule 56(e) further provides that "[a]n assertion of fact set forth in a statement of m a te ria l facts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified re c o rd material supporting the assertion." Moreover, a "court may disregard any statement o f material fact not supported by a specific record citation to record material properly c o n s id e r e d on summary judgment." Local Rule 56(e). These rules "are meant to ease the d is tric t court's operose task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litig a tio n to the court." Cabán-Hernández v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8(1 st Cir. 2 0 0 7 ). The First Circuit has held that when the parties ignore the Local Rule, they do so at th e ir peril. See Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F. 3d 24, 28 (1 st Cir. 2000). U p o n reviewing the parties' filings, this Court finds that ¶¶ 1-10, 16-18 and 20 1 of D e f e n d a n ts ' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("SUF") were admitted by Plaintiffs. However, statements ¶¶ 13-15 are not properly supported by the record. Specifically, Exhibit
Defendants misnumbered the facts set forth after ¶ 8. As such, this Court will address all facts from ¶ 8 of Docket # 143, p. 2, with the correct numbering.
1

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1 1 , provided in support of statement ¶ 13, is missing from Defendants' attachments. Moreover, although Defendants provide that Exhibit 34 ("General Order 98-16 ") is attached in support of statements ¶¶ 14 and 15, said exhibit does not include "General Order 98-16 ," a n d instead, consists of "General Order 98-11." Finally, in statements ¶¶ 19 and 20, D e f e n d a n ts aver that Rivera Ruiz and Meléndez Meléndez have "no previous record that w o u ld demonstrate a pattern of civil rights violation at the time of the alleged events." H o w e v e r , the documents provided in support of said statement show that complaints had b e e n filed against both officers for allegations of illegal arrests, and other civil rights v io la tio n s . Plaintiffs opposed. In statements ¶¶ 3-8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21 of their opposition, th e y attempted to create controversy as to Defendants' SUF by proposing additional facts m in g le d together with Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' SUF, in clear contravention to L o c a l Rule 56's mandate. See Docket # 162. Therefore, this Court will disregard the a d d itio n a l facts set forth by Plaintiffs at Docket # 162, in accordance with Local Rule 56, and F irs t Circuit precedent. See Local Rule 56(c) However, Plaintiffs properly controverted s ta te m e n ts ¶¶ 11 & 12. They also filed a "Statement of Contested Material Facts" (Docket # 163), wherein they raise material issues of fact on whether the arresting officers were p ro p e rly trained in the management of suspects who swallow narcotics, and whether D e f e n d a n ts took the necessary steps, within the police department, to avoid this type of s itu a tio n .2 Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs' statement of contested material facts (d o c k e t # 163), as such, it is deemed unopposed. Based on the foregoing, the uncontested facts are as follows:

See Docket # 163, ¶¶ 18, 28, 30-32, 34, 39, 42-44, 46, 48-53. However, Plaintiffs did not provide specific record citations (page or paragraph), pursuant to Local Rule 56(e) for statements ¶¶ 217, 19-27, 29, 33, 35-38, 40-41, 45 & 47, as such, they are not supported by the record and are disregarded by this Court.

2

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In January 2005, Toledo was appointed as Puerto Rico Police Department's S u p e rin te n d e n t. Defendants' SUF ¶ 1. From July 2004 to May 2004, Soto was the Director o f the Aibonito Drug Division. Id. at ¶ 2 & 16. Between July 2004 and April 15, 2005, Soto o f f e re d nine monthly academies3 to Rivera, Meléndez, Rodriguez, and other officers. Id. at ¶ 2. On March 2005, Morales was appointed as Director of the Drugs, Narcotics, Vice C o n tro l, and Illegal Firearms Bureau, and he offered two academies between the date of his a p p o in tm e n t and April 15, 2005. Id. at ¶ 2 & 17. However, Morales was not Rivera, M e lé n d e z or Rodriguez's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 5. Morales and Calderon were not present d u rin g the events that took place on April 15, 2005. Id. at ¶ 6 & 8. Calderon, Morales's direct s u p e rv is o r, was the Auxiliary Superintendent of Criminal Investigations on said date. Id. at ¶ 7. On April 15, 2005, a working plan was conducted in the Aibonito Drug Division targeted a t high crime areas. Id. at ¶ 9. Soto directed the working plan, and Rivera executed it. Id. at ¶ 10. General Order 98-16 was included in the agenda for the academy offered on March 23, 2 0 0 5 . Id. at ¶ 18. Rodriguez did not have a previous record which indicated a pattern of civil rig h ts violations. Id. at ¶ 20. Section 1983 Claims P la in tif f s brought Defendants as supervisors of the police defendants, and Toledo "in h is personal and individual capacity as head of the Puerto Rico Police Department and u ltim a te supervisor of all police members and the defendants." Docket # 1 at 5. They aver t h a t Defendants failed to properly train, supervise, and discipline the police defendants re g a rd in g the use of violence in the course of an arrest, and specifically, handling cases w h e re suspects swallow drugs. Therefore, they tacitly condoned the officers' conduct. In the m o tio n for summary judgment, Defendants move for the dismissal of all claims on the g ro u n d s that there is no supervisory liability pursuant to Section 1983, that they are entitled
3

The Police Department offers monthly academies or meetings about various topics related to the police force's work responsibilities and obligations.

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to qualified immunity, and as a result, the pendent state law claims must be dismissed. In order for a plaintiff to have a viable claim under section 1983, he must show (1) th a t the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; a n d (2) that this conduct deprived the plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured b y the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Gutiérrez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 5 5 9 (1st Cir. 1989). The second prong of the inquiry is two-folded: (1) there must be an actual d e p riv a tio n of a federally protected right, and (2) the conduct complained of must have been c a u s a lly connected to the deprivation. Id. The law in this Circuit clearly states that a superior officer, such as Toledo, "cannot b e held vicariously liable under [section 1983] on a respondeat superior theory." Maldonado v . Castillo, 23 F. 3d 576, 581(1st Cir. 1994). A supervisor can only be held liable for his own a c ts or omissions. Id. That is, in order for supervisory liability to attach, a plaintiff must a lle g e that the supervisor's behavior demonstrates deliberate indifference to conduct that is v io la tiv e of his constitutional rights and that this conduct was affirmatively linked to the s u b o rd in a te 's violative act or omission. Id. at 582. In other words, there is an element of d e lib e ra te indifference and one of causation. The "causation requirement can be satisfied e v e n if the supervisor did not participate directly in the conduct that violated a citizen's rig h ts ... if the supervisor knew of, overtly or tacitly approved of, or purposely disregarded th e conduct." Id. The necessary nexus may be found also if "there exists a widespread abuse s u f f ic ie n t to alert a supervisor to ongoing violations [, to the extent that] the supervisory is o n notice and fails to take corrective action, say, by better training or closer oversight." Id. F u rth e rm o re , "isolated instances of unconstitutional activity ordinarily are insufficient to e s ta b lis h a supervisor's policy or custom, or otherwise to show deliberate indifference." Id. F in a lly, in order to find that a supervisor showed deliberate indifference, there must b e an allegation of: (1) a grave risk of harm, (2) the supervisor's actual or constructive k n o w le d g e of that risk, and (3) his failure to take easily available measures to address the

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risk . Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F. 3d 1, 7(1st Cir. 1998). In other words, it is "required that the s u p e r v i s o r had `overtly or tacitly approved of, or purposely disregarded the conduct." R o d ríg u e z Vázquez v. Cintrón, 160 F. Supp. 22d 204, 211(D. P.R. 2001) (citing Lipsett v. U n iv e rs ity of Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881, 902-903 (1st Cir. 1988)). In this regard, "an im p o rta n t factor in determining whether a supervisor is liable to the extent he has e n c o u ra g e d , condoned ... or been deliberately indifferent to the behavior of a subordinate, is w h e th e r the official was put on notice of behavior which was likely to result in the violation o f the constitutional rights of citizens." Rodríguez-Vázquez, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 211. The first element (acting under color of state law) has not been disputed by either D e f e n d a n t, and it is apparent from the complaint that all the appearing defendants were a c tin g under color of state law. Moreover, taking as true all the facts alleged in the c o m p la in t, the police defendants' conduct clearly deprived Malavé of his constitutional rig h ts . Therefore, Plaintiffs have met the requirements for a Section 1983 claim. Defendants c o n te n d that, even under said assumption, Plaintiffs have not met the requirements for the im p o s itio n of liability to supervisors under Section 1983. However, after reviewing the re c o rd , this Court finds that there are material issues of fact regarding Defendants knowledge o f the police defendants' past behavior, and whether they are liable to Plaintiff under Section 1 9 8 3 for their actions and omissions. As previously stated, at this stage, the court may not w e ig h t the evidence, and examines the record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant," a n d indulges all "reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Based on the foregoing u n c o n te s te d facts, this Court cannot grant Defendants' request without weighing the e v id e n c e . Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground is DENIED. Q u a lifie d Inmunity D e f e n d a n ts also aver that under the doctrine of qualified immunity, they are immune f ro m suit for money damages in their personal capacity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative d e f e n s e against personal liability which may be raised by state officials. Whitfield v.

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M e lé n d e z -R iv e ra , 431 F. 3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). It "provides a safe harbor for public officials a c tin g under the color of state law who would otherwise be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for in f rin g in g the constitutional rights of private parties." Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 4 8 3 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified im m u n ity, courts shall apply a three-part test: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a c o n s titu tio n a l violation; (2) whether the law was clearly established that defendants' action v i o la t e d a constitutional right of the plaintiff; and (3) whether a reasonable official would h a v e understood that his actions violated a constitutional right." Rivera-Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 3 6 2 F. 3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2004); Jennings, 499 F.3d at 11. A t this stage, this Court has concluded that Plaintiffs have shown that material issues o f fact regarding Defendants' knowledge of the police defendants actions, and the measures t a k e n by them to avoid the same, are in controversy. It remains to be seen whether D e f e n d a n ts ' acts or omissions violated Malavé's constitutional rights. Moreover, Defendants a re sued both in their personal capacities and as the police defendants' supervisors. T h e re f o re , Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground is DENIED. Since P la in tif f s ' federal claims have not been dismissed, Defendants' request for the dismissal of th e pendent state law claims is also DENIED. Conclusion B a se d on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. I T IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 24 th day of March, 2009. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge