Martinez v. Cuerpo de Bomberos de Puerto Rico

Filing 119

OPINION AND ORDER denying 89 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, all certified translations are due by 8/14/2009. Notice of Compliance Deadline due by 8/14/2009.Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 8/11/2009.(THD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

A N A G. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff v. C O M M O N W E A L T H OF PUERTO RICO D efendant Civil No. 06-1862 (SEC)

O P I N I O N AND ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Defendant Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 89), and Plaintiff Ana G. Martinez's ("Plaintiff") o p p o s itio n thereto (Docket # 93). After considering the filings, and the applicable law, D e f e n d a n t's motion is hereby DENIED. F a c tu a l and Procedural Background O n September 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed the above captioned complaint against the C o m m o n w e a lth . She then filed an Amended Complaint (Docket # 10), and various motions to d ism is s (Docket # 8 (declared moot), Docket # 17 (denied) and Docket # 48 (declared moot)). On April 8, 2008, this Court granted Plaintiff the opportunity to file a Second Amended C o m p la in t (Docket # 53), to which the Commonwealth filed an answer on April 30, 2008, and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See Docket # 60. A c c o rd in g to Plaintiff, the pattern of harassment that occurred at the Rio Piedras fire s ta tio n , and led to her prior civil action,1 did not cease with the settlement agreement. During

The present suit is, in may ways, related to Plaintiff's prior action, Ana G. Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, civil no. 00-1468 (D.P.R. filed April 13, 2000), which was settled on July 8 , 2002.

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th e course of said action, Defendant transferred Plaintiff to the Trujillo Alto fire station. See D o c k e t 53-2 at ¶ 5.20. However, Plaintiff alleges that events that transpired after the settlement in the Trujillo Alto station, constitute new and discrete acts of retaliation and sexual harassment, w h ic h are proscribed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. M o re specifically, Plaintiff alleges that upon her return to the Puerto Rico Fire D e p a rtm e n t ("PRFD"), her working conditions deteriorated even further. To wit, she was s u b je c te d to retaliation, and continued acts of sexual harassment. She further contends that due t o the foregoing, she felt unable to continue as an employee of the PRFD, and therefore r e s ig n e d . See Docket # 53-2; Docket # 61 at 3. In turn, Defendant contends that the present a c tio n should be dismissed on the basis of "res judicata/collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. . ." See Docket # 60 at 2. This argument is predicated on the existence of the earlier settlement a g re e m e n t between Plaintiff and the Commonwealth, which Defendant asserts bars all new a c t i o n s . Id. at 8. Furthermore, Defendant alleges that the events described in the Second A m e n d e d Complaint, even those that occurred after the prior settlement, are not actionable u n d e r Title VII. Id. at 9. Accordingly, Defendant filed the present motion requesting summary ju d g m e n t, and Plaintiff opposed. This Court will address each party's arguments below. S ta n d a r d of Review R . FED. CIV. P. 56 T h e Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, a n s w e rs to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that th e re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 248 (1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2005). In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs.,

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In c . v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994). At this stage, the court examines th e record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant," and indulges all "reasonable in f e re n c e s in that party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is only in the absence of a genuine issue as to the material facts o f the case. Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004). Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the n o n m o v in g party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least o n e fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1 st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "A factual issue is `genuine' if `it may reasonably be re so lv e d in favor of either party and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make `a choice b e tw e e n the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" DePoutout v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 1 1 2 , 116 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also SEC v. F ic k e n , 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1990). In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory a lle g a tio n s , improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 4 0 7 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 , 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). Nor will "effusive rhetoric" and "optimistic surmise" suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997). Once th e party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, a n d that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the "party opposing summary j u d g m e n t must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Méndez-Laboy v. A b b o t Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting from Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo R o d ríg u e z , 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). "The non-movant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue. . . . Failure to do so allows th e summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States,

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9 2 4 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the s u m m a ry judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with c o n s e q u e n c e ." ); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F .2 d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989), holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy c a n n o t be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing v e rs io n s of the truth which a fact finder must resolve."). The opposing party may not rest on m e re allegations, or denials of the pleadings. In cases of sexual harassment, "summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for p o lic [ in g ] the baseline for hostile environment claims," Mendoza v. Borden, Inc. 195 F. 3d 1 2 3 8 , 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoted in Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 447 F. 3d 79 (1st C ir. 2006). A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis B e c a u s e the instant motion is for summary judgment, Defendant must comply with the re q u ire m e n ts of Local Rule 56, and file a statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, a n d supported by record citations. See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when confronted with a m o tio n for summary judgment, the opposing party must: [ s ]u b m it with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material f a c ts . The opposition shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each n u m b e re d paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation a s required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section a d d itio n a l facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a re c o rd citation[...] L o c a l Rule 56(c). L o c a l Rule 56 (e) further provides that "[a]n assertion of fact set forth in a statement of m a t e r i a l facts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified re c o rd material supporting the assertion." Moreover, a "court may disregard any statement of m a te ria l fact not supported by a specific record citation to record material properly considered

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o n summary judgment." Local Rule 56(e). These rules "are meant to ease the district court's o n e ro u s task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the court." C a b á n -H e rn á n d e z v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). The First Circuit h a s held that when the parties ignore the Local Rule, they do so at their own peril. See RuizR iv e ra v. Riley, 209 F. 3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000). After reviewing the Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts ("SUF") (Docket # 90), a n d Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("RSUF") (D o c k e t # 93-2), this Court notes that both parties have substantially complied with Rule 56. U n c o n te s te d Facts P u rs u a n t to Defendant's SUF ( Docket # 90), and Plaintiff's RSUF (Docket # 93-2), the f o llo w in g facts are uncontested.2 T h e PRFD has regulations and general orders regarding policy towards the prevention o f sexual harassment in the workplace, and to establish a procedure to channel claims of sexual h a ra ss m e n t. SUF ¶ 16.3 Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement in her first case (00-1468 (C C C )). SUF ¶ 28. As part of the settlement of that case, Plaintiff was transferred to the T ru jillo Alto Station. SUF ¶ 36. Although the first case was settled, the harassment in Trujillo A lto never stopped. SUF ¶ 29. Part of the issues negotiated with PRFD entailed that the h a ra ss m e n t towards her would stop, but according to Martinez, it never did. SUF ¶ 30-32. Plaintiff kept a book of notes of all the incidents that were occurring in the Trujillo Alto S ta tio n . In it, events from July 15, 2003 to August 2, 2004 were recorded. SUF ¶¶ 105-112. In her logbook, Plaintiff recorded three instances where she found pornographic drawings in h e r work area. Id. The first one makes reference to a drawing left at her desk on May 6, 2003.

Facts ¶ ¶ 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 55, 60, 64, 69, 87, 103, 107, 108, and 111 were properly objected or denied by Plaintiff. All of the remaining facts were admitted by Plaintiff.
3

2

To the extent such document exists.

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Id . Then on May 5, 2004 Plaintiff again wrote that she found a napkin with an anatomically c o rre c t drawing of a male doll. On June 14, 2004, Martinez recorded that she found another p a p e r with a pornographic drawing. SUF ¶ 112. An investigation was made of the drawing a lle g e d ly received by Plaintiff in May 2003, and it was determined, nearly a year later, that the p e rs o n responsible could not be identified. SUF ¶ 113. In addition to the drawings, Plaintiff recorded two incidents regarding problems with the d o o r to the ladies' restroom. SUF ¶ 114. The first one occurred on January 20, 2004, where s h e claimed that the door had become lodged, and two firemen were required to open the door. Id. Subsequently, on March 8, 2004, at 7:10 a.m., an unidentified person damaged the lock of th e door. Id. That day, the door of the ladies' restroom could not be opened. Id. Plaintiff also recorded two instances where the ladies' restroom reeked of urine, because th e floor had been peed on. SUF ¶ 115. The first instance was recorded on May 10, 2004. Id. The second one was recorded on July 16, 2004. Id.4 F u rth e rm o re , three incidents with anonymous obscene phone calls at the fire station in T ru jillo Alto were recorded in Plaintiff's logbook. SUF ¶ 116. The first was on November 3, 2 0 0 3 at 11:15 a.m., when an unidentified voice called her "crazy." Id. On that same day, at 1:10 p .m ., Plaintiff recorded another call where the unknown caller said, "put out my fire, crazy cryb a b y." Id. The second occasion recorded occurred on November 6, 2003 at 2:55 p.m., when a n unidentified man called the Station, and made three sexually explicit comments to her. Id. The third and last occasion recorded by Plaintiff was on November 7, 2003 at 11:19 a.m., when a n o th e r unidentified man uttered another sexually explicit insult to her. Id. Plaintiff admitted th a t these calls were anonymous, and that she never identified who was calling. SUF ¶ 117.

T h e s e are of significance because Plaintiff alleges that she was the only woman working at the station most days, a n d that the male employees intentionally defaced the bathroom to make her feel unwelcome.

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A f te r several administrative proceedings with the Commonwealth, the Court's judgment in case 00-1468 (CCC), and the filing of a new complaint, Ana G. Martinez v. Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico, civil no. 06-1862 (SEC) (see SUF ¶ 41, 43, 45, 56, 58, 59, 61-63, 65-68, 70-86, and 88-102), Martinez requested a transfer to the Fajardo fire station on August 4, 2004. SUF ¶ 23. On September 7, 2004, she was transferred to the Luquillo fire station. SUF ¶ 24. After h e r arrival at the Luquillo station, a hostility-free environment prevailed, for a time. SUF ¶ 25. Plaintiff went to the Luquillo station after meeting with Captain Cruz, who recommended L u q u illo instead of the Fajardo station because it was a calmer. SUF ¶ 27. However, the respectful atmosphere allegedly did not prevail, and Plaintiff reported an u n w a n te d sexual advance from co-worker Mario Millan on March 29, 2006. SUF ¶ 1. This u n w a n te d sexual advance allegedly took place on March 28, 2006 at the Luquillo fire station. SUF ¶ 2. After Plaintiff complained, an administrative investigation was recommended by C o m m a n d e r Gilberto Cruz Perez, Chief of the Carolina Area. SUF ¶ 3. The agency concluded th e investigation, and by April 7, 2006, firefighter Mario Millan was removed from the Luquillo f ire station, and sent to the Rio Grande fire station. SUF ¶¶ 4, 5.5 After Plaintiff complained a b o u t the alleged sexual harassment committed against her by Millan, the agency summoned T e d d y Torres, Miguel Sanchez, Sergeant Montoyo, Millan, and Plaintiff for the investigation. SUF ¶ 6.6 On September 28, 2006, Sergeant Edwin Rosario rendered a report of his

i n v e stig a tio n regarding the alleged sexual harassment described by Plaintiff. SUF ¶ 7. 7 N o tw ith s ta n d in g the conclusion of said report, which stated that there was not enough evidence

Plaintiff admits SUF ¶ 5, only to the extent that a procedure was initiated, as she contends that it was biased and vitiated. See Docket # 93-2, § II, ¶ 81. Only to the extent that a procedure was initiated, and the named individuals were called; however, she holds that the process was biased, and vitiated, and people who had no knowledge of the events were asked to testify, namely Jorge Hernandez, whom Plaintiff had filed harassment complaints. Id.
7 6

5

With the qualification that the report was biased and vitiated.

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to sustain the charges against firefighter Mario Millan, German Ocasio, Chief of PRFD, sent a letter to Millan suspending him from his employment and salary for a term of sixty (60) days. SUF ¶ 9. Thereafter, in light of the report issued by the hearing officer, Chief German Ocasio is s u e d a decision revoking the intended sanction. SUF ¶ 13. Plaintiff was allowed to testify in th e administrative hearing. SUF ¶ 14.8 O n April 13, 2007, German Ocasio ordered an administrative investigation against P la in tif f for insubordination, violation of the norms pertaining to the use of bedrooms, falsely im p u tin g improper behavior on a fellow firefighter, and for repeatedly lying in her testimony a n d written documents. SUF ¶ 17. Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment under Title VII T itle VII of the Civil Rights Act, "makes it an unlawful employment practice to d isc rim in a te against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or p riv ile g e s of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a )(1 ); see also Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993). The Supreme Court has interpreted th e phrase terms, conditions or privileges of employment broadly, and has stated that it e n c o m p a s s e s Congress' intent to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and w o m e n in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatory hostile or a b u s iv e environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 20; see also Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U .S . 742, 753-754 (1998) (holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination th a t is actionable under the statute). That is, Title VII is violated whenever "the workplace is p e rm e a te d with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or p e rv a siv e to alter the conditions of the victim's employment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.

With the qualification that Ms. Martinez's lawyers were not allowed to intervene in any way or object. Furthermore, Mr. Lamberty (the hearing officer) confused her with his questions and attempted to embarrass her. See Docket # 93-5, p. 141, lines 22-25; p. 142, lines 1-14.

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In order to succeed in a hostile work environment claim, plaintiff must show that: (1) s h e is a member of a protected class (in this case, her gender); (2) that she was subjected to u n w e lc o m e sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the h a ra ss m e n t was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment; (5 ) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such th a t a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive; and (6) some basis of employer lia b ility. Rosario v. Department of the ARMY, 573 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (citing Pomales, 447 F . 3d at 83. The focus of hostile work environment cases is generally on elements (4) and (5). S e e O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Faragher.v. City o f Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 20-23). There is no controversy as to the fact that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. H o w e v e r, there is still contention regarding whether Martinez was subjected to unwelcome s e x u a l harassment, and if the harassment was based on sex. Defendant argues that the conduct c o m p la in e d was not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of Plaintiffs e m p lo ym e n t, and that it was not objectively abusive. A lth o u g h there is no mathematically precise test, in order to determine whether an e n v iro n m e n t is hostile or abusive, the Court must look at all the circumstances, which may in c lu d e : (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, (2) its severity, (3) whether it is p h ysic a lly threatening or humiliating, (4) whether it was just a mere utterance, and (5) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see a ls o Pomales, 447 F.3d at 83; Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, 304 F. 3d 7, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 2 ); Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough del Caribe, Inc., 354 F. 3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 2003). T h e "mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee d o e s not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII." Harris, 510 U .S . at 20. The conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive for a reasonable person to find

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th a t the work environment was hostile or abusive. Id. Title VII also requires that the employee s u b j e c t iv e ly perceive the work environment as abusive. Id. Despite Title VII's protection a g a in st discrimination based on sex, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that "the prohibition o f harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's e m p lo ym e n t." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). That is, " [ c ]o n d u c t that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive w o rk environment- an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive- is b e yo n d Title VII's purview." Id. As previously stated, Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim stands on a series of incidents o r comments involving Millan, and other unidentified persons after the prior case, 00-1668 (C C C ), was settled on June 24, 2002. See Docket # 93 and Docket # 93-2. P l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g a t i o n s , if true, depict a highly uncomfortable work situation, which could reasonably be c o n s tru e d as severely abusive. See Docket # 69. As such, those claims based on Plaintiff's a lle g a tio n s of a hostile work environment continuing after the 2002 settlement cannot be d ism is s e d at this juncture. T h e Commonwealth also contends that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the employer liability p ro n g of the hostile environment test. In this regard, when the harassment is caused by a coe m p l o ye e , the employer is liable if it knew, or should have known, of the charged sexual h a ra ss m e n t, and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action. See White v. N e w Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2000). Furthermore, when an e m p lo ye r fails to take a remedial measure to stop the offensive conduct, he has "effectively r a t if ie d the harassment" when he knew of the discrimination but took no action against the o f f e n d in g party. Dixon v. International Brotherhood of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (quoting Woods v. Graphic Commc'ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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In the alleged case of harassment between Martinez and Millan, controversy exists as to w h e th e r the harassment claimed by Plaintiff took place at all, and whether the administrative p ro c e d u re s that ensued against her after she denounced said incident affected the conditions of h e r employment, prompting her to resign. See Docket # 53-2; Docket # 61 at 3; RSUF § II, ¶ 8 5 . The Court notes that, at this juncture, the record must be examined in the "light most f a v o ra b le to the nonmovant," and indulging all "reasonable inferences" in the non-moving p a rty's favor. Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581. B a s e d on the foregoing, Defendant's request for summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual h a ra ss m e n t and hostile work environment claim is DENIED. However, this does not dispose o f the instant motion. The Commonwealth also moves the Court to grant summary judgment on P la in tif f 's retaliation claim, and res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds. R e ta lia tio n T h e Commonwealth argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to establish a re ta lia tio n claim under Title VII. A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires for a plaintiff to show that: "(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered some materially a d v e rse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to her protected activity." Dixon v . Int'l Bhd. Of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 2007). With regards to Plaintiff's a lle g a tio n s of retaliation, her claim is predicated on having denounced allegedly discriminatory situations, like the pornographic drawings she found in her desk (SUF ¶ 112, 113), the damage in f lic te d to the ladies' restroom door and facilities (when, at all times, she was the only woman w o rk in g at the Station) (SUF ¶ 114, 115), and the obscene telephone calls she received (SUF ¶ 116, 117). All of these instances were allegedly ignored by her superiors, who also allegedly u s e d Martinez as a scape goat (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.26), allegedly threatened that they would not p ro m o te her (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.27), made allegedly unfounded charges that she took u n a u th o riz e d leaves of absence (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.49-50), and began an allegedly malicious

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in te rn a l investigation against her for reporting an alleged act of sexually improper conduct by a n o th e r employee (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.54). Moreover, in Plaintiff's RSUF, there are sixteen (16) o b je c tio n s , and denials on facts that are central to the alleged instances of retaliation.9 T h is Court is satisfied that these facts demonstrate a prima facie pattern of retaliation, a s they suggest that Plaintiff was singled out due to her complaints against male fire fighters. As such, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in relation to Plaintiff's retaliation claims is DENIED. Res judicata and collateral estoppel T h e Commonwealth wishes "to prevent the waste of judicial and party resources through v e x a tio u s and multiple lawsuits, and encourage the rendering of consistent, reliable a d ju d ic a tio n s ," Esteves v. Ortiz-Alvarez, 678 F. Supp., 963, 965 (D.P.R. 1988), claiming that th e Court should not entertain the case at hand. Defendant relies on University of Tennessee

v . Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986), for the proposition that the purported investigation, and findings o f fact by the PRFD related to the Millan incident are res judicata. In Elliott, as the Defendant c o rre c tly noted, the Supreme Court ruled that an Agency's final decision adjudicating § 1983 c la im s are final. However, the instant case is not a § 1983 claim, it is a Title VII case, under 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000 (e), et seq. Congress's intent was for a claimant to have a trial de novo n o tw ith s ta n d in g the administrative determinations. The Elliott Court held that: T h e legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain m e a n in g of the statute, and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal e m p lo ye e s the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative p ro c e e d in g s ' as is enjoyed by private-sector employees, and employees of state g o v e rn m e n ts and political subdivsions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964. E llio tt, 478 U.S. at 795-796. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44

24 (1 9 7 4 ) (holding that "[...] final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with 25
9

See, supra n. 1.

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f e d e ra l courts."); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 623-624 (2nd Cir. 2001) (stating "The S u p re m e Court has held that Congress, in enacting Title VII, generally intended to e lim in a te the binding effect of prior administrative findings and provide a de novo trial on T itle VII claims."). D e f e n d a n t also moves this Court to consider that pursuant to Puerto Rico case law, P la in tif f must be directed to request the execution of the settlement agreement signed in 2 0 0 2 instead of continuing with the case at hand. In support, the Commonwealth cites a P u e rto Rico Supreme Court case, Neca Mortgage Corp. V. A&W Developers, S.E., 137 P .R . Dec. 860 (1995), which resolved that in the case there is a court settlement, the p la in tif f must ask for the execution of the settlement agreement as a final judgment. This Court declines Defendant's invitation to dismiss this case on res judicata and c o lla te ra l estoppel claims. As exposed by the facts in contention in Plaintiff's RSUF, and th e many instances she denounced retaliatory acts (See Docket # 53-2, ¶¶ 5.26, 5.27, 5.49, a n d 5.54; SUF ¶ 112-117), there is a genuine controversy regarding whether the C o m m o n w e a lth failed, during five (5) years, to provide a hostility-free working e n v i r o n m e n t for Plaintiff, in spite of her administrative maneuvers within the PRFD to s e e k adequate relief. Furthermore, this Court has clearly established that all incidents prior to July 8, 2002 are barred from further judicial relief. See Docket # 69 at p. 6. T h e re f o re , this Court DENIES the Commonwealth's Motion for Summary J u d g m e n t, in as much as the RSUF contains contested allegations sufficient to sustain Title V II claims for retaliation claims new and independent from those covered in the 2002 s e ttle m e n t.

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C o n c lu s io n B a s e d on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. I T IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11th day of August, 2009. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge