Martinez v. Cuerpo de Bomberos de Puerto Rico

Filing 69

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 60 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 1/20/2009. (THD) Modified on 1/21/2009 to add: "opinion and"(ab).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO A N A G. MARTINEZ * * P l a in tif f * * v. * * C O M M O N W E A L T H OF PUERTO * RICO, ET AL * * D e f e n d a n ts * **********************************

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC)

O P I N IO N AND ORDER P e n d in g before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket # 60) f ile d by Defendant the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in conjunction with the Puerto Rico F ire Department (hereinafter "the Commonwealth" or "Defendant") , and Plaintiff Ana G. M a rtin e z 's (hereinafter "Ms. Martinez" or "Plaintiff") Opposition thereto. See Docket # 61. A f te r reviewing the parties' motions and the applicable law, the Commonwealth's Motion f o r Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket # 24) will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED I N PART. F a c tu a l Background: O n September 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed the above captioned complaint against the C o m m o n w e a lth . Additionally, she filed an Amended Complaint (Docket # 10), and various m o tio n s to dismiss (Docket # 8 (declared moot), Docket # 17 (denied), and Docket # 48 (de clared moot)), which were all denied or declared moot. On April 8, 2008, the Court g ra n ted Plaintiff the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint (Docket # 53), to

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ w h ic h the Commonwealth filed an answer on April 30, 2008, and a Motion for Judgment on th e Pleadings. See Docket # 60. The present suit is, in many ways related to Plaintiff's prior action, Ana G. Martinez v . Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No 00-1468 (D.P.R. filed April 13, 2000), which was s e ttle d on July 8 th , 2002. However, Plaintiff alleges that the pattern of harassment that led to her prior civil action did not cease with the settlement agreement. The acts leading to the P la in tif f 's first action occurred at the Rio Piedras fire station. However, during the course of the prior action, Defendant transferred Plaintiff to the Trujillo Alto fire station. Docket 53-2 a t ¶ 5.20. Plaintiff alleges that events that transpired after the settlement in the Trujilo Alto station , constitute new and discrete acts of retaliation and sexual harassment, which are p ro s c rib e d under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that upon her return to the Puerto Rico Fire D e p a rtm e n t, her working conditions deteriorated even further, she was subjected to re ta lia tio n , and continued acts of sexual harassment. Because of the acts described in her a lle g a tio n s , Ms. Martinez eventually felt unable to continue as an employee of the Puerto Rico F ire Department, and therefore resigned. See Docket # 53-2; Docket # 61 at 3. In turn, D e f en d a n t, contends that the present action should be dismissed on the basis of "res judicata/ c o lla te ra l estoppel or issue preclusion. . ." See Docket # 60 at 2. This argument is predicated o n the existence of the earlier settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the Commonwealth, w h ic h Defendant asserts bars all new actions. Id. at 8. Furthermore, Defendant alleges that the e v e n ts described in the Second Amended Complaint, even those that occurred after the prior

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ s e ttle m e n t, are not actionable under Title VII. Id. at 9. Accordingly, Defendant has filed a motion requesting judgement on the pleadings. The C o u rt will address each party's arguments below. Standard of Review: F e d . R. Civ. P. 12(c) D ef e n d an ts have moved to dismiss this case under FED.R.CIV.P. 12( c ). This rule states th a t "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party m a y move for judgment on the pleadings." A judgment on the pleadings is not proper "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts in support of her c la im which would entitle her to relief." Id.(emphasis added). A motion for judgment on the p lead ing s uses the same standard as a motion to dismiss under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). See M e d i n a Pérez v. Fajardo, 257 F. Supp. 2d 467, 470-71 (D.P.R. 2003); see also Ad-Hoc C o m m itte e of Baruch Black & Hispanic Alumni Assoc. v. Bernard M. Baruch, 835 F. 2d 980, 9 8 2 (2 n d Cir. 1987). F e d . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) U n d e r Rule 12(b)(6) in assessing whether dismissal for failure to state a claim is a p p ro p ria te , "the trial court, must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the c o m p l a in t, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determine w h e th e r the complaint, so read, limns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable th e o ry." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1 st Cir. 1998) (citations o m itted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ b e yo n d doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would e n title him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), quoted in, Davis v. M o n ro e County Bd. of Ed., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1676 (1999); Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F .3 d 225, 226 (1st Cir. 2005)). Therefore, "even under the liberal pleading standards of F e d e ra l Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a m o tio n to dismiss, a complaint must allege `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" RodríguezO rtíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1 s t Cir. 2007). Complaints do not need detailed fa ctua l allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). However, f a ctu a l allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. T w o m b ly at 1965. A lth o u g h the standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 12(b)(6) is generally lim ited to the facts stated on the face of the complaint, a court may also consider documents a p p e n d ed to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of which jud icial notice can be taken. See Allen v. Westpont-Pepperrel, Inc., 945 F. 2d 40, 44 (2 n d Cir. 1 9 9 1 ); Kramer v. Time Warner, 937 F. 2d 767 (2 nd Cir. 1991). A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis: R e s Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Defendant argues that this suit is barred due to the 2002 settlement agreement. The First Circuit has described res judicata as a doctrine whereby an issue between identical p a rtie s that has been subject to a final judgement, or that should have been raised in the prior a c tio n , may not be litigated anew in the future. See Breneman v. Untited States ex rel.

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ F .A .A ., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1 st Cir. 2004). The First Circuit´s test for determining res judicata in v o lv e s determining whether there has been, "a final judgment on the merits," "sufficient id e n tic a lity between the causes," and "sufficient identicality between the parties." Id. (q u o tin g Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)); See also Gonzalez-Piña v. Rodriguez, 4 0 7 F.3d 425, 429 (1 st Cir. 2005). C o lla te ra l estoppel is a very similar issue to res judicata. It requires: (1 ) an identity of issues (that is, that the issue sought to be precluded is th e same as that which was involved in the prior proceeding), (2) actuality of litig atio n (that is, that the point was actually litigated in the earlier proceeding), (3 ) finality of the earlier resolution (that is, that the issue was determined by a valid and binding final judgment or order), and (4) the centrality of the a d ju d i c a ti o n . Gonzalez-Piña, 407 F.3d at 430 (quoting Fagain v. Kelly, 184 F.3d . 67, 78 (1 st Cir. 1999)). A s such, both collateral estoppel and res judicata bar Plaintiff from presenting claims against th e Commonwealth based on the issues involved in the 2002 settlement agreement between th e parties. However, Plaintiff is not barred from brining a claim based on new conduct o c c u rrin g after the settlement agreement that was "broader or more far reaching" than the e v e n ts leading to the prior settlement. Id. (quoting Walsh v. Int´l Longshoremen´s Ass´n, A F L CIO, Local 799, 630 F.2d 864, 873 (1 st Cir. 1980)). M s . Martinez´s Second Amended Complaint prays for enforcement of the 2002 s e ttle m e n t. Res judicata and collateral estoppel bar this claim, because a final judgment has b e e n entered, between identical parties, and on identical issues. However, the Second A m e n d e d Complaint also brings claims for allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory events

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ o c c u rrin g in the years following the 2002 judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that after Ju n e 2002, her supervisors and co-workers made the work environment so emotionally u n te n a b le that she felt forced to resign on July 9, 2007. The Court finds that Plaintiff´s claims based on violations of the 2002 settlement, and a ll events occurring before July 8, 2002 (the date judgment was entered), are barred by both r e s judicata and collateral estoppel. These issues are hereby DISMISSED. Nevertheless, res ju d ic a ta and collateral estoppel should not apply to controversies surrounding those events o c c u rrin g after July 8, 2002, in as much as the could constitute new and discrete violations o f Plaintiff´s rights. Plaintiffs Post Settlement Claims B e s id e s its res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments, the Commonwealth asserts th a t Plaintiff´s claims of retaliation and sexual harassment after the 2002 settlement do not c o n stitu te actionable violations of the law. With regards to the post-2002 sexual harassment a lle g a tio n s , Defendant argues that Plaintiff only alleges a single sexually improper incident o c c u rrin g after the settlement, and that this is insufficient to support her claim of a hostile w o rk environment. Docket # 60 at 8 (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 2 6 8 , 271 (2001)). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff presents a series of other incidents, which in c lu d e sexually explicit drawings (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.46), and the repeated vandalizing of h e r bathroom (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.44 & 5.43). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, "makes it an unlawful employment practice to d is c rim in a te against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ p riv ile g e s of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a )(1 ); see also Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993). The most important aspect of a sex u al harassment claim based on a hostile work environment is whether the "work e n v iro n m e n t is severely abusive, subjectively and objectively." Rodriguez-Robles v. Pfizer Pharm aceuticals, LLC, 561 F.Supp.2d 180, 185 (D.P.R. 2008) (paraphrasing Rivera-Martinez v . Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 05-2605, slip op. at 2, 2007 W.L. 16069 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 7 ). Furthermore, "although there is no mathematically precise test, in order to determine w h e t h e r an environment is hostile or abusive, the Court must look at all the circumstances, w h ic h may include: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, (2) its severity, (3) w h e th e r it is physically threatening or humiliating, (4) whether it was just a mere utterance, a n d (5) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." R o d rig u ez - R o b les, 561 F. Supp. 2d. at 185; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (1993); Marrero v . Goya of Puerto Rico, 304 F. 3d 7, 18-19(1 st Cir. 2002); Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough d e l Caribe, Inc., 354 F. 3d 34, 46 (1 st Cir. 2003); Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 447 F . 3d 79, 83 (1 st Cir. 2006). Harassing conduct can constitute unwelcome conduct motivated b y sexual desire, or differential treatment towards an employee because of her sex. RiveraM a rtín e z , 2007 WL 16069 at p. 3. Plaintiff's allegations, if true, depict a highly

u n c o m fo rta b le work situation, which could reasonably be construed as severely abusive. As s u c h , those claims based on Plaintiff's allegations of a hostile work environment continuing a f te r the 2002 settlement cannot be dismissed at this juncture.

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ M o re o v e r, the Commonwealth argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to estab lish a retaliation claim under Title VII. A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII re q u ire s for a Plaintiff to show that: "(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered s o m e materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to her p rotec ted activity." Dixon v. Int'l Bhd. Of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 2007). W ith regards to Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation, her claim is predicated on having filed o f various other discrimination complaints, which were allegedly ignored by her superiors, w h o used Ms. Martinez as a scape goat (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.26), threatened that she would n o t be promoted (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.27), made unfounded charges that she took (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.49-50), and began an internal

u n a u th o riz e d leaves of absence

in v e stig a tio n against her for reporting an alleged act of sexually improper conduct by another e m p lo ye e (Docket # 53-2, ¶ 5.54). The Court is satisfied that these facts demonstrate a prima facie pattern of retaliation, a s they suggest that Plaintiff was singled out due to her complaints against male fire fighters. T h e re f o re , the Court shall DENY the Commonwealth's Motion for Judgment on the P lead ing s, in as much as the Second Amended Complaint contains allegations that are s u f f ic ie n t to sustain Title VII claims for sexual harassment and retaliation claims new and in d e p e n d e n t from those covered in the 2002 settlement. Conclusion: F o r the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's claims for enforcement of

Civil No. 06-1862(SEC) ______________________________________________________________________________ th e 2002 settlement agreement shall be DISMISSED with prejudice. However, the Motion f o r Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED for Plaintiff's claims originating from subsequent c o n d u c t after the 2002 settlement agreement. SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 20 th day of January, 2009. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge