Belfort v. Corporacion Hogar San Agustin y Teresa, Inc. et al
Filing
107
ORDER granting 83 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability. Trial scheduled for 1/20/09 shall be limited to damages only. Signed by Judge Raymond L. Acosta on 12/18/08. (ans)
1 2 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
NANCY BELFORT,
4
Plaintiff,
5
v.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
CORPORACION HOGAR SAN AGUSTIN Y TERESA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY AND LIMITING TRIAL TO DAMAGES Plaintiff has moved the court to enter partial summary judgment in this action finding that defendant's acts or omissions were negligent and the proximate cause of the death of decedent JUANA BELFORT. The court having reviewed plaintiff's legal arguments as well as the documents submitted in support therewith hereby finds that a
17
finding of liability as requested is warranted.
18
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
19
Plaintiff, NANCY BELFORT, instituted this action seeking damages
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1
for the death of her mother allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendant HOGAR SAN AGUSTIN Y TERESA ("HOGAR"). At the Further Initial Scheduling Conference held on May 30, 2008,1 the following discovery deadlines relevant to the matter currently before us were set:
See Minutes (docket No. 63).
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CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 2
6/30/08
3 4
HOGAR to provide a description of the witnesses listed as #4 to #16 in the Second Joint ISC memorandum (docket No. 58) and their knowledge of decedent and/or
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
her pain.2 6/30/08 7/31/08 7/31/08 HOGAR to identify expert witnesses. HOGAR to submit expert witness reports. Conclusion witnesses. 8/12/08 8/26& 28/08 10/17/08 Blocked for deposition of HOGAR's expert witnesses. Alternate dates for expert depositions. Dispositive Motions of depositions of parties and/or fact
13
At the STATUS/SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE held on September 11, 2008,3
14
the court became aware that HOGAR had failed to provide a description
15
of its witnesses listed as #4 through #16 nor had defendant complied
16
with the deadlines pertaining to expert witnesses. Accordingly, both
17
those
18 19
particular
fact
witnesses
as
well
as
plaintiff's
expert
witnesses were deemed waived. Defendant's
20 21
subsequent
request
for
reconsideration
of
this
ruling was denied. In its order denying reconsideration the court noted that "[a]part from the fact that petitioner has failed to
22 23 24 25 26 HOGAR was specifically admonished that failure to provide this information by the court-imposed deadline would result in the automatic waiver of these witnesses in this action. See Minutes (docket No. 63) n . 1.
3 2
See Minutes (docket No. 76).
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 3
adduce any valid reason for disregarding the court's case management
3
orders, allowing petitioner to comply with its discovery obligations
4
at this late date would in effect deprive plaintiff of its [sic]
5
right to take the depositions of these fact and expert witnesses."4
6
LOCAL RULE 56(c)
7
Motions for summary judgment must comport with the provisions of
8
Local Rule 56(c) which, in pertinent part, reads:
9
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
10
submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise
11
statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall
12
admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each
13
numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of
14
material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support
15
each denial or qualification by a record citation as
16
required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain
17
in a separate section additional facts, set forth in
18
separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record
19
citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule.
20
This provision specifically requires that in its own statement
21
of material fact respondent either admit, deny, or qualify each of
22
movant's proffered uncontested facts and for each denied or qualified
23
statement cite the specific part of the record which supports its
24 25
4
Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (docket No.
26
8 8 ).
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 4
denial
3 4
or
qualification.
Respondent
must
prepare
its
separate
statement much in the same manner as when answering the complaint. The purpose behind the local rule is to allow the court to
5
examine each of the movant's proposed uncontested facts and ascertain
6
whether or not there is adequate evidence to render it uncontested.
7
"This `anti-ferret' rule aims to make the parties organize the
8
evidence rather than leaving the burden upon the district judge."
9
Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy, 400 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2005). "The purpose
10
of this `anti-ferret rule' is to require the parties to focus the
11
district court's attention on what is, and what is not, genuinely
12
controverted. Otherwise, the parties would improperly shift the
13
burden of organizing the evidence presented in a given case to the
14
district court." Mariani-Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d
15
216, 219 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). See also,
16
Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)
17
(summary judgment should not "impose [upon the court] the daunting
18
burden of seeking a needle in a haystack"); Leon v. Sanchez-Bermudez,
19
332 F.Supp.2d 407, 415 (D.P.R. 2004).
20
"When complied with, they serve to dispel the smokescreen behind
21
which litigants with marginal or unwinnable cases often seek to hide
22
and greatly reduce the possibility that the district will fall victim
23
to an ambush." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d
24
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets
25
omitted).
26
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CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 5
Apart from the fact that Local Rule 56(e) itself provides that
3
"[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material
4
facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule,
5
shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted" in discussing
6
Local Rule 311.12, its predecessor, the First Circuit Court of
7
Appeals stressed the importance of compliance by stating that the
8
parties who ignore its strictures run the risk of the court deeming
9
the facts presented in the movant's statement of fact admitted.
10
"Given the vital purpose that such rules serve, litigants ignore them
11
at their peril. In the event that a party opposing summary judgment
12
fails to act in accordance with the rigors that such a rule imposes,
13
a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to
14
accept the moving party's facts as stated." Id. See also, Alsina15
Laboy, 400 F.3d at 80 ("Where the party opposing summary judgment
16
fails to comply, the rule permits the district court to treat the
17
moving party's statement of facts as uncontested"); Cosme-Rosado v.
18
Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2004) ("uncontested"
19
facts pleaded by movant deemed admitted due to respondent's failure
20
to properly submit statement of contested facts.)
21
"[A]bsent such rules, summary judgment practice could too easily
22
become a game of cat-and-mouse, giving rise to the `specter of
23
district court judgment being unfairly sandbagged by unadvertised
24
factual issues.'" Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
25 26
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 6
2000) (citing Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722
3
F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir. 1983)).
4
Providing an alternative statement of facts without addressing
5
the movant's factual proposals individually does not conform to the
6
Local Rule's mandate and will cause defendant's proffered facts to be
7
deemed uncontested. Mariani-Colon, 511 F.3d at 219. Further, denials
8
without more are ineffective. Rather, the opposing party "must offer
9
specific
10 11
facts
to
counter must
those
set the
out
by
[defendant]. of definite
[N]onmovant's
12
facts
demonstrate
existence
competent evidence fortifying plaintiff's version of the truth. This is the case even where motive and intent are at issue. [Plaintiff]
13
may not meet his burden by citing an inequity and tacking on the
14
self-serving
15 16
conclusion
that
the
defendant
was
motivated
by
a
discriminatory animus." Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 527 F.3d 215, 219-20 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation
17
marks omitted).
18
A party's failure to abide by the strictures of Local Rule
19
56(c), however, does not automatically entitle movant to summary
20
judgment as requested. "It mainly means that the district judge can
21
accept the moving party's allegedly uncontested facts as true, but
22
whether or not this justifies summary judgment for the moving party
23
depends upon the legal and factual configuration that results." Caban
24
Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 8.
25 26
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CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 7
In the case before us, HOGAR did not raise particularized
3
objections to plaintiff's proffered Statement of Facts as mandated by
4
Local
5 6
Rule
56(c).5
Accordingly,
we
shall
consider
plaintiff's
submitted facts - which have adequate evidentiary support - as uncontested.
7
UNCONTESTED FACTS
8
We find the following facts submitted by plaintiff which are
9
duly supported by the evidence are uncontested.
10
1.
11 12
Plaintiff daughter.
NANCY
BELFORT
is
decedent
JUANA
BELFORT's
2.
13 14
Plaintiff signed a contract with HOGAR for the care of her mother and thus was fully responsible for the monthly payments, decedent's personal needs and any other
15
miscellaneous needs.
16
3.
17 18
Pursuant
to
the
aforementioned
contract,
HOGAR
was
responsible for decedent's security, safety and medical treatment.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Instead, defendant submitted its own Controverted Material Facts in its response to plaintiff's summary judgment request. See Controverted Material Facts (docket No. 93). However, the vast majority of those facts are based either on the statements of individuals or on the opinion of defendant's expert all of which were previously stricken by the court. Additionally, we concur with the objections raised by plaintiff as to the remaining proffered facts. Based on the foregoing, we need not consider defendant's alleged material facts in controversy for purposes of disposing of plaintiff's summary judgment request.
5
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CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 8
4.
3 4
Decedent was admitted to the HOGAR in February 2002 where she remained until September 2006.
5.
5 6
MYRIAM
AVILES,
plaintiff's
cousin,
visited
decedent
regularly at the HOGAR and kept plaintiff informed as to decedent's condition.
7
6.
8 9
DR. RAUL ROSADO FIGUEROA was the only physician provided by HOGAR to care for decedent and was, in effect, her treating physician.
10
7.
11 12
When
decedent
arrived
at
the
HOGAR,
she
was
able to
ambulate, albeit with difficulty. 8.
13 14
At least by May 2006, the Sunday prior to Mother's day, decedent was placed in a wheelchair. Her relatives were informed that it was to prevent falls.
15
9.
16 17
According to the notes of DR. RAUL ROSADO FIGUEROA, from 2002 to 2006 decedent's muscular-skeletal system was "o.k." with no changes and she could ambulate with difficulty.
18
This statement continued in the record even after decedent
19
was placed in a wheelchair.
20
10.
21 22
Shortly after decedent was placed in a wheelchair, she became bedridden as a result of a fracture of her right hip evidenced by an x-ray taken at Hospital Metropolitano.
23
12.
24 25
A person with a displaced hip fracture such as the one decedent had could not have basically normal extremities as recorded by DR. RAUL ROSADO FIGUEROA.
26
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CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 9
13.
3 4
At the time of her death JUANA BELFORT was 77 years old. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for
5
ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that
6
they shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
7
interrogatories,
8 9
and
admissions
on
file,
together
with
the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
10
a matter of law."
11 12
Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st
Cir. 2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the
13
absence
14 15
of
a
genuine
issue
of
material
fact
in
the
record.
DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997).
16
A genuine
issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of
17
Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am.
18
Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
19
1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994).
20 21
A fact is material if
it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.
22
1995).
23
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view
24
`the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
25
drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Poulis26
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 10
Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Barbour v.
3
Dynamics
4 5
Research
Corp.,
63
F.3d
32,
36
(1st
Cir.
1995)).
"In
marshaling the facts for this purpose we must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. That does
6
not mean, however, that we ought to draw unreasonable inferences or
7
credit
8 9
bald
assertions,
empty
conclusions,
rank
conjecture,
or
vitriolic invective." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted italics in
10
original).
11
Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment.
12
"`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
13
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
14
not those of a judge.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
15
530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing
16
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
17
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe,
18
Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir. 2000) ("court should not engage in
19
credibility assessments."); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit
20
Union, 170 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 1999) ("credibility determinations
21
are for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary
22
judgment."); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st
23
Cir. 1998) (credibility issues not proper on summary judgment);
24
Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d
25
108,
26
113
(D.P.R.
2002).
"There
is
no
room
for
credibility
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 11
determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting
3
evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge
4
to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood. In fact,
5
only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to
6
credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any
7
material fact may the court enter summary judgment." Cruz-Baez v.
8
Negron-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R. 2005) (internal
9
citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).
10
In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of
11
proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a
12
motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
13
U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; Navarro v. Pfizer
14
Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2000); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of
15
Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000), and cannot rely
16
upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
17
speculation".
18
Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st
Cir. 2000);
19 20
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d
(1st Cir. 1994); Medina-Muñoz v. 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
21
NEGLIGENCE
22
Plaintiff claims that defendant is liable due to the failure of
23
both
24 25 26
the
physician
and
the
HOGAR's
staff
to
detect
decedent's
fractured hip and adequately monitor decedent's condition.
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 12
Art. 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.,
3
§ 5141 (1990), governs tort liability in Puerto Rico. It provides
4
that "[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
5
through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
6
done." Negligence is the failure to exercise due diligence to avoid
7
foreseeable risks.
8
According to this provision, a person is liable for damages
9
resulting from his/her negligent acts or omissions. In order to
10
prevail plaintiff must establish: (1) a negligent act or omission,
11
(2) damages, and (3) a causal relationship between them. Irvine v.
12
Murad Skin Research Lab., Inc., 194 F.3d 313, 321 -322 (1st Cir.
13
1999); De-Jesus-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus. of P.R., Inc., 160
14
F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1998); Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d
15
845, 847 (1st
16 17
Cir. 1987); Pons Anca v. Engebretson, 160 D.P.R. 347,
354 (2003); Montalvo v. Cruz, 144 D.P.R. 748, 755 (1998); Toro-Aponte v. E.L.A., 142 D.P.R. 464, 473 (1997).
18
The mere fact that injuries or damages ensue is not grounds for
19
liability under art. 1802 for that would entail absolute liability.
20
Defendant will be liable only for those reasonably foreseeable
21
consequences to its conduct.
22 23
De-Jesus-Adorno, 160 F.3d at 842; Pons
Anca, 160 D.P.R. at 354; Montalvo, 144 D.P.R. at 755; Toro-Aponte, 142 D.P.R. at 473; Ocasio Juarbe v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 125
24
D.P.R. 410, 418 (1990) official translation reproduced in full in 902
25 26
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 13
F.2d 117 (1st Cir.1990); Jimenez v. Pelegrina Espinet, 112 D.P.R. 700,
3
704, (1982); Pacheco v. A.F.F., 112 D.P.R. 296, 300 (1982).
4
Additionally, pursuant to art. 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil
5
Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit., 31 § 5142 (1990), tort liability may be
6
incurred not only for personal [negligent] acts and omissions, but
7
also for those [negligent acts or omissions] of the persons for whom
8
[a principal] should be [held] responsible." For instance, hospitals
9
and physicians can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts
10
or omissions of their respective employees. Lopez v. Dr. Cañizares,
11
163 D.P.R. 119, 135 (2004); Blas v. Hosp. Guadalupe, 146 D.P.R. 267,
12
349 (1998). See also, Márquez Vega v. Martínez Rosado, 116 D.P.R.
13
397, 404-06 (1985) (hospitals jointly liable for acts or omissions of
14
physicians in the emergency room when the patient initially seeks
15
medical assistance from the hospital rather than directly from a
16
particular medical doctor).
17
Physicians are bound to furnish patients with that care and
18
attention
19
which
in
light the
of
modern
means
of
communication
and
knowledge
20 21
satisfies
professional
requirements
generally
recognized by the medical profession at the time that the medical care was provided. Lopez v. Dr. Cañizares, 163 D.P.R. at 133; Marti
22
v. Abreu, 143 D.P.R. 520, 526 (1997); Santiago Otero v. Mendez, 135
23
D.P.R. 540 (1994); Rodriguez Crespo v. Hernandez, 121 D.P.R. 639
24
(1988); Nuñez v. Cintron, 115 D.P.R. 598, 613 (1984).
25 26
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 14
In order to prevail in a medical malpractice action, plaintiff
3
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the physician
4
was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
5
patient's injuries. Lopez v. Dr. Cañizares, 163 D.P.R. at 133; Blas
6
v. Hosp. Guadalupe, 146 D.P.R. at 350.
7
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure
8
to act whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act
9
or omission was the factor which most probably brought about or
10
actually caused the injuries complained of, and that the injuries
11
were either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
12
the act or omission charged by plaintiffs. Crespo v. Hernandez, 121
13
D.P.R. 639 (1988).
14
LIABILITY
15
According to DR. GERMAN MALARET, plaintiff's expert witness,
16
decedent's fracture was a result of some kind of trauma most likely
17
a fall. This must have happened while decedent was at the HOGAR, most
18
probably prior to May 2006, since by that date she was confined to a
19
wheelchair.
20
If decedent was ambulating - albeit with difficulty - and
21
according to DR. ROSADO FIGUEROA's notes her musculo-skeletal system
22
was in good condition gives rise to the question: why was she placed
23
in a wheelchair and subsequently bedridden?
24 25 26
The logical conclusion
is that she was in pain or could not walk due to the hip fracture
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 15
which was not diagnosed by DR. ROSADO FIGUEROA and which also went
3
undetected by the HOGAR's staff.
4
DR. MALARET opined that DR. ROSADO FIGUEROA was negligent in
5
that he failed to diagnose decedent's fractured hip. Nor did the
6
HOGAR personnel, who were responsible for her daily care, become
7
aware of and/or ignored her condition.
8
Additionally, DR. MALARET indicated that the care provided by
9
the HOGAR's staff for decedent's ulcer condition was deficient in
10
that she was not turned as frequently as required. This type of ulcer
11
develops due to poor skin care and continued pressure in the area in
12
a patient that has poor circulation, particularly at the pressure
13
points, i.e., shoulders, hips, back, and heels.
14
DR. ROSADO FIGUEROA described for the first time a type-three
15
ulcer on September 1, 2006 which, according to DR. MALARET, means
16
that decedent had ulcers for a prolonged period of time prior to this
17
date.
18
Due to the untreated fracture, plaintiff was initially confined
19
to a wheelchair and subsequently bedridden which caused plaintiff to
20
develop severe decubitus ulcers in various parts of her body. DR.
21
MALARET concluded that decedent's death was proximately caused by the
22
irreversible deterioration and complications resulting from her being
23
bedridden
24 25 26
and
the
ensuing
grave
ulcerous
condition
which
was
deficiently treated.
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 16
It is axiomatic that in this particular case the HOGAR is
3
responsible for the negligent acts or omissions of both DR. ROSADO
4
FIGUEROA and its employees. Similar to a hospital setting, this
5
physician was contracted directly by the institution to provide
6
medical care to the confined elderly population. As a matter of fact,
7
it is undisputed that this was the only medical doctor who regularly
8
attended decedent at the nursing home.
9
Thus, we find that defendant's negligence has been clearly
10
established by plaintiff's expert witness.6 The record reflects that
11
decedent's fractured hip went undetected by the treating physician
12
for an inordinate period of time.
13
The negligence of the HOGAR's staff is also well supported in
14
DR. MALARET's report. Again, there is no reference to decedent's
15
fracture in the HOGAR's records. It is evident from DR. MALARET's
16
conclusions that the HOGAR staff was negligent both in failing to
17
detect decedent's fracture and also in being derelict in the care of
18
a wheelchair bound and bedridden patient which resulted in the
19
development of decubitus ulcers.
20
Thus, the delay both by the physician and the staff in noticing
21
the fracture added to the failure to adequately handle the bedridden
22 23 24 25 26
Defendant's arguments in the opposition to the summary judgement request are based exclusively on the testimony of its expert and personnel all of which were stricken by the court. Accordingly, this evidence may not be considered in our ruling.
6
1 2
CIVIL NO. 07-1240 (RLA)
Page 17
patient caused her to develop the decubitus ulcers which eventually
3
resulted in her death.
4
CONCLUSION
5
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
6
Judgment as to Liability (docket No. 83)7 is GRANTED.
7
Accordingly, we find that defendant is liable for the negligent
8
acts or omissions of DR. ROSADO FIGUEROA as well as those of the
9
HOGAR's staff which negligence was the proximate cause of decedent's
10
demise.
11
It is further ORDERED that the trial scheduled for January 20,
12
2009, shall be limited to damages only.
13
IT IS SO ORDERED.
14
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 18th day of December, 2008.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
7
S/Raymond L. Acosta RAYMOND L. ACOSTA United States District Judge
See Opposition (docket No. 92) and Reply (docket No. 102).
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