Delgado-Sanchez et al v. Toledo-Davila et al

Filing 114

OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 84 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Pedro Toledo-Davila. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 12/8/2009.(LB)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

W E N D E L DELGADO SANCHEZ, et al P la in tif f s v. Civil No. 07-1709 (SEC) P E D R O TOLEDO DAVILA, et al Defendants

O P I N I O N AND ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Co-Defendant Pedro Toledo-Dávila's ("Toledo") Motion f o r Summary Judgment (Dockets ## 84 & 85), and Plaintiffs' opposition thereto (Dockets ## 9 6 & 97). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Toledo's motion for summary ju d g m e n t is GRANTED. Procedural Background P la in tif f s seek relief for the damages suffered by Wendel Delgado Sánchez (hereinafter " W e n d e l" ), and Dwight Delgado Sánchez ("Dwight") (collectively "Plaintiffs") as a result of th e alleged illegal seizure, false arrest, imprisonment, and beating undertaken by members of th e Puerto Rico Police Department. Plaintiffs' complaint is premised on Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1 9 8 3 , the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States C o n s titu tio n and several state laws.1 Plaintiffs brought this suit against Toledo, the Police D e p a rtm e n t Superintendent; Francisco Carbó Marti, the Director of the drug and addictions c o n tro l of Puerto Rico; Coriano, Lieutenant of the Carolina Tactics Operation; Carlos Carrión R o d ríg u e z , Lieutenant of the Carolina Drug Division; Sanchez Ofaril, Supervisor of the C a ro lin a Drug Division; agents José L. López Pagán, Endel Meléndez, Toledo Reyes, and

The initial complaint was filed on August 8, 2007 (Docket # 1), and a first amended complaint was filed on August 15, 2007. Docket # 2. On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12.

1

1 2

CIVIL NO. 07-1709 (SEC)

Page 2

E rn e s to Santiago; Diego Figueroa, President of the Frente Unido de Policías Organizados 3 (h e re in a f te r FUPO); and several unnamed defendants. 4 On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12. 5 D e f e n d a n ts moved this Court to strike Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, however, their 6 re q u e st was denied. Docket # 26. On January 28, 2008, Defendants moved for dismissal of the 7 c o m p la in t. In its prior Opinion & Order, this Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' 8 c la im s federal claims against Toledo, as well as Plaintiffs' Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Amendment 9 c la im s against all Defendants. Docket # 40. On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff a motion requesting 10 th a t this Court reconsider its prior holding, and reinstate all claims against Toledo. Docket # 42. 11 S p e c if ic a lly, Plaintiffs argued that the allegations in the second amended complaint were 12 s u f f ic ie n t to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 13 g ra n te d . This Court granted Plaintiffs' request, and their Section 1983 claims against Toledo 14 w e re reinstated. Docket # 72. 15 On May 26, 2009, Toledo filed the instant motion. Docket # 84. Plaintiffs filed an 16 o p p o s itio n . Docket # 96. 17 Standard of Review 18 F ED. R. CIV. P. 56 19 T h e Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, 20 a n s w e rs to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 21 th e re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 22 a s a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 23 2 4 2 , 248(1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2005). 24 In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., 25 In c . v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994). At this stage, the court examines 26

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

3

th e record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant," and indulges all "reasonable in f e re n c e s in that party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1 st C ir. 1994). O n c e the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the n o n m o v in g party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least o n e fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "A factual issue is `genuine' if `it may reasonably be re so lv e d in favor of either party and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make `a choice b e tw e e n the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" DePoutout v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 1 1 2 , 116 (1st Cir. 2005)(quoting Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also SEC v. Ficken, 5 4 6 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2008). In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory a lle g a tio n s , improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 4 0 7 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 , 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Nor will "effusive rhetoric" and "optimistic surmise" suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1 st Cir. 1997). Once th e party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, a n d that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the "party opposing summary ju d g m e n t must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Méndez-Laboy v. A b b o t Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting from Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo R o d ríg u e z , 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). "The non-movant must `produce specific facts, in s u ita b le evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue. . . .Failure to do so allows the s u m m a ry judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F .2 d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary ju d g m e n t proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence");

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

4

M e d in a -M u ñ o z , 896 F.2d at 8 (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be c o n je c tu ra l or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions o f the truth which a factfinder must resolve."). When filing for summary judgment, both parties must comply with the requirements of L o c a l Rule 56, and file a statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, and supported b y record citations. See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when confronted with a motion for summary ju d g m e n t, the opposing party must: [ s ]u b m it with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material f a c ts . The opposition shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each n u m b e re d paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation a s required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section a d d itio n a l facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a re c o rd citation...Local Rule 56(c). L o c a l Rule 56(e) further provides that "[a]n assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material f a c ts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record m a te ria l supporting the assertion." Moreover, a "court may disregard any statement of material f a c t not supported by a specific record citation to record material properly considered on s u m m a ry judgment." Local Rule 56(e). Local Rule 56(e)(2) further states that, if the opposing p a rty does not respond to a motion for summary judgment, "summary judgment should, if a p p ro p ria te , be entered against that party." When "a party opposing summary judgment fails to a c t in accordance with the rigors that such a rule imposes, a district court is free, in the exercise o f its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated." Cabán-Hernández v. Philip M o rris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). These rules "are meant to ease the district c o u rt's operose task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the c o u rt." Id. at 8. The First Circuit has held that when the parties ignore the Local Rule, they do s o at their own peril. See Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F. 3d 24, 28 (1 st Cir. 2000).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis

5

In the present case, Defendant complied with Rule 56, and submitted a Statement of U n c o n te s te d Facts (Docket # 85) (hereinafter "Toledo's SUMF"), numbered, and supported by re c o rd citations. In opposition, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion Submitting Uncontested Material F a c ts in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Plaintiffs' SUMF"). D o c k e t # 97. Upon reviewing the record, however, this Court notes that Plaintiffs did not admit, d e n y or qualify Toledo's SUMF by reference to each numbered paragraph. Instead, Plaintiffs p ro v id e d additional facts which are not related to Toledo's SUMF. Since Plaintiffs did not o p p o s e Toledo's SUMF in compliance with Rule 56, this Court will deem uncontested those f a c ts that are properly supported by the record. As a result, the facts set forth at Toledo's SUMF ¶ ¶ 1-4, and 6-10 are deemed unopposed.2 F u rth e rm o re , Plaintiffs failed to provide specific record citations in support of any of th e ir assertions of fact, and SUMF ¶¶ 13 and 12 do not have record citations. Also, Exhibits # 1 , 3, 4, 7, and 8 are not properly authenticated. The First Circuit has held that "[t]o be a d m iss ib le at the summary judgment stage, `documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e).'" Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 1 3 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993)). In Carmona, the C o u rt refused to give credence to "a purported copy of the investigation file -- unsworn, u n c e rtif ie d , and, at first, untranslated -- to the motion." Id. Additionally, the English

T ra n s la tio n of Exhibit # 8, provided in support of SUMF ¶9, is missing pages 2-12. As a result, S U M F ¶ 9 will be disregarded when ruling on the instant motion. Notwithstanding, since

2

SUMF ¶5 is a conclusion of law which is better left for this Court to decide.

25 26 Notwithstanding, this statement of fact has been admitted by the parties, and as such, will be considered by this Court.
3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

6

P la in tif f s ' SUMF ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, and 10, which are supported by Exhibits ## 1, 3 and 4, coincide w ith Toledo's SUMF, said exhibits' validity is deemed admitted by Toledo. Accordingly, P la in tif f s ' SUMF ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, and 10 will be considered by this Court. Lastly, portions of P la in tif f s ' SUMF ¶¶ 5, 8, and 10, set forth conclusions of law regarding alleged violations to th e Puerto Rico Police Department's regulations, to Plaintiff's rights, and local laws, which are m a tte rs for this Court to decide. B a s e d on the foregoing, the uncontested facts are as follows. A search warrant was is s u e d authorizing the search of Block # 23 House # 21, located at Sabana Gardens Street # 16.4 P la in tif f s ' SUMF ¶2. On August 9, 2006, Wendel and Dwight were standing in the street at S a b a n a Gardens. Id. at ¶3.5 On even date, Plaintiffs were subject of a police intervention that c u lm in a te d in their arrest, and imprisonment for approximately 12 hours. Toledo's SUMF ¶2. A t that time, Toledo was the Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department. Id. at ¶1. On th e same day, Toledo suspended Wendel without pay. Id. at ¶6. One day later, on August 10, 2 0 0 6 , Wendel received the suspension letter from Toledo, informing him that he was suspended w ith o u t pay. Id. at ¶7; Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶4. Wendel appealed the letter of suspension on A u g u st 17, 2006. Toledo's SUMF ¶8. A hearing was held on January 16, 2007, and Wendel was p re s e n t. Id. at ¶¶9 & 10; Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶6. Therefore, Wendel was suspended for 8 months, a n d afterwards, he was expelled. Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶8.

Plaintiffs' proposed statement of fact ¶2 provides that they "were standing in front of houses 21 and 22 of Jardines de Carolina." However, the deposition cited in support thereof does not mention the name "Jardines de Carolina." Moreover, Exhibit # 6 states that the search warrant was directed at residences located in Sabana Gardens. Although Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶ 3 states that "Wendell and Dwight Delgado were standing in front of houses 21 and 22 of Jardines de Carolina," as previously stated, the facts took place in Sabana Gardens. Furthermore, Wendel's deposition testimony, provided in support of said assertion of fact, does not clearly state that Plaintiffs were standing in front of residences 21 and 22. Instead, Wendel stated that they were standing on the street "in a corner." Docket # 97-7.
5

4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

7

P la in tif f s ' only evidence regarding Toledo's failure to train the police force is his own p e rc e p tio n and allegation that "you are not taught to beat on people at the Academy, and you a re not taught to libel persons at the Academy." Toledo's SUMF ¶3. Plaintiffs have no evidence o f lack of training other than the allegation in the previous statement. Id. at ¶4. Although Plaintiffs contend that Toledo did not conduct an investigation before s u s p e n d in g Wendel, the suspension letter states that there was a preliminary investigation re g a rd in g Wendel's conduct. See Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶5; Exhibit # 1, Docket # 108-5. Toledo is s u e d statements to the press and the T.V. news. Id. at ¶10.6 In his motion for summary judgment, Toledo contends that Plaintiffs failed to establish a Section 1983 claims against him. Specifically, Toledo avers that there is no causal connection b e tw e e n his actions, and the alleged illegal arrest. Toledo further argues that Wendel's p ro c e d u ra l due process rights were not violated, insofar as he was granted a hearing regarding h is suspension, and was duly advised about his right to appeal the same. In opposition, Plaintiffs a rg u e that Toledo suspended Wendel the day after he was arrested and beaten, without due p ro c e s s of law and in violation of the Police Department's rules and regulations. Moreover, P la in tif f s contend that Toledo defamed Wendel when he appeared on TV, and commented on W e n d e l's suspension. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo was aware of the administrative

c o m p la in ts filed against the arresting officers, and failed to adequately supervise, train, monitor a n d evaluate them. As such, they argue that Toledo tacitly encouraged and condoned their b e h a v io r, and is responsible under the respondeat supervisor doctrine.

At Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶11, they posit that "Toledo did not provide adequate training to the Carolina drug division police officers regarding the penetration of houses." However, considering that Plaintiffs arrest took place on the street, not inside a house or structure, said statement of fact is irrelevant to the case at bar.

6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

8

T h e Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive rig h ts , but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. M .S . Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). There are two essential elements of a Section 1983 c la im : "(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; a n d (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the U n ite d States." Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145 , 151-152 (2 n d Cir. 2006); Johnson v . Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2005); Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1 st Cir. 1995) (c itin g Chrongis v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1 st Cir. 1987)). This second prong has tw o aspects: (1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected rig h ts ; and (2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and th e deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. See Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1 st C ir. 1989); Mahoney, 424 F.3d at 89. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires th a t the plaintiff establish that each defendant's own actions deprived the plaintiff of his/her p ro te c te d rights, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978); GutiérrezR o d ríg u e z , 882 F.2d at 562; Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1 st Cir. 1989). F u rth e rm o re , the defendant's conduct must be shown to be intentional, grossly negligent, or a m o u n te d to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See S im m o n s v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir. 1986); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. A s for supervisory liability in §1983 actions, the rule is that "supervisors may only be f o u n d liable on the basis of their own acts or omissions." Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. In order for a supervisor to be found liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that th e supervisor's own acts or omissions deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right; (2 ) that his "conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the c o n s titu tio n a l rights of others;" and (3) that there was "an `affirmative link' between the street le v e l misconduct and the action or inaction of supervisory officials." Id.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

9

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs aver that Toledo "knew or should have k n o w n and identified the dangerous tendencies of (the arresting) police officers..." Docket # 12 a t ¶ 29. They further allege that Toledo knew that said officers had received inadequate and deficient training. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo failed to properly train, monitor, supervise, a n d evaluate the arresting police officers. Id. Moreover, they contend that Toledo "knew or s h o u ld have known the many administrative complaints filed against (the arresting officers)" f o r civil rights violations, and he failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or correct the o f f ic e rs ' improper conduct. Docket # 12 at ¶ ¶ 29 & 30. As such, Plaintiffs argue that Toledo w a s grossly negligent in exercising his responsibilities and, as such, is responsible for the v io la tio n of Plaintiffs' civil rights. Notwithstanding, pursuant to the above mentioned uncontested facts, Plaintiffs' only e v id e n c e regarding Toledo's failure to train the police force is his own perception and allegation th a t "you are not taught to beat on people at the Academy, and you are not taught to libel p e rs o n s at the Academy." Toledo's SUMF ¶3. Furthermore, in his deposition testimony, Wendel a d m its he has no evidence of lack of training other than the allegation in the previous statement. Id . at ¶4. Also, Plaintiffs admit that Toledo was not present during the arrest. As such, this Court f in d s that Plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between Toledo's conduct and the a lle g e d deprivation of their federal rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims a g a in st Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

D u e Process Claims T h is Court first notes that Dwight Delgado is not a police officer. Therefore, he lacks s ta n d in g to set forth due process claims against Toledo. As such, Dwight's due process claims a g a in st Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. A d d itio n a lly, although Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985), m a n d a te s pre-termination hearings, the Hudson-Parratt doctrine bars Wendel's due process

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

10

c la im s . Pursuant to the same, due process violation claims, based on the unauthorized denial of p re -te rm in a tio n rights, fail when adequate post-deprivation remedies are provided to plaintiffs. In order "to establish a procedural due process claims under Section 1983, a plaintiff m u s t allege that he was deprived of a property interest by defendants acting under color of state la w and without the availability of a constitutionally adequate process." Maymi, 515 F.3d at 29. " P ro p e rty interests are not created by the Constitution; `they are created and their dimensions a re defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as s ta te law.'" De Vélez v. Zayas, 328 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing Bd. of Regents v . Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).7 T h is Court notes that, in invoking his procedural due process claims, Wendel argues that T o le d o deprived him of the established pre-termination procedures. According to Wendel, he w a s summarily suspended, without an investigation into the facts of the case, or an a d m in is tra tiv e hearing pursuant to the Police Department's Personnel Regulations. He further n o te s that the hearing was held 5 months after his suspension. After reviewing the record, this C o u rt finds that it is uncontested that Wendel was summarily suspended. Notwithstanding, the P o lic e Department's Personnel Regulations allow the Superintendent to summarily suspend a m e m b e r of the Force from employment and wages, prior to the administrative hearing, when th e re is misuse of public funds, lack of competence, misconduct or crime charged, or whenever t h e r e is a reasonable belief that the public's health or safety may be endangered. Article

Employees classified as "career" or permanent" have vested property rights, and cannot be deprived of that right without due process of law. Borges-Colon v. De Jesus-Flores, 483 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). At a minimum, career employees are entitled to "notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond" prior to termination. Figueroa, 221 F.3d at 5-6 (citations omitted); Monfort-Rodriguez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 168. At the pre-termination stage, due process requires that "[t]he tenured public employee [receive] oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 546.

7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

11

1 4 .3 (2 )(b )(1 )(b ), Personnel Regulation #4216, May 11, 1990. Therefore, Toledo complied with th e Personnel Regulations. Moreover, although Plaintiffs contend that Toledo did not conduct a n investigation before suspending Wendel, the suspension letter states that there was a p re lim in a ry investigation regarding Wendel's conduct. See Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶5; Exhibit # 1, D o c k e t # 108-5. Thereafter, a thorough investigation was conducted. Also, Wendel appealed th e letter of suspension on August 17, 2006, and a hearing was held on January 16, 2007. T o le d o 's SUMF ¶8; Plaintiffs' SUMF ¶¶ 6, 9 & 10. As such, Wendel's rights were properly safe g u a rd ed . Additionally, as previously mentioned, even if Toledo failed to provide Wendel the p ro c e d u re due prior to making the decision to terminate them, he cannot succeed on his p ro c e d u ra l due process claim unless he can show that the state failed to provide him with an a d e q u a te post-deprivation remedy. Id. (citing Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 340-41 (1 st Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) (holding that "[i]f a state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies -- either by statute o r through the common-law tort remedies available in its courts -- no claim of a violation of p ro c e d u ra l due process can be brought under § 1983 against the state officials whose random a n d unauthorized conduct caused the deprivation."). Under the Hudson/Parratt doctrine, "when a deprivation of a property interest is o c c a s io n e d by random and unauthorized conduct by state officials, the Supreme Court has re p e a te d ly emphasized that the due process inquiry is limited to the issue of the adequacy of the p o s td e p riv a tio n remedies provided by the state." Hadfield v. Mc Donough, 407 F.3d 11, 19 (1 st C ir. 2005); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). A s a result, public entities are protected from federal due process claims where the denial of p ro c e ss was caused by the negligent or intentional misapplication of state law by a government o f f ic ia l. Id. In interpreting said doctrine, this Circuit has held that "a government official has c o m m itte d a random and unauthorized act when he or she misapplies state law to deny an

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

12

in d iv id u a l the process due under a correct application of state law." Hadfield, 407 F.3d at 20. T h e underlying rationale behind this doctrine rests on the fact that a state cannot anticipate and c o n tro l the random and unauthorized negligent or intentional conduct of its employees. Hudson, 4 6 8 U.S. at 533. More so considering that "one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his p ro p e rty might well take affirmative steps to avoid signaling his intent." Id. The Hudson-Parratt doctrine has been applied in the public employment context. S p e c if ic a lly, the First Circuit stated that a plaintiffs' procedural due process claims fail when " s ta te law clearly provided for adequate notice and there was no suggestion that either by formal o r informal means the state had authorized the giving of inadequate notice to persons who may b e terminated, or that this was any form of regular practice," and proper post-deprivation re m e d ie s were provided. Hadfield v. Mc Donough, 407 F.3d 1 at 20. Wendel does not contest that he was informed about his right to appeal to the In v e stig a tio n , Processing and Appeal Committee (CIPA, for its Spanish acronym) in both the s u s p e n s io n , and the dismissal letters. Instead he argues that Toledo summarily suspended him in violation of the Personnel Regulations, intentionally deprived him of his right to a prete rm in a tio n hearing. As noted by this Circuit, "[i]n such situations, additional pre-deprivation s a f e g u a rd s would have little value in preventing an erroneous deprivation of the protected in te re s t." Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 193 (1st Cir. 2003). That is, in all likelihood, a pre-termination hearing would not have afforded Wendel the relief he sought. Thus c o n s id e rin g the above-cited case law, and that adequate post-deprivation remedies were a f f o rd e d to Wendel, his procedural due process claims fail. B ased on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. Supplemental State Law Claims

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC)

13

H a v in g dismissed Plaintiffs' federal law claims against Toledo, their state law claims a g a in s t said co-defendant are also dismissed. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st C ir. 1991) (holding that "[t]he power of a federal court to hear and to determine sate-law claims in non-diversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one `substantial' federal claim in th e lawsuit.") Conclusion F o r the reasons stated above, Toledo's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, a n d Plaintiffs' claims against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th day of December, 2009. S /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas S a lv a d o r E. Casellas U .S . District Judge