Delgado-Sanchez et al v. Toledo-Davila et al

Filing 72

OPINION AND ORDER. MOOT 30 MOTION reinstating Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint as Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint; GRANTED 42 MOTION to Alter Judgment Relief from Judgment; GRANTED 52 MOTION to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m ) as to John Doe, Jane Doe, Richard Roe, Peter Poe, Leonard Loe; GRANTED 53 MOTION for Judgment; GRANTED 56 MOTION to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) as to Morales. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 3/23/2009.(LB)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

W E N D E L DELGADO SANCHEZ, et al P la in tif f s v. Civil No. 07-1709 (SEC) P E D R O TOLEDO DAVILA, et al Defendants

O P I N I O N AND ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Judgment (Docket # 42), C o -d e f e n d a n ts Pedro Dávila Toledo ("Toledo"), Felícita Coriano Rivera ("Coriano"), Carlos S á n c h e z Ofaril ("Sanchez"), and Carlos Toledo Reyes' ("Toledo Reyes") (collectively " S u p e rv is o ry Defendants") Motion Reinstating Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 30), and Plaintiffs' o p p o s itio n thereto (Docket # 33). After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, Plaintiffs' m o tio n for relief from judgment is GRANTED, and Defendants' motion is MOOT. Factual and Procedural Background P la in tif f s seek relief for the damages suffered by Wendel Delgado Sánchez (hereinafter " W e n d e l" ), and Dwight Delgado Sánchez ("Dwight") as a result of the alleged illegal seizure, f a ls e arrest, imprisonment, and beating undertaken by members of the Puerto Rico Police D e p a rtm e n t. Plaintiffs' complaint is premised on Title 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, retaliation, the F o u rth , Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and s e v e ra l state laws.1 Plaintiffs brought this suit against Toledo, the Police Department S u p e r i n t e n d e n t; Francisco Carbó Marti, the Director of the drug and addictions control of P u e rto Rico; Coriano, Lieutenant of the Carolina Tactics Operation; Carlos Carrión Rodríguez,

The initial complaint was filed on August 8, 2007 (Docket # 1), and a first amended complaint was filed on August 15, 2007. Docket # 2. On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12.

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L ie u te n a n t of the Carolina Drug Division; Sanchez Ofaril, Supervisor of the Carolina Drug 3 D iv isio n ; agents José L. López Pagán, Endel Meléndez, Toledo Reyes, and Ernesto Santiago; 4 D ie g o Figueroa, President of the Frente Unido de Policías Organizados (hereinafter FUPO); and 5 s e v e ra l unnamed defendants. The facts of the instant case were set forth in this Court's July 30, 6 2 0 0 8 Opinion & Order (Docket # 40), and they are as follows. 7 W e n d e l worked for the Carolina Tactics Operation for over 4 years. During his 8 e m p lo ym e n t, Wendel never had an administrative complaint filed against him, nor was 9 s u s p e n d e d for wrong behavior as a police officer. His performance evaluations always scored 10 m o re than 50%. On August 9th , 2007, Wendel and his younger brother Dwight, went to visit a 11 f rie n d at Jardines de Carolina. After arriving at said location, and for no apparent reason, a 12 c o n tin g e n t of police officers, on information and belief, members of the Carolina's Drug 13 D iv isio n , entered and searched houses 20 and 21 of Jardines de Carolina. After searching the 14 h o u s e s , the police officers searched, beat, and arrested Wendel, and Dwight in front of their 15 f rie n d 's house, and in front of other people. The police officers also searched Wendel and 16 D w ig h t's vehicle, and nothing was found therein. 17 After the incident, the officers took Wendel and Dwight to the Carolina precinct where 18 th e y were incarcerated for more than 12 hours, and then released without any charges brought 19 a g a in st them. That same day Plaintiffs were shown in handcuffs on the local TV news channels. 20 T h e TV news alleged that they were involved with a drug dealer known as Coquito, who had 21 b e e n killed months before. The Puerto Rico Police Department requested an administrative 22 in v e stig a tio n against Wendel, and a hearing was held 6 months after the filing of the charges 23 a g a in st him. After the incident, Wendel was expelled from work without salary. 24 On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12. 25 D e f e n d a n ts moved this Court to strike Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, however, their 26

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re q u e st was denied. Docket # 26. On January 28, 2008, Defendants moved to dismiss the 3 c o m p la in t arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and 4 F o u rte e n th Amendments; (2) Michelle, Randal, and Randel lacked standing to sue under section 5 1 9 8 3 ; (3) they were entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 6 u n d e r section 1983. Carbó and Toledo also argued that there was respondeat superior liability 7 u n d e r section 1983, whereas Ofaril argued all the above defenses plus that all claims against 8 h im should be dismissed because he was on vacation during the time of the events alleged in 9 th e complaint. Docket # 20. In response to Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, Defendants 10 f ile d a "Motion Reinstating Motion to Dismiss" (Docket # 30), and reasserting the arguments 11 s e t forth in their prior motion to dismiss (Docket # 20). 12 In its prior Opinion & Order, this Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims 13 f e d e ra l claims against Toledo, as well as Plaintiffs' Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Amendment claims 14 a g a in st all Defendants. Docket # 40. On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff a motion requesting that this 15 C o u rt reconsider its prior holding, and reinstate all claims against Toledo. Docket # 42. 16 S p e c if ic a lly, Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in the second amended complaint are sufficient 17 to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 18 Standard of Review 19 F ED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) 20 R u le 59(e) allows a party, within ten (10) days of the entry of judgment, to file a motion 21 s e e k in g to alter or amend said judgment. The rule itself does not specify on what grounds the 22 re lie f sought may be granted, and courts have ample discretion in deciding whether to grant or 23 d e n y such a motion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1 st Cir. 2004) 24 (c ita tio n s omitted). In exercising that discretion, courts must balance the need for giving finality 25 to judgments with the need to render a just decision. Id. (citing Edward H. Bolin Co. v. 26

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B a n n in g Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)). Despite the lack of specific guidance by the rule 3 o n that point, the First Circuit has stated that a Rule 59(e) motion "must either clearly establish 4 a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence." F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., 5 In c ., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 6 1 2 6 8 (7th Cir. 1986)). Rule 59(e) may not, however, be used to raise arguments that could and 7 s h o u ld have been presented before judgment was entered, nor to advance new legal theories. 8 B o g o so n ia n v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 323 F.3d 55, 72 (1 st Cir. 2003). 9 A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis 10 In their motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiffs move this Court to reinstate all claims 11 a g a in st Toledo. Docket # 42. In support of their request, Plaintiffs argue that their second 12 a m e n d e d complaint includes specific allegations as to Toledo's alleged involvement in the facts 13 o f the instant case. Specifically, they argue that Toledo suspended Wendel the day after he was 14 a rre s te d and beaten, without due process of law and in violation of the Police Department's 15 ru le s and regulations. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that Toledo defamed Wendel when he 16 a p p e a re d on TV, and commented on Wendel's suspension. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo was 17 a w a re of the administrative complaints filed against the arresting officers, and failed to 18 a d e q u a te ly supervise, train, monitor and evaluate them. As such, they argue that Toledo tacitly 19 e n c o u ra g e d and condoned their behavior, and is responsible under the respondeat supervisor 20 d o c trin e . Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs aver that their allegations limn sufficient facts to 21 s u rv iv e a motion to dismiss at this stage of the proceedings. 22 In the Opinion and Order under reconsideration, this Court dismissed all claims against 23 T o le d o , finding that "the lack of specific allegations that link Toledo to the officers' 24 m a lf e a s a n c e impedes us to conclude that his conduct showed deliberate indifference for 25 26

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P la in tif f s ' constitutional rights as it is required to hold Toledo liable under section 1983." 2 3 D o c k e t # 40 at 11. 4 The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive 5 rig h ts , but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. 6 M .S . Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). There are two essential elements of a Section 1983 7 c la im : "(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; 8 a n d (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 9 U n ite d States." Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145 , 151-152 (2 n d Cir. 2006); Johnson 10 v . Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2005); Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1 st Cir. 1995) 11 (c itin g Chrongis v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1 st Cir. 1987)). This second prong has 12 tw o aspects: (1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected 13 rig h ts ; and (2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and 14 th e deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. See Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1 st 15 C ir. 1989); Mahoney, 424 F.3d at 89. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires 16 th a t the plaintiff establish that each defendant's own actions deprived the plaintiff of his/her 17 p ro te c te d rights, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978); Gutiérrez18 R o d ríg u e z , 882 F.2d at 562; Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1 st Cir. 1989). 19 F u rth e rm o re , the defendant's conduct must be shown to be intentional, grossly negligent, or 20 a m o u n te d to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 21 S im m o n s v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir. 1986); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. 22 23 24 25 26
This Court also held that Co-plaintiffs Michelle Collazo Díaz, Wendell's wife, and Wendel's sons, Randal Delgado Collazo, and Randel Delgado Collazo's lacked standing under Section 1983, and as a result, their claims were dismissed. See Docket # 40. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Fifth, Eight and Ninth Amendment claims were dismissed. Id.
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A s for supervisory liability in §1983 actions, the rule is that "supervisors may only be 3 f o u n d liable on the basis of their own acts or omissions." Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. 4 In order for a supervisor to be found liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that 5 th e supervisor's own acts or omissions deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right; 6 (2 ) that his "conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the 7 c o n s titu tio n a l rights of others;" and (3) that there was "an `affirmative link' between the street 8 le v e l misconduct and the action or inaction of supervisory officials." Id. 9 Although the allegations against Toledo may be less specific than those regarding the 10 a rre s tin g police defendants, they still survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In the 11 s e c o n d amended complaint, Plaintiffs aver that Toledo "knew or should have known and 12 id e n tif ie d the dangerous tendencies of (the arresting) police officers..." Docket # 12 at ¶ 29. 13 T h e y further allege that Toledo knew that said officers had received inadequate and deficient 14 tra in in g . Id. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo failed to properly train, monitor, supervise, and 15 e v a lu a te the arresting police officers. Id. Moreover, they contend that Toledo "knew or should 16 h a v e known the many administrative complaints filed against (the arresting officers)" for civil 17 rig h ts violations, and he failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or correct the officers' 18 im p ro p e r conduct. Docket # 12 at ¶ ¶ 29 & 30. As such, Plaintiffs argue that Toledo was grossly 19 n e g lig e n t in exercising his responsibilities and, as such, is responsible for the violation of 20 P la in tif f s ' civil rights. 21 Considering Rule 12(b)(6)'s mandate, and taking as true all of Plaintiffs' well-pleaded 22 f a c ts , this Court concludes that the second amended complaint "limns facts sufficient to justify 23 re c o v e ry on any cognizable theory." Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a viable Section 24 1 9 8 3 claim against Toledo. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment is 25 GRANTED. 26

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O n January 28, 2008, the Supervisory Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Docket # 20. 3 O n April 29, 2008, they also filed a motion reinstating the arguments set forth in their prior 4 m o tio n to dismiss. Docket # 30. On July 31, 2008, this Court ruled upon Supervisory 5 D e f e n d a n ts ' first motion to dismiss. Docket # 40. Insofar as the same arguments were raised in 6 b o th motions to dismiss, the Supervisory Defendants' motion reinstating motion to dismiss is 7 M OOT. 8 F in a lly, this Court reminds the parties that all representations to the court, submitted to 9 th e court through pleadings, motions, and any other document, are bound by FED. R. CIV. P. 10 1 1 (b )'s mandate. Therefore, all claims, defenses, and other legal arguments that are unwarranted 11 b y existing law, are, in fact, frivolous, and can be sanctioned by the courts. In the instant case, 12 b o th Plaintiffs and Defendants have set forth unwarranted legal arguments, insofar as the 13 c u rre n t case law is extremely clear as to the applicable statutes in cases such as this one. The 14 m e th o d ic inclusion of numerous allegations and defenses is unjustified, and unnecessarily 15 o n e ro u s for the courts. Therefore, the parties shall take the foregoing into consideration when 16 a p p e a rin g before this Court, or face the imposition of sanctions. 17 Conclusion 18 F o r the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment is GRANTED, 19 a n d Defendants' motion reinstating motion to dismiss is MOOT. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 20 c la im s against Toledo are reinstated. 21 I T IS SO ORDERED. 22 S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23rd day of March, 2009. 23 24 25 26 S /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas S a lv a d o r E. Casellas U .S . District Judge