Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz

Filing 353

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 344 Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on the Court's Rule 54(b) ruling is DENIED. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 01/20/2012. (brc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
EVELYN RAMIREZ-LLUVERAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 08-1486 (FAB)

v.
JAVIER PAGAN-CRUZ, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
On

January

12,

2012,

plaintiffs

filed

a

motion

for

reconsideration of the Court’s ruling denying its Rule 54(b)
request.

(Docket

No.

344.)

Defendants

promptly

filed

opposition to plaintiff’s motion on the following day.
No. 345.)

an

(Docket

For the reasons set forth, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’

motion.
Plaintiffs state that defendant Javier Pagan (“Pagan”) “was
found guilty at trial of the charge of murder”, “is in default in
the instant case”, and allege that he is collaterally estopped from
making any argument regarding “his use of excessive force and
unjustified use of deadly force.”

(Docket No. 344 at 1.)

It is

plaintiffs’ position that there is “absolutely no controversy” that
Pagan committed an underlying constitutional violation, and that,
therefore, the claims of supervisory liability may be considered
final and appealable, and that there is no just reason to delay
their appeal.

Id.

Plaintiffs raise this argument for the first

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

2

time in their motion for reconsideration, and do not deny that this
argument was never raised in their substantive motion for summary
judgment

or

in

their

initial

motion

for

Rule

54(b)

relief.

Moreover, plaintiffs’ two-page motion for reconsideration is void
of any citation to persuasive or controlling case law, nor do
plaintiffs submit the state court judgment finding defendant Pagan
guilty of murder.

As the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently

stated, “Judges are not mind-readers, so parties must spell out
their issues clearly, highlighting the relevant facts and analyzing
on-point authority.” Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659
F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011).
Defendants raise a number of procedural arguments regarding
the deficiencies in plaintiffs’ motion.

(Docket No. 345.)

First,

defendants correctly point out that plaintiffs’ failure to raise
the relevant claims in a timely manner results in a waiver of those
objections.

See DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 33 (1st

Cir. 2001).

Plaintiffs are not allowed “to introduce new evidence

or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to
the district court” prior to this Court’s initial order regarding
plaintiff’s motion for relief under Rule 54.
Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).

Aybar v. Crispin-

Plaintiffs do not attempt

to explain why this general principle should be set aside; the
Court finds that the arguments raised in plaintiffs’ motion for

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

3

reconsideration should have been raised in their initial motion and
are therefore deemed waived.
Second,

defendants

allege,

and

this

Court

agrees,

that

plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration contains no factual or legal
development explaining why this conviction against one of the field
officers compels a finding of collateral estoppel and thus warrants
granting plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 54 relief.

This Court will

not engage in the task of developing a factual record and fleshing
out legal argumentation - that is the responsibility of the party
requesting

relief.

The

First

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals

has

steadfastly held that where issues have been “adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation,

[they]

are

deemed

waived.”

United

States

v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
Third, even considering plaintiffs’ substantive arguments
regarding issue preclusion, the Court finds that plaintiffs have
not met the threshold showing necessary to assert a res judicata or
collateral

estoppel

defense.

Puerto

Rico

law

governs

the

preclusive effect of a judgment entered by a Puerto Rico court.
See Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party v. Dalmau, 544 F.3d 58, 69
(1st Cir. 2008).

Under Puerto Rico law, a party asserting a res

judicata (or collateral estoppel) defense must establish three
elements:

“(i) the existence of a prior judgment on the merits

that is ‘final and unappealable’; (ii) a perfect identity of thing

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

4

or cause between both actions; and (iii) a perfect identity of the
parties and the capacities in which they acted.”

Id.; see also

Baez-Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio, 140 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir.
1998).

Not

only

have

plaintiffs

failed

to

acknowledge

the

existence of these requirements, they have also failed to make the
required showing necessary to assert an issue preclusion defense.
See Dalmau, 544 F.3d at 70 (finding that the party asserting the
res judicata defense failed to make a threshold showing because the
party “did not put in the record a certified translation of any
aspect of the prior Puerto Rico court proceedings.”)
As a final matter, the Court finds that even if plaintiffs had
properly

asserted

their

collateral

estoppel

defense

against

defendant Pagan, which they have failed to do, they still have not
explained how it would affect the interrelatedness of the claims
analysis required to grant a Rule 54(b) motion.

As explained in

this Court’ initial order denying plaintiffs’ Rule 54(b) motion,
the Court must balance the following factors to determine whether
there

is

judgment:

a

persuasive

reason

for

delaying

entry

of

a

final

“(1) the interrelationship or overlap among the various

legal and factual issues involved in the dismissed and the pending
claims, and (2) any equities and efficiencies implicated by the
requested piecemeal review.”

(Docket No. 343 at 4.)

This Court

held that “[p]laintiffs’ claims against the supervisory defendants

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)
are

closely

officers.”

5

intertwined

with

their

claims

against

the

field

Id. at 6.

Plaintiffs currently have pending claims against all three
field officer defendants. Thus, even if plaintiffs had proven that
defendant

Pagan

had

committed

an

underlying

constitutional

violation, the claims against the other two field officers remain
to be decided.

In the event that those officers are not found

guilty of an underlying constitutional violation, plaintiffs may
choose to appeal, thus resulting in an unnecessary piecemeal review
of the individual field officer defendants’ liability.

Because

there still exists (a) significant factual overlap between the
field

officers’

liability

and

the

supervisory

defendants’

liability, and (b) pending claims against the other field officers’
liability before this Court, entering final judgment with respect
to defendant Pagan would result in the inefficient and scattered
disposition of litigation in this case. For the reasons explained,
plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration on the Court’s Rule 54(b)
ruling is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 20, 2012.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE