Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz

Filing 490

OPINION AND ORDER re 468 Motion to Dismiss and Motion for New Trial; re 469 Motion to Dismiss and Motion for New Trial. The Court DENIES defendant Carlos Sustache-Sustache's motion pursuant to Rule 50 and Rule 59, (Docket No. 468), and DENIES defendant Zulma Diaz's motion pursuant to Rule 50 and Rule 59, (Docket No. 469). Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 01/28/2013. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
EVELYN RAMIREZ-LLUVERAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL NO. 08-1486 (FAB)

JAVIER PAGAN-CRUZ, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
On November 9, 2012, after a 12-day trial, a jury rendered a
verdict in favor of all plaintiffs1 against defendants Carlos
Sustache-Sustache (“Sustache”), Zulma Diaz (“Diaz”), and Javier
Pagan-Cruz (“Pagan”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”)
and article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
31, § 5141 (“article 1802”).2
November 13, 2012.

1

The Court entered judgment on

(Docket No. 467.)

Plaintiffs in this case are the widow and children of Miguel

A. Cáceres (“Mr. Caceres”):
Evelyn Ramirez-Lluveras, Jenitza
Caceres, Michelle Caceres, and the minor child, known as M.A.C.
(Docket No. 64.)
2

The jury awarded $2 million to the estate of decedent Mr. Caceres;
$800,000 to plaintiff Evelyn Ramirez; $750,000 to plaintiff Jenitza
Caceres; $930,000 to plaintiff Michelle Caceres; $2 million to plaintiff
M.A.C.; and $5 million in punitive damages against defendant Pagan.
(Docket No. 464.)

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

2

Before the Court are the renewed3 motions for judgment as a
matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (“Rule
50”) of defendant Sustache, (Docket No. 468), and defendant Diaz,
(Docket No. 469).
pursuant to

Federal

Both defendants also request a new trial
Rule

(Docket Nos. 468 & 469.)
each motion.

of

Civil Procedure 59

(“Rule

59”).

Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition to

(See Docket Nos. 470 & 471.)

For the reasons that

follow, both defendant Sustache’s and defendant Diaz’s motions are
DENIED.
I.

RULE 50 STANDARD
Rule 50 allows a party during a jury trial to move the Court

for entry of judgment as a matter of law.

Such a motion may be

granted “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a
jury trial and the [C]ourt finds that a reasonable jury would not
have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party
on that issue . . . .”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).

If the Court denies

the motion, then “[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of
judgment . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for
a new trial under Rule 59.”

3

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).

On November 7, 2012, defendants Sustache and Diaz each presented
in open court a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. (Docket
No. 460.)
Although defendant Diaz also filed a written motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50, (Docket No. 458),
defendant Sustache did not file a motion in writing.

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

3

Because granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law
deprives the party opposing it of a determination by the jury, it
is to be granted cautiously and sparingly.

Rivera-Castillo v.

Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Even in the best
circumstance, the standards for granting a motion for judgment as
a matter of law are stringent.”); 9B Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2524 (3d ed. 2008).

A district court “may

only grant a judgment contravening a jury’s determination when ‘the
evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the
moving party that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict
adverse to that party.’”

Rivera-Castillo, 379 F.3d at 9 (quoting

Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 759–60 (1st
Cir. 1994)).
In reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
Court

“must

draw

all

reasonable

inferences

in

favor

of

the

nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000); see also White v. N.H. Dep’t. of Corrections, 221
F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2000).

The Court “should give credence to

the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached,
at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested
witnesses.”

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (citation omitted).

Pursuant

to Rule 50, therefore, defendants Sustache’s and Diaz’s “motion[s]

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)
for

judgment

cannot

be

4
granted

unless,

as

a

[plaintiffs have] failed to make a case . . . .”

matter

of

law,

Montgomery Ward

& Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Defendant Sustache
1.

Rule 50 Motion
Defendant Sustache first argues that plaintiffs

could not prevail as a matter of law on their section 1983 claim.4
He

contends

constitutional

that

he

right:

did

not

“There

deprive
was

no

Mr.

Caceres

agreement,

no

of

any

reckless

indifference, and no intention to violate any of Caceres’ rights.”
(Docket No. 468 at p. 4.)

“There is no evidence that defendant

Sustache acted voluntarily and deliberately, or with reckless
disregard for [Mr.] Caceres’ life during this incident.”

Id.

He

adds that he “did not have a realistic opportunity to stop the
shooting by defendant Pagan, . . . [and] his “omission, if any[,]
was caused by possible mistake, accident, negligence or other
innocent reason.”

4

Id.

To prevail on their section 1983 claim, plaintiffs had the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law;
(2) that the conduct deprived Mr. Caceres of rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and
(3) that one or more of the defendants’ acts were the proximate cause of
the injuries and consequent damages sustained by Mr. Caceres. (Docket
No. 463 at p. 21.)

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

5

Second, defendant Sustache argues that judgment as
a matter of law is warranted as to plaintiffs’ article 1802 claim.5
His argument rests on the contention that “[t]here is no proof of
negligence . . . since the surprising events took place in a matter
of

seconds,

making

foreseeability

practically

impossible.

[Defendant] Sustache did not cause nor did he contribute to the
damages in this case.”6
The

Id.

Court

finds

that

a

legally

sufficient

evidentiary basis existed for a reasonable jury to find defendant
Sustache liable under both section 1983 and article 1802.

In

support of their claims, plaintiffs submitted a video recording
depicting the events that led up to and included the shooting of
Mr. Caceres. The video captured in real time the various movements
of

Mr.

Caceres

and

defendant Sustache.

the

police

officers,

including

those

of

Plaintiffs also called numerous witnesses who

5

To prevail on their article 1802 claim, plaintiffs had the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that defendants
Sustache or Diaz committed an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence; (2) that the plaintiffs suffered injuries; and (3) that
defendants Sustache’s or Diaz’s act(s) or omission(s) were a proximate
cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. (Docket No. 468 at p. 37.)
6

Defendant
Sustache
also
references
a
“particular
jury
instruction,” the denial of which “played a role in the verdict rendered
. . . .” (Docket No. 468 at p. 4.) The Court has no frame of reference
in which to even begin addressing defendant Sustache’s insinuation that
the denial of a jury instruction improperly influenced the verdict. The
Court refuses “to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the
argument, and put flesh on its bones . . . . Judges are not expected to
be mind-readers.”
U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
Conclusory and woefully undeveloped, that argument is waived.
See
McDonough v. Donahoe, 673 F.3d 41, 49 n.14 (1st Cir. 2012).

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

6

testified as to the events and the actions of Mr. Caceres and the
officers—including those of defendant Sustache—at the scene.

In

addition, plaintiffs introduced into evidence defendant Diaz’s
deposition testimony and a Puerto Rico Police incident report, and
they called defendant Sustache to testify as an adverse witness.
They also submitted photographs of the plaintiffs with their
decedent,

Mr.

Caceres;

testimony

and

psychological

treatment

records regarding plaintiffs since Mr. Caceres’ death; and letters
and cards offering condolences to the plaintiffs after the family’s
loss.

Given such evidence, the Court does not find this to be a

case where a reasonable jury would have lacked a legally sufficient
evidentiary

basis

to

find

that

each

of

the

elements

of

a

section 1983 and an article 1802 claim were satisfied. (See Docket
Nos. 433, 438, 439, 440, 443–445, 460, & Trial Exhibits.)
In his Rule 50 motion, defendant Sustache offers his
own version of the facts, (see Docket No. 468 at pp. 2–3), and then
argues, “Given these facts, it is clear that [defendant] Sustache
did not . . . deprive [Mr.] Caceres of any right under the
Constitution.”

Id. at p. 3.

A Rule 50 motion requires the Court

to refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence, and yet that is precisely what defendant Sustache asks
the Court to do.

See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–52 (“Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

7

of a judge.”) (internal citation omitted). Simply because the jury
did not follow defendant Sustache’s preferred interpretation of the
evidence does not mean that a reasonable person could not have
reached the conclusion reflected in the verdict. The jury was free
to weigh the perceived credibility of the witnesses and credit or
discount their testimony accordingly.

See Aponte–Rivera v. DHL

Solutions (USA), Inc., 650 F.3d 803, 808–09 (1st Cir. 2011).

That

being the case, the Court declines to conclude that the jury did
not “have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find” that
plaintiffs failed to prove their claims by a preponderance of the
evidence.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).

Accordingly, defendant

Sustache’s Rule 50 motion is DENIED.
2.

Rule 59 Request
Defendant Sustache’s alternate request for a new

trial pursuant to Rule 59 suffers the same fate.

“[W]hen an

argument that the evidence was insufficient forms the basis of a
motion for new trial, the district court is generally well within
the bounds of its discretion in denying the motion using the same
reasoning as in its denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law.” Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing
review of Rule 50 and Rule 59 challenges based on insufficient
evidence

as

“essentially

coterminous”).

From

the

arguments

presented in defendant Sustache’s motion, there appears to be no
convincing basis upon which to conclude that “the motion was so

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

8

clearly against the weight of the evidence as to amount to a
manifest miscarriage of justice.”

See PH Group Ltd. v. Birch, 985

F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).

Much like defendant Sustache’s request for judgment as

a matter of law, his request for a new trial asks the Court to
invade the province of the jury and make credibility determinations
other than those supporting the verdict.

(See Docket No. 468.)

For the reasons expressed above, the Court declines to do so.
Accordingly, defendant Sustache’s motion, (Docket No. 468), is
DENIED.
B.

Defendant Diaz
1.

Rule 50 Motion
Defendant Diaz also seeks relief pursuant to Rule 50

as to plaintiffs’ section 1983 and article 1802 claims. First, she
contends that the section 1983 claim must fail because evidence
“never

was

presented

that

protocols and procedures.”

she

deviated

from

correct

(Docket No. 469 at p. 1.)

police

She argues

that she had probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest against
Mr. Caceres; that plaintiffs improperly alleged at trial that the
defendant officers failed to inform Mr. Caceres of the reason for
attempting to arrest him; that Mr. Caceres resisted arrest; that a
person

has

no

right

to

resist

an

arrest;

that

Mr.

Caceres’

resistance was an intervening factor between any act or omission of
defendant Diaz’s and Mr. Caceres’ death; and that plaintiffs

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)
improperly

argued

at

9
trial

that

Mr.

Caceres’

death

was

a

consequence of defendants’ failure to inform him as to the reason
for his arrest.

Id. at pp. 4–5.

Defendant Diaz also contends that

plaintiffs could not establish an excessive force claim against her
because “[t]here is no evidence that [defendant] Diaz engaged in
the use of excesive [sic] force.”
plaintiffs

prevail

on

a

failure

Id. at p. 6.
to

intervene

Nor could

claim,

because

plaintiffs “failed to present any evidence that support[s] their
allegation that [defendant] Diaz was in a position to intervene and
stop

Pagan,

[or]

that

she

had

a

realistic

opportunity

to

intervene[, . . . or that she had] the intentional failure to
intervene.”

Id. at p. 7.
Second, defendant Diaz contests plaintiffs’ article

1802

claim

because

“[t]he

evidence

support[s]

the

fact

that

defendant Diaz was not negligent and that there is no causal
[relation] between [Mr.] Caceres’ death and [defendant] Diaz’s
actions or omissions . . . .”

(Docket No. 469 at p. 9.)

She

argues that plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action
pursuant to article 1802 because “[i]t’s an uncontested fact that
[Mr.] Caceres resisted arrest.
subdue him.

Therefore, force was necessary to

There is no evidence that [defendant] Diaz used force

[or] that she was in [a position] to stop the use of force.”
at pp. 9–10.

Id.

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

10

For the same reasons it denies defendant Sustache’s
motion, the Court finds that defendant Diaz’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law must fail.

A legally sufficient evidentiary

basis existed for a reasonable jury to find defendant Diaz liable
under both section 1983 and article 1802.

Plaintiffs introduced a

video recording and called numerous witnesses at trial to testify
to the events and to the actions of the officers at the scene on
August 11, 2007.

A reasonable jury could have found in favor of

plaintiffs on both claims, given that evidence as well as defendant
Diaz’s own deposition testimony; the Puerto Rico Police incident
report; defendant
photographs,
letters.

Sustache’s

psychological

trial

testimony;

treatment

records,

and
and

plaintiffs’
condolence

The Court finds unavailing defendant Diaz’s claim that

there is “no evidence” demonstrating that she “engaged in the use
of exces[s]ive force,” id. at p.6; “was in a position to intervene
or stop Pagan,” id. at p.7; “had a realistic opportunity to
intervene,” id.; “intentional[ly] fail[ed] to intervene,” id.; was
negligent, id. at p. 9; “used force,” id.; “was in a position to
stop the use of force,” id.; or that there was “a causal relation
between [Mr.] Caceres’ death and [defendant] Diaz’s actions or
omissions,” id. at pp. 9–10.
Like defendant Sustache, defendant Diaz offers her
own version of the facts and disputes the jury’s verdict based on
that interpretation. (See Docket No. 469.) As the Court discussed

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

11

above, however, “the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts” are the province of the jury,
and simply

because

the

jury

did not

follow

defendant

Diaz’s

preferred interpretation of the evidence does not mean that a
reasonable jury could not have reached the conclusion ultimately
reflected in the verdict. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–52; see also
Docket Nos. 433, 438, 439, 440, 443–445, 460, & Trial Exhibits.
Because this is not a case where a reasonable jury would have
lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that the
elements

of

a

section

1983

and

an

article

1802

claim

were

satisfied, the Court DENIES defendant Diaz’s Rule 50 motion.
2.

Rule 59 Request
Finally, defendant Diaz seeks relief pursuant to

Rule 59 because the Court failed to instruct the jury “regarding
the fact that [Mr.] Caceres did [not have] a constitutional right
to resist arrest and that there is no constitutional right to be
informed of the reason of the arrest.”

(Docket No. 469 at p. 10.)

She argues that the Court erred in failing “to instruct the jury
regarding Rules 11, 13 and 16 of Puerto Rico’s Criminal Procedure,”
and

that

the

denial

of

those

instructions

“was

detrimental,

damaging and wrongfully harmful[] to defendant [Diaz’s] rights.”
Id.
Defendant Diaz misconstrues the elements that were
required to establish plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against her.

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

12

To support her argument, defendant Diaz cites to Santana v. United
States, 919 F. Supp. 558, 564 (D.P.R. 1996), a case in which
another judge in this district analyzed claims for malicious
prosecution,

false

tortious conduct.

arrest/illegal

deprivation

of

liberty,

and

The causes of action in Santana were brought

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act and specifically required
that the

claims

“be

examined

Santana, 919 F. Supp. at 562.

according

to Puerto

Rico

law.”

Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, to

the contrary, rest on a section 1983 analysis, and section 1983
“creates a private right of action for violations of federally
protected rights.” Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).

Instructing the jury as to Puerto

Rico law, therefore, would have been inappropriate and erroneous.
Moreover, section 1983 does not require an instruction as to the
absence of constitutional rights—to have instructed the jury that
Mr. Caceres “did not ha[ve] a constitutional right to resist arrest
and that there is no constitutional right to be informed of the
reason of the arrest” would have been irrelevant to the elements of
a section 1983 claim, and, thus, improper.

Because the Court

instructed the jury as to the elements of a section 1983 claim,7 it
7

The Court instructed the jury that in their section 1983 claim,
plaintiffs allege that defendants Sustache and Diaz “subjected Mr.
Caceres to deprivation of his rights by: first, attempting to arrest Mr.
Caceres without probable cause; or second, failing to intervene to
prevent or stop the use of excessive force against Mr. Caceres.” (Docket
No. 463 at p. 29.) It then instructed the jury as to probable cause,
(id. at pp. 30–31); excessive force, id. at p. 32-34; and failure to
intervene, id. at pp. 35–36.

Civil No. 08-1486 (FAB)

13

was not erroneous to deny defendant Diaz’s request for instructions
regarding (1) the laws of Puerto Rico and (2) the absence of
constitutional rights to resist arrest or be informed of the
reasons for an arrest.

Accordingly, defendant Diaz’s Rule 59

motion for a new trial is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES defendant
Carlos Sustache-Sustache’s motion pursuant to Rule 50 and Rule 59,
(Docket No. 468), and DENIES defendant Zulma Diaz’s motion pursuant
to Rule 50 and Rule 59, (Docket No. 469).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 28, 2013.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE