Rivera-Carrion v. United States of America, et al

Filing 107

OPINION & ORDER denying 75 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 7/9/2009. (THD)

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO G L A D Y S RIVERA CARRION, et. al. Plaintiffs v. U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA, et. al. Defendants C iv il No. 08-1498 (SEC)

Opinion & Order P e n d in g before this Court is Co-Defendants Maximino Miranda, Jane Doe, and the C o n ju g a l Partnership Miranda-Doe's (collectively "Miranda") Motion to Dismiss for lack of s u b je c t matter jurisdiction (Docket # 75), and Plaintiffs opposition thereto (Docket # 84). After re v iew in g the filings, their exhibits, and the applicable law, Miranda's motion to dismiss is D E N IE D . F a c tu a l and Procedural Background T h e present lawsuit was brought by Co-plaintiff Betsy Roman-Rivera ("Roman"), a m in o r represented by her mother Gladys Rivera-Carrion (hereinafter "Rivera"), for medical m a lp ra c tic e against Miranda, Gurabo Community Health Center (hereinafter "GCHC"), and the U n ite d States of America ("United States"). The original complaint also included various other p a rtie s for whom the claims against them have since been dismissed. See Dockets ## 54 & 58. R o m an received medical treatment at GCHC between the years 2000 and 2005 for a g ro w th on her leg. See Docket # 27-2, Exh. 1. Plaintiffs allege that this treatment was negligent, a n d that it lead to Roman having a large portion of her calf removed. Plaintiffs also allege that th e y were only alerted to the fact that Roman had been subject to negligent medical treatment o n May 24, 2005, after a consultation with a doctor not associated with GCHC. See Docket # 1 at 5. On January 1, 2004, during the time Roman was a patient of GCHC, the clinic gained

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m a lp ra c tic e coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. S e e Docket # 75 at 4. Accordingly, this Court has federal question jurisdiction over the present a c tio n for all claims after January 1, 2004. Plaintiffs have also brought claims under the C o m m o n w e a lth of Puerto Rico's general tort statutes, Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto R ic o Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141 & 5142, against GCHC and Miranda for a lle g e d malpractice occurring before 2004. Responding to the Article 1802 claims, Miranda has brought the present motion to d ism iss alleging that the lack of a federal question claim before 2004 bars any Commonwealth la w claims from preceding years. To defend this assertion, Miranda offers the following s yl l o g i s m : T h e only cause of action, as claimed by plaintiff, against Miranda arises from s ta te law, specifically under Article 1802 of the Civil Code. This cause of action ca n n o t, by itself, create federal jurisdiction between plaintiffs and Miranda. In o rd e r to prevail, plaintiff has to assert and prove that during Miranda's in te rv e n tio n with Roman, the FTCA is applicable. Nevertheless, the Department o f Health and Human Services has certified that the GCHC was not eligible for fu n d s from the FTCA. Consequently, said legislation is inapplicable for the years 2 0 0 1 and 2002, thus there is no federal question that can be asserted for those ye a r s . If there is no federal question that can establish federal jurisdiction and th ere is no diversity among parties, there is no jurisdiction regarding Miranda's c a u s e that could only be asserted at State Court. See Docket # 75 at 5. Plaintiffs have opposed this conclusion, arguing that this Court does e n t e r t a i n jurisdiction over the claims against Miranda because they arise from the same tre a tm e n t continuum, and are thus covered by supplemental jurisdiction. Standard of Review F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for challenging a court's subject matter ju risd ictio n . Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001). Under this ru le , a wide variety of challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted,

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a m o n g them those based on sovereign immunity, ripeness, mootness, and the existence of a f e d era l question. Id. (citations omitted). When faced with a similar jurisdictional challenge, th is Court must ". . . give weight to the well-pleaded factual averments in the operative p le a d in g s [. . .] and indulge every reasonable inference in the pleader's favor." Aguilar v. U.S. I m m ig r a tio n and Customs Enforcement Div. of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st C ir .2 0 0 7 ). A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has the b u rd e n to demonstrate that such jurisdiction exists. See Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F . Supp. 32, 33 (D. Me. 1992); see also SURCCO V. PRASA, 157 F. Supp. 2d 160, 163 (D. P .R . 2001). However, in order for a plaintiff's claim to be dismissed for lack of subject matter ju r is d ic tio n , due to the inadequacy of the plaintiff's federal claim, that claim must be ". . . so in su b sta n tial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely d e v o id of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. C o u n ty of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). In this context, this Court is empowered to resolve f a ctu a l disputes by making reference to evidence in the record beyond the plaintiff's allegations w ith o u t having to convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Lord, 789 F . Supp. at 33 (D. Me. 1992); see also SURCCO, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 163. "Where a party c h a lle n g e s the accuracy of the pleaded jurisdictional facts, the court may conduct a broad in q u iry, taking evidence and making findings of fact." Hernández-Santiago v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F . 3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005). Therefore, the court may consider extrinsic materials, "and, to the e x te n t it engages in jurisdictional fact-finding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiff's a lleg a tio n s." Dynamic, 221 F. 3d at 38. That is, the principle of conversion of a motion to d is m is s into a motion for summary judgment when extrinsic materials are reviewed, does not a p p ly in regards to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

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CIVIL NO. 08-1498 (SEC) A p p lica b le Law and Analysis

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The question before this Court is whether supplemental federal jurisdiction should apply to Plaintiffs' pre-2004 claims. Federal courts have exercised some form of supplemental jurisd ictio n since the early 19 th Century. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 W h e a t.) 738, 823 (1824). With regards to pendant party jurisdiction, the Congress has stated t h a t it "shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." 28 U .S .C . § 1367(a). This language originates from 1990 Congressional legislation that superseded F in le y v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1989), a case that h a d rejected pendant party jurisdiction. Alvarez Torres v. Hosp. Ryder Mem., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2 d 38, 41 (D.P.R. 2004). Accordingly, the abovementioned policy in § 1367(a) aims ". . . to p e rm it a case ­ one common nucleus of operative facts ­ to be tried in a single court[,]" and th u s avoid having to bring suit in two different forums. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal J u ris d ic tio n 351 (5th ed. 2007). Circuit courts have stated that "[t]he question under section 1 3 6 7 (a ) is whether the supplemental claims are so related to the original claims that they form p a rt of the same case or controversy, or in other words, that they `derive from a common n u c le u s of operative fact.'" Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing U n ite d Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1 9 6 6 )) . In the present lawsuit, the federal and state are facially related to the same core factual

22 is s u e s, which involve possible medical malpractice at GCHC between the years 2000 and 2006. 23 P la in tif f s claim that, throughout the treatment continuum, Roman's treating physicians acted 24 n e g lig e n tly in both the diagnosis and care offered, leading to the permanent mutilation of her 25 c a lf area. Given that Plaintiffs theory involves intertwining allegations of treatment from various 26 d o c to rs , during several years, should medical negligence be found, it is highly probable that

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G C H C , Miranda, and the United States would be found jointly and severally liable. Therefore, th is Court concludes that Plaintiffs Article 1802 and FTCA claims originate from a common n u c leu s of operative facts, and splitting the causes of action would do nothing to promote ju d ic ia l efficiency or the interests of justice. In light of the above, this Court finds that supplemental, or pendant party, federal

8 ju ris d ic tio n exists over Plaintiffs' pre-2004 claims against GCHC and Miranda. Accordingly, 9 th e motion to dismiss is DENIED. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of July, 2009. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U n ite d States District Judge