Santiago et al v. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al

Filing 106

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 96 MOTION for Reconsideration re 93 Opinion and Order; DENYING 105 MOTION for Extension of Time until 12/17/09 to File Response/Reply as to 96 MOTION for Reconsideration. We order partial summary judgment in favor o f Defendants Guillermo Cotto, Luz Oyola, and the conjugal partnership between them on all federal claims. We dismiss all federal claims against Defendants Guillermo Cotto, Luz Oyola, and the conjugal partnership between them (Docket No. 20 ) with pr ejudice, and all claims against them under Puerto Rico law without prejudice. We amend our Opinion and Order dated November 12, 2009 (Docket No. 93 ), to retain Plaintiffs' claim against the Commonwealth under Title IX only.Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 12/10/09.(mrj)

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U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO J E R A L IN E SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. C O M M O N W E A L T H OF PUERTO RICO, e t al., D e f e n d a n ts .

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ORDER O n November 12, 2009, we issued an Opinion and Order denying the motion to dismiss f ile d by Defendants Guillermo Cotto, Luz Oyola, and the conjugal partnership between them ( " M o v a n t s" ) ; dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the Commonwealth; and ordering Plaintiffs to show cause as to why we should not grant sua-sponte summary judgment for Movants on all fe d era l claims. (Docket No. 93.) Plaintiffs filed dual motions in compliance and for

re c o n sid e ra tio n on November 20 (Docket No. 96); Movants responded on December 4 (Docket N o . 102). Movants also sought reconsideration of our Opinion and Order on November 24. (D o c k e t No. 97.) We address in turn Plaintiffs' arguments against summary judgment and the tw o motions for reconsideration.

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In answering our order to show cause, Plaintiffs do not contest our determination that M o v a n ts cannot be held liable under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX " ), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.1 (Docket No. 96.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Movants are sta te actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that we should not apply the Third Circuit p re c ed e n t in Black v. Indiana Area School District, 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993), to deny relief in this case. (Docket No. 96.) The Black court held that private school bus operators may not b e held liable under § 1983, because the carriage of schoolchildren to school is not a traditional p u b lic function. 985 F.2d at 710-11. P la in tif f s' principal contention is that Black is distinguishable as it involved the c o n v e ya n c e of average school pupils, whereas the public contract for transportation in the instan t case stems from a legislative mandate to provide carriage to disabled children. (Id.) P la in tif f s characterize this provision of transportation as both a non-delegable duty of the Puerto R ico Department of Education and a right granted to disabled schoolchildren by statute. (Id.) P la in tif f s draw our attention to the fact that the Department is required to furnish such services, u n lik e Black, where there was no express legal requirement to transport schoolchildren. (Id.) T h e proper focus of our inquiry under Black, however, is not the legislative mandate im p o s e d upon state agencies, but rather the nature of the service provided. See 985 F.2d at 710. " [ T ]h e function performed must have been `traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the

We agree with Plaintiffs that their amended complaint did not accuse Movants of violating Title IX (Docket No. 96). Nevertheless, the parties constructively pleaded the issue into this case (Docket No. 93).

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S ta te .' " Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)). The purpose of this te st is to prevent states from abdicating their constitutional responsibilities by delegating tra d itio n a l governmental roles to private parties. Barrios-Velázquez v. Asociación de

E m p l e a d o s , 84 F.3d 487, 493-94 (1st Cir. 1996). In Black, the Third Circuit held that the state's u s e of private contractors to provide school buses was not delegation of a traditional public f u n c tio n . 985 F.2d at 710-11. W e find the present case indistinguishable from Black. Movants' transportation of c h ild re n to school did not supplant a traditionally-exclusive governmental prerogative. Even if the Department was under a legislative mandate to supply disabled children with carriage, P la in tif f s remained free at all times to arrange for alternate conveyance.2 Indeed, even a law f o rc in g parents to send their children on school buses would not transform the transportation o f pupils into a traditional governmental function. F u rth erm o re, Plaintiffs do not contend that Commonwealth regulations required Movants to employ the alleged child molester, or that Movants were entangled in a close relationship w ith the Commonwealth such that Movants' business could not function on its own.3 (Docket N o . 96.) The First Circuit test for state action by private persons encompasses two additional
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To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on the legislative mandate to refute our public-function analysis, Plaintiffs confuse their statutory entitlement for a compulsory requirement to use public services. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Black on a further ground that is separate from its discussion of traditional governmental function. (Docket No. 96.) Black held that state laws compelling school attendance did not create an affirmative duty for school officials to monitor schoolchildren on buses, because parents could send their children to school themselves. 985 F.2d at 714. This matter does not concern us, as Movants are not state actors and, hence, are not susceptible to any heightened duties under § 1983, whether or not they exist.
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p r o n g s besides traditional public functions: The existence of a financial or regulatory nexus b e tw e e n the state and the defendant that compelled the alleged misconduct, or a symbiotic re l a t io n s h ip between the state and the defendant that is characterized by interdependence. B a r rio s - V e lá z q u e z , 84 F.3d at 493-95. Because neither situation appears in this case, Plaintiffs a re bereft of grounds to charge Movants as state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.; cf. B la c k , 985 F.2d at 710-11. As we are satisfied that Plaintiffs may assert no federal claims ag ains t Movants as a matter of law, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over P la in tif f s ' associated claims against Movants under Puerto Rico law. § 1367(c)(3); Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 1992). P la i n t i f f s also seek reconsideration of our dismissal of their claims against the C o m m o n w e a lth on the grounds that their amended complaint included a claim under Title IX.4 (D o c k e t No. 96.) In ordering dismissal pursuant to the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment im m u n ity, we construed Plaintiffs' amended complaint to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a vehicle for red ressin g the Commonwealth's alleged Title IX violation. (Docket No. 93.) W e agree with Plaintiffs that their amended complaint also plausibly asserts a claim a g a in s t the Commonwealth under Title IX itself. (See Docket No. 20.) Private litigants may s u e public entities for alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. See 28 U.S.C.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), we entertain motions for reconsideration to (1) correct manifest errors of law or fact, (2) consider newly-discovered evidence, (3) incorporate an intervening change in the law, or (4) otherwise prevent manifest injustice. See Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing 11 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).

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§ 1681(a); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 796 (2009). Congress has e x p re ss ly waived Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX as a condition for federal e d u c atio n a l funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a); see Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 485 F .3 d 5, 9 n.5 (1st Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs may, therefore, proceed on their Title IX claim against th e Commonwealth. L a s t l y, Movants move separately for reconsideration of our denial of their motion to d is m is s . (Docket No. 97.) Because no claims remain against Movants, their petition is moot. In view of the foregoing, we hereby ORDER partial summary judgment in favor of M o v a n t s on all federal claims; GRANT Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 96); a n d DENY as MOOT Movants' motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 97). W e DISMISS all federal claims against Movants (Docket No. 20) WITH PREJUDICE an d all claims against Movants under Puerto Rico law (id.) WITHOUT PREJUDICE. W e AMEND our Opinion and Order dated November 12, 2009 (Docket No. 93), to R E T A I N Plaintiffs' claim against the Commonwealth under Title IX only (Docket No. 20). I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 10 th day of December, 2009. S /J o s é Antonio Fusté J O S E ANTONIO FUSTE C h ie f U.S. District Judge