Rivera-Colon et al v. Toledo-Davila et al

Filing 165

ORDER granting 154 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 6/28/2010. (THD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

E V E L Y N RIVERA-COLON, et al P la in tif f s v. Civil No. 08-1590 (SEC) P E D R O TOLEDO-DAVILA, et al D e f e n d a n ts

O P I N IO N and ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration (Docket # 154), which Defendants have not opposed. After considering the pleadings, and the legal arguments c o n ta in e d therein, the motion for reconsideration shall be GRANTED. Factual Background T h e facts giving rise to the present action are spelled out in this Court's Opinion & Order (D o c k e t # 152) of March 24, 2010. On said date, this Court dismissed claims made by Plaintiffs a g a in st supervisory Co-defendants Pedro Toledo-Davila ("Toledo") and Wally Matos (" M a to s " ). Plaintiffs claims for false arrest were also dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the present, unopposed, motion for reconsideration was filed. It argues th a t the Opinion & Order was too strict in its application of the failure to state a claim standard ( u n d e r Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) to Plaintiffs' claims of supervisory liability and false arrest. F u rth e rm o re , Plaintiffs allege that evidence from depositions taken after the motions were pled shows that Toledo and Matos were aware of allegations of police brutality in Villa Cañona d u rin g the period relevant to this suit. Plaintiffs argue that this newly introduced evidence from th e discovery process warrants reconsideration of the dismissal of their claims against Toledo a n d Matos. Both of these arguments will be considered in turn.

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3 F ED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) allows a party, within ten (10) days of the entry of judgment, to file 4 a motion seeking to alter or amend said judgment. The rule itself does not specify on what 5 g ro u n d s the relief sought may be granted, and courts have ample discretion in deciding whether 6 to grant or deny such a motion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1 st 7 C ir. 2004) (citations omitted). In exercising that discretion, courts must balance the need for 8 g iv in g finality to judgments with the need to render a just decision. Id. (citing Edward H. Bolin 9 C o . v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5 th Cir. 1993)). 10 D e s p ite the lack of specific guidance by the rule on that point, the First Circuit has stated 11 th a t a Rule 59(e) motion "must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present 12 n e w ly discovered evidence." F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1 st Cir. 1992) 13 (c itin g Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7 th Cir. 1986)). Rule 59(e) may 14 n o t, however, be used to raise arguments that could and should have been presented before 15 ju d g m e n t was entered, nor to advance new legal theories. Bogosonian v. Woloohojian Realty 16 C o rp ., 323 F.3d 55, 72 (1 st Cir. 2003). 17 A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis 18 T o le d o and Matos Supervisory Liability 19 T h is Court dismissed claims for supervisory liability against Toledo and Matos on the 20 p re m is e that Plaintiffs' pleadings failed to establish a sufficient link between the 21 a f o re m e n tio n e d police officials and the alleged civil rights violations. See Docket # 152 at 6-8. 22 P la in tif f s now ask for reconsideration of said ruling, and in doing so proffer new evidence from 23 d e p o s itio n s where Toledo and Matos admitted to having had knowledge of complaints of police 24 a b u s e in Villa Cañona during the relevant period. See Dockets ## 154-2 at 120 & 154-3 at 36. 25 26

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O n reconsideration, it appears that Toledo and Matos' declarations suggest that they were 3 a w a re of the general background of events in Villa Cañona and that they were consulted 4 re g a rd in g the same. As stated in this Court's previous Opinion & Order, supervisory 5 re sp o n s ib ility can only constitute a claim under Section 1983 if "(1) the behavior of [his] 6 s u b o rd in a te s results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]'s action or inaction 7 w a s affirmative[ly] link[ed] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as 8 s u p e rv is o ry encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to 9 d e lib e ra te indifference." Pineda v. Toorney, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)(citing Lipsett v. 10 U n iv e rs ity of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988)). Encouragement, condonation, 11 o r acquiescence can be shown in situations where, a supervisor was aware of the risk of 12 c o n s titu tio n a l violations, but conscientiously took no acts to remediate 13 Rodriguez-Rivero v. Toledo-Davila, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102885 (D.P.R. 2009). 14 In dismissing claims against Toledo and Matos, this Court concluded that the pleadings 15 h a d not plausibly linked the pair as having any knowledge or supervisory involvement with the 16 e v e n ts giving rise to this complaint. Accordingly, this Court found that the claims against 17 T o le d o and Matos had not risen above the speculative level, as required in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 18 1 2 9 S. Ct. 1937, 1960, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). At said juncture, the depositions were not 19 in c lu d e d in the pleadings,1 and did not factor into the previous ruling. 20 T h e depositions appear to contradict Defendants' prior theory that Toledo and Matos 21 w e re not familiar with the events occurring in Villa Cañona. Furthermore, their 22 a c k n o w le d g m e n t of at minimum tangential knowledge of risks of constitutional violations 23 c le a rly suggests that Plaintiffs' case for supervisory liability is more than merely speculative. 24 25
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the situation.

D e fe n d a n ts have not opposed their present inclusion.

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T h is matter is far from resolved, but must be reserved for summary judgment pleadings or trial. 3 A c c o rd in g ly, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on these grounds is GRANTED, and those 4 c la im s against Toledo and Matos dismissed on the basis of supervisory liability shall be 5 r e in s ta te d . 6 Forth Amendment False Arrest 7 Plaintiffs allege that this Court erred in concluding that they were not subject to 8 g o v e r n m e n t seizure of their personal liberty sufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment's 9 p ro te c tio n s against false arrest and detention. Seizure or restraint under the fourth amendment 10 re q u ire s something more than a consensual encounter. The Supreme Court has established that, 11 " [ o ]n ly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 12 re s tra in e d the liberty of a citizen may [the courts] conclude that a `seizure' has occured." Terry 13 v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 14 Case law after Terry has refined this concept, punctualizing that "[w]hen compliance with 15 a [police] request is required, the request is more accurately described as a demand." U.S. v. 16 V e la z c o -D u ra z o , 372 F.Supp. 2d 520, 525 (D. Ariz. 2005). This is contrasted with voluntary 17 c o o p e ra tiv e questioning, which is not considered a seizure. U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 18 (2 0 0 2 ). Accordingly, the necessary question in determining whether an illegal seizure has taken 19 p la c e is if it is somehow coercive or confrontational. The use of force is oftentimes indicative 20 o f this, because it implies an officer intentionally restricted a citizen's freedom of movement, 21 b u t a totality of the circumstances test prevails. 22 c irc u m s ta n c e s where Plaintiffs allege they were detained and subjected to the use of coercive 23 p o lic e force. 24 On reconsideration, this Court concludes that the pleadings allow for an inference that 25 Plaintiffs were subject to an unreasonable seizure, and that their privacy rights protected by the 26 The case at bar involves a variety of

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F o u rth Amendment were potentially violated. This issue therefore may not be disposed of at the 3 p le a d in g s stage as it requires evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the events. 4 Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on this point of law is GRANTED. 5 Conclusion 6 F o r the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. 7 T o le d o and Matos shall once again be added as Defendants in the above captioned case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 28th day of June, 2010. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 s /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge