Martinez-Rodriguez v. Matias et al

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER. After considering the parties filings and the applicable law, Petitioners motion 2 is hereby DENIED, and the Governments motion to dismiss 12 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 3/26/2009.(THD)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO A L E X MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ * * P e t i t io n e r * * v. * * J U D IT H MATIAS-DE-LEON, et al * * R e sp o n d e n t * **********************************

Criminal No. 08-1598(SEC)

O P I N IO N AND ORDER B e f o re the Court is Petitioner Alex Martinez-Rodriguez's request for a writ of habeas c o rp u s . (Docket # 2), and co-respondents Judith Matias and Roberto Sanchez's ("the G o v e rn m e n t" ) motion to dismiss and opposition thereto (Docket # 12). After considering the p a rtie s ' filings and the applicable law, Petitioner's motion (Docket # 2) is hereby DENIED, a n d the Government's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. P e titio n e r, Alex Martinez-Rodriguez was convicted in state court for first degree m u rd e r, attempted murder, violations of the Commonwealth's firearms law, and aggravate b u rg la ry. See Docket # 6 at 2. Petitioner filed the instant motion, pro se, arguing that his s e n te n c e is unconstitutional, in violation of Articles IV, V, and VI of the United States C o n stitu tio n , because of alleged irregularities in the jury venire and his attorney's failure to a f f o rd him effective counsel. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1 9 9 6 ("AEDPA"), a federal court "may not disturb the state court's conclusion unless the `a d ju d ic a tio n of [the] claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an u n re a s o n a b le application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme C o u rt of the United States.'" Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 573 (1st Cir. 2007)(citing 2 8 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). An unreasonable application of federal law occurs when a state c o u rt "arrives at a conclusion opposite from that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court . . ." e ith e r on a question of law or materially indistinguishable facts, or if the state court properly id e n tifie s the correct legal principles but nevertheless, "(i) applies those principles to the facts

2 o f the case in an objectively unreasonable manner; (ii) unreasonably extends clearly e sta b lish e d legal principles to a new context where they should not apply; or (iii) u n re a so n a b ly refuses to extend established principles to a new context where they should a p p ly." Sleeper v. Spencer, 510 F.3d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2007). A second ground available is if the state court's decision ". . . was based on an u n rea so n ab le determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court p ro c e e d i n g . " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). While reviewing a case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a f e d era l court must operate with a presumption that the state court's decision was correct, and " th e habeas petitioner may defeat the presumption of correctness only with clear and co n v in c in g evidence to the contrary." Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002); S le e p e r, 510 F.3d at 38. Moreover, ". . .an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires both deficient p e rf o rm a n ce and prejudice." See Sleeper, id; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 6 6 8 , 690-694(1984). This must be proven within the context of a highly deferential review, w h ic h inquires into whether or not counsel's actions were objectively reasonable given the c irc u m sta n c e s. Accordingly, the petitioner must show that but for counsel's objectively u n re a s o n a b le error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 39. Applicable Law & Analysis Petitioner has emphatically expressed his counsel's failure to afford him effective re p re se n t atio n . However, he only identifies two areas of his counsel's supposed sh o rtco m in g s: 1) failure to oppose the selection of an allegedly illegal jury, and 2) the failure to file the appropriate appeals. Jury Selection With regards to the selection of the jury, Petitioner states: ". . . out of 98 members of

3 the jury panel, only 54 came in, 6 were excused." Docket # 6 at 3 1 . However, he does not a v e r that this alleged irregularity caused any specific prejudice, such as racial discrimination, o r other bias amongst the jurors, nor that the jurors were selected from a certain swath of P u e rto Rico society, and, thus, did not represent a fair sample of his peers. Furthermore, the S u p r e m e Court of Puerto Rico has clearly established that even the nonobservance of the G u id e lin e s for the selection of the list of jurors " . . . does not warrant a reversal unless it is sh o w n that such departure was deliberate and intended to prejudice the defendant, or that it w as fraudulent." Pueblo v. Laboy, 110 P.R. Dec. 164, 10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 208 (1980).

R u le 103 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the attendance of the n u m b e r of jurors deemed necessary. Id. It states: Whenever the criminal matters of a part of the Court of First Instance require th e attendance of a trial jury, the court shall render an order directing the a p p e ara n c e of the number of jurors it may deem necessary wand whose names s h a ll be drawn. P .R . Laws Ann. tit. 34, App. II R. 103. The plain text of this rule shows that it leaves the u ltim a te decision as to the number of jurors in the panel in the discretion of the trial court. A c c o rd in g ly, in the absence of allegations that this ". . . had the effect of discriminating a g a in s t or excluding a determined group of persons and thus diminish the possibility of a c h ie v in g a cross section of the community, we cannot conclude that the constitutional right o f the defendant to a trial by jury was violated." Laboy, 10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 208. In the p re se n t case, the text of the rule does not favor Petitioner's allegations, and his failure to a lle g e any specific bias in the selection of the venire, or grounds for believing said bias might h av e existed, means that his assertions do not hold water. Finally, the alleged original venire
1

He further states that, "[t]he 6th Amendment Constitutional rights violation consist such as when the Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico Prosecutor and the Puerto Rico Superior Court of M a ya g u e z in clear violation of the Puerto Rico Criminal R u le s and Procedures, and the selection of jury members were violated, infected and was not fair and impartial thing that in c u r in a fundamental error and violation to such constitutional right and guarantee that should assist the plaintiff were v io la t e d to the exremes that is cause prejudice damage, and secure and obtain a criminal conviction for the C o m m o n w e a lth of Puerto Rico. . ."

4 Civil No. 08-1598(SEC) ________________________________________________________________________ o f 54 would appear reasonable to this Court. A d e q u a te Representation in the Appeals Process A d d itio n a l to his argument based on the jury selection process, Petitioner also alleges th a t, ". . . during appeals matters [the] attorney did not file the appropriate certiorari writ and th e habeas corpus filed . . was not the correct legal writ to be used an counsel failed to in c lu d e several issues before the courts." Docket # 13 at 4. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not id e n tif ie d a single one of the "several issues" his counsel failed to argue. He has also failed to coherently explain his counsel's actions during the appeals process, or proffer any a rg u m e n t as to why his counsel's alleged actions might have prejudiced him. Furthermore, h e has not averred any grounds upon which his original sentence was erroneous, and that w o u ld have permitted overturning his sentence upon appeal. None of his allegations place th is Court in a position to find that Petitioner's attorney gave him objectively unreasonable co u n sel and that, if true, they would undermine confidence in the outcome of the state court p re c e d in g . Sleeper, 510 F.3d at 39. Piecemeal Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court will GRANT the Commonwealth's m o tio n to dismiss. Petitioner's motion is accordingly DENIED, and this case is

D I S M I S S E D . Judgment is hereby entered accordingly. SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 26th day of March, 2009.

S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U n ite d States District Judge