Candelario-Del Moral v. UBS Financial Services Incorporated of Puerto Rico

Filing 226

OPINION AND ORDER. DENIED 212 MOTION for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 6/11/2013.(AVB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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MADELEINE CANDELARIO-DEL
MORAL,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 08-1833 (SEC)
v.
UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES
INCORPORATED OF PUERTO RICO,
Defendant.

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OPINION AND ORDER

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Before the Court are putative intervenor David Efron’s motion for reconsideration

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(Docket # 212), and the parties’ responses thereto (Dockets # 218 & 225). After reviewing the

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filings and the applicable law, Efron’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

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Factual and Procedural Background

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On April 29, 2013, the Court denied Efron’s motion to intervene under Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) (intervention as of right). Candelario v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No.

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08-1833, 2013 WL 1791024 (D.P.R. Apr. 29, 2013) (to be published in F.R.D.). In a nutshell,

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the Court held that Efron’s motion, which had failed to comply with the procedural

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requirements mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c), see id. at 3 n. 3, was untimely.

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See, e.g., id. at *6 (“The record reflects undue delay by Efron, a would-be intervenor with

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complete knowledge that his rights were in peril.”). Because Efron could not “meet the

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timeliness requirement,” the opinion stated, the Court declined to “‘consider whether other

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conditions for intervention under Rule 24 were satisfied.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass'n for

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Advancement of Colored People v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 369 (1973)).

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On May 20, 2013, Efron filed the instant motion for reconsideration (presumably under

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Rule 59(e)), arguing in pertinent part that his motion to intervene “is timely.” Docket # 212, p.

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CIVIL NO. 08-1833 (SEC)

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3. He also (again) requests additional time to obtain counsel and asks this court to order a
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“30-day moratorium on any settlement negotiations” or court hearings. Id., p. 5. The plaintiff
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timely opposed. Docket # 218. She says that Efron’s motion should be denied, because it “fails
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to address the legal reasoning set forth . . . in this court’s ruling on the matter.” Id., p. 5.
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“Instead of analyzing the criteria applicable to intervention, and without filing the required
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pleading under Rule 24,” the plaintiff further maintains, Efron “prefers to dedicate his efforts
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to besmirching [the plaintiff], accusing her of being violent, abandoning her children, [and]
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living high off the hog . . . .” Id.
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Exhibiting its characteristic neutrality, defendant UBS Financial Services Incorporated
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of Puerto Rico (UBS) also responded. Docket # 225. Because it “intends to call Efron as a
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witness, regardless of whether he is allowed to intervene, UBS takes no position on Efron’s
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motion for reconsideration.” Id., p. 3. UBS nonetheless makes some key factual corrections. As
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relevant here, UBS properly rebuts Efron’s incorrect contention that the “first time” he was
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advised that “he would be liable for any settlement between the parties in this case” was on
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March 4, 2013. Id., p. 1 (citing Docket # 212, p. 2). Setting the record straight, UBS correctly
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states that it “has repeatedly reminded Efron of its intention to hold him accountable for this
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obligation, including after the Court’s prior summary judgment ruling in January 2010, again
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in its July 2011 proof of claim in Efron’s bankruptcy proceeding, and again in February and
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March of this year.” Id., pp. 1-2 (citations omitted).
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Standard of Review
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“The granting of a motion for reconsideration is ‘an extraordinary remedy which should
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be used sparingly.’” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation
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omitted). It is common ground that the moving party “must ‘either clearly establish a manifest
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error of law or must present newly discovered evidence.’” Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp.,
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402 F.3d 1, 7 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143,
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CIVIL NO. 08-1833 (SEC)

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146 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2004)). It is also well settled that “[a] motion for reconsideration is not a
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vehicle for the introduction of arguments that could and should have been made to the district
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court earlier.” Fábrica de Muebles J.J. Álvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682
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F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2012). Nor does Rule 59(e) “provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own
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procedural failures.” Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Moro v.
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Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996)).
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Applicable Law and Analysis
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As said, Efron argues that this court should reconsider its denial of his motion for
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intervention. This request is without merit. The short answer is that Efron neither argues that
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the denial of his motion to intervene was a manifest error of law nor does he present newly
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discovered evidence. Rather, for the first time in this litigation, he simply maintains — without
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much in the way of an argument — that his motion to intervene “is timely.” Docket # 212, p.
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2. Shockingly, he again “neither mentions nor applies the timeliness factors,” 2013 WL
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1791024, at * 4, as adopted by the First Circuit in the normative Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d
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15, 20 (1st Cir.1980) — thus making waiver applicable. See, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 895
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F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Nor does he even attempt to comply with Rule 24(c)’s mandatory
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procedural requirements, see Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d
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197, 205 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1998); Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783-84 (1st Cir.
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1988), which provided yet another ground to deny his undeveloped and unpersuasive request
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for intervention. See 2013 WL 1791024, at *3 n. 3. The upshot is that Efron’s request for
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reconsideration is plainly unwarranted.
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The Court need not spill more ink on this matter. Because Efron’s motion for
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reconsideration falls way short of showing that the court erred as a matter of law or fact, it is
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DENIED. Needless to say, Efron’s unfounded request for “30-day moratorium on any
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settlement negotiations” or court hearings is also DENIED. See 2013 WL 1791024, at *2 n. 1.
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CIVIL NO. 08-1833 (SEC)

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Conclusion
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For the reasons stated, Efron’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11th day of June, 2013.
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S/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge