Guzman-Rivera v. Lucena-Zabala et al

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 12 MOTION to dismiss and Memorandum in Support Thereof. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 7/1/2009.(LB)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO M IG U E L GUZMÁN-RIVERA Plaintiff v. Civil No. 08-1897 (SEC) K E R M IT LUCENA-ZABALA; ZAIDA C A M A C H O -R O S S Y ; ANABELLE N U Ń E Z -U B A R R I; LÁZARO SERRANOC ID ; ZULMARIE URRUTIA-VÉLEZ; O J E L RODRÍGUEZ-TORRES; PUERTO R IC O EXAMINING BOARD OF A CCO U NTA N TS D e f e n d a n ts

O P I N IO N and ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Co-Defendants Kermit Lucena-Zabala, Zaida CamachoR o s s y, Anabelle Nuńez-Ubarri, Lázaro Serrano-Cid, and Zulmarie Urrutia-Vélez's (collectively " D e f e n d a n ts " ) motion to dismiss (Docket # 12), and Plaintiff Miguel Guzmán-Rivera's (" P la in tif f " ) opposition thereto (Docket # 13). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable la w , Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Factual Background O n August 13, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint against Defendants, in their o f f ic ia l and individual capacities, under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S .C . § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Docket # 1. Plaintiff s e e k s relief for the damages he suffered as a result of the alleged deprivation of his property in te re s ts without due process of law. Id. According to the complaint, on February 12, 1998, P la in tif f received a Certified Public Accountant's ("CPA") license. On June 5, 2006, the Puerto R ic o Examining Board of Accountants ("the Board") required Plaintiff to submit to an

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in v o lu n ta ry practice review,1 by August 31, 2006. Plaintiff requested that the practice review b e postponed until 2007, but the Board denied this request citing a "need for urgency." At P la in tif f 's request, the Board scheduled a hearing for October 20, 2006, however, Plaintiff f a ile d to appear due to a scheduling error on his behalf. On November 17, 2006, the Board in d e f in ite ly suspended Plaintiff's CPA license. Plaintiff received notice of the suspension on N o v e m b e r 27, 2006. Two days later, on November 29, 2007, Plaintiff requested that the Board re c o n sid e r its decision, arguing that he had already begun the process of submitting himself to th e practice review. While the Board sent Plaintiff a notice of a hearing scheduled for December 18, 2006, s a id notice did not contain any information as to the nature or purpose of the hearing, any a lle g e d violations on the part of Plaintiff, his right to attend with counsel, nor did it include in f o rm a tio n regarding the consequences of his failure to appear. During the hearing, Plaintiff w a s informed that the suspension would remain in place until his practice review was presented, f o r which they set a deadline of January 31, 2007. After several delays, which Plaintiff informed th e Board of via email, on March 6, 2007, Plaintiff completed the requested practice review. U p o n receiving the Puerto Rico Association of Certified Public Accountants' ("PRACPA") a p p ro v a l2 on July 3, 2007, the practice review was presented to the Board on July 13, 2007. O n August 17, 2007, the Board decided not to lift the suspension on Plaintiff's license, a n d notified him that another hearing would be held on September 24, 2007. Once again, the n o tic e did not contain any information as to the nature or purpose of the hearing, any alleged v io la tio n s on the part of the Plaintiff, his right to attend with counsel, nor did it include

An examination of Plaintiff's accountancy practice conducted by a reviewing CPA. The reviewing CPA then issues a report regarding his findings.
2

1

The practice review process is not conducted by the Board, but by the PRACPA.

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in f o rm a tio n regarding the consequences of his failure to appear. At the second hearing, the c o n te n ts of the practice review were not discussed, nor did the Board inform Plaintiff of his due p ro c e ss rights. Rather, the Board questioned Plaintiff as to the reasons for the tardiness of his p ra c tic e review, although, as stated above, Plaintiff had previously provided an explanation for th e delays. On October 24, 2007, the Board issued a resolution revoking Plaintiff's CPA license, a n d stating that he had not followed the standards of the profession. Plaintiff was notified of this re so lu tio n on October 27, 2007, and on October 29, 2007, he filed a request for reconsideration, w h ic h the Board denied on November 26, 2007. On December 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed for judicial review before the Puerto Rico Court o f Appeals, arguing that the Board suspended, and later revoked his license, in violation of his d u e process rights. On June 16, 2008, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals revoked the Board's ru lin g , and ordered the Board to reinstate the license "immediately and without any kind of d e la y" pending the "corresponding findings, if any, pursuant to the rulings of this judgment." H o w e v e r, the Court of Appeals allowed the Board to conduct any administrative hearings which th e y deemed necessary. Docket # 7 at p. 28. The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals also stated that " th e Board totally disregarded the procedures required to suspend and revoke a license." Id. at 2 2 . As a result thereof, on June 30, 2008, Plaintiff's CPA license was reinstated. On November 10, 2008, Defendants filed a motion requesting the dismissal of the case. A c c o rd in g to Defendants, all claims against them should be dismissed because: (1) a final a d m in is tra tiv e decision is still pending, thus the Younger abstention doctrine applies to the case a t bar, (2) they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in their official capacities, and (3 ) in their individual capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity.

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CIVIL NO. 08-1897 (SEC) S ta n d a r d of Review F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)

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F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for challenging a court's subject matter ju ris d ic tio n . Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001). Under this ru le , a wide variety of challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted, a m o n g them those based on sovereign immunity, ripeness, mootness, and the existence of a f e d e r a l question. Id. (citations omitted). When faced with a similar jurisdictional challenge, this Court must ". . . give weight to the well-pleaded factual averments in the operative p le a d in g s [. . .] and indulge every reasonable inference in the pleader's favor." Aguilar v. U.S. Im m i g r a t i o n and Customs Enforcement Div. of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st C ir .2 0 0 7 ) . A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has the b u rd e n to demonstrate that such jurisdiction exists. See Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F . Supp. 32, 33 (D. Me. 1992); see also SURCCO V. PRASA, 157 F. Supp. 2d 160, 163 (D. P .R . 2001). However, in order for a plaintiff's claim to be dismissed for lack of subject matter ju ris d ic tio n , due to the inadequacy of the plaintiff's federal claim, that claim must be ". . . so in su b sta n tia l, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely d e v o id of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. C o u n ty of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). In this context, this Court is empowered to resolve f a c tu a l disputes by making reference to evidence in the record beyond the plaintiff's allegations w ith o u t having to convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Lord, 789 F . Supp. at 33 (D. Me. 1992); see also SURCCO, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (D. P.R. 2001). " W h e re a party challenges the accuracy of the pleaded jurisdictional facts, the court may c o n d u c t a broad inquiry, taking evidence and making findings of fact." Hernández-Santiago v.

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E c o la b , Inc., 397 F. 3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005). Therefore, the court may consider extrinsic materials, " a n d , to the extent it engages in jurisdictional fact-finding, is free to test the truthfulness of the p la in tif f 's allegations." Dynamic, 221 F. 3d at 38. That is, the principle of conversion of a m o tio n to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when extrinsic materials are reviewed, d o e s not apply in regards to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) T o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiffs' "well-pleaded facts must possess enough h e f t to show that [they are] entitled to relief." Clark v. Boscher, 514 F. 3d 107, 112 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ).3 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all o f their "well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences therefrom" in the plaintiff's f a v o r. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). The First Circuit has held th a t "dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual a lle g a tio n s , either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain re c o v e ry under some actionable legal theory." Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). Courts "may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to th e complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice." Id. at 3 0 5 -3 0 6 . However, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must "differentiate between w e ll-p le a d e d facts, on the one hand, and `bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, p e rip h ra s tic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other hand; the former must be credited, but th e latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (quoting A u ls o n v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to allow the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).

3

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2 9 , 33 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus Plaintiffs m u s t rely in more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be re je c te d . Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 5 1 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)). T h e re f o re , "even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 , the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must a lle g e `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed f a c tu a l allegations, the "plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,'but it a s k s for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 127 S . Ct. At 1965; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A plaintiff's obligation to "provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and c o n c lu s io n s , and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." T w o m b ly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965. That is, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to re lie f above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are tru e ." Parker v. Hurley, 514 F. 3d 87, 95 (1 st Cir. 2008). A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis A b s te n tio n Due to Pending Administrative Decision T h e Younger abstention doctrine states that federal courts "must abstain from reaching th e merits of a case over which it has jurisdiction...[if]...there is (1) an ongoing state judicial p ro c e e d in g , instituted prior to the federal proceeding...that (2) implicates an important state in te re s t, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the claims advanced in his federal suit." Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n V. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 4 2 3 , 432 (1982). While Younger originally called on federal courts to abstain from ongoing

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s ta te judicial proceedings, it has since been expanded to include abstention from "comparable s ta te administrative proceedings that are quasi-judicial in character and implicate important state in te re s ts ." Maymó-Meléndez v. Alvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004). Therefore, this Court must first determine whether there is an ongoing administrative procedure regarding Plaintiff's claim; second, whether those proceedings implicate an important s ta te interest; and third, whether those proceedings provide an adequate opportunity for the P la in tif f to raise the claims advanced in his federal claim. In regards to the first prong, Defendants argue that there is still an ongoing administrative p ro c e d u re , instituted when PREBA first contacted the Plaintiff about submitting to a practice re v ie w in the summer of 2006. Defendants argue that, since Plaintiff does not claim that the B o a rd 's administrative process has concluded, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this s u it, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, and dismissal is warranted. In opposition, P la in tif f argues that, while the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Board, a n d ordered that his license be reinstated, their mandate was limited to questions regarding re in s ta te m e n t, not damages. Plaintiff argues that since Defendants did not appeal this decision, o r conducted any further administrative hearings, and considering that Plaintiff's license was in fact reinstated, the administrative procedure effectively concluded. Upon review of the complaint, this Court notes that while Plaintiff admits that the a d m in is tra tiv e proceedings commenced in the summer of 2006, he does not admit that said p ro c e e d in g s are ongoing. Moreover, itt does not appear that the Board made any further findings n o r held any further administrative proceedings regarding reinstatement as allowed to them by th e Puerto Rico Court of Appeals' ruling. Docket # 7 at p. 28. Instead, the Board reinstated P la in ti f f ' s license on June 30, 2008. As such, this Court finds that the administrative

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p ro c e e d in g s regarding Plaintiff's license reinstatement effectively concluded when Plaintiff's lic e n s e was reinstated, and no further action was taken by the Board. Additionally, the claim brought before this Court, seeking money damages for the e x p a n s e of time that Plaintiff did not have his license, never was, nor currently is, before the B o a rd 's administrative proceedings, since their authority is limited to reinstatement, or denial th e re o f , of Plaintiff's license. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 20, § 782. As such, the first prong is not met, a n d this Court need not abstain from deciding the merits of Plaintiff's federal claims.4 As such, D e f e n d a n ts ' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED. Eleventh Amendment Immunity T h e Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: [ t]h e Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any s u it in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States b y Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. C o n s t. Am. XI. A lth o u g h the Eleventh Amendment literally seems to apply only to suits against a State b y citizens of another State, the Supreme Court has consistently extended the scope of this A m e n d m e n t to suits by citizens against their own State. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of A la . v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 7 2 -7 3 (2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). Even though the Commonwealth of P u e rto Rico is not a state, it enjoys the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. See JusinoM e rc a d o v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000); Ortiz Feliciano v. T o le d o Dávila, 175 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1999); Futura Development v. Estado Libre Asociado,

This Court notes that the second prong of the Younger abstention doctrine is met because there is an important state interest involved in the administrative proceedings regarding CPA licensing conducted by the Board. However, Defendants fail to satisfy the third prong, since the Board does not have jurisdiction over damages claims, and therefore, they cannot provide an adequate opportunity for the Plaintiff to raise the claims set forth in the present suit.

4

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Page 9 144 F.3d 7,12-13 (1st Cir. 1998);

C u le b ra s Enters. Corp. v. Rivera Ríos, 838 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1987); Ramírez v. Puerto R ic o Fire Servs., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1984). T h e Supreme Court has established that the Eleventh Amendment protection primarily f u rth e rs two goals: the protection of a state's treasury, and the protection of its dignitary interest o f not being haled into federal court. Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & th e Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. Mar. C o m m 'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)). However, Eleventh Amendment im m u n ity is not absolute and may be waived by the state or "stripped away" by Congress. M e tc a lf & Eddy v. P.R.A.S.A., 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir. 1993). There are four (4) c irc u m s ta n c e s in which the Eleventh Amendment protection unravels: (1) when a state consents to be sued in a federal forum; (2) when a state waives its own immunity by statute or the like; ( 3 ) when Congress abrogates state immunity ("so long as it speaks clearly and acts in f u rth e ra n c e of particular powers"); and (4) when, provided that circumstances allow, other c o n s titu tio n a l imperatives take precedence over the Eleventh Amendment's protection. Id. at 9 3 8 (citations omitted). Despite the second of the above mentioned circumstances, the First C irc u it has held that the fact that a state has waived its immunity to be sued does not a u to m a tic a lly mean that it has waived its immunity in federal court. See Díaz-Fonseca v. C o m m o n w e a lth of Puerto Rico, 451 F. 3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that although the C o m m o n w e a lth waived its immunity to be sued in certain circumstances in its own courts, it did n o t waive its immunity to be sued in federal court). T h e Eleventh Amendment bar extends to governmental instrumentalities which are an a rm or "alter ego" of the State. See Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 8 1 8 F.2d. 1034, 1036 (1st Cir. 1987); Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faría, 618 F. Supp. 434, 435

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(D .P .R . 1985); Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Mt. Healthy C ity Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-281 (1977); Ursulich v. P.R. Nat'l Guard, 384 F. S u p p . 736, 737-38 (D.P.R. 1974). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment also protects state o f f ic ia ls in their official capacity. The rationale behind this extension of the Eleventh A m e n d m e n t protection is that a claim against a state official in his or her official capacity, for m o n e ta ry relief, is an action for the recovery of money from the State. Ford Motor v. Dept. of T re a s u ry, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). Hence, a claim against a state official in her official capacity for monetary relief is, in essence, a claim against the State. T h e Supreme Court requires a two-step analysis in order to determine whether a g o v e rn m e n t institution is an arm or alter ego of the state, and thus, entitled to immunity under th e Eleventh Amendment. Fresenius Med. Care, 322 F.3d at 65 (citing and discussing Hess v. P o rt Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)). First, the court must analyze how the state h a s structured the government institution and, second, if the "structural indicators point in d if f e re n t directions," the risk of the damages being paid from the public treasury should be a s se s s e d . Id. at 65-69. The Puerto Rico Board of Accountancy, and therefore the Board, is an a rm or alter ego of Puerto Rico pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 20, § 773 (2008), which creates " a Board of Accountancy in and for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico [which] shall consist o f five (5) members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate." P.R. L a w s Ann. tit. 20, § 773 (2008). As such, this Court need not dwell on this point. F in a lly, it is well settled that while the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude claims f o r prospective equitable relief, it does bar suits for monetary damages against the state, and its o f f ic e rs , in their official capacities. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908); NievesM á rq u e z v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 123 (1st Cir. 2003).

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B a s e d on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is entitled to Eleventh A m e n d m e n t immunity. By like token, this Court finds that the Puerto Rico Board of A c c o u n ta n c y, and therefore the Board, an arm of the Commonwealth, and Defendants in their o f f ic ia l capacities, are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. As such, Defendants' re q u e st for dismissal of the claims against them in their official capacities is GRANTED. A b s o lu te Immunity D e f e n d a n ts also argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity in their individual c a p a c itie s , for the acts they performed as members of the Board. According to Defendants, they e n g a g e in quasi-judicial duties which sufficiently resemble those functions that are entitled to a b s o lu te immunity. Indeed, "there are some officials whose special functions require a full e x e m p tio n from liability." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). Specifically, those o f f ic ia ls who perform quasi-judicial functions that share "enough characteristics [with] the ju d ic ia l process...should also be immune from suits for damages." Id. at 512-513. More to the p o in t, the First Circuit has held that members of an administrative board, acting in a quasiju d ic ia l capacity, enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability. Diva's Inc. v. City of Bangor, 4 1 1 F.3d 30, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2005). Therefore, this Court must determine if, "while executing the activities which gave rise to this claim," Defendants, as members of the Board, "were acting in an adjudicatory capacity s u c h that [they] are entitled to absolute immunity." Destek Group, Inc. V. State of N.H. Pub. U tils . Comm'n, 318 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). In analyzing whether the members of the Board w e re performing quasi-judicial functions sufficiently similar to that of a judge so as to entitle th e m to absolute immunity, this Court must apply a three part test. Bettencourt v. Bd. of R e g is tra tio n In Med. Of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 783 (1st Cir. 1990). First, this Court must d e te rm in e if the Board members perform "traditional `adjudicatory' function[s], in that [they]

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d e c i d e [ ] facts, appl[y] law, and otherwise resolve[] disputes on the merits." Id. Second, it is n e c e s sa ry to determine if the "Board member[s], like a judge, decide cases sufficiently c o n tro v e rs ia l that, in the absence of absolute immunity, [they] would be subject to numerous d a m a g e s actions." Id. Third, this Court must determine if the "Board member[s], like a judge, a d ju d ic a te disputes against a backdrop of multiple safeguards designed to protect [an in d iv id u a l's ] constitutional rights." Id. Defendants aver that they are entitled to absolute immunity because (1) as members of th e Board, they perform traditional adjudicatory functions; (2) the controversial nature of the d e c is io n s made by them in these proceedings expose them to numerous lawsuits; and (3) the rig h t to appeal the Board's decisions via judicial review provides a sufficient safeguard to p ro te c t an individual's constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not contest that the cases decided by th e Board are not sufficiently controversial so as to require absolute immunity to protect the m e m b e rs from numerous lawsuits. Plaintiff does, however, aver that Defendants' actions in p re s id in g over the administrative hearings were of such poor quality, that the first and third e le m e n ts of this test are not satisfied, thus absolute immunity is inapplicable. Specifically, P la in tif f argues that Defendants' actions were not truly adjudicatory in nature due to their d isre g a rd for the provisions that govern the quasi-judicial proceedings. As members of the Board, when determining whether or not to revoke or reinstate CPA lic e n s e s , the Board must review the facts, weigh the evidence, apply the relevant laws and re g u la tio n s to those facts, and issue a written order. Public Accountancy Act of 1945 (" A c c o u n t a n c y Act"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 20, § 782 (2008).5 These types of traditional

Puerto Rico's Uniform Administrative Procedure Act ("LPAU"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 2151 (2008) also ensures the safeguard of an accused's procedural due process rights, guaranteeing the right to be notified of the charges filed, present evidence, among others.

5

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a d ju d ic a to ry functions satisfy the first element of the above described test. Upon reviewing the L P A U and the Accountancy Act, this Court finds that the allegedly deficient manner in which th e members of the Board presided over these administrative hearings is irrelevant, insofar as th e tasks they performed were in fact adjudicatory in nature, are functionally comparable to th o s e of a judge, and thus entitles them to the absolute immunity that is vested upon judges.6 S p e c if i c a l ly, any individual before the Board is protected by certain procedural safeguards, in c lu d in g the right to appeal the Board's decision via judicial review. In regards to the hearings h e ld before the Board, the Accountancy Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 20, § 782 (2008), states that in d iv id u a ls affected by the Board's decisions have the right to appeal these decisions by seeking ju d ic ia l review. In this case, Plaintiff exercised such right, and on appeal, his license was re in s ta te d . Therefore, the right to seek judicial review effectively safeguarded Plaintiff's rights f ro m any possible error, or wrongdoing by the Board, and his constitutional rights were a d e q u a te ly protected. Considering the above, this Court finds that Defendants are entitled to a b s o lu te immunity in their individual capacities. Conclusion B a s e d on the foregoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1 st day of July, 2009. S /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas

Generally, judges are immune from suits for monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). This immunity applies with full force to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967). Judges therefore enjoy "a comparably sweeping form of immunity." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Procedural errors, even grave ones, do not divest a judge from immunity. Cintrón-Rodríguez v. PagánNieves, 736 F. Supp. 411, 413 (1990).

6

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CIVIL NO. 08-1897 (SEC) S a lv a d o r E. Casellas U .S . District Judge

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