Rios-Marcano v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico et al

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 24 Supplemental Motion; granting 19 MOTION to dismiss as to Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Administracion de Correccion, Jose Vega-Aponte. We DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth, AOC, Vega-Aponte, Marcano, and Movants' unnamed underwriter insurer (Docket No. 2 ). Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 12/17/09.(mrj)

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U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO R O B E R T O RÍOS-MARCANO, Plaintiff, v. C O M M O N W E A L T H OF PUERTO RICO, et a l., Defendants.

C i v il No. 08-2256 (JAF)

O P I N IO N AND ORDER P la in tif f , Roberto Ríos-Marcano, brings the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a g a in s t Defendants, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth"), the Administration of C o rre c tio n s ("AOC"), Warden José Vega-Aponte, of Zarzal Detention Facility, Custodial O f f ic e r Henry Marcano, and an unnamed insurance company. (Docket No. 2.) Commonwealth, A O C , and Vega-Aponte (together, "Movants") move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 19.) Movants filed a supplement to the motion to dismiss. (D o c k e t No. 24.) The motion is unopposed. I. F a c tu a l and Procedural History W e derive the following facts from Plaintiff's complaint. (Docket No. 2.) Plaintiff is an in m a te in the penal custody of the Commonwealth, confined at the Zarzal Detention Facility in R ío Grande, Puerto Rico. On July 23, 2008, Plaintiff suffered a slip-and-fall accident in the

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p ris o n facility's bathroom shower. Plaintiff slipped and cut his arm on the sharp edges of the f lo o r tiles. Plaintiff was then rushed to the facility's hospital, where he received twelve stitches. A f ter w a rd , Plaintiff complained to prison officials, repeatedly, about the bathroom floor, but th e prison officials did not respond. On October 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this co u rt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Movants moved to dismiss on March 9, 2009. (Docket No. 19.) P la in tif f has not opposed the motion. II. S t a n d a r d Under Rule 12(b)(6) A defendant may move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the complaint, f o r the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (b )(6 ). In assessing this motion, we "accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all re a so n a b le inferences in favor of the [plaintiff]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F .2 d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993). However, mere legal conclusions "are not entitled to the a s s u m p tio n of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). T h e complaint must demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief" by alleging facts that d ire c tly or inferentially support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. S u lliv a n , 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 5 5 9 (2007)). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair n o tic e of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U .S . 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Civil No. 08-2256 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 III. A n a l y s is

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C o n s id e rin g that Plaintiff appears pro se, we construe his pleadings more favorably than w e would pleadings drafted by an attorney. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, Plaintiff's p ro -s e status does not insulate him from the strictures of procedural and substantive law. See A h m e d v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). S e c tio n 1983 provides a civil remedy for violation of a federal right by a person acting u n d e r the color of state or territorial law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 because (1) Commonwealth, AOC, and Vega-Aponte are entitled to state sovereign immunity (Docket No. 19); (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative re m e d ies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (id.); (3 ) Plaintiff has not shown which federally protected right, if any, has been violated (Docket N o . 24); (4) Plaintiff's complaint lacked sufficient facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible o n its face (Docket No. 10); and (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (Docket No. 2 4 ) . Because our determination below rests on the first four arguments, we need not address th e last. A. State Sovereign Immunity U n d e r the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from federal-court s u its brought by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U .S . 651, 663 (1974); see U.S. Const. amend. XI. The applicability of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). "For

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E le v e n th Amendment purposes, the Commonwealth is treated as if it were a state; consequently, th e Eleventh Amendment bars any suit brought against it." Gotay-Sánchez v. Pereira, 343 F. S u p p . 2d 65, 71-72 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer A u th ., 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1993)). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to

c o m m o n w e a lth agencies that function as "arms of the Commonwealth." Rivera v. Medina, 963 F . Supp. 78, 82 (D.P.R. 1997), vacated on other grounds sub nom. M e d in a -V a rg a s , 168 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999). S in ce the Commonwealth has not consented to litigation in this case, we lack the power to hear Plaintiff's case against it. See Gotay-Sánchez, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 71-72. Likewise, we c a n n o t hear Plaintiff's case against the AOC, an administrative organ of the Commonwealth. S e e Rivera v. Medina, 963 F. Supp. at 82. We determine that Commonwealth and AOC are e n title d to state sovereign immunity. As to Defendants Vega-Aponte and Marcano, we decline Barreto-Rivera v.

to dismiss them on state sovereign immunity grounds. While it is unclear from his complaint
w h e t h e r Plaintiff sues Defendants Vega-Aponte and Marcano in their individual, as opposed to official, capacities, we must construe Plaintiff's pleadings in the light most favorable to him. A n d because a suit against Defendants Marcano and Vega-Aponte in their official capacities w o u ld be dismissible due to state sovereign immunity, see Culebras Ent. Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 8 1 3 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1987), we assume for the sake of this motion that they are being s u e d in their individual capacities.

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M o v a n t s contend that dismissal is required because Plaintiff affirmatively stated in his c o m p la in t that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies by seeking relief through prison g riev an ce procedures. (Docket No. 19.) U n d er the PLRA, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until s u c h administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although m a n d a to ry, exhaustion is an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise and prove, not a ju risd ictio n a l bar. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007). The exhaustion requirement u n d e r the PLRA expressly pertains to suits regarding "prison conditions." See 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 9 7 e (a ). U p o n examining Plaintiff's complaint, it is clear that he filed for formal relief through th e available prison grievance procedures. (Docket Nos. 2; 25.) In his complaint, Plaintiff s ta te s : "My grievance complaint was not answered . . . ." (Docket No. 25.) In light of this s ta te m e n t, and by drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, we must conclude th a t he exhausted the available administrative remedies. Accordingly, Movants may not rely o n this affirmative defense. C. Eighth Amendment M o v a n t s contend that Plaintiff has not stated which constitutional right Movants a lle g e d ly violated. (Docket No. 24.) Given that Plaintiff complains about the dangerous s h o w e rs , however, we construe his as a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

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C o n d i t i o n s -o f -c o n f in e m e n t claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. See R h o d e s v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981). T h e Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. Const. amend. V I II . Under it, prisoners have the right to humane conditions of confinement, which imposes o n prison officials a duty to take "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." G iro u x v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U .S . 825, 832 (1994)). A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for d e n yin g humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk o f serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." F a rm e r, 511 U.S. at 847. W h e n evaluating whether a particular condition of confinement constitutes an Eighth A m e n d m e n t violation, we consult the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress o f a maturing society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Supreme Court h a s held, for example, that deprivation of essential food, medical care, and sanitation violates th e Eighth Amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), whereas housing two p ris o n e rs in the same cell ("double celling") does not, see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 350. In Rhodes, th e Supreme Court found that while double celling indeed further endangered prisoners, it did n o t render the prisons unconstitutionally unsafe. Id. The Court explained that "the Constitution d o e s not mandate comfortable prisons" and that "these considerations properly are weighed by th e legislature and prison administration rather than a court." Id. Measuring the instant case a g a in s t this standard, we find, in line with the Ninth Circuit, that Plaintiff's complaint of

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s lip p e r y, sharp tiles simply does not rise to the level of a claim for unconstitutional conditions o f confinement. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[S]lippery prison f lo o rs . . . do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment." (alteration in o rig in a l)). For the reasons stated above, we find that Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which re lie f can be granted. W e note finally that Defendant Marcano is not a party to the instant motion. Where it i s clear, however, that a plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be f u tile , a sua-sponte dismissal may stand. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 ( 2 0 0 1 ). Here, because Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under § 1983, we find that a sua- sponte d is m is s a l is in order. IV . C o n c lu s io n F o r the reasons stated herein, we hereby GRANT Movant's motion to dismiss (Docket N o . 19). We DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth, AOC, Vega-Aponte, M a rc a n o , and Movants' unnamed underwriter insurer (Docket No. 2). I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 17 th day of December, 2009. s/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge