Diaz-Castro v. Roman-Roman et al

Filing 42

ORDER. DENIED 37 MOTION for Reconsideration re 31 Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions; NOTED 41 MOTION Submitting English Translation; MOOT 40 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Maria Judith Diaz-Castro. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 6/11/2010.(LB)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

M A R IA JUDITH DIAZ-CASTRO Petitioner v. R O M A N -R O M A N , ET AL Defendants CIVIL NO. 09-1033 (SEC)

O P I N I O N AND ORDER In the Opinion and Order dated February 10, 2010, this Court denied Petitioner's habeas c o r p u s petition on two fronts: failure to exhaust administrative remedies and untimeliness. D o c k e t # 31. Therein this Court noted that Petitioner did not file a motion pursuant to Puerto R ic o Criminal Procedure Rule 192.1, P.R. Laws ann. tit. 34, § 1741(c), and as a result, dismissal o f her Section 2254 was warranted. Moreover, we pointed out that Petitioner was sentenced on J u n e 23, 2003; that her appeal to the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals was denied on December 12, 2 0 0 5 ; her subsequent motion for reconsideration to the appeals court was denied on March 3, 2 0 0 6 ; her writ of certiorari to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was denied on June 2, 2006; her tw o requests for reconsideration to said Court were denied on July 21 and August 21, 2006. T h e re f o re , the State court's final judgment was final on or around August 21, 2006. Although P e titio n e r should have filed the instant petition on or around August 22, 2007, her petition was f ile d on January 13, 2009, that is, well after the one-year period of limitations for petitions under S e c tio n 2254. Absent allegations or proof of extraordinary circumstances which impeded P e t i t i o n e r's timely filing, this Court held that Petitioner's claims were time-barred, and as a re su lt, dismissal of her petition was also warranted on these grounds.

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O n March 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Spanish language 3 (D o c k e t # 33), arguing that she exhausted all remedies available in the state court, to wit, that 4 s h e filed a Rule 192.1 motion in the state court. She also set forth alleged exculpatory evidence 5 to support her request for habeas relief. The Government opposed, arguing that Petitioner's 6 m o tio n for reconsideration was untimely filed, and fails to rebut this Court's conclusion that her 7 S e c tio n 2254 petition is time-barred. 8 U p o n reviewing the record, for the reasons set forth in our prior Opinion, this Court finds 9 th a t Petitioner's Section 2254 is time-barred. Moreover, she has not exhausted all the remedies 10 a v a ila b le in the state court. As previously discussed in the Opinion, a petition for writ of habeas 11 c o r p u s may be brought by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, if such 12 c u s to d y is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 13 2 2 5 4 (a ). However, Section 2254(b)(1)(A) provides that an application for a writ of habeas 14 c o r p u s under said section shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted 15 th e remedies available in the courts of the State. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 16 (1 9 9 9 ) (finding that "[f]ederal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have 17 e x h a u s te d their claims in state court"). A petitioner shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 18 re m e d ie s available in the state courts within the meaning of Section 2254, "if he has the right 19 u n d e r the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 20 U .S .C . § 2254(c). 21 The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted 22 in stru m e n t which reflects a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the 23 n e e d to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a `swift and imperative remedy in all cases of 24 i lle g a l restraint or confinement.'" Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 25 (1 9 7 3 ) (citations omitted). Accordingly, federal courts "will not entertain an application for 26

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h a b e a s relief unless the petitioner first has fully exhausted his state remedy with respect to each 3 a n d every claim contained in the application." Delgado v. Martinez, 72 F. Supp. 2d 2, 5 (D.P.R. 4 1 9 9 9 ) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). In Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 5 3 2 (2004), the Court ruled that a claim cannot be exhausted if it is not presented directly to the 6 s ta te 's highest court. See also Delgado, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 4. Moreover, a petitioner for federal 7 h a b e a s review must present claims to the state supreme court irrespective of whether said 8 c o u rt's review is discretionary. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839. Based on the foregoing, a "habeas 9 p e titio n e r has to avail himself, not only of whatever appeals he was entitled to as a matter of 10 rig h t, but also as to any discretionary remedies available." Marin-Robles v. Del Valle, 2005 U.S. 11 D is t. LEXIS 1800, *8-9 (D.P.R. 2005). 12 The Puerto Rico courts provide for appellate relief and state habeas corpus post 13 c o n v ic tio n relief. P.R. Laws ann. tit. 34, § 1741. Therefore, in order to be afforded federal 14 h a b e a s corpus relief, a Petitioner challenging a Puerto Rico court conviction must exhaust these 15 m e c h a n is m s . Rodriguez v. Warden, 791 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D.P.R. 1992) (finding that a federal 16 h a b e a s petitioner fails to exhaust all state court remedies when he fails to avail himself of state 17 p o s t-c o n v ic tio n court proceedings). A prerequisite to state habeas corpus relief is the filing and 18 d isp o sitio n of a motion pursuant to Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 192.1. P.R. Laws ann. 19 t i t. 34, § 1741(c); Rodriguez v. Warden, 791 F.Supp. 41, 42 (D.P.R. 1992). As such, the 20 p ris o n e r must first seek post-conviction collateral relief under Rule 192.1, which provides that 21 " a n y person who is imprisoned by virtue of a judgment rendered by any Division of the Court 22 o f First Instance and who alleges the right to be released because . . . the sentence was imposed 23 i n violation of the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or of the 24 C o n s titu tio n and laws of the United States, . . . may file a motion, in the part of the court which 25 im p o se d the sentence, to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment." Thereafter, the order 26

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e n te re d by the Court of First Instance is appealable to the appeals court, and subsequently to the 3 P u e rto Rico Supreme Court. After said remedy has been exhausted, the prisoner must then seek 4 h a b e a s relief in the state courts, prior to filing a petition for federal habeas relief. Thus even if 5 P e titio n e r filed a Rule 192.1 motion before the state court (Docket # 33), she fails to show that 6 s h e appealed said court's denial of the same, and sought habeas relief in the state courts. 7 Therefore, Petitioner has not exhausted all state court remedies. 8 Conclusion 9 B a s e d on the foregoing, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 10 I T IS SO ORDERED. 11 S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11 th day of June, 2010. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge