Maya-Gambino v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico et al

Filing 66

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 60 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Maria E. Melendez-Rivera, Edwin Zayaz-Figueroa, Alba T. Reyes-Bermudez, Lyzzette Tanon-Melendez. Judgment shall enter dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' complaint against all remaining defendants. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 11/30/2010.(mrj)

Maya-Gambino v. Melendez-Rivera et al

Doc. 66

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U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO J O S E P H MAYA-GAMBINO, P la in tif f , v. M A R IA MELENDEZ-RIVERA; EDWIN Z A Y A S -F IG U E R O A ; LYZZETTE T A Ñ O N -M E L E N D E Z ; and ALBA T. R E Y E S -B E R M U D E Z , D e f e n d a n ts .

C iv il No. 09-1117 (JAF)

O P I N I O N AND ORDER P la in tif f , Joseph Maya-Gambino, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against D e f e n d a n ts , María Meléndez-Rivera, Edwin Zayas-Figueroa, Lyzzette Tañón-Meléndez, and A lb a T. Reyes-Bermúdez in their personal capacities and as members of the Junta de Libertad B a jo Palabra ("Parole Board") alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause. (Docket No. 25.) D e f e n d a n t s move for summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity, judicial im m u n ity, and mootness. (Docket No. 60.) I. F a c tu a l and Procedural Summary P la in tif f is currently serving a fifty-four-year sentence in Puerto Rico's prison system for v io la tio n of the Domestic Abuse Prevention and Intervention Act, 8 L.P.R.A. §§ 601­664 (2 0 0 6 ). On September 15, 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter to Meléndez-Rivera, acting chair of the

Dockets.Justia.com

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P a ro le Board, informing her that, as of August 2008, he had served the minimum of his sentence n e c e s sa ry to be considered for parole under 4 L.P.R.A. § 1503 (2002). (Docket No. 25-2 at 1.) In this letter, Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled by law to a parole hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff s e n t two more letters to Meléndez-Rivera over the next two months without response. (Id. at 2 ­ 4 .) Plaintiff then filed a "Request for Initial Hearing" with the Parole Board. (Id. at 5­8.) P la in tif f argued that he was entitled, under the Parole Board's own regulations, to a parole h e a rin g within forty-five days of completing his minimum sentence. (Id.) H a v in g received no response to his requests, Plaintiff filed his § 1983 claim with this c o u rt on February 5, 2009, alleging that the Parole Board's failure to hold his hearing was a v io la tio n of his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. (Docket No. 25.) Plaintiff seeks a n award of $50,000 in damages and an injunction ordering his immediate release. (Id.) In a p re v io u s order, we dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and th e Parole Board. (Docket No. 34.) T h e Parole Board subsequently held a hearing for Plaintiff on March 4, 2009, and later is s u e d an order denying parole and scheduling the next parole hearing for March 2010. (Docket N o . 64-1.) Defendant petitioned the Parole Board for reconsideration (Docket No. 64-2) and w a s denied (Docket No. 64-3). Defendants failed to answer Plaintiff's complaint, and, on A p ril 7, 2010, the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re 55(a). (Docket No. 40.) On September 29, 2010, we granted Defendants' motion

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to set aside default. (Docket No. 54.) Defendants subsequently filed an answer to the complaint (D o c k e t No. 56) and the instant summary-judgment motion (Docket No. 60). II. R u le 56 Summary Judgment B e c a u s e Plaintiff is pro se, we construe the complaint more favorably than we would p le a d in g s drafted by an attorney. Ayala Serrano v. Lebrón González, 909 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1 9 9 0 ). W e grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure m a te ria ls on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact a n d the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual d isp u te is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party and "material" if it potentially a f f e c ts the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 4 ). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we view the record in the light most f a v o ra b le to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). T h e movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any m a te ria l fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). "Once the moving party has m a d e a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must `p ro d u c e specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy is s u e .'" Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Triangle Trading Co. v . Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)). The nonmovant "may not rely merely on

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a lle g a tio n s or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts s h o w in g a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). III. A n a ly s is P la in tif f seeks both injunctive relief and damages for the alleged violations of his rights to due process. For the reasons discussed below, we find that neither form of relief is w a rra n te d . A. I n ju n c tiv e Relief In his complaint, Plaintiff requests an injunction ordering his immediate release from p ris o n as a remedy for alleged due-process violations by the Defendants. (Docket No. 25 at 2.) It is settled law that an inmate may not challenge the validity or duration of his confinement th ro u g h a suit under § 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78­82 (2005). When s e e k in g release from confinement, state prisoners may not use § 1983 as an end-run around 28 U .S .C . § 2254 or its state-law equivalent. See id. at 81. Plaintiff's request for immediate re le a s e from prison necessarily fails. T o the extent the Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering the initial hearing, this claim is m o o t. It is undisputed that the Parole Board held Plaintiff's initial hearing on March 4, 2009. B. D a m a g e s Relief P la in tif f does not specify whether his claim for $50,000 in damages is against the D e f e n d a n ts in their personal or official capacities. Regardless, § 1983 is not a cause of action

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f o r damages against a state official acting in her official capacity. See Nieves-Marquez v. P u e rto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U .S . 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a claim for damages against a state official in his official c a p a c ity is a suit against the state itself and, thus, barred by sovereign immunity)). D e f e n d a n ts assert that they are immune from damages claims brought against them in th e ir personal capacities, citing Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1987). I n Johnson, the First Circuit held that, because of their quasi-judicial role, members of the R h o d e Island Parole Board were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all actions taken w ith in the scope of their official duties. See 815 F.2d at 6­8. The First Circuit joined the Ninth C irc u it in qualifying that absolute immunity would be granted only for actions within the scope o f a parole board member's official duties, "i.e., in processing parole applications and deciding w h e th e r to grant, deny, or revoke parole." Id. at 6. It is clear from the record that the D e f e n d a n ts perform the same quasi-judicial functions of processing and deciding parole a p p lic a tio n s as performed by the Rhode Island Parole Board members in Johnson.

F u rth e rm o re , Plaintiff makes no argument that the alleged delay in holding his initial hearing w a s attributable to an action outside the scope of Defendants' duties. We find that Defendants' q u a s i-ju d ic ia l role confers absolute immunity upon them for their actions in this case. Having d e c id e d the that Defendants are immune from suit, we need not reach the merits of Plaintiff's c la im of a due-process violation.

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F o r the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT Defendants' summary-judgment motion (D o c k e t No. 60). We DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' complaint against all

re m a in in g defendants. I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 30th day of November, 2010. s/J o s é Antonio Fusté JO S E ANTONIO FUSTE C h ie f U.S. District Judge