RODRIGUEZ-RIVERA et al v. Pereira-Castillo et al

Filing 59

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 3/8/2010.(THD)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 D e f e n d a n ts

I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO V IR G E N RODRIGUEZ-RIVERA, et al. Plaintiffs v. M IG U E L PEREIRA-CASTILLO, et al. C iv il No. 09-1426

OPINION & ORDER O n October 1, 2009, Co-defendants Zoraida Torres-De-Jesús ("Torres"), Gressel AcostaV é le z ("Acosta") and Salinas Detention Center ("SDC")filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 1 9 ) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Hector M. Fontanez-Rivera ("Fontanez") and Jose M orales-P erez ("Morales")(Docket # 44)(collectively, "Defendants") , filed motions for joinder to the Motion to Dismiss on December 14, 2009 (Docket # 35) and January 22, 2010 (Docket # 44) respectively. Plaintiffs have filed an Opposition (Docket # 21) to the original Motion to D is m is s , and a Renewed Opposition (Docket # 46) taking into account Fontanez and Morales' m o tio n s for joinder. After reviewing the pleadings and the applicable law, the Motion to D is m is s is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Factual and Procedural Background T h e facts constituting the present action began on May 14, 2009, when minor J.C.S.R. w a s detained pending a hearing for an unknown offense at SDC, a juvenile correctional facility, a d m in is te re d and owned by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth") Department o f Correction and Rehabilitation's ("Puerto Rico Corrections") Administration of Juvenile In stitu tio n s ("Juvenile Corrections").1 1 Dockets ## 1 at 8-9 & 46. Plaintiffs are Virgen
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The Managing Director of Juvenile Corrections submitted an affidavit on February 2, 2010, affirming that SDC is ". . . p r o p e r ty of the Administration of Juvenile Institutions has been administered since it was acquired in June 2003 in all its a s p e c ts by the Administration of Juvenile Institutions." Docket # 47-2.

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R o d rig u e z -R iv e ra ("Rodriguez"), individually and in representation of her minor son J.C.S.R., L u is Ramon-Jimenez-Delgado ("Jimenez"), and the Rodriguez-Jimenez Conjugal Partnership. T h e y first allege that upon J.C.S.R.'s intake to SDC he was not properly interviewed or e x a m in e d , and then assigned to Cell Block B. Docket # 1 at 9. The Complaint also avers that C e ll Block B contained the general, juvenile, inmate population, and that J.C.S.R. should not h a v e been assigned there.2 F u rth e rm o re , they allege that of the approximately fifteen (15) minors in Cell Block B, a p p ro x im a te ly four (4) required special supervision.3 Id. More importantly, Plaintiffs allege that a s result of the consent decree in U.S. v. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Civ. No. 94-2080 (D .P .R . 1994), the ratio of minor detainees to corrections officers should never exceed eight (8) to one (1), significantly lower than the fifteen (15) to one (1) ration averred for SDC in the C o m p la in t. Plaintiffs also allege that the dormitory rooms in Cell Block B should have been locked, b u t were left open, despite the fact that allegedly "[i]t was well known for more than a year that R o o m 204 of Cell Block B was unlocked and was a security threat . . ." Id. At approximately 8 :1 5 p.m. on May 15, 2008, when the lone guard, Officer Carlos Alvarez ("Alvarez"), was d istrib u tin g snacks, four (4) other juveniles attacked J.C.S.R. with a shank thirty six (36) times, p u n c tu rin g both of his lungs. The gist of the Complaint is that the attack occurred due to o v e rc ro w d in g and the fact that J.C.S.R.'s dormitory room was left unlocked. No reasons are p ro f f e re d explaining Plaintiffs' theory why the doors to Cell Block 8 should have been locked a t 8:15 p.m.

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The reasoning behind this averment is not included in the Complaint.

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T h e details of why they allegedly required special supervision, what type of supervision was required, or how this in fo r m a tio n is known, have not been plead.

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A f te r the attack, Plaintiffs allege unnamed guards made J.C.S.R. walk to the infirmary, a n d that he was not taken to Cristo Redentor Episcopalian Hospital ("Hospital") until a p p ro x im a te ly two (2) hours after the attack, despite his allegedly great anguish. J.C.S.R. was a ls o allegedly transported in a private vehicle, and not an ambulance. Docket # 1 at 10. Rodriguez received notice of her son's injuries between 12:00 and 1:00 a.m. that same night. At Hospital, J.C.S.R. underwent surgery, which involved the intubation of his lungs, and w a s released from Hospital on May 20, 2008. Id. Two days later he returned to Hospital, due to unmentioned medical complications, where he stayed as an inpatient for two more days, until M a y 26, 2008. Id. at 11. As a result of the abovementioned facts, Plaintiffs have brought claims against D e f e n d a n ts pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the U n ite d States under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 ("Section 1983"). Plaintiffs also bring causes of action u n d e r the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in particular: Art. II, §§ 1 , 7, and 12, the fifth clause of § 20 of Art. II, and Art. VI, §19 of the Constitution of the C o m m o n w e a lth of Puerto Rico, and Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. 31 L.P.R.A. § 5 1 2 6 . Because Defendants' Motion to Dismiss focuses on only the federal causes of action, th is Opinion & Order will not discuss the local law claims. Standard of Review It is well known that, "the general rules of pleading require `a short and plain statement o f the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Gargano v. Liberty Int'l U n d e rw rite rs , 572 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The purpose of this is to give a defendant fair notice of the claims against him and their grounds. Id. (citing Bell Atl. C o rp . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Therefore, " e v e n under the liberal pleading standards of FED. R. CIV. P. 8, the Supreme Court has recently

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h e ld that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege `a plausible entitlement to re lie f .'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 1 2 7 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed factual allegations, the

" p la u sib ility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer p o s s ib il i t y that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965; see also A s h c ro f t v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A plaintiff's obligation to "provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires m o re than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action w ill not do." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965. That is, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the c o m p la in t are true." Parker v. Hurley, 514 F. 3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2008). Of course, this Court n e e d not give credence to ". . .conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of f u rth e r factual enhancement." Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing A s h c ro f t v. Igbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1960, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. a t1 9 4 9 . Applicable Law & Analysis E le v e n th Amendment as to SDC T h e Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: [ t]h e Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any s u it in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

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CIVIL NO. 09-1426 (SEC) b y Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. C o n s t. Am. XI.4

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A lth o u g h the Eleventh Amendment literally seems to apply only to suits against a State b y citizens of another State, the Supreme Court has consistently extended the scope of this A m e n d m e n t to suits by citizens against their own State. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of A la . v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 7 2 -7 3 (2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The Commonwealth enjoys the same E le v e n th Amendment immunities as a State. See Jusino-Mercado v. Commonwealth of Puerto R ic o , 214 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000); Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 145 F.3d 410 (1st Cir. 1998). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bar extends to governmental instrumentalities w h ic h are an arm or alter ego of the State. See Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism C o . of P.R., 818 F.2d. 1034, 1036 (1st Cir. 1987); Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U .S . 89, 100 (1984); Colon-Andino v. Toledo-Davila, 634 F.Supp. 220, 230 (D.P.R. 2009). This Court will take judicial notice that Puerto Rico Corrections, and by extension J u v e n ile Corrections, constitute an arm or alter ego of the Commonwealth.5 T h e re f o re , both Puerto Rico Corrections and Juvenile Corrections are dependencies of the Commonwealth, and p ro te c te d by immunity. Furthermore, Defendants have proffered an affidavit affirming that S D C was run by and belonged to Juvenile Corrections at the time of the incident, and continues to be run by said agency. Docket # 47-2. Therefore, the applicability of Eleventh Amendment im m u n ity appears pellucid.6

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The Supreme Court has established that the Eleventh Amendment protection primarily furthers two goals: the p r o te c tio n of a state's treasury and the protection of its dignitary interest of not being haled into federal court. F r e s e n iu s Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 6 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)). 53 This fact is not contested by Defendants. Docket # 21 at 2. 6 T h is particular point of the motion to dismiss involves an issue of jurisdiction, so examining the abovementioned d o c u m e n t does not automatically convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, because to the extent th is Court ". . . engages in jurisdictional fact-finding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations." Dynamic

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In light of the above, all claims against SDC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. D e s p ite this ruling, should evidence appear that SDC's ownership or operation is private, and th a t the affidavit is false, this Court will reopen the issue. However, at present it appears to be a n open and shut matter. . S e c tio n 1983 Claims by Rodriguez, Jimenez, and the Rodriguez-Jimenez Conjugal P a r tn e r s h ip S u its under Section 1983 must be brought by the individual affected by the allegedly u n c o n s titu tio n a l acts or omissions. Nunez Gonzalez v. Vazquez Garced, 389 F. Supp.2d 214, 2 1 8 (D.P.R. 2005). As a result, family members cannot bring a pendant Section 1983 claim for th e ir own suffering, "unless the constitutionally defective conduct or omission was directed at th e family relationship." Id.; see also Robles-Vazquez v. Garcia, 110 F.3d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1 9 9 7 ). In this case, no specific acts by Defendants are alleged to have affected J.C.S.R., R o d rig u e z , and Jimenez's family relationship. True, Plaintiffs do allege that SDC officials did n o t contact Rodriguez until various hours after the attack, but this can hardly be construed as a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, as will be discussed below. Nor can th is Court find a takings issue because, Rodriguez and Jimenez ". . . were forced to make at least tw o trips daily between their home in Yabucoa and the hospital." Docket # 21 at 6. In light of th is , all Section 1983 claims by Rodriguez, Jimenez, and the Rodriguez-Jimenez Conjugal P a rtn e rs h ip are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. E ig h th Amendment The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment, applicable to th e states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual p u n ish m e n ts on those convicted of crimes." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1 9 9 1 )(e m p h a s is added); see also Martinez-Rivera v. Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 9 (1 st Cir. 2007). The
I m a g e Technologies, Inc. v. U.S., 221 F. 3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2000).

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a m e n d m e n t also covers "deprivations that were not specifically part of the sentence but were s u f f e re d during imprisonment." Seiter, 502 U.S. at 297. However, the Eighth Amendment only c o m e s into play after there has been a formal adjudication of guilt, through a criminal p ro s e c u tio n , in accordance with due process of law. Martínez-Rivera, 498 F. 3d at 9 (stating that " b e c a u s e there had been no formal adjudication of guilt against [Plaintiffs] at the time of the a lle g e d constitutional deprivation, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable and any claim brought o n that theory was properly dismissed."); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 4 6 3 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983) (affirming the necessity of " . . .a f o rm a l adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.") (quoting Ingraham v. W rig h t, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977)). F u rth e rm o re , "only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eight A m e n d m e n t." Seiter, 502 U.S. at 297. None of these circumstances exist at present, as least with re g a rd s to those Defendants alleged to have acted under the color of state law. Plaintiff has not a lle g e d that he was both convicted and imprisoned, after a formal process of adjudication, nor d o e s he claim to have been subjected to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as p u n ish m e n t. On the contrary, this case involves a temporary detention prior to a juvenile p ro c e e d in g . The attack was perpetrated by other juvenile detainees, and, while conceivably n e g lig e n t, nothing indicates either SDC's staff's alleged short delay in taking J.C.S.R. to H o s p i ta l, or their asking him to walk to the infirmary, were wanton infliction of pain or d e lib e ra te indifference to medical needs. Id. Therefore, the Eight Amendment claims must be D I S M I S S E D WITH PREJUDICE. . F o u r te e n th Amendment Due Process Substantive due process claims may be pled under two (2) different theories: 1) by p ro v in g that the state's conduct "shocks the conscience" or 2) by demonstrating the "deprivation

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o f an identified liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Brown v . Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1st Cir. 1995). Fourteenth Amendment s u b s ta n tiv e due process claims generally are reviewed under the `shocks the conscience' test to the alleged state action. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 272 (1st Cir. 2009); see also E s p in o z a v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009). Under this theory, "[t]he substantive c o m p o n e n t of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action `when it can properly be c h a ra c te riz e d as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.'" Id. (quoting C o u n ty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998)). Moreover, " . . . the Supreme Court h a s been firm in its reluctance to expand the doctrine of substantive due process. . . because of th is resistance toward expanding the reach of substantive due process that the official conduct `m o s t likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level' is `conduct intended to injure in some way u n ju stif ia b le by any government interest.'" Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 273 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 9 )(q u o tin g Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003)). Furthermore, qualified immunity must also be assessed, and "analyzing the pleadings u n d e r Iqbal . . . [the Complaint must] . . . allege a sufficient connection between [Defendants] a n d the alleged conscience-shocking behavior." Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 273. "A government o f f ic ia l who himself inflicts truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable harm on a person or h is property may be liable. . ." for a substantive due process violation. Id. at 274 (1st Cir.

2 0 0 9 ). In sum, under the shocks the conscience due process standard, the Complaint must a lle g e , as to each defendant, that he or she was personally involved in conscious shocking b e h a v io r,5 described as "`arbitrary and capricious,' or [running] counter to `the concept of o rd e r e d liberty,' or [. . .] which, in context, appear[s] `shocking or violative of universal
5

T h is Case has problems with how it is plead, which can be construed as a series of "bare assertions" insufficient to survive th e pleadings stage. Id.

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s ta n d a rd s of decency.'" Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 0 )(c itin g Brown, 68 F.3d at 531. This is a very restrictive standard as pertains to the actual behavior of the government o f f ic ia ls , but, as mentioned above, there is another path for plaintiffs if they ". . . demonstrate a deprivation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t." Cruz-Erazo, 212 F.3d at 622. Therefore, in order to examine the pleadings and th e particular case at hand, it is important to sketch the contours of substantive due process, e s p e c ia lly as applied to prisoners and others similarly confined in government custody. This s ta rts by pointing out ". . .the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act o f an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. W illia m s , 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Importantly, "[a]s a general proposition, a state's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of due process." N ic in i v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (invoking Deshaney v. Winnebago County D e p 't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989). Notwithstanding the above, substantive due process does ". . . require[] the State to p ro v id e involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure th e ir `reasonable safety' from themselves and others." Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (citing Y o u n g b e rg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-315 (1982)); see also Revere v. Massachusetts G e n e ra l Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Cote v. Maloney, 152 Fed. Appx. 6, 7 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 5 ). Such a duty flows from the `historic liberty interest' in personal security enshrined in the D u e Process Clause. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. The reasoning is that by limiting an in d iv id u a l's ability to provide his own protection, or "act on his own behalf," the State imposes a n affirmative duty on itself. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200. Deshaney surmised that Youngberg a n d Revere came to the limited conclusion ". . . that when the State takes a person into its

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c u s to d y and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding d u ty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id. Therefore, it is o n ly logical to assume this also applies to juvenile detainees awaiting hearing. In the context of Section 1983, as applied to the government actors in the present action, th is Court must ask, ". . . if, at the time of the alleged violation, `the contours of the right [are] s u f f ic ie n tly clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that rig h t." Brown, 68 F.3d at 531 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 5 2 3 , 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987)). Given Daniels established that merely negligent acts do not give ris e to due process claims, but that Youngberg and Deshaney affirm the right to reasonable s a f e t y for those in government custody, this Court must decide if Defendants knowingly d e p riv e d J.C.S.R. of his right to reasonable safety while at SDC. Before fully discussing the matter of J.C.S.R.'s substantive rights to safe detention c o n d itio n s , this Court notes that it does not find that any of the behavior described in the C o m p la in t passes the "shocks the conscience" test. The filtering and assignment of J.C.S.R. to th e cell block in question certainly does not fit under this analysis, because beyond mentioning th e U.S. v. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico consent decree, Plaintiffs have not alleged that S D C officials had any reason to believe, besides the alleged ratio of guards to juveniles, that C e ll Block B was particularly dangerous. The same applies to leaving Cell Block B's doors u n lo c k e d , especially at an hour of the evening (around 8:00 p.m.), when it is entirely c o n c e iv a b le to believe that the juveniles would not have been required to be in lock-down. F u rth e rm o re , the attack, while very disturbing, was perpetrated by other detainees, not SDC o f f ic ia ls , and the alleged actions of asking J.C.S.R. to walk to the infirmary after the attack, and th e short delay in taking J.C.S.R. to Hospital can hardly been construed as shocking or violative o f universal standards of decency. However, given J.C.S.R.'s substantive due process liberty

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in te re s t in safe confinement conditions and adequate medical care while under SDC's custody, th is Court's analysis cannot stop with the "shocks the conscience" test. Failure to Promptly Obtain Qualified Medical Treatment Plaintiffs allege that various Defendants, among them Torres, Acosta, Fontanez, and M o ra le s , had a duty to provide J.C.S.R. with access to qualified medical treatment within a re a s o n a b le time after his injuries, but failed to do so by making him: 1) walk to the infirmary a n d 2) waiting approximately two hours before bringing him to Hospital. Docket # 1 at 16. Failure to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals can constitute a violation of th e Eighth Amendment. Rivera v. Alvarado, 240 F. Supp. 2d 136, 142 (D.P.R. 2003); see also E s te lle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Therefore, in light of Youngberg's reasoning, the same s h o u ld also extend to pretrial juvenile detainees under the substantive Due Process Clause. The E ig h th Amendment uses a two-pronged test requiring a serious deprivation of medical care, and f o r the defendant to have been deliberately indifferent to the failure to provide care. Id. (stating " (1 ) the alleged deprivation must be objectively sufficiently serious and, (2) the defendants must h a v e a culpable state of mind, meaning that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the in m a te 's health or safety."). The courts have established that the protections offered to pretrial d e ta in e e s and mental health patients should be no weaker than those offered by the Eighth A m e n d m e n t. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-316. Accordingly, if the Complaint pleads plausible f a c ts that SDC officials were knowingly indifferent to J.C.S.R.'s pain, or other serious medical n e e d s , the claim is sufficient to survive the pleadings stage for this cause of action. The facts of the Complaint do not support such a conclusion. To the contrary, they show th a t J.C.S.R. was taken to the infirmary almost immediately, and then to Hospital in the hours f o llo w in g the attack. While the delay in bringing J.C.S.R. to Hospital appears to be possibly lo n g e r than the highest standards of care might require, it would be speculative to conclude it

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e q u a te d to any deliberate denial of medical care, rather, at most it points towards negligence, w h ic h is not covered by Section 1983. Here, the medical indifference allegations, even when seen in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, cannot lead to a conclusion that Defendants were deliberately, or knowingly, in d if f e re n t to J.C.S.R.'s medical needs after the attack. This would be entirely different if the a lle g a tio n s suggested that SDC officials intentionally left J.C.S.R. to suffer, or otherwise acted to deny him care. Moreover, the Complaint does not include any non-conclusory pleadings that th e injuries appeared life threatening, or that J.C.S.R. has continued to suffer because of the s h o rt, alleged, delay in bringing him to Hospital. There he received treatment, which Plaintiffs a lle g e was negligent under Article 1802, but Hospital's standard of care is beyond the ambit of S e c tio n 1983. Even when given all possible positive inferences, Plaintiffs' allegations of deprivation o f medical treatment are little "more than [] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me a c c u s a tio n [ s ]," which is what Iqbal proscribed, when it stated "labels and conclusions" or "a f o rm u la ic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.6 T h is Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a valid claim of d e p riv a tio n of medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. Therefore, said claim is hereby D I S M I S S E D WITH PREJUDICE against all Defendants. Failure to Protect What remains to consider are the allegations of dangerous conditions in Cell Block B. O n e case analyzing a similar issue, albeit under the Eighth Amendment, found that a Section 1 9 8 3 claim for unsafe prison conditions requires showing conditions that present a substantial ris k for harm, and deliberate indifference to said conditions on the part of the defendants. In o rd e r to satisfy the above, Defendants would have had to have received notice or possessed

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k n o w le d g e of circumstances, within their control, that should have made them aware that a c tio n s were needed to ensure the safety of the juvenile detainees, but, despite awareness of the s itu a tio n , they were still deliberately indifferent to them. Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F.Supp. 830, 8 3 6 -8 3 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (elaborating the standard created in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 8 2 9 (1994)). That is, the allegations must show that SDC officials knew of and disregarded s u b s ta n tia l risks to J.C.S.R.'s safety. Id. There are three factual allegations underlying the claim for unconstitutional deprivation o f J.C.S.R.: 1) there were 15 minors in Cell Block B and only one (1) guard; 2) the door to R o o m 204 was left unlocked; 3) SDC employees improperly screened J.C.S.R. upon his arrival a t the facility, and endangered him by placing him in a cell block with other inmates in Cell B lo c k B. Docket # 1 at 11-12. These will be analyzed for sufficiency under Twombly and Iqbal a s to Torres, Acosta, Fontanez, Morales, and the Complaint as a whole. Sufficiency of the Pleadings & Qualified Immunity According to the Complaint, both Torres and Acosta worked as social workers at SDC. P la in tif f s allege that they were entrusted with screening and admitting J.C.S.R. Docket # 1 at 7 , 9, & 11. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, including Torres and Acosta, knew of the allegedly d a n g e ro u s staffing situation and that Room 204 in Cell Block B was left unlocked, and that this p re s e n te d a danger to J.C.S.R. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific instructions w e re violated or other cognizable facts as to why J.C.S.R. should have not been assigned to Cell B lo c k B.6 They allege four (4) of the other juveniles in Cell Block B had "special needs" but
6

General Relevant Facts as pled in the Complaint (Docket # 1 at 9): 2 8 . The Plaintiff J.C.S.R. was not properly interviewed and examined upon arrival at th e Salinas Detention Center on May 14, 2008. 2 9 . Plaintiff J.C.S.R. was assigned to Cell Block B of the Salinas Detention Center. 3 0 . Cell Block B includes a dormitory area in which detainees are housed, and a c o m m o n area. 3 1 . One of the dormitory rooms in Cell Block B, Room 204, should have been locked

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d o not specify why SDC staff should have known this might have created a dangerous situation. Furthermore, nothing in the Complaint suggests that either Torres or Acosta, as Social Workers, h a d anything to do with determining the conditions of supervision within the holding cells. A g a in , no theory has been given as to why leaving Room 204 unlocked created a substantial risk f o r harm, nor why Torres and Acosta should have known about the alleged dangers. The

C o m p la in t also alleges that Torres and Acosta were indifferent to proper procedures, but does n o t even cite which procedures were omitted, or which others should have been followed. After reviewing the Complaint, this Court must conclude that Defendants have not a lle g e d specific facts suggesting Torres or Acosta had any actual knowledge of a substantial s e c u rity risk to J.C.S.R. in particular. The Complaint makes various allegations as to general s a f e ty conditions, but none are substantiated, or explained as to the individual defendants, e s p e c ia lly SDC's social workers. As to Torres and Acosta, Plaintiffs have only proffered f o rm u la ic and conclusory "defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation[s]." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. a t 1949. Therefore, all claims against them must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for f a ilin g to state a plausible claim for relief.

but was not. 3 2 . It was well known for more than a year that Room 204 of Cell Block B was u n lo c k e d and was a security threat, which threat could readily be removed by the simple e x p e d ie n t of installing a proper lock. 3 3 . According to the decree in U.S. v. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Civil A c tio n No. 94-2080-CC (1994), there should be one corrections officer for every eight m in o r s on the day and evening shift, and more if any of the minors require special supervision. 3 4 . Upon information and belief, on May 15, 2008, there were approximately 15 m in o r s in Cell Block B, and approximately four of them required special supervision. 3 5 . Upon information and belief, on May 15, 2008, Corrections Officer Carlos A lv a r e z was the sole officer present In Cell Block B. 3 6 . On May 15, 2009 rather than keeping minor Plaintiff J.C.S.R. separate from the r e s t of the population, he was placed with the rest of the inmate population. 3 7 . At approximately 8:15 P.M. of May 15, 2008, while Officer Carlos Alvarez was d is tr ib u tin g snacks, detained minors J.A.C.P.; L.O.; J.M. and L.A. viciously and without p r o v o c a tio n attacked minor Plaintiff J.C.S.R. in room 204 and stabbed him at least thirty-six times with a shank.

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W ith regards to Fontanez, Director of Security at Puerto Rico Corrections, and Morales, w h o Plaintiffs allege acted as head of security at SDC, the analysis must be different because th e y are implicated via having exercised supervisory roles within Puerto Rico Corrections. T h e re is no respondeant superior liability under Section 1983, and supervisors must be found lia b le on the basis of their own acts or omissions. That is, "a supervisory official may be held lia b le for the behavior of his subordinates only if `(1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results i n a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]'s action or inaction was affirmative[ly] lin k [ e d ] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory e n c o u ra g e m e n t, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate in d if f e re n c e .'" Pineda v. Toorney, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Lipsett v. University o f Puerto Rico, 864 F.3d 881, 902 (1 st Cir. 1988)). T h i s Court has taken judicial notice of the consent decree and enforcement actions c u rre n tly underway in U.S. v. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs also allege that D e f e n d a n ts knew "that there existed a pervasive risk that detainees housed in Cell Block B in tro d u c e d and harbored weapons." Id. at 13. There are also allegations regarding the risk p re s e n te d by leaving Room 204 unlocked, but no specific allegations as to a particularly d a n g e ro u s situation for J.C.S.R.. The presence of the consent decree itself cannot create a u to m a tic liability for all SDC employees. The Complaint must have pled facts allowing for a re a s o n a b le inference that Defendants were indifferent to the allegedly dangerous conditions in C e ll Block B. In light of this, this Court concludes that Morales, as head of security of SDC, would h a v e plausibly had information regarding the consent decree, and number of guards needed, as w e ll as the conditions regarding the door in Cell Block B. His job also would have imposed u p o n him a positive duty to remedy any immediate dangers. Thus, failing to act upon

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k n o w le d g e of the staffing problem, or the security situation inside Cell Block B, could c o n s titu te knowing indifference to serious security threats to J.C.S.R.'s `reasonable safety' e x p e c ta tio n s. This Court cannot, at present, conclude what Morales knew or did not know. H o w e v e r, if the facts of the complaint are correct, then it is plausible that Morales would have b e e n responsible for the safety situation in Cell Block B, and, should have known about the o v e rc ro w d in g and problems with the door. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss as to the Section 1 9 8 3 claims against him regarding the security situation must be DENIED. Fontanez's agency-wide position, when compared to Morales'rol at SDC, was farther re m o v e d , and no facts in the Complaint connect him directly with the daily administration of S D C , nor do they suggest how he would have personally known about the situation in Cell B lo c k B. Because the consent decree could not itself alert him to the present situation, this C o u rt finds that the facts in their entirety do not plead a plausible claim for relief against F o n ta n e z under Section 1983. The Motion to Dismiss is thus GRANTED at to Fontanez. A lo n g this same line of reasoning, this Court notes that the claims against Miguel Pereira C a s tillo ("Pereira"), Secretary of Puerto Rico Corrections, and Evaristo Cruz Morales ("Cruz"), D ire c to r of Classification for Puerto Rico Corrections appear to fall into the same category as th o s e against Fontanez. However, a ruling cannot be made on said point at present, and will be d e f e rre d until such time that it is brought before this Court. Civil Contempt To enforce a consent decree a party should recur to the court that entered the consent d e c re e , in instances, such as the present, where said court has retained jurisdiction. In general, " [ i]f the plaintiff (the party obtaining the writ) believes that the defendant (the enjoined party) is failing to comply with the decree's mandate, the plaintiff moves the court to issue an order t o show cause why the defendant should not be adjudged in civil contempt and sanctioned."

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R e yn o ld s v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); 13-65 Moore's Federal Practice C iv il § 65.81. If satisfied that the plaintiff sketches a situation of non-compliance, the defendant is asked to show cause, and a hearing is then held to determine compliance. Id. This Court understands that the civil contempt power for U.S. v. the Commonwealth of P u e rto Rico, Civ. No. 94-2080, resides with the judge who presided said case, because it is he o r she who retains personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a particular to enforce the consent d e c re e . Puerto Rico Corrections and the United States Department of Justice remain active in th e implementation of the same. Therefore, this Court finds that any enforcement of the consent d e c re e should be pursued under the aforementioned case. Therefore, this issue is DISMISSED W I T H O U T PREJUDICE. Another issue is whether Plaintiffs have standing to seek e n f o rc e m e n t of said consent decree, but that is not properly before this Court, and will not be a d d resse d . Conclusion In light of the above, all claims against SDC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as a re those against TORRES, ACOSTA, and FONTANEZ. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims under th e Eighth Amendment, and for failure to promptly obtain qualified medical treatment are also D IS M IS S E D WITH PREJUDICE, along with Rodriguez, Jimenez, and the Rodriguez-Jimezez C o n ju g a l Partnership's individual claims under Section 1983. The motion for civil contempt is a ls o DENIED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. So Ordered. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th day of March, 2010. S /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U .S . Senior District Judge