Lugo v. Avon Products, Inc.
Filing
86
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 66 MOTION to Alter Judgment. Signed by Judge Juan M Perez-Gimenez on 5/10/2011.(PMA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LAURA LUGO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
AVON PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Laura Lugo (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Lugo”) filed this
action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA” or “the
Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 623, against her former employer Avon Products, Inc.
(“Avon” or “Defendant” or “the Company”), alleging discrimination on the basis
of age and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. See Docket No. 1.
Specifically, Lugo claims that she was the victim of harassment and a hostile
work environment and that she was transferred and eventually fired in
violation of the Act. See id. Lugo also pleads supplemental state law claims
for age discrimination under Puerto Rico’s anti-discrimination statute, Law
No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (“Law No. 100”), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146, et
seq.; Puerto Rico’s wrongful termination statute, Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976
(“Law No. 80”), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185, et seq.; and, Puerto Rico’s
general tort statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (“Article
1802”), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141.
Upon careful review, the Court granted in part and denied in part Avon’s
motion for summary judgment in an Opinion and Order of March 1, 2011. See
Docket No. 62. Therein, the Court dismissed Lugo’s discriminatory transfer and
hostile work environment claims under ADEA; however, the Plaintiff’s ADEA
termination and retaliation claims, as well as her supplemental state law
claims, remained pending disposition. See id.
Shortly thereafter, Avon filed a motion for reconsideration seeking that
the Court amend its ruling. See Docket No. 66. The Plaintiff timely opposed
said motion (Docket No. 73) and the Defendant repled (Docket No. 75). For the
reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
Defendant’s motion.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 2
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) allows a party, within twenty-eight (28) days of the
entry of judgment, to file a motion seeking to alter or amend said judgment.
The rule itself does not specify on what grounds the relief sought may be
granted, and courts have ample discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny
such a motion. See Venegas–Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190
(1st Cir.2004) (citations omitted). In exercising that discretion, courts must
balance the need for giving finality to judgments with the need to render a
just decision. Id. (citing Edward H. Bolin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355
(5th Cir.1993)). Despite the lack of specific guidance by the rule on that
point, the First Circuit has stated that a Rule 59(e) motion “must either
clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered
evidence.” F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992)
(citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.1986)).
Rule 59(e) may not, however, be used to raise arguments that could and should
have been presented before judgment was entered, nor to advance new legal
theories. See Bogosonian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 323 F.3d 55, 72 (1st
Cir.2003).
II. DISCUSSION
A. ADEA Retaliation Claim
In our Opinion and Order of March 1st, 2011 (Docket No. 62), the Court
found that the Defendant limited its discussion in favor of the entry of
summary judgment as to Lugo’s ADEA retaliation claim on the lack of temporal
proximity between her protected conduct and her termination, thus failing to
address adverse employment acts that arguably took place shortly after Lugo
complained of discrimination, such as her negative job evaluation and her
placement in a probationary period. See Docket No. 62. Avon now requests that
this Court reconsider its ruling. See Docket No. 66. Avon explains that it had
focused its discussion of the ADEA retaliation claim on Plaintiff’s discharge
because a retaliatory termination was the only claim it was defending against
pursuant to Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and during the discovery
process. Avon argues that because Plaintiff did not allege or disclose that
Avon also retaliated against her by placing her in a probationary period or
by taking any other adverse employment action, the Plaintiff was enjoined from
arguing in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment that any adverse
employment action other than her termination precluded the entry of summary
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 3
judgment as to the ADEA retaliation claim.1 See Docket No. 66. In her response
(Docket No. 73), the Plaintiff raised several arguments, which will be
addressed in turn.
The Plaintiff first argues that her allegations in the complaint comply
with the tenets of FED.R.CIV.P. 8, and thus, enough facts were alleged to
sustain a claim of retaliation under ADEA. See Docket No. 73 at page 6. In our
Opinion and Order, we specifically held that adverse employment actions (other
than her termination) prevented the entry of summary judgment as to Lugo’s
retaliation claim because they were temporally close to Lugo’s internal
complaint of discrimination. These adverse employment actions included, as
argued by the Plaintiff in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
the following:
(1) not following up on Lugo’s discrimination complaint
as required by Avon’s written policy of discrimination;
(2) trying to discredit Lugo’s performance by putting
her in a probationary period without documenting the
same as required by Avon’s probationary period policy;
(3) improperly assessing Lugo’s 2007 performance
evaluation as the worst performance in her 16 years of
employment with Avon; (4) failing to properly document
her performance evaluation; (5) failing to follow
Avon’s Performance Management Plan procedure in order
to ensure the proper documentation of the PMP; (5)
failure to properly document Lugo’s alleged failure to
perform on 2008; (6) failing to properly document
Lugo’s approval of the probationary period; and,
(7) failing to properly document Lugo’s achievements
after her probationary period ended.
See Docket No. 62 at page 21-22. However, the complaint states the following
relevant allegations as to Lugo’s claim of retaliation:
1. This action is brought pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter, “ADEA”),
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Puerto Rico’s Law No. 100 of
June 30, 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq., and Puerto
Rico’s Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a
et seq., seeking compensatory, double and liquidated
damages, severance pay, back pay, and equitable and
injunctive relief to seek redress for defendant’s
harassment, hostile work environment, retaliation
unlawful employment termination, and defendant’s
discriminatory practices against Plaintiff Laura Lugo
on the basis of age.
1
The Court notes that this argument could have more efficiently been raised in
Defendant’s reply memoranda, thereby obviating the need for a motion for reconsideration on
the matter. Nevertheless, we shall discuss it herein.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 4
31. On that same date, Plaintiff sent a letter to
Edgardo Ruiz, Avon’s Human Resources Director,
informing among other things, that her removal as
District Zone Manager for District Zone 23, was
addressed to compel Plaintiff’s resignation and that
said removal constituted discrimination on the basis of
age. This was not the only occasion that Plaintiff
complained and/or expressed her objections to the
employment actions taken against her because of her
age.
Fourth Cause of Action
Retaliation
67. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every
preceding paragraph as if fully set herein.
68. Plaintiff was dismissed after she complained about
the fact that her transfer from District Zone 23 to
District Zone 10 was because of her age. Defendant
conduct was willful and in reckless disregard of
Plaintiff’s federally and locally protected rights
under ADEA and Puerto Rico Law 100, as well as other
Puerto Rico statutory provisions. Accordingly Plaintiff
is entitle [sic] to damages, double damages, back pay,
reinstatement and/or front pay for those acts of
retaliation.
See Docket No. 1. As stems from the foregoing citation of the complaint, and
as pointed out by the Defendant, none of the additional adverse employment
actions that Plaintiff argued in her response to the motion for summary
judgment as being related to her retaliation claim were included in her
pleadings.
It is the law of this court, however, that “summary judgment is not a
procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.”
st
Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 24 (1
Fleming v.
Cir.1990).
[T]he necessary factual averments are required with
respect to each material element of the underlying
legal theory. … This burden, of course, rests squarely
upon the pleader; initial failure to satisfy the burden
in no way obligates the district court to allow the
parties an opportunity to offer matters outside the
pleadings.
Id. Furthermore, “[i]t simply will not do for a plaintiff to fail to plead
with adequate specificity facts to support a … claim, all-the-while hoping to
play that card if her initial hand is a dud.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 85 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Fleming, 922 F.2d
at 24). Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s ADEA retaliation claim
is limited to her termination as the adverse employment action that resulted
from engaging in protected conduct.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 5
Plaintiff also contends in its response that it could not have alleged
facts that were unknown to her at the time the complaint was filed and could
have only been raised after discovery was conducted.
In this case, plaintiff found out about Avon’s
departure from its policies and procedures regarding
the employment evaluation and probationary period only
after the production of documents were provided to
plaintiff, the depositions of Roxanna Vilella, Edgardo
Ruiz and Dennis Roman were taken and the probationary
period policy was provided. Plaintiff was prevented to
argue that this [sic] were adverse employment actions
until it had factual evidence that the same were
arbitrary and capriciously taken.
See Docket No. 73 at page 6. In reply, the Defendant purports that at the time
the complaint was filed, the Plaintiff must have had knowledge of some of the
other incidents which she now claims are retaliatory adverse employment
actions, such as her poor evaluation and her placement in a probationary
period, but failed to include them in the complaint. See Docket No. 75.
However, the Court notes that in the complaint Lugo alleges that she “not only
met Avon’s expectations and goals, and was commended for her work, but she was
never reprimanded for any failure or deficiency in the performance of her
job.” See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 26 (emphasis ours). At any rate, regardless of
whether Plaintiff knew, knew not, or should have known, the Court is certain
that at some point during the discovery process, which ended a year after the
complaint was filed, see Docket No. 33, the Plaintiff came across this
information. As a result, the Plaintiff now seeks leave to amend the complaint
under FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a) to include additional adverse employment actions as
part of its claim of retaliation, see Docket No. 73, but the Defendant opposes
the amendment in light of the untimeliness of this request, see Docket No. 75.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that “a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave.
The
court
should
freely
give
leave
when
justice
so
requires.”
FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2). The First Circuit Court of Appeals finds that “Rule
15(a) reflects a liberal amendment policy … .” U.S. ex rel. Gagne v. City of
Worcester, 565 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted). “Even
so, the district court enjoys significant latitude in deciding whether to
grant leave to amend, … . Reasons for denying leave include undue delay in
filing the motion, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies,
amendment.”
undue
Id.
prejudice
(internal
to
the
citations
opposing
omitted).
party,
In
her
and
futility
application,
of
the
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 6
Plaintiff appeals to the Rule’s call for justice, however, the interests of
justice must serve both plaintiffs and defendants equally. In the case at
hand, undue delay and undue prejudice to the opposing party prevent this Court
from allowing said leave on the eve of trial. See Kunelius v. Town of Stow,
588 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2009) (declining to find that district court abused
discretion in denying such a circuitous request for an amendment to the
complaint after summary judgment motions had been docketed).
Finally, the Defendant moves this Court to reconsider its ruling on
substantive grounds. Avon purports in its motion for reconsideration that this
Court should have ruled that due to lack of temporal proximity, no causal
connection could be found between Plaintiff’s protected conduct and her
termination, and thus, her ADEA retaliation claim should have been dismissed.
See Docket No. 66. In her response, the Plaintiff avers that temporal
proximity is not the only way to establish the required causal connection
requirement, and that the evidence submitted by Lugo at the summary judgment
stage, such as the evidence of disparate treatment, was sufficient to support
its case and deny summary judgment. See Docket No. 73. Avon replied, however,
that to the extent Plaintiff was unable to establish an element of the prima
facie case of retaliation under ADEA, the Plaintiff could not skip to the
pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas2 burden-shifting framework. See Docket
No. 75.
As previously set forth by this Court, where there is no direct evidence
of retaliation, the plaintiff may proceed to establish a prima facie case that
closely tracks the McDonnell Douglas framework: the plaintiff must show that
(1) she engaged in ADEA-protected conduct, (2) she was thereafter subjected
to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between
the protected conduct and adverse action. See Ramirez Rodriguez v. Boehringer
Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir.2005); see also
Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.2007) (noting that at
a bare minimum, this requires an employee to make a “colorable showing of a
causal connection” between his protected activity and the adverse employment
action). Furthermore, this Court also held that the temporal gap between
Lugo’s letter and her termination is “sufficiently large so that, without some
corroborative evidence, it will not support an inferred notion of a causal
connection between the two.” See Docket No. 62 at page 22 (emphasis ours).
2
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 7
It is firmly established caselaw that it remains the plaintiff’s burden
to
produce
evidence
discriminatory
biases
of
a
and
causal
the
connection
challenged
between
employment
a
defendant’s
action.
See
Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. P.R. 2010). “Such
evidence can be direct or circumstantial, and it can come in a wide variety
of forms.” Id. (citing Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir.
1991)). In Mesnick, an age discrimination and retaliation case, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[t]here are many sources of circumstantial
evidence that, theoretically, can demonstrate retaliation in a way sufficient
to leap the summary judgment or directed verdict hurdles.” Mesnick, 950 F.2d
at 828.
These include, but are not limited to, evidence of
differential treatment in the workplace, … ,
statistical evidence showing disparate treatment, … ,
temporal proximity of an employee’s protected activity
to an employer’s adverse action, … , and comments by
the employer which intimate a retaliatory mindset.
Whatever the sources of his proof, a plaintiff, in
order to survive judgment as a matter of law, must
present evidence from which a reasonable jury could
infer that the employer retaliated against him for
engaging in ADEA-protected activity.
Id. (internal citations omitted). In other words, “[w]hatever form the
evidence takes, … it must be sufficiently probative to support a finding that
the plaintiff’s protected activity … was a substantial or motivating factor
in the employment decision, that is, that the protected activity or status was
an impetus for, or moved the employer towards, the employment decision.”
Mercado-Berrios, 611 F.3d at 24 (citing Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.3d 18,
25 (1st Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is an uncontested fact that on September 21, 2007, Plaintiff’s
attorney sent a letter to Avon’s Director of Human Resources wherein Lugo
objected to her transfer on the basis of age discrimination. See Docket
No. 62. It is also undisputed that Avon discharged Lugo from her employment
on October 31, 2008, thirteen months after Plaintiff engaged in protected
conduct. See Docket No. 62. Because the Plaintiff was unable to establish
sufficient temporal proximity to establish a causal connection between the
protected conduct and the relevant adverse action, namely, her termination,
the Court must now determine whether the Plaintiff presented other forms of
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the
employer retaliated against the Plaintiff for engaging in ADEA-protected
activity. Pursuant to the applicable law, this evidence may consist of
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 8
evidence of disparate treatment or comments by the employer which suggest a
retaliatory animus.3
At the summary judgment stage, the Defendant set forth evidence to the
effect that Lugo received the lowest possible rating in her 2007 evaluation,
which was discussed in early 2008, and that she was placed in a probationary
period4 . It thus follows that Lugo’s evaluation took place shortly after her
internal complaint of age discrimination. Additionally, it was found to be an
uncontested fact that at least five (5) other Avon employees, who held similar
positions to that of Plaintiff’s, had serious performance problems, did not
improve their performance, but yet have continued working for Avon. See Docket
No. 62. Lugo also submitted, and was deemed a triable issue of fact, that she
was the victim of ageist comments on the part of her supervisors Dennis Roman
and Jose Quiñones. Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that enough
other circumstantial evidence of causal connection exists for a factfinder to
conclude that Plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of retaliation under
ADEA.
In Mesnick, the First Circuit also held that “courts confronted by
summary judgment motions must at this point focus on the ultimate question,
scrapping the burden-shifting framework in favor of considering the evidence
as a whole.” Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 827. “Thus, the critical inquiry becomes
whether the aggregate evidence of pretext and retaliatory animus suffices to
make out a jury question.” Id.
In our analysis of Lugo’s ADEA claim as to her termination, the Court
stated that to the extent the Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating
Plaintiff required us to make credibility determinations, the Court could not
encroach into what is so decidedly a duty for the jury. Moreover, the Court
also held that a reasonable factfinder could deem the Company’s deviations
from its policies, the disparate application thereof, as well as the matter
3
In its motion for reconsideration, the Defendant relies in part in the First Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, (1st
Cir.2004), in support of its argument that the lack of temporal proximity automatically
renders Plaintiff’s ADEA retaliation claim groundless. However, a careful reading of this
case deviates from Defendant’s application thereof. In Calero-Cerezo, the First Circuit held
that where the plaintiff “relies primarily on the timing of the employment actions as her
primary evidence of causal connection,” id. at 25 (emphasis ours), “ … the temporal
proximity must be very close.” Id. To that effect, the First Circuit stated that “[t]hree
and four month periods have been held insufficient to establish a causal connection based
on temporal proximity.” Id. at 25. Because the case now before the Court is not one in which
merely temporal proximity is asserted as evidence of a causal connection, its strict
application is inapposite.
4
See Docket No. 37-11 at page 95.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 9
of the ageist comments still in controversy, as evidence of pretext. See
Docket No. 62 at pages 16-18. In light of our duty to consider the evidence
as a whole at this stage of the proceedings, as well as our obligation to
examine the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Rochester Ford
Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002), we hereby hold
that sufficient evidence on record exists to permit a factfinder to conclude
that the Plaintiff can make out a case of retaliation under ADEA. As a result,
this
Court
is
precluded
from
summarily
disposing
of
said
claim,
and
Defendant’s motion to that effect must be DENIED.
B. State-Law Retaliation Claim
In our Opinion and Order (Docket No. 62), the Court failed to address the
merits of Plaintiff’s state-law claims inasmuch as Plaintiff’s ADEA claims
remained pending. See Docket No. 62. However, the Defendant now argues that
this Court should have dismissed Plaintiff’s retaliation claim pursuant to
local law. Avon asserts that a state-law cause of action for retaliation as
a result of an internal complaint simply does not exist. According to
Defendant, a retaliation cause of action is recognized in Act No. 115 of
December 20, 1991, 29 L.P.R.A. § 194-194b (2001) (“Law No. 115”), not Law
No. 100, as cited by the Plaintiff in the complaint. Nevertheless, the
protection afforded by Law No. 115 is only extended to employees who file or
participate in charges, complaints, or proceedings before a legislative,
administrative or judicial forum. See Docket No. 66. In her opposition,
Plaintiff counters that she has a cognizable claim for retaliation as a result
of her internal complaint pursuant to Law No. 115 because in her internal
complaint letter she communicated to Avon “her intention to seek judicial
action … .” See Docket No. 73 (emphasis ours).
Law 115 provides that an employer may not discharge, threaten, or
discriminate against an employee should the employee “offer or attempt to
offer, verbally or in writing, any testimony, expression or information before
a legislative, administrative or judicial forum in Puerto Rico.” P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 29, § 194a (emphasis ours).
The Court first notes that an important semantic difference exists
between having the intention of carrying out an act versus attempting to carry
out the same act, the latter being what the law requires. In other words, the
complaint letter may have stated that taking judicial action against Avon was
on Lugo’s mind, but it was not until she was terminated that she carried out
conscientious efforts and activity intended in so accomplishing.
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 10
Nevertheless, this Court has previously held that “Law 115 does not
prohibit retaliation in response to internal complaints, only offerings to a
judicial forum.” Cabrera v. Sears, Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc., No. 08-1325,
2009 WL 2461688, at *9 (D.P.R. August 10, 2009) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29,
§ 194a; Hoyos v. Telecorp Commc’ns., 405 F.Supp.2d 199, 207 (D.P.R.2005)). See
also Villanueva-Batista v. Doral Financial Corp., No. 08-1214, 2009 WL 4936396
(1st
Cir.
December
23,
2009)
(“Law
No.
115
protects
only
‘testimony,
expression or information … before a legislative, administrative, or judicial
forum,’ not internal complaints.”).
The Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that she offered or
attempted to offer testimony or information to a legislative, administrative
or judicial forum prior to her termination. Accordingly, the Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment dismissing Lugo’s state-law retaliation claim,
and thus, its motion for reconsideration is GRANTED on those grounds.
C. Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense
Finally, Avon purports in its motion for reconsideration that this Court
“concluded that the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is not available to
Avon, based on the fact that Avon did not investigate plaintiff’s internal
complaint of discrimination.” See Docket No. 66 at pages 8-9. The Defendant
misquotes the Court. In our Opinion and Order, the Court stated that the
Ellerth-Faragher5 defense is unavailable to Avon because Lugo was the victim
of tangible employment actions by the same supervisor who she alleges made
discriminatory comments regarding her age. See Docket No. 62 at page 19. We
reiterate our finding herein.
Although there is no affirmative defense if the hostile
environment “culminates in a tangible employment
action” against the employee, Ellerth, 524 U.S., at
765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, an employer does have a defense
“[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken” if it
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any” discriminatory conduct and “the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” ibid.
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson, 555 U.S. 271,
129 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (emphasis ours). Therefore, our ruling on the matter
stands and the Defendant’s motion is DENIED on those grounds.
5
See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
CIV. NO. 09-1522 (PG)
Page 11
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART Defendant’s motion for reconsideration (Dockets No. 66). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s state-law retaliation claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
However, Plaintiff’s ADEA retaliation claim remains and the Court maintains
its ruling that the Faragher/Ellerth defense is unavailable to the Defendant
for the reasons explained in our Opinion and Order of March 1st, 2011 (Docket
No. 62).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 10, 2011.
S/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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