Rodriguez v. Radio Shack et al
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER - GRANTING Defendant Radio Shack Corp.'s 12 Motion to Dismiss; FINDING AS MOOT Plaintiff's 17 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint; DENYING Plaintiff's 29 Motion Tendering Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Jaime Pieras, Jr. on 7/16/2010. (mld)
Rodriguez-Lizardi v. Radio Shack Corporation et al
Doc. 47
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PEDRO DANIEL RODRÍGUEZ-LIZARDI, Plaintiff v. CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP) RADIO SHACK CORPORATION, et al., Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Radio Shack Corporation's ("Radio Shack") motion to dismiss (No. 12), as well as Plaintiff Pedro Daniel Rodríguez-Lizardi's Plaintiff Rodríguez ("Rodríguez") filed this opposition lawsuit thereto (No. to the 22).1 Age
pursuant
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., alleging that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff Rodríguez on the basis of his age. In addition, Rodríguez alleges a claim of
retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
1.
P l a i n t i f f ' s opposition brief (No. 22) was filed late. Nevertheless, in the i n t e r e s t of considering the motion to dismiss on its merits, the Court will c o n s i d e r Plaintiff's opposition. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to a m e n d the complaint, in which Plaintiff inadvertently resubmitted the identical c o m p l a i n t which was originally submitted. The Court FINDS AS MOOT said motion ( N o . 17) in light of Plaintiff's subsequent motion (No. 29) tendering a second a m e n d e d complaint. The proffered second amended complaint does differ slightly f r o m the original complaint. However, the differences are minimal and do not a l t e r the analysis herein. The Court finds that the proposed amendments would b e futile, and therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion tendering a second amended c o m p l a i n t (No. 29). Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 5 5 3 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[I]f the proposed amendment would be futile b e c a u s e , as thus amended, the complaint still fails to state a claim, the d i s t r i c t court acts within its discretion in denying the motion to amend.") ( i n t e r n a l citations omitted).
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CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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Rodríguez also brings supplemental claims pursuant to the Puerto Rico Employment Discrimination Statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq. ("Law 100"); and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 ("Article 1802"). Defendant Radio Shack moves to dismiss the ADEA and Title VII claims, arguing that the amended complaint lacks sufficient
allegations to state a claim under either statute.
Defendant Radio
Shack also argues for dismissal of the Puerto Rico law claims with prejudice, or in the alternative requests that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Radio Shack's motion to dismiss (No. 12) is hereby GRANTED. I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff Rodríguez, age 56, alleges that he began working for Radio Shack on November 8, 1990, as a sales representative.
Plaintiff alleges that he has consistently performed his employment duties in a satisfactory manner, and has at times exceeded
expectations, as in 1991 when he was recognized as the best sales representative for attaining sales of $300,000.00. In 2006, Rodríguez was demoted to a part time position. Shortly thereafter, Radio Shack allegedly hired two employees who were younger than Rodríguez for full time positions. Rodríguez's schedule was subsequently reduced to three hours per week.
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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Plaintiff further alleges that in 2009, he received letters from supervisor Ahmed Vélez ("Vélez") in which Vélez harassed, In
intimidated, and threatened to fire Rodríguez for low sales.
addition, Vélez allegedly stated at a district meeting, while looking directly at Plaintiff, that there are some "losers" that should not be working for the company. Plaintiff also alleges that he faced discrimination in the form of a series of interactions with Janira Hernández ("Hernández"), who is the Caguas store manager. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Hernández gave Rodríguez a notebook to make notes so that he would not forget things, took away certain job responsibilities without explanation, and would not permit Plaintiff to climb ladders.
Hernández also allegedly told Rodríguez's wife, when Rodríguez started working part time in 2006, that he would have time to rest and would no longer have swollen feet. Plaintiff further alleges that he has faced discrimination from coworkers who call him "viejito" ("little old man"), and make statements such as "el viejito ya no debe estar cerrando la tienda porque se tarda mucho cuadrando la caja" ("the little old man should no longer be closing the store because he takes a long time adding up the register"). Plaintiff Rodríguez alleges that the
discriminatory conduct to which he has been subjected has resulted in a loss of income. Plaintiff requests damages as well as
reinstatement to a full time sales representative position.
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP) II.
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LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS According to the Supreme Court, "once a claim has been stated
adequately,
it
may
be
supported
by
showing
any
set
of
facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint." v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp.
As such, in order to survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable. Id. at 570. The
First Circuit has interpreted Twombly as sounding the death knell for the oft-quoted language of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc.,
490 F.3d 92, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562). Still, a court must "treat all allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff." Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East Providence,
970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1992). III. ANALYSIS Defendant Radio Shack argues that Plaintiff's ADEA claim should be dismissed because (1) several of Plaintiff's allegations are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff's remaining allegations do not set forth factual circumstances from which discrimination may be inferred; (3) Plaintiff does not allege an actionable adverse employment
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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action; and (4) Plaintiff does not properly allege a Title VII retaliation claim because he does not allege discrimination on the basis of any of the categories protected by Title VII. Defendant
Radio Shack also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Puerto Rico law claims. The Court shall consider Defendant Radio Shack's arguments in turn. A. Statute of Limitations
Prior to filing his complaint before the Court, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). EEOC charges alleging a violation of the ADEA normally must be filed within 29 180 § days of the alleged If unlawful is an employment applicable practice. state age
U.S.C.
626(d)(1).
there
discrimination law and agency, as there is in Puerto Rico, the time period is extended to 300 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2).
Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (D.P.R. 2006) (Pieras, J.). In the instant case, Plaintiff's EEOC charge was filed on April 15, 2009. Therefore, allegations pertaining to facts preceding June 19, 2008 are time-barred. As alleged by Plaintiff, his demotion to a part time position occurred in 2006. The alleged addition of Given that said
younger employees occurred a "few months later."
facts are alleged to have occurred at some date in 2006, and within a few months thereafter, these alleged facts could not have occurred later than mid-2007. Therefore, said allegations predate June 19,
2008 and are time-barred. Accordingly Plaintiff's ADEA claim may not
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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rely on the allegations of Plaintiff's demotion and reduction in hours. Considering only the other facts that are alleged to have
occurred after June 19, 2008, the Court will now proceed to assess the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations of an ADEA violation. B. Plaintiff's ADEA Claim
The ADEA states that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In order to prevail in
a lawsuit under the ADEA, the plaintiff's age must actually have played a role in the employer's decision-making process and have had a determinative or motivating influence on the outcome. See Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000); Hoffman v. Applicators Sales & Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, an ADEA claimant must adduce evidence that: (1) he was at least forty years of age; (2) his job performance met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment action (e.g., an actual or constructive discharge); and (4) the employer did not treat age neutrally. Hoffman, 439 F.3d at 17
(citing González v. El Día, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2002)). In the context of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging an ADEA claim is not required to establish a full prima facie case. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); Twombly,
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP) 550 U.S. at 569-70. facts sufficient to
-7However, an ADEA plaintiff still must state "state his claim and the grounds showing
entitlement to relief" and to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Setting aside the allegations that are time-barred, Plaintiff Rodríguez's allegations in the instant case consist of two
categories: (1) interactions with supervisors; and (2) interactions with non-supervisor coworkers. As to his interactions with
supervisors, Plaintiff Rodríguez alleges that in 2009 Vélez sent him letters threatening to fire him for low sales. Plaintiff also
alleges that Vélez stated at a district meeting, while looking directly at Plaintiff, that there are some "losers" that should not be working for the company. These allegations are not sufficient to The
support an inference of discrimination on the basis of age.
letter sent by Vélez indicates only that Vélez considered terminating Rodríguez for poor performance, not for any reason related to his age. Vélez's comment regarding "losers" in the company, even if
directed at Rodríguez, also does not indicate any motivation based upon age. See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 636
(1st Cir. 1996) ("isolated or ambiguous remarks, tending to suggest animus based on age, are insufficient, standing alone, to prove an employer's discriminatory intent.") (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff also alleges that his supervisor Hernández gave Rodríguez a notebook to make notes so that he would not forget
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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things, took away certain job responsibilities without explanation, and would not permit Plaintiff to climb ladders. are also insufficient to support an These allegations of age-based
inference
discrimination.
Plaintiff does not allege that younger employees
were given additional responsibilities denied to Rodríguez, or that during any of the alleged interactions with Hernández she stated or otherwise indicated that her actions were motivated by Plaintiff's age. With regard to Plaintiff's interactions with non-supervisory coworkers, Plaintiff alleges that coworkers made derogatory remarks to him including referring to him as "the little old man." The First Circuit has established that "statements made either by
nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish . . . the requisite discriminatory animus." at 69. González, 304 F.3d
Because the age-based comments referenced by Plaintiff are
alleged to have been made by coworkers who do not possess decision making power as to Plaintiff's terms of employment, said comments do not suffice to state an ADEA claim. allegations Hernández, regarding nor his interactions allegations Thus, neither Plaintiff's with supervisors Vélez and with In
regarding
interactions
non-supervisory coworkers, are sufficient to support his claim.
the absence of allegations in the complaint to support a claim for
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
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discrimination pursuant to the ADEA, the Court will dismiss said claim with prejudice. C. Plaintiff's Title VII Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff also alleges a claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII. the Said claim does not warrant in-depth discussion because
Title VII statute does not create a claim for discrimination on Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the
the basis of age.
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff Rodríguez makes no allegations that he
has faced discrimination on the basis of any of the categories protected by Title VII. As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's
Title VII retaliation claim. D. Plaintiffs' Puerto Rico Law Claims
Plaintiffs filed supplemental claims against Defendant Radio Shack pursuant to Puerto Rico law. Having dismissed the federal
claims, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims. See Marrero-Gutiérrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 7-8
(1st Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's decision to decline jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing federal claims). The Court will enter judgment dismissing the Puerto Rico law claims against Radio Shack without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Court GRANTS Defendant Radio Shack's motion to dismiss. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims
CIVIL NO. 09-1724 (JP)
-10The Court will also Because the
against Defendant Radio Shack with prejudice.
dismiss the Puerto Rico law claims without prejudice.
individual Defendants were voluntarily dismissed (Nos. 43 and 46), no further claims remain pending. entered accordingly. IT IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of July, 2010. A separate judgment will be
s/Jaime Pieras, Jr. JAIME PIERAS, JR. U.S. SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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