Bonilla Ayes et al v. Freedom Pharmacy, Inc

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 10 MOTION to dismiss Fernando L Toro, Conjugal Partnership Toro-Bonilla's claims filed by FMC Distributor, Inc, Freedom Pharmacy, Inc. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 12/7/2009.(LB)

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

E D M A R IE BONILLA ET AL Plaintiffs v. F R E E D O M PHARMACY, INC. ET AL D e f e n d a n ts C iv il No. 09-1773 (SEC)

OPINION AND ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Defendants Freedom Pharmacy, Inc., and FMC distributors, In c .'s motion to dismiss. Docket # 10. Plaintiffs have not opposed. After reviewing the filings, a n d the applicable law, Defendant's motion is GRANTED. F a c tu a l Background O n August 7, 2009, Plaintiffs Edmarie Bonilla ("Bonilla"), Fernando Toro ("Toro"), and th e ir conjugal partnership, filed suit against Defendants under the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e et al. According to Plaintiffs, Bonilla demotion and eventual termination by D e f e n d a n ts , was discriminatory and based on her pregnancy. On October 16, 2009, Defendants f ile d the instant motion, requesting the dismissal of Toro and the conjugal partnership's claims. In support of their request, Defendants argue that spouses lack standing to sue under Title VII, a n d Commonwealth employment statutes. They further contend that although Plaintiffs do not a s se rt claims under Article 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3 1 , § 5141 & 5142, any tort claims as well as all of Plaintiffs' supplemental state law claims s h o u ld be dismissed as well. Standard of Review T o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiffs' "well-pleaded facts must possess enough h e f t to show that [they are] entitled to relief." Clark v. Boscher, 514 F. 3d 107, 112 (1 st Cir.

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2 0 0 8 ).1 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all o f their "well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences therefrom" in the plaintiff's f a v o r. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). The First Circuit has held th a t "dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual a lle g a tio n s , either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain re c o v e ry under some actionable legal theory." Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305(1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). Courts "may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to th e complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice." Id. at 3 0 5 -3 0 6 . However, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must "differentiate between w e ll-p le a d e d facts, on the one hand, and `bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, p e rip h ra s tic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other hand; the former must be credited, but th e latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (quoting A u ls o n v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d 2 9 , 33 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1 st Cir. 1999). Thus Plaintiffs m u s t rely in more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be re je c te d . Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 5 1 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)). T h e re f o re , "even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 , the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must a lle g e `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to allow the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).

1

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f a c tu a l allegations, the "plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,'but it a s k s for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 127 S . Ct. At 1965; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A plaintiff's obligation to "provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and c o n c lu s io n s , and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." T w o m b ly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965. That is, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to re lie f above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are tru e ." Parker v. Hurley, 514 F. 3d 87, 95 (1 st Cir. 2008). T h e Court "may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice." G a g lia rd i v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305-06 (1 st Cir. 2008). A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis U p o n reviewing the record, this Court notes that Plaintiffs' complaint is devoid of any a lle g a tio n s regarding Toro and the conjugal partnership in the events that led to this lawsuit. F u rth e rm o re , Plantiffs do not allege that Toro was Defendant's employee. Thus Toro's only c o n n e c tio n with this case is the fact that he is married to Bonilla. However, courts have held that " s p o u s e s of individuals who have been victimized by employment discrimination cannot be said to fall within the class of persons Title VII was intended to protect." Patton v. United Parcel S e rv ., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1278 (S.D.Tx. 1995) (citing Feng v. Sandrik, 636 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N .D . Ill. 1986)); see also Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986). T h is court has held that "[t]hough Congress intended Title VII to provide a broad f o u n d a tio n to remedy employment discrimination, it did not intend to provide a remedy to a s p o u s e of a plaintiff having no employment connection with the employer." Ramos v. Roche P ro d u c ts , Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1018, 1026 (1988) (vacated and remanded on other grounds). This

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s te m s from the fact that Title VII only prohibits discrimination arising out of an employment re la tio n s h ip . Id. (citing Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Inc., 699 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978). Since T o r o and the conjugal partnership did not maintain an employer-employee relationship with D e f e n d a n ts , their claims under Title VII are DISMISSED with prejudice. H a v in g dismissed Plaintiffs' federal law claims against Toro and the conjugal p a rtn e rs h ip , Plaintiffs' state law claims against said co-defendants are also DISMISSED. See N e w m a n v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that "[t]he power of a federal c o u rt to hear and to determine sate-law claims in non-diversity cases depends upon the presence o f at least one `substantial' federal claim in the lawsuit."). Conclusion B a s e d on the foregoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Partial Judgment s h a ll be entered accordingly. I T IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th day of December, 2009. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U n ite d States District Judge