Diaz-Colon et al v. Toledo-Davila et al

Filing 331

ORDER denying 320 Motion to Stay Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 10/24/2013. (EM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JOSE LUIS DIAZ-COLON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL NO. 09-1835 (FAB/MEL)

PEDRO TOLEDO-DAVILA, et al.,
Defendants.
CARMELO VELAZQUEZ-COLON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL NO. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

JOSE FUENTES-AGOSTINI, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court are the defendants’ motion to stay the
proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal and the plaintiffs’
responses in opposition. (Docket Nos. 320, 328, & 329.) For the
reasons stated below, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to stay
the proceedings.
I.

Background
On July 17, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment

based in

part

on

the

contention

that

absolute

and qualified

Civil No. 09-1835 and Civil No. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

2

immunity shielded them from liability. (Docket Nos. 217 & 220). On
October 2,

2013,

the Court

denied

summary judgment

on those

grounds, finding that absolute immunity did not apply to the one
remaining defendant prosecutor, Gabriel Miranda-Redondo, and that
the other defendants’ arguments regarding qualified immunity were
not sufficiently developed to allow the Court to rule on that
issue. (Docket No. 304.) Defendants filed a notice of interlocutory
appeal requesting appellate review of the denial of qualified and
absolute immunity defenses on October 15, 2013. (Docket No. 318.)
The parties subsequently commenced settlement negotiations before
Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez, but the negotiations were not
successful. The case is ready for trial. A pretrial conference will
be held on October 25, 2013. Defendants now seek a stay of all
proceedings pending the outcome of the interlocutory appeal.
II.

Discussion
A district court’s denial of the defense of absolute or

qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an issue of
law,” is a final judgment that can be immediately appealed. Behrens
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996). If a denial of summary
judgment

is

based

on

a

factual

dispute,

the

issue

is

not

immediately appealable. Valdizan v. Rivera-Hernandez, 445 F.3d 63,
64 (1st Cir. 2006); Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 1012 (1st Cir. 2000). An appellate court does not have pendent

Civil No. 09-1835 and Civil No. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

3

jurisdiction over additional “nonappealable interlocutory orders.”
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 55 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 provides that “[a] party
must ordinarily move first in the district court for . . . a stay
of the judgment or order of a district court pending appeal.”
Fed.R.App.P. 8(a). In deciding the issuance of a stay pursuant to
Rule 8, courts consider,
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies.
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)(internal citations
omitted).

After considering the arguments of the parties and the

factors listed above, the Court determines that a stay is not
appropriate at this juncture.
The Court based its denial of the absolute immunity defense
for defendant prosecutor Miranda-Redondo on a factual dispute
regarding

whether

investigative

he

participated

capacity,

and

it

in
is

the

prosecutions

therefore

not

in

an

properly

appealable. See Valdizan, 445, F.3d at 64; Acevedo-Garcia, 204 F.3d
at 10-12. Similarly, the Court’s denial of the other defendants’
qualified immunity defense did not “turn[] on an issue of law,” but
rather was necessitated because of defendants’ failure to apply the

Civil No. 09-1835 and Civil No. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

4

applicable law to the facts of their case in a manner enabling the
Court to decide the issue. (Docket No. 304 at pp. 36-7.)
Even if the denial of qualified immunity were an appealable
issue of law, defendants have not put forth “a strong showing that
[they] are likely to succeed on the merits.” Hilton, 481 U.S. at
776. In determining whether qualified immunity shields a state
actor from liability, courts look at 1) whether the plaintiff has
alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) whether the
right

at

issue

was

clearly

established

at

the

time

of

the

defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231-2 (2009). Courts may, at their discretion, assume the first
prong

and

proceed

to

analyze

the

second

prong.

Id.

at

236.

Qualified immunity does not protect those who knowingly violate the
law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on factual and
legal issues similar to those presented here, and its case law
shows that defendants are not likely to prevail on the issue of
qualified immunity. The court of appeals has held that freedom from
malicious prosecution is a constitutional right under the Fourth
Amendment, Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013),
and that the prohibition against “deliberately fabricating evidence
and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit,” as alleged
in this case, was clearly established as far back as 1935. Limone

Civil No. 09-1835 and Civil No. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

5

v. Condon, 327 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004)(internal citation
omitted). Accordingly, First Circuit jurisprudence weighs against
appellants’ success on the merits on qualified immunity.
Nor have defendants shown they will suffer irreparable harm if
the stay is denied. “[A]voidance of disruptive discovery is one of
the very purposes for the official immunity doctrine. . . .”
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991). If a stay is denied,
defendants

will

proceed

to

trial,

and

may

resume

settlement

negotiations with plaintiffs. This litigation has been pending in
federal court for over four years, and the parties have already
spent a great deal of time and expense on discovery; “disruptive
discovery” will not be avoided because it has been completed.
Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that defendants will suffer
irreparable harm if a stay is denied. To the contrary, further
delay in the proceedings will cause harm to the plaintiffs, who are
ready

for

trial

and

have

already

participated

in

settlement

negotiations in good faith.
Finally, the consideration of the public interest cuts against
a stay. While “there is a strong public interest in protecting
public officials from the costs associated with the defense of
damages actions,” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998),
the

same

public

interest

is

served

by

quick

and

efficient

resolutions of lawsuits against those officials and in which

Civil No. 09-1835 and Civil No. 10-1097 (FAB/MEL)

6

official immunity does not apply. See id.; Digital Equipment Corp.
v. Currie Enterprises, 142 F.R.D. 8, 15 (D. Mass. 1991)(recognizing
that the public “has an interest in the prompt resolution of civil
cases.”). Here, the public policy concerns underlying official
immunity doctrines will not be served by further delaying these
proceedings.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the balance of considerations
weighs against the issuance of a stay of proceedings pending
appeal, and the defendants’ motion is DENIED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 24, 2013.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE