Martnez-Morales et al

Filing 56

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Ivan Montalvo-Nieves, Ricardo Martinez-Morales; GRANTING 29 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Iris Lopez-Sanchez. Judgment shall enter dismissing all claims in the present case. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 12/22/2010.(mrj)

Martinez-Morales et al v. Lopez-Sanchez et al

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U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO R IC A R D O MARTÍNEZ-MORALES and IV Á N MONTALVO-NIEVES P la in tif f s , v. IR IS LÓPEZ-SÁNCHEZ, et al., D e f e n d a n ts . C iv il No. 09-1845 (JAF)

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O P I N I O N AND ORDER P la in tif f s , Ricardo Martínez-Morales and Iván Montalvo-Nieves, bring this action under 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendants, Iris López-Sánchez, John Doe, and the conjugal p a rtn e rs h ip between them, acted under color of state law to deprive them of their constitutional rig h ts under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs also claim v io la tio n s of their rights under Article Two of Puerto Rico's Constitution. (Id.) Defendant L ó p e z -S á n c h e z moves for summary judgment (Docket No. 29), which Plaintiffs oppose (Docket N o . 44). Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment, on their Fourteenth Amendment claims (D o c k e t No. 30), and López-Sánchez opposes (Docket No. 41). I. F a c tu a l and Procedural Summary W e derive the following factual summary from the parties' statements of fact and a c c o m p a n yin g exhibits. (Docket Nos. 28; 31; 46.) Plaintiffs were employed as security guards a t the central office of Puerto Rico's Administration for Future Workers and Entrepreneurs

Dockets.Justia.com

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T ra in in g ("AFWET"). AFWET hired Plaintiffs as irregular employees1 using funds secured f ro m the Employment Opportunities Development Fund, commonly known as "Law 52 funds." S e e 29 L.P.R.A. § 711c (creating the fund to be administered by the Department of Labor and H u m a n Resources). Two additional security guards worked at the central office in career p o s itio n s . The former administrator of AFWET, Eduardo Vergara-Agostini, initially signed a s ix -m o n th contract with the secretary of the Department of Labor and Human Resources to c re a t e 128 positions in AFWET. This contract was to end on December 31, 2008, but the p a rtie s amended it to extend until March 31, 2009, and to fund an additional sixteen jobs. Prior to these amendments to the contract, however, Vergara-Agostini extended Plaintiffs' e m p lo ym e n t contracts until June 30, 2009. No Law 52 funds were allocated for this extension. O n January 2, 2009, López-Sánchez was sworn in as the new administrator of AFWET. S o o n thereafter, she was informed by her staff that AFWET would not receive further Law 52 f u n d s and that it had funds to cover only part of the January payroll. López-Sánchez transferred a ll employees who had been paid with Law 52 funds to the general payroll account; this a c c o u n t, however, was also running a deficit in excess of half a million dollars. López-Sánchez w ro te a letter to the director of the Office of Budget and Management, requesting additional

As defined by Puerto Rico law, irregular government personnel are those employees hired for fixed durations "when the conditions and/or the nature of the work render impracticable the creation of positions, as this term is defined in the Personnel Act." 3 L.P.R.A. § 711 (2003). The Personnel Act, a precursor to the current civil service legislation, defined a "position" as full- or part-time employment to which the hiring criteria and protections of the merit-based civil service applied; such position would be held by a "regular employee." Personnel Act, Act No. 345, 1947 P.R. Laws 596 (repealed 1975). The most recent iteration of Puerto Rico's civil service legislation, the Public Service Human Resources Administration Act, 3 L.P.R.A. §§ 1461­1468, abandoned the nomenclature of regular/irregular employees and instead recognizes three types of employees: career, confidential or transitory. All employees hired for fixed durations, including for non-skilled or semi-skilled jobs, are "transitory employees." § 1462b(i), (k).

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f u n d s to cover AFWET's budget deficit, which was projected to exceed two million dollars by J u n e 30, 2009. The Office of Budget and Management did not grant this request, and LópezS á n c h e z was unsuccessful in other attempts at securing funding to cover this deficit. L ó p e z -S á n c h e z claims that when faced with these budget deficits--and in light of the im p e n d in g passage of Law 7, which would direct agencies to terminate all irregular e m p lo ye e s -- sh e decided to terminate irregular employees who did not provide direct services to the population served by AFWET, disadvantaged youths. See 18 L.P.R.A. § 1412 (2005) (sta tin g AFWET's mission). Accordingly, AFWET's human resources office prepared a list o f all irregular employees for López-Sánchez's review. Plaintiff Martínez-Morales received a l e t te r on March 6, 2009, announcing his termination. Plaintiff Montalvo-Nieves received a s im ila r termination letter on March 6, 2009. Both were terminated summarily, without

o p p o rtu n ity for a hearing. A private security firm contracted by the previous administration p ro v id e d additional security in the wake of Plaintiffs' terminations. An additional irregular e m p lo ye e who worked in the human resources department and, thus, did not provide "direct s e rv ic e s ," was terminated two months later in May 2009. O n August 25, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming that their terminations ran afoul o f the U.S. Constitution and various Commonwealth statutes. Central to Plaintiffs' claims is th a t they were terminated because of their political affiliations and were not given a prete rm in a tio n hearing. Plaintiffs are both members of the Partido Popular Democrático ("PPD"), w h ile López-Sánchez is a member of the Partido Nuevo Progresista ("PNP"). Plaintiff

M a rtín e z -M o ra le s claims that he overheard López-Sánchez make a statement in the hallway to th e effect that "heads of many employees were going to roll" and that the heads in question were

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o f those employees who had been employed by the previous, and PPD-affiliated, administrator. (D o c k e t Nos. 28-28; -29.) On this point, Martínez-Morales' testimony might be described as e q u iv o c a l at best. When first asked if he heard López-Sánchez make this statement, he a n s w e re d , "[López-Sánchez] expressed it to a coworker and that coworker expressed it to us." W h e n pressed on whether he heard it directly, he states, "No, she didn't tell me directly. She s a id it in a way for everyone to hear it . . . ." Eventually, Martínez-Morales clarifies, "I heard it said. I heard it said in the hallway and I was with another coworker." M a rtín e z -M o ra le s stated that he had never told López-Sánchez his political affiliation a n d that his contact with her was limited to a single discussion of security issues and a request t o sign a document. He believed, however, that she knew of his affiliation with the PPD b e c a u s e he talked to people who were party sympathizers, he actively participated in the party, a n d both he and former administrator Vergara-Agostini were from the town of San Sebastian.2 F u r th e rm o re , Martínez-Morales believed that López-Sánchez's constant "scolding . . . for no re a s o n at all" was a demonstration of her politically-motivated animus. (Docket No. 28-3.) B e f o re his termination, Montalvo-Nieves heard gossip that maintenance and reception s ta f f would be fired because they were PPD members. He did not hear López-Sánchez make a n y comments regarding retaliation against PPD members. (See Docket No. 28-33.) He also s ta te d that López-Sánchez did not know his political affiliation. (See Docket No. 28-34 ("Q: D o e s Iris López know your political affiliation? A: No.").) He believes, however, that "she

Prior to being appointed administrator, López-Sánchez had succeeded in her own political discrimination action against Vergara-Agostini for wrongful termination.

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t h o u g h t I was among the people from the PPD and she thought that perhaps had caused her h a rm ." (Docket No. 28-33.) II. S u m m a r y Judgment Under Rule 56 W e must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and d isc lo s u re materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any m a te ria l fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 , 19 (1st Cir. 2004). T h e movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any m a te ria l fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The movant may satisfy this b u rd e n by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, d o c u m e n ts , electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, . . . or other materials." F e d . R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of m a te ria l fact, the movant need not produce evidence but may instead point to a lack of evidence s u p p o rtin g the nonmovant's case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. a t 325. "Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine [dispute] of m a te ria l fact exists, the nonmovant must produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy [dispute]." Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1 st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

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In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we must view the record in the light most f a v o ra b le to the nonmovant. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150­51 (2 0 0 0 ). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). III. A n a ly s is P la in tif f s claim they were terminated because of their political association, in violation o f their First Amendment rights. They also claim that they were deprived of employment w ith o u t due process of law. Finally, they claim violations of Puerto Rico's bill of rights. We tre a t each claim in turn. A. P o litic a l Discrimination T h e First Amendment protects government employees who are not in "policy-making p o s itio n s of confidence" from adverse employment actions based upon an employee's political a f f ilia tio n . Montfort-Rodriguez v. Rey-Hernandez, 504 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting B o rg e s Colon v. Roman-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2006)). In order to make out a primaf a c ie case of political discrimination, a plaintiff must point to "sufficient direct or circumstantial e v id e n c e from which a jury reasonably may infer that [her] constitutionally protected c o n d u c t-- in this case, political affiliation . . . was a `substantial' or `motivating' factor behind" a n adverse employment action. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 1993). If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing the prima-facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff would h a v e been dismissed regardless of her political affiliation. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.

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o f Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Sanchez-Lopez v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 1 3 0 ­ 3 3 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the Mt. Healthy defense and the necessity for a plaintiff to p ro v e that her political affiliation was a "but for" cause of the adverse employment action). P la in tif f s cannot meet the burden of a prima-facie case of political discrimination without d e m o n s tra tin g that López-Sánchez knew of their membership in the PPD. Plaintiff MontalvoN ie v e s flatly states in his deposition that López-Sánchez did not know his political affiliation. H e later speculates that López-Sánchez was aware of his party membership, but he offers no re a s o n why she would be aware of it. In their opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue th a t López-Sánchez inferred Montalvo-Nieves' party affiliation from his relationship with M a rtín e z -M o ra le s , but Plaintiffs point to no evidence establishing what relationship the two had a n d why it would lead López-Sánchez to believe they shared a political affiliation. As such, P la in tif f Montalvo-Nieves has failed to create a trial-worthy issue as to López-Sánchez's k n o w le d g e of his political affiliation. See Sullivan v. City of Springfield, 561 F.3d 7, 14 (1st C ir. 2009) (noting that a plaintiff may not rely on "conclusory allegations, improbable in f e re n c e s , and unsupported speculation" to defeat a summary-judgment motion). P la in tif f Martínez-Morales likewise fails to present evidence from which a jury could re a s o n a b ly infer that López-Sánchez was aware of his PPD membership. The fact that M a rtín e z -M o ra le s is from the same town as the former administrator and is an active member o f his party does not create a reasonable inference that López-Sánchez knew of his political a f f ilia tio n . Plaintiffs do not even show that López-Sánchez knew what town Martínez-Morales w a s from, much less explain how it logically follows that a jury can reasonably infer knowledge o f political affiliation from his town of origin. Such an inference is not necessarily impossible

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b u t would require detailed and substantial evidence of political participation in San Sebastián. H e re , we have only the assertion that both Martínez-Morales and the former administrator were f ro m the same town and belonged to the same party. An inference of political affiliation cannot b e supported by such flimsy evidence. See id. B. D u e Process P la in tif f s claim a property right in their employment through the end of their contract p e rio d . They allege that the failure to give them a hearing or other opportunity to respond to th e ir dismissal was a violation of due process. D u e Process requires that a deprivation of property "be preceded by notice and o p p o r tu n ity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. L o u d e rm ill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 3 3 9 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). State employees holding a legally-protected property interest in th e ir employment generally must be given a pre-termination hearing before they are dismissed f o r cause. See id.; Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). A hearing is n o t required, however, where a "reorganization or other cost-cutting measure" was the cause o f the employees' dismissal. Whalen, 397 F.3d at 24. This "reorganization exception" to the s ta n d a rd notice-and-hearing requirement applies when a termination is "in good faith directed a t positions rather than individuals." Id. at 25 (quoting Hartman v. Providence, 636 F. Supp. 1 3 9 5 , 1409 (D.R.I. 1986)). A s s u m in g , for the sake of argument, that Plaintiffs have a legally-protected property in te re s t in their employment, they have failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether their terminations were directed at them personally, as opposed to their positions.

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T h e re is no dispute on the record as to the budget deficits faced by AFWET or the economic re a litie s the Commonwealth faced at that time. Plaintiffs argue that López-Sánchez hired a p riv a te security firm to take over Plaintiffs positions and paid them at a greater cost. LópezS á n c h e z 's deposition testimony is clear, however, in stating that after Plaintiffs were fired, a th ird security guard (out of the original four) left. López-Sánchez turned to the security firm, c o n tra c te d by the previous administration, to provide two guards at night. López-Sánchez states th a t this was a cost-saving measure because she concurrently cut the security details provided b y this company to AFWET's satellite offices. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence to c o n tra d ic t López-Sánchez's explanation. W e recognize that the "reorganization exception" does not apply where plaintiffs have ra is e d a genuine dispute that the reorganization or cost-cutting was merely pretext masking a te rm in a tio n "for cause" or for an impermissible motive. See Whalen, 397 F.3d at 25 n. 5. Here, h o w e v e r, there is no evidence on the record from which a jury could reasonably infer that L ó p e z -S á n c h e z 's cost-cutting was pretext. The budget deficits faced by AFWET and the larger C o m m o n w e a lth government are not disputed. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not succeeded in their c la im s that they were terminated due to political animus. Plaintiffs note, however, that a tra n s ito ry employee in AFWET's human resources office was not fired until May 2009. We do n o t find this gap in time between terminations sufficient to create a trial-worthy issue as to p re te x t. C. S u p p le m e n ta l Claims A s we dismiss both of Plaintiffs' federal claims, we decline to consider their s u p p le m e n ta l claims under Article II of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1367(c)(3); González-De-Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 89 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that a "district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" if "the district court has d ism is s e d all claims under which it has original jurisdiction"). IV . C o n c lu s io n F o r the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT López-Sánchez's motion for summary ju d g m e n t (Docket No. 29) and dismiss all claims. We DENY Plaintiffs' motion for summary ju d g m e n t (Docket No. 30). I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 22n d day of December, 2010. s/J o s é Antonio Fusté JO S E ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge