Gonzalez-Santos et al v. Torres-Maldonado et al
Filing
295
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 291 Motion Requesting Order, and granting 293 Motion in Compliance with Order. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Gonzalez's motion to dismiss, but dismisses her claims against Torres WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 05/31/2012. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ROSA ANGELA GONZALEZ-SANTOS, et
al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL NO. 09-1850 (FAB)
ANGEL TORRES-MALDONADO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is plaintiff Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss her
claim
against
defendant
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
motion in opposition.
Torres
without
prejudice
(Docket No. 291.)
(Docket No. 293.)
pursuant
to
Torres has filed a
Two other defendants,
Instituto Medico del Norte, Inc., d/b/a Hospital Wilma N. Vazquez
(“Hospital”) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”), who
recently settled
opposition.
I.
with
Gonzalez, have
also
filed
a
motion
in
(Docket No. 294.)
Procedural History
Gonzalez’s initial complaint was filed on August 26, 2009, and
during the almost three years of litigation, there have been two
Court orders and a settlement that disposed of the majority of
1
Justin Rowinsky, a second-year student at the Georgetown
University Law Center, assisted in the preparation of this
Memorandum & Order.
Civil No. 09-1850 (FAB)
Gonzalez’s original claims.
2
The Court’s order on September 28,
2011 (Docket No. 244) granted numerous defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and the Court’s second order on March 14, 2012 (Docket
No. 271) granted summary judgment for additional defendants.
The
Hospital and Liberty then settled with Gonzalez, leaving only
Torres as the remaining defendant.
(Docket No. 286.)
The Court’s
order on March 31, 2012 (Docket No. 277) set the trial date for
June 11, 2012 and ordered the parties to file a joint proposed
pretrial order, proposed voir dire questions, and proposed jury
instructions by May 29, 2012.
That deadline has passed.
Gonzalez requests dismissal of her Puerto Rico law claims
against Torres without prejudice for the following reasons:
the
“fruitless” continued negotiations between Gonzalez and Torres, the
cost of a trial, and Gonzalez’s current emotional and physical
health.
(Id.
at
¶¶
2-4.)
Gonzalez
specifically
requests
a
dismissal without prejudice to permit future litigation over her
claim against Torres in Commonwealth court.
(Id. at ¶ 5.)
In response, Torres asks for dismissal with prejudice in light
of the past three years of litigation and the emotional and
financial distress he has incurred.
(Docket No. 293 at ¶ 3.)
The
Hospital and Liberty also filed a motion in opposition, seeking a
dismissal with prejudice due to the potential of exposure to
“indirect claims and the commission of further expenses and costs”
Civil No. 09-1850 (FAB)
if
Gonzalez
re-filed
Commonwealth court.
3
her
remaining
claims
against
Torres
in
(Docket No. 294.)
The Court will now address the merits of Gonzalez’s motion to
dismiss.
II.
Legal Analysis
Rule 41(a)(2) requires a “court order, on terms that the court
considers proper” to grant a plaintiff’s motion to dismiss when
filed
after
the
defendant
has
answered
the
complaint.
In
exercising its discretion, a court is responsible for ensuring that
the defendant will not suffer legal prejudice if the motion is
granted.
Doe v. Urohealth Systems, Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 160 (1st
Cir. 2000).
Factors used to evaluate whether a defendant will face legal
prejudice include:
(1) “the defendant’s effort and expense of
preparation for trial,” (2) “insufficient explanation for the need
to take a dismissal,” (3) excessive delay by the plaintiff, and
(4) pending dispositive motions filed by the defendant.
Doe, 216
F.3d at 160 (citing Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334
(7th Cir. 1969)).
This list is not exclusive, but “simply a guide”
when a court exercises its discretion under Rule 41(a)(2).
Doe,
216 F.3d at 160 (quoting Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d
54, 56 (7th Cir. 1980)).
Civil No. 09-1850 (FAB)
4
There is no evidence that Gonzalez has unduly delayed the
prosecution of this case, nor are any dispositive motions by Torres
currently pending.
On the other hand, the first two enumerated
factors weigh in Torres’ favor.
See Doe, 216 F.3d at 161 (quoting
the district court’s opinion).
First, Torres has incurred “a vast amount of legal expenses”
(Docket No. 293 at ¶ 3) preparing for the trial scheduled to begin
on June 11, 2012, almost three years since Gonzalez first filed her
complaint.
See Doe, 216 F.3d at 161 (finding that the defendant’s
investment of “considerable resources, financial and otherwise, in
defending [plaintiff’s] federal action” was a factor supporting
denial of the plaintiff’s motion); Guptil v. Martin, 228 F.R.D. 62,
65 (D.Me. 2005) (“Defendants had to engage in substantial legal
research as well as limited discovery.”). In contrast, courts have
granted
a
plaintiff’s
41(a)(2)
motion
when
the
duration
of
litigation was relatively shorter and the costs of discovery were
directly applicable to on-going litigation in Commonwealth court.
See Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46,
50 (1st Cir. 1981).
Due to the complexity of this case (numerous
plaintiffs, defendants and claims) it is unclear what percentage of
Torres’s efforts thus far would be applicable to future litigation
in Commonwealth court, if any.
Civil No. 09-1850 (FAB)
5
Second, Gonzalez’s explanation in support of her motion is
insufficient.
A plaintiff citing costs on the eve of trial after
three years of litigation is unpersuasive, for cost is a necessary
consideration when deciding whether to file in the first place.
Although the Court notes Gonzalez’s current health issues, Torres
has also claimed “a great deal of emotional distress” resulting
from the lengthy litigation.
(Docket No. 293 at ¶ 3).
Finally,
difficult settlement negotiations are the rule rather than the
exception and not a relevant factor supporting a dismissal without
prejudice.
Gonzalez
must
offer
something
more
to
justify
dismissing this case without prejudice only two weeks before trial
while preserving her right to litigate anew in Commonwealth court.
Moreover, the Court notes that the May 29, 2012 deadline for
filing the joint proposed pre-trial order and respective proposed
voir
dire
questions
and
instructions has passed.
the
Court
for
an
proposed
preliminary
(Docket No. 277.)
extension,
counsel
for
and
final
jury
Rather than petition
Gonzalez
requested
dismissal of the current case without prejudice and simply stated
that no filing would take place.
Gonzalez does not have the substantive right to a dismissal
without prejudice, only the procedural option of petitioning the
Court.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
In exercising its discretion, the
Court finds that Gonzalez’s stated explanation requiring dismissal
Civil No. 09-1850 (FAB)
6
without prejudice is insufficient to overcome the expense and
effort
of
litigating
this
case
for
almost
three
years.
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss,
but dismisses her claims against Torres WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 31, 2012.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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