Miranda-Fernandez et al v. Grupo Medico San Pablo et al
Filing
98
OPINION AND ORDER re 95 MOTION to dismiss and/or motion for judgment on the pleadings as to All Plaintiffs filed by Ilia Zayas, Vania Medina, Maria Correa, Ismael Toro-Grajales, Grupo Medico San Pablo, Conjugal Partnership Doe-Rivera, San Pablo Physician Group, Carmen Rivera. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on 2/1/12.(ljt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGELA MIRANDA-FERNANDEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL NO. 09-1966 (CVR)
GRUPO MEDICO SAN PABLO, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Angela Miranda-Fernández (hereafter “plaintiff Miranda”) and her husband
Angel Pizarro-Rivera filed a Second Amended Complaint against individual defendants and
against Grupo Médico San Pablo and San Pablo Physician Group (hereafter “SPPG”) alleging
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereafter “ADA”),
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and pendent state law claims.1 (Docket No. 72).
On January 10, 2012, co-defendants María Correa, Carmen Rivera, Dania Medina,
and their respective husbands and conjugal partnerships, Dr. Ilia Zayas and Dr. Ismael Toro
Grajales, and their conjugal partnership (“individual defendants” or their respective last
names as appropriate), San Pablo Physician Group (hereafter “SPPG”) and Grupo Médico
San Pablo filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket No. 95).
On January 27, 2012, plaintiffs filed their opposition. (Docket No. 97).2
1
42 U.S.C. §1201 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §701 et seq.; P.R. Law No. 44, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1 section 501; Art. 1802-03,
P.R. Civil Code, tit. 31 sections 5141-42; Law No. 80, 29 L.P.R.A. §185a et seq.
2
The parties consented to jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings including the Jury Trial
and entry of judgment. (Docket No. 90).
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
Civil No. 09-1966 (GAG)
Opinion and Order
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The co-defendants are requesting the Complaint be dismissed as to individual
defendants María Correa, Carmen Rivera, Dania Medina and their respective husbands and
conjugal partnerships, Dr. Ilia Zayas, Dr. Ismael Toro Grajales, and their economic society,
SPPG and Grupo Médico San Pablo3:
(1) the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide for individual liability;
(2) plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to them;
(3) this Federal District Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction
as to the pendent state claims, if the federal claims are dismissed.
The co-defendants also request that tort claims under P.R. Civil Code Art. 1802 be
dismissed for the alleged conduct is already covered by a more specific statute, P.R. Law No.
44.
Plaintiff Miranda’s opposition to above defendants’ requests has already conceded
there is no individual liability under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act or Law No. 44 and,
thus, plaintiffs agree to the dismissal of said claims as to the individual defendants. Plaintiff
also agrees that dismissal as to Law No. 80 claims as to the individual defendants is
appropriate.
As such, we shall briefly discuss the remaining issues raised in the co-defendants’
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or to Dismiss.
3
Even though co-defendant Grupo Médico San Pablo appears among the defendants mentioned in the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or to Dismiss, no legal grounds in support of dismissal are submitted as to said codefendant.
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
Civil No. 09-1966 (GAG)
Opinion and Order
Page No. 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 226 (1st Cir.2005); Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158
F.3d 601, 602 (1st Cir.1998).
A motion to dismiss filed after the complaint has been answered is treated as a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissal may be
warranted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To elucidate a motion
to dismiss the Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e]
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1996). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding
each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory."
Romero-Barceló v. Hernández-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Gooley v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Court, need not accept a complaint's
" 'bald assertions' or legal conclusions" when assessing a motion to dismiss. Abbott, III v.
United States, 144 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194,
1216 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The Supreme Court most recent opinion changes the standard for a motion to dismiss
so that plaintiff will now have to include more information in the pleadings if he/she wants
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
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to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1969 (2007).4
The First Circuit has cited to this decision and noted this new standard in RodríguezOrtiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2007), wherein, as stated in part
below indicated:
At the outset, we note that even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to
relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007). In so doing, the Court disavowed the oft-quoted language of Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. The Court
found that the "no set of facts" language, if taken literally, would
impermissibly allow for the pleading of "a wholly conclusory statement of [a]
claim," and that "after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement." Id. at 1968, 1969.
Similarly under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, the factual
statements of the complaint are still considered true, indulging every reasonable inference
helpful to plaintiffs’ cause. However, the tenet that a court must accept as true all the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions and mere recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
4
No heightened fact pleading of specifics is required but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
Civil No. 09-1966 (GAG)
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LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.
SPPG - Failure to Exhaust.
Co-defendant SPPG requests dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs failed to
previously present administrative proceedings against SPPG and, thus, exhaust the remedies
as required. Plaintiff Miranda is indeed required to file prior to judicial action a timely
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and then, upon
receipt of a right to sue letter for the corresponding defendant, a federal claim may follow.
Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999). Co-defendant SPPG
submits it was not included in the administrative charge which plaintiff Miranda filed with
the EEOC.5 (Docket No. 1, Exhibit 1)6. Thus, administrative remedies were not exhausted
as to said co-defendant.
Plaintiff Miranda’s opposition has addressed SPPG’s request for dismissal by
submitting said co-defendant is but a single employer of Grupo Médico San Pablo, who is
indeed identified in the EEOC charge. Plaintiff avers the administrative charge provided
notice to both defendants as employer of plaintiff Miranda. Plaintiff Miranda argues that,
under the single employee doctrine, two (2) nominally separate companies may be
interrelated to constitute a single employer subject to liability under Title VII. Torres-
5
The individual defendants were not named either in the Charge of Discrimination. However, since plaintiffs
have agreed to dismissal of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, there is no need to discuss the issue.
6
An Amended Complaint was filed at Docket No. 52.
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
Civil No. 09-1966 (GAG)
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Page No. 6
Negrón v. Merck & Company, Inc., 488 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (As in the case of Title VII, the
single employer test has been applied to determine liability under ADA).7
The single employer doctrine finds that two (2) nominally separate companies may
constitute a single employer subject to liability and the Court must be able to examine the
factors to reach the application of said doctrine. Among the factors to be assessed are the
interrelation of operations; common management; centralized labor relations; common
ownership. See Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 662 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Cavallaro
v. UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc., slip copy, 2011 WL 2295023 (D. Mass., June 08,
2011).8
Plaintiffs herein submit some of these facts weight against defendant SPPG which
would avoid dismissal or judgment on the pleadings as to defendant SPPG. Evidently it has
been shown by the submission of the facts to be elucidated that a judicial determination may
not be reached on a motion to dismiss or upon a judgment on the pleadings at this stage of
proceedings as to defendant SPPG.
Thus, defendant SPPG’s request for dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
proceedings as to ADA and/or the Rehabilitation Act is DENIED.
7
Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 (6th CIr. 1997) (single employer examination
under ADEA and ADA provisions).
8
See also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982); Engelhardt v. S.P. Richards
Co., 472 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006).
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B.
Pendent/Supplemental Jurisdiction.
Defendant SPPG also requests the Court not to exercise jurisdiction as to state law
claims included in the Complaint based on the understanding the federal claims filed against
SPPG would be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Since the case is not ripe to entertain
dismissal of the federal claim on the failure to exhaust doctrine as to SPPG, the premise
under which dismissal was requested by said defendant SPPG is not available.
As to the individual defendants whose claims as to the federal ADA and Rehabilitation
Act are to be dismissed for lack of individual liability, this Court may still retain jurisdiction
on pendent state law within its discretionary authority. The Supreme Court has stated in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966), that “if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” However
such statement in Gibbs “does not establish a mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all
cases.” See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also Rosado
v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-05 (1970).
To consider whether to exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties or state law
supplemental claims, it must be examined if the claims share a common nucleus of operative
fact with a claim over which federal courts have jurisdiction, and if so, the parties may
expect to try the claims in the same proceedings. Pendent jurisdiction should also promote
judicial economy and avoid jury confusion. See Gibbs.
Furthermore, a federal district court must exercise “informed discretion” when
deciding whether to assert supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Roche v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-57 (1st Cir. 1996); see Redondo Construction
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
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Corp. v. Jose M. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (a court dismissing all claims over
which it has original federal jurisdiction is not obligated to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over remaining state law claims).
Thus, a this early stage of the proceedings, the Court will continue to exercise
jurisdiction on any related state law claims because the federal claims survive and upon
consideration of the criteria exposed in Redondo.
C.
Tort Claims under §1802 and/or Law No. 44.
Defendants submit state tort claims presented in the complaint under Article 1802
should be dismissed for a more specific law provides relief, in particular Law No. 44.
Plaintiffs’ opposition avers that Law No. 44 is to be construed solely as to the
employer, upon lack of individual liability already discussed above, while tort claims are
included so as to allow co-plaintiff Pizarro, plaintiff Miranda’s spouse, to recover as to the
individual defendants. Plaintiffs contend Pizarro, as relative of a person who has been
forced by an employer to resign because of harassment and/or discrimination, may obtain
redress through Article 1802 in keeping with general principles of extra contractual (tort)
liability.
Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code provides a cause of action to relatives of a
tort victim, including individuals suffering from employment discrimination. Santini-Rivera
v. Service Air, Inc., 94 J.T.S. 121 (1994) (the Puerto Rico Supreme Court referred to this
cause of action as flowing from or contingent upon the underlying discrimination claim of
the employee). See González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney Puerto Rico, Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318
Angela M. Miranda-Fernández, et al. v. Grupo Médico San Pablo, et al
Civil No. 09-1966 (GAG)
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(1st Cir. 2009).9 Said cause of action is independently founded in the general tort provision
of the Civil Code (Article 1802) and not in the anti-discrimination laws. Campos Otros v.
Banco de Ponce, 138 D.P.R. 366, 370-71 (1975) (creating independent action besides law No.
80 or Law No. 100, as to unjustified dismissal or state anti-discrimination provisions).10
Accordingly, the request to dismiss Article 1802 vis a vis the claims raised under Law
No. 44, is Denied.
CONCLUSION
In view of the above discussed, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment
on the Pleadings (Docket No. 95) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as
follows:
-
IT IS GRANTED as to individual co-defendants María Correa, Carmen Rivera
and Dania Medina, and their respective husbands and conjugal partnerships,
Dr. Ilia Zayas, Dr. Ismael Toro Grajales and their economic society, insofar as
the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and state Law No. 44 and Law No. 80.
-
IT IS DENIED as to defendant San Pablo Physician Group.
-
IT IS DENIED as to supplemental state claims as to all defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1st day of February of 2012.
s/CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE
CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9
Article 1802, under certain circumstances, has been authoritatively interpreted to provide a cause of action in
favor of close kinfolk of a victim of unlawful workplace discrimination.
10
See Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Intern., Inc., 232 F.3d 245, 258 n.7 (1st Cir. 2000).
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